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Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 485 Filed 08/16/19 Page 1 of 34
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`SAN JOSE DIVISION
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`IN RE: PERSONALWEB
`TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, ET AL. PATENT
`LITIGATION
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`Case No. 18-md-02834-BLF
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`ORDER CONSTRUING CLAIMS IN
`U.S. PATENT NOS. 6,928,442; 7,802,310;
`7,945,544; 8,099,420
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`[Re: ECF 406, 412, 420]
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`In this multidistrict litigation (“MDL”), PersonalWeb Technologies, LLC (“PersonalWeb”)
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`alleges patent infringement by Amazon.com, Inc. and Amazon Web Services, Inc., and separately
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`by dozens of Amazon’s customers, related to the customers’ use of Amazon’s Simple Storage
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`Service (“S3”) in connection with downloading files from S3. Two of the cases comprising this
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`MDL are proceeding at this time: Amazon v. PersonalWeb (Case No. 5:18-cv-00767-BLF), in
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`which PersonalWeb asserts counterclaims of patent infringement, and PersonalWeb v. Twitch
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`Interactive, Inc. (Case No. 5:18-cv-05619-BLF), in which PersonalWeb asserts claims of patent
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`infringement and which the Court has designated as a representative customer case.
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`In each of these two actions, PersonalWeb alleges infringement of four patents, all of
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`which are at issue in the present claim construction dispute: U.S. Patent Nos. 6,928,442 (“the ’442
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`patent”); 7,802,310 (“the ’310 patent”); 7,945,544 (“the ’544 patent”); and 8,099,420 (“the ’420
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`patent”). PersonalWeb filed an opening claim construction brief (ECF 406); Amazon.com, Inc.,
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`Amazon Web Services, Inc., and Twitch, Interactive, Inc. (collectively, “Amazon”) filed a joint
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`responsive brief (ECF 412); and PersonalWeb filed a reply brief (ECF 420). The Court held a
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`tutorial on May 2, 2019 and a Markman hearing on May 24, 2019 (“the Hearing”) for the purpose
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`of construing ten disputed terms in the above listed patents.
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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 485 Filed 08/16/19 Page 2 of 34
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`I. BACKGROUND
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`All four patents-in-suit share a specification and each claims priority to a patent application
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`filed on April 11, 1995. The ’310 patent is titled “Controlling Access to Data in a Data Processing
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`System” and was issued on September 21, 2010. Ex. 1 to Thompson Decl. (“’310 patent”),
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`ECF 406-2. The ’420 patent is titled “Accessing Data in a Data Processing System” and was
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`issued on January 17, 2012. Ex. 7 to Thompson Decl. (“’420 patent”), ECF 406-8. The ’544
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`patent is titled “Similarity-Based Access Control of Data in a Data Processing System” and was
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`issued on May 17, 2011. Ex. 9 to Thompson Decl. (“’544 patent”), ECF 406-10. The ’442 patent
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`is titled “Enforcement and Policing of Licensed Content using Content-Based Identifiers” and was
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`issued on August 9, 2005. Ex. 12 to Thompson Decl. (“’442 patent”), ECF 406-13.
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`The patents-in-suit generally relate to methods for identifying data items in a data
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`processing system—for example, methods for efficiently naming and identifying files on a
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`computer network. According to the (shared) specification, the problems with prior art systems
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`include that “[t]he same [file] name in two different [folders] may refer to different data items, and
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`two different [file] names in the same [folder] may refer to the same data item.” See ’310 patent
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`at 2:41–43. To address this problem, the patents-in-suit produce a content-based “True Name”
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`identifier for a file or other particular data item, in an effort to ensure that identical file names refer
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`to the same data, and conversely, that different file names refer to different data. See id. at 6:20–
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`41, 34:4–12, 37:48–53. Put differently, the invention provides an identity for a given data item
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`that “depends on all of the data in the data item and only on the data in the data item.” See id.
