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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 594 Filed 04/10/20 Page 1 of 10
`
`MICHAEL A. SHERMAN (SBN 94783)
`masherman@stubbsalderton.com
`JEFFREY F. GERSH (SBN 87124)
`jgersh@stubbsalderton.com
`SANDEEP SETH (SBN 195914)
`sseth@stubbsalderton.com
`WESLEY W. MONROE (SBN 149211)
`wmonroe@stubbsalderton.com
`STANLEY H. THOMPSON, JR. (SBN 198825)
`sthompson@stubbsalderton.com
`VIVIANA BOERO HEDRICK (SBN 239359)
`vhedrick@stubbsalderton.com
`STUBBS, ALDERTON & MARKILES, LLP
`15260 Ventura Blvd., 20th Floor
`Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
`Telephone:
`(818) 444-4500
`Facsimile:
`(818) 444-4520
`Attorneys for PersonalWeb Technologies,
`LLC
`
`J. DAVID HADDEN (CSB No. 176148)
`dhadden@fenwick.com
`SAINA S. SHAMILOV (CSB No. 215636)
`sshamilov@fenwick.com
`TODD R. GREGORIAN (CSB No. 236096)
`tgregorian@fenwick.com
`MELANIE L. MAYER (pro hac vice)
`mmayer@fenwick.com
`RAVI R. RANGANATH (CSB No. 272981)
`rranganath@fenwick.com
`CHIEH TUNG (CSB No. 318963)
`ctung@fenwick.com
`FENWICK & WEST LLP
`Silicon Valley Center
`801 California Street
`Mountain View, CA 94041
`Telephone:
`650.988.8500
`Facsimile:
`650.938.5200
`Attorneys for Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon
`Web Services, Inc., and Twitch Interactive,
`Inc.
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`SAN JOSE DIVISION
`CASE NO.: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`IN RE PERSONAL WEB TECHNOLOGIES,
`LLC, ET AL., PATENT LITIGATION
`
`AMAZON.COM, INC. and AMAZON WEB
`SERVICES, INC.,
` Plaintiffs,
`
`v.
`
`PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
`and LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,
` Defendants.
`
`CASE NO.: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`CASE NO.: 5:18-cv-05619-BLF
`JOINT STATEMENT REGARDING
`PERSONALWEB’S REQUEST TO DENY
`OR DEFER CONSIDERATION OF
`MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND
`BILL OF COSTS PENDING
`RESOLUTION OF PERSONALWEB’S
`APPEALS
`
`PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES, LLC
`and LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,
`Counterclaimants,
`
`v.
`AMAZON.COM, INC. and AMAZON WEB
`
`JOINT STATEMENT REGARDING PERSONALWEB’S REQUEST TO DENY OR DEFER
`CONSIDERATION OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND BILL OF COSTS
`PENDING RESOLUTION OF PERSONALWEB’S APPEALS
`
`CASE NO: 5:18-MD-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-CV-00767-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
`
`

`

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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 594 Filed 04/10/20 Page 2 of 10
`
`SERVICES, INC.,
`Counterdefendants.
`
`PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, a
`Texas limited liability company, and
`LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, a
`Delaware limited liability company
`Plaintiffs,
`
`v.
`TWITCH INTERACTIVE, INC. a Delaware
`corporation,
`Defendant.
`
`The parties submit the following joint statement regarding PersonalWeb’s request to deny or
`defer consideration of the motion for attorneys’ fees and bill of costs of Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon
`Web Services, Inc., and Twitch Interactive, Inc. (collectively, “Amazon”) pending resolution of
`PersonalWeb’s Federal Circuit appeal.
`
`PersonalWeb submits its request pursuant to the Court’s standing invitation regarding case
`management issues and requests a telephone conference to address the issues set forth herein.
`(Transcript of Proceedings, February 28, 2019, Dkt. 373 at 79:17-20) (“As always, if issues arise that I
`can address on case management, please submit a joint statement outlining the issues. I will get you
`together by phone within a few days and then we can decide what we need to do.”);Transcript of
`Proceedings, November 2, 2018, Dkt. 300 at 32:6-9.)
`
`Amazon does not oppose PersonalWeb’s request for a telephonic case management conference.
`But, as set forth in the joint statement below, because PersonalWeb seeks denial of Amazon’s motion
`for attorneys’ fees, or, in the alternative, seeks affirmative relief from the Court in the form of a stay of
`briefing on that motion, PersonalWeb should have raised these issues in its opposition to Amazon’s
`motion, or filed a noticed motion for the relief it seeks.
`
`1
`JOINT STATEMENT REGARDING PERSONALWEB’S REQUEST TO DENY OR DEFER
`CONSIDERATION OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND BILL OF COSTS
`PENDING RESOLUTION OF PERSONALWEB’S APPEALS
`
`CASE NO: 5:18-MD-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-CV-00767-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
`
`

