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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 560 Filed 11/01/19 Page 1 of 10
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`J. DAVID HADDEN (CSB No. 176148)
`dhadden@fenwick.com
`SAINA S. SHAMILOV (CSB No. 215636)
`sshamilov@fenwick.com
`TODD R. GREGORIAN (CSB No. 236096)
`tgregorian@fenwick.com
`RAVI R. RANGANATH (CSB No. 272981)
`rranganath@fenwick.com
`CHIEH TUNG (CSB No. 318963)
`ctung@fenwick.com
`FENWICK & WEST LLP
`Silicon Valley Center
`801 California Street
`Mountain View, CA 94041
`Telephone:
`650.988.8500
`Facsimile:
`650.938.5200
`
`Counsel for AMAZON.COM, INC., and AMA-
`ZON WEB SERVICES, INC.
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`SAN JOSE DIVISION
`
`
`
` Case No.: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`
`Case No. 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`
`REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION OF
`AMAZON.COM, INC. AND AMAZON
`WEB SERVICES, INC. FOR SUM-
`MARY JUDGMENT OF NON-IN-
`FRINGEMENT
`
`Date:
`November 14, 2019
`Time:
`9:00 a.m.
`Dept:
`Courtroom 3, 5th Floor
`Judge:
`Hon. Beth L. Freeman
`Trial Date: March 16, 2020
`
`
`
`IN RE: PERSONAL WEB TECHNOLOGIES,
`LLC ET AL., PATENT LITIGATION
`
`AMAZON.COM, INC., and AMAZON WEB
`SERVICES, INC.,
`
`Plaintiffs.
`
`v.
`
`PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES, LLC and
`LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES, LLC and
`LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,
`
`Counterclaimants,
`
`
`v.
`
`AMAZON.COM, INC., and AMAZON WEB
`SERVICES, INC.,
`
`Counterdefendants.
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`REPLY OF AMAZON I.S.O. SJ OF NON-
`INFRINGEMENT
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`Case No. 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
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`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
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`FENWICK & WEST LLP
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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 560 Filed 11/01/19 Page 2 of 10
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`INTRODUCTION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1
`AMAZON’S TECHNOLOGY DOES NOT INFRINGE FOR SEVERAL
`REASONS INCLUDING THOSE THAT DO NOT DEPEND ON THE
`COURT’S CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER ------------------------------------------------ 1
`A.
`Amazon’s Technology Does Not “Allow,” “Permit,” or “Not Permit”
`Access to Content Cached at Web Browsers -------------------------------------------- 1
`Amazon’s Technology Does Not Determine Whether an ETag Corresponds
`to a “Plurality of Identifiers” --------------------------------------------------------------- 4
`Amazon’s Technology Does Not Use ETags to Determine the Presence of a
`File --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5
`AMAZON DID NOT “INDUCE” PERSONALWEB TO IGNORE THE
`COURT’S CASE SCHEDULE --------------------------------------------------------------------- 6
`CONCLUSION---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`I.
`II.
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`III.
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`IV.
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`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
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`FENWICK & WEST LLP
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`REPLY OF AMAZON I.S.O. SJ OF NON-
`INFRINGEMENT
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`i
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`Case No. 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 560 Filed 11/01/19 Page 3 of 10
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`
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases:
`
`Page(s):
`
`Rovid v. Graco Children’s Prods.,
`No. 17-cv-01506-PJH, 2018 WL 5906075 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2018) ------------------------- 6
`
`Other Authorities:
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6
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`REPLY OF AMAZON I.S.O. SJ OF NON-
`INFRINGEMENT
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`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Amazon does not infringe the asserted patents. PersonalWeb has no evidence to the con-
`trary; it did not serve an expert report alleging infringement. Indeed, PersonalWeb concedes that
`Amazon does not infringe the patents as construed by the Court. But, Amazon does not infringe
`for three other reasons that do not depend on the Court’s constructions. As the Court already re-
`jected PersonalWeb’s invitation to enter an order addressing only the consequences of the Court’s
`claim constructions on its infringement theory (Dkt. 559), the Court should include each independ-
`ent basis for Amazon’s non-infringement in its order granting summary judgment.