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`at 3:54–55. “Thus the [True Name] identity of a data item is independent of its name, origin,
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`location, address, or other information not derivable directly from the data, and depends only on
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`the data itself.” See id. at 3:55–58.
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`The specification states that “[a] True Name is computed using a [hash] function . . . which
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`reduces a data block B . . . to a relatively small, fixed size identifier, the True Name of the data
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`block, such that the True Name of the data block is virtually guaranteed to represent the data block
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`B and only data block B.” ’310 patent at 12:21–26. Larger files may be split into smaller
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`segments. See id. at 13:45–49. The hash function is applied to each segment, and the resulting
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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 485 Filed 08/16/19 Page 3 of 34
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`values are strung together into an indirect data item. See id. at 13:49–54. The True Name of this
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`indirect data item is then computed and becomes the True Name of the larger file. See id.
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`at 13:54–59.
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`The summary of the invention describes multiple uses for these True Names, including
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`(1) to avoid keeping multiple copies of a given data file, regardless of how files are otherwise
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`named; (2) to avoid copying a data file from a remote location when a local copy is already
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`available; (3) to access files by data name without reference to file structures; (4) to maintain
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`consistency in a cache of data items and allow corresponding directories on disconnected
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`computers to be resynchronized with one another; (5) to confirm whether a user has a particular
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`piece of data according to its content, independent of the name, date, or other properties of the data
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`item; and (6) to verify that data retrieved from a remote location is the intended data. See ’310
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`patent at 4:1–52. The patents-in-suit are directed to various specific aspects of this system.
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`II. LEGAL STANDARD
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`Claim construction is a matter of law. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S.
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`370, 387 (1996). “It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the
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`invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude,’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d
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`1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal citation omitted). As such, “[t]he appropriate
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`starting point . . . is always with the language of the asserted claim itself.” Comark Commc’ns,
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`Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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`Claim terms “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,” defined as “the
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`meaning . . . the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question . . . as of the
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`effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313 (internal citation
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`omitted). The court reads claims in light of the specification, which is “the single best guide to the
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`meaning of a disputed term.” Id. at 1315; see also Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs.
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`N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1284–85 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc). Furthermore, “the
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`interpretation to be given a term can only be determined and confirmed with a full understanding
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`of what the inventors actually invented and intended to envelop with the claim.” Phillips, 415
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`F.3d at 1316 (quoting Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed.
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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 485 Filed 08/16/19 Page 4 of 34
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`Cir. 1998)). The words of the claims must therefore be understood as the inventor used them, as
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`such understanding is revealed by the patent and prosecution history. Id. The claim language,
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`written description, and patent prosecution history thus form the intrinsic record that is most
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`significant when determining the proper meaning of a disputed claim limitation. Id. at 1315–17;
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`see also Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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`Evidence external to the patent is less significant than the intrinsic record, but the court
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`may also consider such extrinsic evidence as expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and
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`learned treatises “if the court deems it helpful in determining ‘the true meaning of language used
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`in the patent claims.’” Philips, 415 F.3d at 1318 (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 980). However,
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`extrinsic evidence may not be used to contradict or change the meaning of claims “in derogation
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`of the ‘indisputable public records consisting of the claims, the specification and the prosecution
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`history,’ thereby undermining the public notice function of patents.” Id. at 1319 (quoting
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`Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
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`III. AGREED CONSTRUCTIONS
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`The parties agree on the construction of five terms. Revised Joint Claim Construction and
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`Prehearing Statement at 2, ECF 430; see id. at Appendix A. The Court approves and adopts the
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`parties’ agreed-upon constructions as follows:
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`Claim Term
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`Agreed-Upon Construction
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`“data item”
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`(’310 patent, claim 20)
`(’420 patent, claims 25, 166)
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`“data file(s)”
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`(’442 patent, claim 10)
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`“wherein the particular file
`comprises a first one or more parts”
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`(’544 patent, claim 46)
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`“sequence of bits”
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`“a named data item”
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` “wherein the particular file is made up of a first one or
`more separate sequences of bits”
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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 485 Filed 08/16/19 Page 5 of 34
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`“wherein each file of the plurality of
`files comprises a corresponding one
`or more parts”
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`(’544 patent, claim 52)
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`“database”
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`(’544 patent, claims 46, 52, 55)
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`IV. DISCUSSION
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` “wherein each file of the plurality of files is made up of
`one or more corresponding separate sequences of bits”
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`“plurality” means “two or more”
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`“an organized electronic collection of data”
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`The Court discusses in turn the ten disputed terms that appear in the four patents-in-suit.