`

`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 594 Filed 04/10/20 Page 3 of 10
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`
`PERSONALWEB’S STATEMENT
`Plaintiff PersonalWeb Technologies, LLC (“PersonalWeb”) hereby requests that the Court,
`under its inherent authority under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), deny Amazon.com, Inc.,
`Amazon Web Services, Inc. and Twitch Interactive, Inc.’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion for
`Attorneys’ Fees and Bill of Costs (“Motion”) (Dkt. 593; 589) without prejudice with leave to refile it
`once the Federal Circuit resolves PersonalWeb’s appeals on the grounds that the Motion is principally
`based on substantive issues that are the subject of PersonalWeb’s two appeals pending before the
`Federal Circuit (Dkt. 431, 587) the determination of which will likely affect the Motion. Alternatively,
`PersonalWeb requests that the Court stay the briefing and hearing on Defendants’ Motion until the
`appeals are resolved.
`
`The issues on appeal go to the core of Defendants’ Motion. Denial without prejudice or a stay
`of the Motion is appropriate in this situation, because if the Court were to hear the Motion before the
`Federal Circuit rules on the two pending appeals, the Court, PersonalWeb, and Defendants will spend
`substantial time, effort, and cost (in the case of the parties) briefing, arguing, hearing, and deciding
`these issues —effort that will be wasted should the Federal Circuit rule in favor of one or both of
`PersonalWeb’s pending appeals. PersonalWeb is particularly mindful, now more than ever, of the
`Court’s potentially reduced resources and increased demand for its services which further necessitates
`the requested relief.
`
`PersonalWeb sought to stay Defendants’ Motion via stipulation, but Defendants’ counsel
`refused and indicated it would oppose PersonalWeb’s request. (Exhibit A (Mar. 30 through Apr. 3,
`2020 Emails from Gersh to Gregorian).) PersonalWeb could not have raised this issue before
`Defendants filed their Motion as is dependent on the grounds on which Defendants chose to base their
`Motion.
`District courts have the power and discretion to defer or deny without prejudice a motion for
`attorney’s fees pending resolution of an appeal on the merits. 1993 Advisory Committee Notes to F. R.
`Civ. P. 54(d) (“If an appeal on the merits of the case is taken, the court may rule on the claim of fees,
`may defer its ruling on the motion, or may deny the motion without prejudice, directing under
`subdivision (d)(2)(B) a new period for filing after the appeal has been resolved.”)
`
`2
`JOINT STATEMENT REGARDING PERSONALWEB’S REQUEST TO DENY OR STAY
`OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND BILL OF COSTS
`WHILE APPEALS ARE PENDING
`
`CASE NO: 5:18-MD-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-CV-00767-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
`
`