`
`II.
`
`AMAZON’S TECHNOLOGY DOES NOT INFRINGE FOR SEVERAL REASONS
`INCLUDING THOSE THAT DO NOT DEPEND ON THE COURT’S CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTION ORDER.
`In its opposition, PersonalWeb agrees to the entry of summary judgment of non-infringe-
`ment because the accused Amazon technology does not meet the limitations of the asserted claims
`as construed by the Court. (Dkt. 550 (“Opp.”) at 1.) And while that is enough for the Court to
`grant Amazon’s motion, Amazon technology cannot infringe the asserted patents for reasons unre-
`lated to the Court’s constructions. The Court should enter judgment of non-infringement for those
`reasons as well.
`
`A.
`
`Amazon’s Technology Does Not “Allow,” “Permit,” or “Not Permit” Access
`to Content Cached at Web Browsers.
`
`The asserted claims require “allowing” or “permitting” access, or “not permitting” access
`to content. (’310 patent claim 20; ’442 patent claim 11; ’420 patent claims 25, 166.) These terms
`require no constructions and Amazon is not proposing or relying on any in its motion. “Permitting”
`(or “allowing”) access and “not permitting” access means exactly that: permitting it or not permit-
`ting it. The verbs “preventing” or “prohibiting” are mere synonyms of “not permitting” and are
`used in the Amazon motion to avoid grammatically-prohibited double negatives such as “Amazon’s
`technology does not ‘not permit’ access to content cached at web browsers.”
`PersonalWeb argues that by providing a new version of an object, an HTTP server denies
`the browser permission to access the previously received cached object. (Opp. at 4.) This is akin
`to arguing that by delivering today’s paper, the Wall Street Journal rescinds permission to read the
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`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
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`FENWICK & WEST LLP
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`paper delivered yesterday. This is illogical. Nor is there any support for PersonalWeb’s argument
`in the HTTP specification itself. There is no mechanism in the HTTP protocol, and PersonalWeb
`points to none, for a server to “revoke” a browser’s ability to access a cached object that the same
`server has already provided to it. The HTTP specification in fact says just the opposite, that brows-
`ers should be able to access cached content whether or not it is current. (Dkt. 543 (Shamilov Decl.)
`Ex. 3 (RFC 2616, HTTP 1.1 standard) at § 13.1.1 (cache that cannot communicate with origin
`server should forward stale content to a browser for display with an optional warning indication of
`staleness); § 13.1.4 (at a user’s direction, browsers may override basic mechanisms to validate stale
`entities in cache); § 13.13 (history mechanisms can redisplay entities showing “exactly what the
`user saw at the time when the resource was retrieved” and should display an entity in storage “even
`if the entity has expired”); Shamilov Decl. Ex. 2 (Weissman Rep.) at ¶¶ 54, 97, 152, 179, 189.)
`PersonalWeb acknowledges that this is the case. (Opp. at 5.) PersonalWeb argues, however, that
`the ability of browsers to freely access cached content whether current or not is “irrelevant” because
`it requires “no request . . . to the server” and is not one of “the primary purposes of a browser.”
`(Id.) But the claims require the act of “not permitting access.” If access is always permitted, the
`required act of “not permitting” is not performed by Amazon or anyone else.