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`A. Disputed “authorization” and “licensing” terms in the ’310 and ’420 patents
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`The parties dispute two analogous terms in the ’310 and ’420 patents, respectively:
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`“unauthorized or unlicensed” (in claim 20 of the ’310 patent) and “authorization” (in claims 25
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`and 166 of the ’420 patent). Claim 20 of the ’310 patent recites:
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`20. A computer-implemented method operable in a system which includes a plurality of
`computers, the method comprising:
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`controlling distribution of content from a first computer to at least one other
`computer, in response to a request obtained by a first device in the system from
`a second device in the system, the first device comprising hardware including at
`least one processor, the request including at least a content-dependent name of a
`particular data item, the content-dependent name being based at least in part on a
`function of at least some of the data comprising the particular data item, wherein
`the function comprises a message digest function or a hash function, and
`wherein two identical data items will have the same content-dependent name,
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`based at least in part on said content-dependent name of said particular data
`item, the first device (A) permitting the content to be provided to or accessed by
`the at least one other computer if it is not determined that the content is
`unauthorized or unlicensed, otherwise, (B) if it is determined that the content
`is unauthorized or unlicensed, not permitting the content to be provided to or
`accessed by the at least one other computer.
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`’310 Patent at 39:8–31 (emphasis added).
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`With respect to the ’420 patent, claim 25 is representative and recites:
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`25. A computer-implemented method implemented at least in part by hardware in
`combination with software, the method comprising the steps:
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`. . . selectively allowing a copy of the particular sequence of bits to be provided
`to or accessed by or from at least one of the computers in a network of
`computers, wherein a copy of the sequence of bits is not to be provided or
`accessed with authorization, as determined, at least in part, based on whether or
`not said first content-dependent name of the particular sequence of bits
`corresponds to one of the plurality of identifiers.
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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 485 Filed 08/16/19 Page 6 of 34
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`’420 Patent at 40:9–39 (emphasis added). Each term is discussed in turn.
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`1. “unauthorized or unlicensed” (claim 20 of ’310 patent)
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`PersonalWeb’s Proposal
`Plain and ordinary meaning
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`Alternatively:
`“not permitted or not
`permitted under a license”1
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`Amazon’s Proposal
`“not compliant with a valid
`license”
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`Court’s Construction
`“not compliant with a valid
`license”
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`PersonalWeb contends that in the context of the ’310 patent, the plain and ordinary
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`meaning of “authorization” equates to “permission.” See Opening Br. at 1, ECF 406. In support,
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`PersonalWeb argues that “the specification includes several examples of certain exemplary
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`embodiments of the inventive system permitting, or not permitting, certain actions to take place on
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`the basis of [] given criteria.” See id. at 1–2. PersonalWeb next contends that a “license” is
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`something narrower—“a specific kind of authorization.” See id. at 2. PersonalWeb’s theory is
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`that “the [] term ‘unlicensed’ is a specific species of the genus ‘unauthorized’” and that the ’310
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`patent additionally contemplates restricting more general unauthorized transactions on a basis that
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`is not license-dependent. See id. at 4–5.
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`In its opening brief, PersonalWeb discusses two purported examples of general, genus
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`level authorizations. First, PersonalWeb points out “that a ‘region’ (directory) can be set as read-
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`only, meaning another computer would not have permission to change the contents of the region.”