`

`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 594 Filed 04/10/20 Page 4 of 10
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`Exercising this discretion, California district courts have found it appropriate to deny motions
`for attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 without prejudice while a relevant appeal is pending. See
`FlowRider Surf, Ltd. v. Pac. Surf Designs, Inc., No. 315CV01879BENBLM, 2018 WL 6830611, at *1
`(S.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2018) (denying § 285 attorney’s fee motion without prejudice because it was
`“apparent that the appellate court’s decision could have an impact on this Court’s determination of
`whether this is an ‘exceptional’ case.”); see also Pacing Techs., LLC v. Garmin Int’l, Inc., No. 12-CV-
`1067-BEN JLB, 2014 WL 2872219, at *6 (S.D. Cal. June 24, 2014)).
`
`The court in Pacing Techs. noted the discretionary nature of deciding attorney’s fees motions
`pending appeal but explained that, “‘[p]articularly if the claim for fees involves substantial issues or is
`likely to be affected by the appellate decision, the district court may prefer to defer consideration of the
`claim for fees until after the appeal is resolved.’ District courts have exercised their discretion to defer
`ruling on a motion for attorneys’ fees, or to deny the motion without prejudice to being renewed
`following disposition of the appeal.” Id. at *4-5 (quoting 1993 Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 58).
`This is exactly the situation here. The two pending appeals are about precisely the two primary grounds
`for Defendants’ Motion: (1) that PersonalWeb filed the present cases alleging infringement by S3
`knowing their claims were precluded by the prior Texas action, Motion at 1-2, 9-10 (“That [(suing
`Amazon customers’ use of S3 to infringe the same patents as in the Texas case)] alone should subject
`PersonalWeb to a substantial fee award.” and (2) that PersonalWeb’s substantive infringement case
`was baseless. Motion at 2, 9-10 (“The [noninfringement] summary judgment order, too, makes clear
`that PersonalWeb brought baseless claims. [] The Court ruled that each of the remaining three patents
`was not infringed on multiple distinct grounds, granting Amazon and Twitch’s motions as to every
`specific non-infringement argument raised.”)
`
`The four factor test in Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987), is not applicable because
`it is directed to the ministerial task of taxing costs. PersonalWeb is not aware of any reported case in
`which Hilton’s four factor test has been used regarding staying the much more involved determination
`of whether a case is exceptional under 35 USC §285. Cf. Spitz Techs. Corp. v. Nobel Biocare USA LLC,
`No. SACV1700660JVSJCGX, 2018 WL 6016149, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2018) (denying a motion
`to stay determination of the amount of attorneys’ fees after the court had already granted motion a
`
`3
`JOINT STATEMENT REGARDING PERSONALWEB’S REQUEST TO DENY OR STAY
`OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND BILL OF COSTS
`WHILE APPEALS ARE PENDING
`
`CASE NO: 5:18-MD-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-CV-00767-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
`
`

`

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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 594 Filed 04/10/20 Page 5 of 10
`
`finding the case exceptional under §285.).
`
`Delaying Defendants’ Motion pending appeal in this case is particularly compelling because of
`a change in law that occurred after the first summary judgment ruling. In granting Defendants’ motion
`for summary judgment based on claim preclusion and the Kessler doctrine, the Court primarily
`determined the scope of the Texas action based on the allegations in the complaint rather than the
`infringement contentions. Dkt. 381 at 17-19. Since the Court’s order, the Federal Circuit issued a
`decision in which they explicitly used the infringement contention rather than the complaint to
`determine the subject matter of the prior action for claim preclusion purposes. See Huang v Huawei
`Technologies Co., Ltd., 787 Fed. Appx. 723 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 9. 2019).
`
`Even if the Huang decision does not result in an outright reversal, it makes it particularly likely
`that PersonalWeb’s appeal will result in at the very least a change in the basis and “closeness” of the
`claim preclusion issue. Further, a major argument in Defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees is that the
`Hadley declaration was a “sham” because Mr. Hadley’s testimony about the subject matter of the Texas
`action was contradicted by the complaint. Motion at 5:12-15. If the Federal Circuit follows Huang,
`even if PersonalWeb’ appeal is not entirely successful, the Court’s negative comments regarding the
`Hadley declaration would be vitiated.
`
`4
`JOINT STATEMENT REGARDING PERSONALWEB’S REQUEST TO DENY OR STAY
`OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND BILL OF COSTS
`WHILE APPEALS ARE PENDING
`
`CASE NO: 5:18-MD-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-CV-00767-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
`
`