`Indeed, the HTTP protocol, the basis of PersonalWeb’s infringement theories, does not per-
`mit or not permit access to content using ETags. (Weissman Rep. at ¶¶ 53-56.) The accused con-
`ditional GET requests specified in the HTTP protocol merely determine whether a version of the
`file on the browser is the same version as the file on the server; that is it. (Weissman Rep. at ¶¶ 45-
`46.) It is a version control mechanism. The response to the conditional GET request does not
`prevent the browser from continuing to use the version it already has. This is common sense, even
`according to PersonalWeb itself. During an inter partes review of the ’310 patent, PersonalWeb
`told the Patent Office that “there is no logical reason to have modified [the prior art] to implement
`a system for checking whether that same local computer 20 is authorized to access a previous ver-
`sion of the same file” and “the local computer 20 is permitted to access a prior version of a file if
`that computer already has the current version of that file.” (Declaration of J. David Hadden (“Had-
`den Decl.”) Ex. 6 (Patent Owner’s Response to IPR2013-00596, Paper 15) (“’596 POR”) at 19–20;
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`Weissman Rep. at ¶ 151.)
`The concepts of permitting and not permitting access to content are simple. We face these
`concepts in our daily lives. If the HTTP protocol and the Amazon technology using it did in fact
`permit or not permit access to content via conditional GET requests and ETags, one would expect
`PersonalWeb to point to clear mechanisms of such permission and non-permission in the HTTP
`protocol or Amazon’s documentation. PersonalWeb does not do that because such mechanisms do
`not exist in either. (Weissman Rep. at ¶¶ 56, 100, 152.) Instead, while faulting Amazon for rewrit-
`ing the claims (a red herring as described above), PersonalWeb equates the straightforward claim
`requirements of access permission with the mere mechanism of determining whether two accessible
`files are the same.
`PersonalWeb argues that if the ETags of the file cached by the browser and the file stored
`at the server match, the server “permits” the browser to continue to access the cached file, and if
`the ETags do not match and the server sends an HTTP 200 message with a new version of the file
`the server rescinds the browser’s “permission” to access older content. (Opp. at 7-8.) This argu-
`ment contradicts the HTTP protocol itself, which specifically allows browsers to use old content.
`(RFC 2616 at §§ 13.1.1, 13.1.4, 13.13; Weissman Rep. at ¶¶ 54, 100, 179, 189.) It is also directly
`contrary to PersonalWeb’s admissions made to the Patent Office. (’596 POR at 19-20 (equating
`possession of a file with permission to access older versions).) And while acknowledging that a
`browser may access stale cached content at any time a user chooses, PersonalWeb argues that this
`specification of the HTTP protocol should be ignored because the claims do not require barring
`access “forever” and are limited to the interactions between computers. (Opp. at 5; Dkt. 550-3 (de
`la Iglesia Decl.) at ¶ 28.) But this characterization of the claims is irrelevant. If the web browser
`is allowed to use stale content, as the HTTP protocol specifies and PersonalWeb admits, how does
`it also somehow lack permission to use that content? PersonalWeb does not and cannot answer
`that question because the conditional GET requests and their corresponding 200 OK and 304 re-
`sponses have nothing to do with permitting or not permitting a browser to access its cached content
`and do not, at any time, deny or remove the browser’s ability to access content it has already re-
`ceived. They merely confirm whether a file version cached at the web browser is the same as the
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`Case No.: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`Case No. 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
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`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
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`FENWICK & WEST LLP
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`one stored at the server and, if not, provide the newest version. (Weissman Rep. at ¶¶ 46, 90;
`Shamilov Decl. Ex. 1 (de la Iglesia Rep.) at ¶ 33.)
`For the same reasons, PersonalWeb’s unsupported assertion that setting the max-age for a
`file somehow sets access permissions for that file fails. (Opp. at 6-7.) As the HTTP protocol
`specifies, the max-age merely sets a time when the web browser should check if a new version of
`the cached file became available. (Weissman Rep. at ¶¶ 40, 53; de la Iglesia Rep. at ¶ 27.) It does
`not prevent the web browser from accessing any prior versions of the file. (Weissman Rep. at ¶ 150
`(“The HTTP specification does not require that a browser delete stale object’s in its cache and
`HTTP headers are malleable by end users. Therefore, a user could view and access stale content,
`even if the max-age value is expired, even if past the Expires time, and even if the browser received
`a 200 OK message in response to a conditional GET request sent with that object’s ETag.”); RFC
`2616 at § 13.1.4 (“For example, the user agent might allow the user to specify that cached entities
`(even explicitly stale ones) are never validated.”).)