`

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`
`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 594 Filed 04/10/20 Page 6 of 10
`
`AMAZON’S STATEMENT
`PersonalWeb’s request to deny or stay Amazon’s motion for attorneys’ fees at a telephonic Case
`Management Conference is yet another example of its unreasonable conduct in this case, and only
`underscores the need to deter PersonalWeb’s ongoing abuse of the court system. The request is
`frivolous: Judge Davila denied the same request a week ago in PersonalWeb’s case pending in his court.
`PersonalWeb tried the exact same tactic in both cases: it stipulated to brief the fee motion before its
`appeal; it waited until after its opponent had prepared and filed an opening brief; and then it rushed to
`courthouse to try to delay consideration of the motion for a year to 18 months or even more, pending
`resolution of its Federal Circuit appeals. The Court should deny the request.
`
`The great weight of authority—not to mention the express preference of most Courts of
`Appeal—holds that “the usual course is for the Court to consider attorneys’ fees promptly after the
`merits decision.”1 PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v. EMC Corp., No. 5:13-cv-01358-EJD, 2020 WL
`1557441, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2020) (citations omitted, emphasis added), attached as Exhibit 1.
`Sound policy and judicial efficiency considerations support this rule. It is important to get a ruling on
`fees while the district court has the case fresh in mind rather than years later, and the rules seek to have
`fees appeals resolved contemporaneously with the merits. See Spitz Technologies Corp. v. Nobel
`Biocare USA LLC, No. SACV 17-00660 JVS (JCGx), 2018 WL 6016149 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2018)
`(“[J]udicial economy is better served by determining attorneys' fees promptly while the details of the
`proceedings are still fresh and when the Federal Circuit has the opportunity to consider any appeal of
`the calculation at the same time as the appeal on the merits.”); Masalosalo by Masalosalo v. Stonewall
`Ins. Co., 718 F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1983) (district courts “retains[] the power to award attorneys' fees
`after the notice of appeal from the decision on the merits had been filed . . . . [which] will prevent
`postponement of fee consideration until after the circuit court mandate, when the relevant
`circumstances will no longer be fresh in the mind of the district judge.”); see also Ng. v. US Bank, NA,
`
`1 To justify deviation from this general rule, PersonalWeb carries the burden of satisfying four
`elements: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on
`the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of
`the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public
`interest lies.” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987).
`
`5
`JOINT STATEMENT REGARDING PERSONALWEB’S REQUEST TO DENY OR STAY
`OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND BILL OF COSTS
`WHILE APPEALS ARE PENDING
`
`CASE NO: 5:18-MD-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-CV-00767-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
`
`

`

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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 594 Filed 04/10/20 Page 7 of 10
`
`No. 15-cv-04998-KAW, 2016 WL 6995884 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2016) (same); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54,
`advisory committee’s note (1993 amendments) (“Prompt filing affords an opportunity for the court to
`resolve fee disputes shortly after trial, while the services performed are freshly in mind. It also enables
`the court in appropriate circumstances to make its ruling on a fee request in time for any appellate
`review of a dispute over fees to proceed at the same time as review on the merits of the case.”).
`
`PersonalWeb knows this well from Judge Davila’s denial of its identical request in the case
`before him. PersonalWeb Techs., LLC, 2020 WL 1557441, at *1. There, after Judge Davila entered
`judgment in favor of defendants EMC and VMWare, the parties stipulated to a schedule for briefing
`the defendants’ motion for fees and costs. Id. “Rather than following the stipulated briefing schedule,”
`PersonalWeb filed a motion to extend the briefing schedule until after it had exhausted a related Federal
`Circuit appeal. Id. Judge Davila denied the motion, observing: (1) PersonalWeb “made no showing
`that [it is] likely to succeed on appeal” other than conclusory attorney argument; (2) PersonalWeb did
`not contend that it would be irreparably harmed absent a stay, by, for example, citing evidence that it
`“ha[d] limited financial resources such that litigating attorneys’ fees would be ‘overwhelming’”; (3)
`judicial efficiency concerns supported the prompt resolution of the motion rather than further delaying
`an already prolonged case; and (4) the public interest would be served by “holding parties to their
`stipulation[]” to brief the attorney fee issue before the appeal. Id. at *2. Judge Davila’s conclusions
`apply with equal force here, and each of PersonalWeb’s arguments fails.2
`First, PersonalWeb argues that it is justified in reneging on its agreement to brief Amazon’s
`motion prior to the resolution of its appeals because it “could not have” raised its request to defer
`consideration of the motion until reviewing Amazon’s motion. This is false: the parties expressly
`discussed the basis for Amazon’s motion more than a month ago, on March 10, 2020, when the parties
`met and conferred pursuant to Local Rule 54-5(a). During that conference, Amazon explained that it
`sought fees because, among other things, PersonalWeb pursued its campaign against 80 Amazon
`
`2 PersonalWeb’s unsupported claim that Hilton does not apply contradicts Judge Davila’s order and
`those of other courts in this district. See PersonalWeb Techs., LLC, 2020 WL 1557441, at *2; Spitz
`Techs., 2018 WL 6016149, at *2; Emblaze Ltd. v. Apple Inc., No. 5:11-cv-01079-PSG, 2015 WL
`1304779, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2015).
`
`
`6
`JOINT STATEMENT REGARDING PERSONALWEB’S REQUEST TO DENY OR STAY
`OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND BILL OF COSTS
`WHILE APPEALS ARE PENDING
`
`CASE NO: 5:18-MD-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-CV-00767-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
`
`

`

`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 594 Filed 04/10/20 Page 8 of 10
`
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`
`customers despite being precluded from doing so based on its prior failed litigation against Amazon,
`and PersonalWeb never had a viable claim for infringement against Amazon or its customers.
`PersonalWeb did not propose that the parties stipulate to defer consideration of Amazon’s motion;
`instead, it negotiated an extended briefing schedule under which it had months to oppose the motion.
`(Dkts. 582, 590, 592.) Nearly a month after that conference, and weeks after being served with
`Amazon’s motion, PersonalWeb asked not just to defer resolution of its motion indefinitely, but also
`that Amazon agree to expedited consideration of PersonalWeb’s request. In response, Amazon
`explained—with citation to authority—that there was no basis to defer consideration of the motion.
`Amazon also provided PersonalWeb with a copy of Judge Davila’s order, issued just days before in a
`related case, explaining that the order foreclosed PersonalWeb’s identical request here. (Exhibit 2
`(Apr. 3, 2020 Email from Gregorian to Gersh).)
`
` Second, PersonalWeb is wrong that it is likely to prevail on appeal due to a change in law. In
`the case cited by PersonalWeb, Huang v Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., 787 Fed. Appx. 723 (Fed. Cir.
`2019), the Federal Circuit—in a per curiam decision—affirmed a district court’s grant of summary
`judgment of claim preclusion, determining based in part on a review of claim charts served in the two
`cases that the cases involved essentially the same accused product. Id. at 726. The Federal Circuit did
`not change the law of claim preclusion, nor did it suggest that looking to the complaint allegations in
`the preclusion analysis would be improper. See id. In any event, in this case the Court did review the
`infringement contentions in the Texas case in reaching its conclusion that PersonalWeb asserted the
`same claims against essentially the same technology. (Dkt. 380 at p. 18 (“Second, PersonalWeb argues
`that the scope of the Texas Action should be limited to what was included in the infringement
`contentions, and not the complaint. Trans., ECF No. 376 at 44-45. Even if the Court agreed with
`PersonalWeb, the Texas infringement contentions included the HTTP GET command, and thus
`PersonalWeb’s argument fails on its own terms.”).) PersonalWeb’s appeal is unlikely to succeed, and
`Huang does not change that.
`Third, PersonalWeb claims a stay would be efficient considering the Court’s “potentially
`reduced resources.” This too fails. Though the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in logistical
`difficulties with in-person hearings, the Court has continued to resolve substantive motions. See
`
`7
`JOINT STATEMENT REGARDING PERSONALWEB’S REQUEST TO DENY OR STAY
`OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND BILL OF COSTS
`WHILE APPEALS ARE PENDING
`
`CASE NO: 5:18-MD-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-CV-00767-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
`
`