`
`B.
`
`Amazon’s Technology Does Not Determine Whether an ETag Corresponds to
`a “Plurality of Identifiers.”
`
`PersonalWeb argues that the claim requirement of determining whether a content-depend-
`ent name corresponds to one of “a plurality of identifiers” does not require a plurality of identifiers
`at all, but merely means determining whether the content-dependent name corresponds to a single
`identifier. (Opp. at 11-12; de la Iglesia Decl. at ¶¶ 33-34.) This interpretation of the claims flies in
`the face of PersonalWeb’s own argument at the Patent Office that the prior art did not render claim
`166 of the ’420 patent (reciting “whether or not at least one of said one or more content-dependent
`digital identifiers . . . corresponds to an entry in one or more databases, each of said one or more
`databases comprising a plurality of identifiers”) invalid because it did not disclose “compar[ing]”
`an identifier “with a plurality of identifiers.” (Hadden Decl. Ex. 7 (Patent Owner’s Preliminary
`Response to IPR2014-00058, Paper 9) at 12; Weissman Rep. at ¶ 122.) PersonalWeb cannot have
`it both ways. Indeed, it is undisputed that the accused Amazon technology does not compare an
`ETag to a plurality of values. (Opp. at 12; de la Iglesia Decl. at ¶ 34; Weissman Rep. at ¶ 122.)
`The server associates only one ETag with each object (URL/URI). (Opp. at 11; de la Iglesia Decl.
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`MOTION OF AMAZON FOR SJ OF NON-
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`Case No. 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
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`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
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`FENWICK & WEST LLP
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`at ¶ 32; Weissman Rep. at ¶ 122.) It locates the object by its URL/URI, and then compares that
`one associated ETag to the ETag in the GET request. (de la Iglesia Decl. at ¶ 32; Weissman Rep.
`at ¶ 122.) There is no plurality of ETags to which the ETag from the browser in the conditional
`GET request could be compared. (Weissman Rep. at ¶ 122.) Thus, for the same reason Personal-
`Web argued to the Patent Office that the prior art does not render its claims invalid because it does
`not compare an identifier with a plurality of identifiers, the Amazon technology cannot infringe.
`
`C.
`
`Amazon’s Technology Does Not Use ETags to Determine the Presence of a
`File.
`
`PersonalWeb argues that 1) the claims do not require a determination of the presence of a
`file and 2) Amazon servers determine whether a “copy” of a file is present using ETags, and that is
`sufficient to meet the claims. (Opp. at 9-10.) Both arguments fail.
`First, PersonalWeb’s own expert disagrees with PersonalWeb’s interpretation of the claims.
`For example, in his analysis of claim 10 of the ’442 patent in the Twitch case, which recites “deter-
`mining . . . whether a copy of the data file is present,” Mr. de la Iglesia states “[t]he name (ETag
`value) is used to locate a file as present.” (de la Iglesia Rep. at ¶¶ 111-112 (emphasis added).)
`Second, PersonalWeb’s infringement theory is unavailing even if the claims require a de-
`termination of whether a “copy,” and not the file itself, is present. (’442 patent claim 10.) Person-
`alWeb argues that if the ETag received in the conditional GET request matches the ETag of the file
`with the same URL/URI on the server, the Amazon technology determines that the file is present
`at the browser, and if the ETags do not match, then the Amazon technology determines that the file
`is present at the server. (Opp. at 11; de la Igesias Decl. at ¶ 30.) The claim language, however,
`requires “obtaining a name for a data file” and using that name to “determin[e] “whether a copy”
`of that “data file is present” on a computer. (’442 patent claim 10.) PersonalWeb maps the “name
`for a data file” to an ETag received in the conditional GET request. (Opp. at 9-10; de la Igesias
`Decl. at ¶ 30.) But if that ETag does not match the ETag of the file on the server, the file on the
`server is not the same file identified by the ETag in the GET request; it is not a copy of the file with
`the ETag in the GET request.
`Using a name to locate a file is a simple concept. PersonalWeb’s infringement theory,
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`however, is convoluted, and unreasonable, because the ETags, as used in accordance with the HTTP
`protocol, are not used to determine the presence of anything. As PersonalWeb recognizes, they can
`be used only to evaluate whether two files match. (Opp. at 10; de la Iglesia Decl. at ¶¶ 31-32.) The
`presence of files is always determined using URLs/URIs. (Opp. at 11; de la Iglesia Decl. at ¶ 32.)
`PersonalWeb cannot prove infringement.
`
`III. AMAZON DID NOT “INDUCE” PERSONALWEB TO IGNORE THE COURT’S
`CASE SCHEDULE.
`
`Per the Court’s scheduling order, PersonalWeb had to serve an expert report to meet its
`burden on infringement by August 23, 2019. On that date, PersonalWeb served a report in the case
`against Twitch, but it did not serve any report against Amazon. PersonalWeb’s excuse is that it
`thought Amazon would eventually stipulate to dismissal of the Amazon case while agreeing that
`the customer case against Twitch can proceed on the same issues. (Opp. at 3.) But this condition
`was unreasonable, as the Court already has recognized (Dkt. 165), and Amazon never told Person-
`alWeb that it would agree. (Hadden Decl. at ¶¶ 5-8.) So was PersonalWeb’s requirement that
`Amazon agree to dismiss without prejudice the claims based on the ’791 patent, leaving the door
`open for PersonalWeb to file more lawsuits against Amazon’s customers. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Ultimately,
`PersonalWeb itself decided to forego an expert report in the Amazon case. That decision was not
`“Amazon-induced,” as PersonalWeb claims, but made by PersonalWeb and its counsel. That de-
`cision has consequences: a summary judgment of non-infringement.
`And PersonalWeb’s attempt to reverse that decision by submitting the unsigned declaration
`of Mr. de la Iglesia with its opposition to Amazon’s motion—nine weeks after the deadline to serve
`expert reports—cannot and does not save its case. First, it is too late and must be stricken. Rovid
`v. Graco Children’s Prods., No. 17-cv-01506-PJH, 2018 WL 5906075, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9,
`2018) (Rule 26(e) does not “create a loophole through which a party who submits partial expert
`witness disclosures, or who wishes to revise her disclosures in light of her opponent’s challenges
`to the analysis and conclusions therein, can add to them to her advantage after the court’s deadline
`for doing so has passed.”) (quoting Luke v. Family Care & Urgent Med. Clinics, 323 F. App’x 496,
`500 (9th Cir. 2009)). But even if the Court decides to consider it, PersonalWeb still cannot establish
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`Case No.: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`Case No. 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
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`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
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`FENWICK & WEST LLP
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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 560 Filed 11/01/19 Page 10 of 10
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`infringement by Amazon’s technology as a matter of law as described above.
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`IV. CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons stated in Amazon’s opening brief, the Court
`should enter summary judgment on all established grounds of non-infringement on Amazon’s de-
`claratory judgment claims.
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`Dated: November 1, 2019
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`FENWICK & WEST LLP
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`By: /s/ J. David Hadden
`J. David Hadden
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`Counsel for AMAZON.COM, INC., and AMA-
`ZON WEB SERVICES, INC.
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`MOTION OF AMAZON FOR SJ OF NON-
`INFRINGEMENT
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`Case No.: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`Case No. 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
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`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
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`FENWICK & WEST LLP
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