`

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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 594 Filed 04/10/20 Page 9 of 10
`
`General Order 72 (“All civil matters will be decided on the papers, or if the assigned judge believes a
`hearing is necessary, the hearing will be by telephone or videoconference.”); Scheduling Notes for
`Judge Beth Labson Freeman (“[A]ll civil matters scheduled through May 1, 2020 will be heard
`telephonically only”). Moreover, denying Amazon’s motion without prejudice or deferring
`consideration of the motion would not conserve party or Court resources, given that PersonalWeb’s
`appeals relate only to the Court’s summary judgment orders, while the fee motion covers a variety of
`litigation misconduct unrelated to the issues on appeal. Amazon is open to handling the motion,
`particularly the hearing, in a way the Court deems appropriate in light of the pandemic. But a request
`to defer a ruling by years is an opportunistic use of the present difficult circumstances. Finally, Amazon
`may be substantially prejudiced by the requested delay. PersonalWeb’s patents have long since
`expired, and by the time both of its merits appeals conclude, PersonalWeb may have wound up its
`operations and scattered its assets to the wind. The requested delay appears designed to prevent
`enforcement of any award that the Court is inclined to enter.
`The Court should deny PersonalWeb’s request, and direct PersonalWeb to respond to
`Amazon’s motion under the briefing schedule to which it previously stipulated.
`
`Dated: April 10, 2020
`
`STUBBS, ALDERTON & MARKILES, LLP
`
`By: /s/ Michael A. Sherman
`Michael A. Sherman
`Jeffrey F. Gersh
`Sandeep Seth
`Wesley W. Monroe
`Stanley H. Thompson, Jr.
`Viviana Boero Hedrick
`Attorneys for Plaintiffs
`PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES, LLC
`
`Dated: April 10, 2020
`
`FENWICK & WEST LLP
`
`By: /s/ J. David Hadden
`J. DAVID HADDEN (CSB No. 176148)
`dhadden@fenwick.com
`8
`JOINT STATEMENT REGARDING PERSONALWEB’S REQUEST TO DENY OR STAY
`OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND BILL OF COSTS
`WHILE APPEALS ARE PENDING
`
`CASE NO: 5:18-MD-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-CV-00767-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
`
`

`

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`
`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 594 Filed 04/10/20 Page 10 of 10
`
`SAINA S. SHAMILOV (CSB No. 215636)
`sshamilov@fenwick.com
`TODD R. GREGORIAN (CSB No. 236096)
`tgregorian@fenwick.com
`MELANIE L. MAYER (pro hac vice)
`mmayer@fenwick.com
`RAVI R. RANGANATH (CSB No. 272981)
`rranganath@fenwick.com
`CHIEH TUNG (CSB No. 318963)
`ctung@fenwick.com
`FENWICK & WEST LLP
`Silicon Valley Center
`801 California Street
`Mountain View, CA 94041
`Telephone:
`650.988.8500
`Facsimile:
`650.938.5200
`Attorneys for AMAZON.COM, INC., AMAZON
`WEB SERVICES, INC., and TWITCH
`INTERACTIVE, INC.
`
`9
`JOINT STATEMENT REGARDING PERSONALWEB’S REQUEST TO DENY OR STAY
`OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND BILL OF COSTS
`WHILE APPEALS ARE PENDING
`
`CASE NO: 5:18-MD-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-CV-00767-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
`
`

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