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`Id. at 2; see ’310 Patent at 10:23–35. Second, PersonalWeb states that “[t]he specification also
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`discusses that a file can be locked so that another computer does not have permission to modify
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`it.” Opening Br. at 2; see ’310 Patent at 20:19–22. Therefore, PersonalWeb argues, Amazon’s
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`proposed construction is improper because it “expressly reads [the broader word] ‘unauthorized’
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`out of the claim,” contrary to canons of construction that indicate separate words should be given
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`separate meanings. See id. at 4 (citing Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364,
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`1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) and other cases).
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`Amazon counters that the patents-in-suit “treat ‘unauthorized or unlicensed’ as a single
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`1 Alterative construction as modified by PersonalWeb at the Hearing. See Hearing Tr. at 8:16–
`9:13, ECF 446.
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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 485 Filed 08/16/19 Page 7 of 34
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`concept that relates to a fundamental purpose of the claimed invention—policing access to
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`licensed content.” See Responsive Br. at 5, ECF 412. Amazon argues that the ’310 patent
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`specification “repeatedly treats the concept of ‘licensed’ use of content as interchangeable with
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`whether that use is ‘authorized.’” See id. at 5. As an illustrative example pointed out by Amazon,
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`see id., the specification states that “[t]he True Name provides a safe way to identify licensed
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`material” and goes on to describe “[e]nforcing use of valid licenses . . . for example, by creating a
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`report of users who do not have proper authorization,” see ’310 Patent at 31:3–12. Amazon
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`further argues that PersonalWeb’s two purported examples of unauthorized transactions that are
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`not license-dependent are merely “conventional techniques for preventing computers from making
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`inconsistent changes to the same data at the same time . . . [and have] nothing to do with
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`‘authorizing’ access to content.” See Responsive Br. at 7.
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`In addition, Amazon points out that in prior litigation involving the ’310 patent, ’420
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`patent, and ’442 patent,2 Judge Gilstrap in the Eastern District of Texas construed the term
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`“authorized” as used in claims 1, 2, and 16–19 of the ’310 patent to mean “compliant with a valid
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`license.” See Responsive Br. at 8 (citing and quoting PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v. IBM Corp., No.
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`6:12-cv-661-JRG, Dkt. No. 103 at 25, 28 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2016) (“Gilstrap Order”), Ex. 5 to
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`Hadden Decl., ECF 412-6). Similarly, Judge Gilstrap construed “unauthorized” as used in
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`claims 7 and 23 of the ’442 patent to mean “not compliant with a valid license.” See Gilstrap
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`Order at 26, 28. Judge Gilstrap also construed “unlicensed” as used in claims 7 and 23 of the ’442
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`patent to mean “invalid rights to content.” See id. at 21, 25. Thus, Amazon argues, Judge Gilstrap
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`“recognized that licensing and authorization are the same concept in the patents, and provided the
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`correct construction for these terms.” See Responsive Br. at 8.
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`For the reasons discussed below, the Court agrees with Amazon that “unauthorized or
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`unlicensed” as used in claim 20 of the ’310 patent refers to the single concept of regulating access
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`to licensed content. Accordingly, the Court adopts Amazon’s proposed construction for this term.
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`As an initial matter, the Court recognizes the general principle that “[a] claim construction
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`2 As well as U.S. Patent No. 6,415,280, which is not asserted in the instant action.
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`that gives meaning to all the terms of the claim is preferred over one that does not do so.” Merck
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`& Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Put differently,
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`“[c]anons of construction indicate that terms connected in the disjunctive [by the conjunction ‘or’]
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`be given separate meanings.” Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 73 (1984). Here,
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`PersonalWeb makes precisely this argument—that Amazon’s proposed construction renders “the
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`presence of ‘unauthorized’ in Claim 20 [] superfluous and/or the word ‘or’ would be construed as
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`‘and.’” See Opening Br. at 4. However, “[t]he preference for giving meaning to all terms [] is not
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`an inflexible rule that supersedes all other principles of claim construction.” SimpleAir, Inc. v.
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`Sony Ericsson Mobile Commc’ns AB, 820 F.3d 419, 429 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Rather, “[t]he
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`construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s
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`description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct construction.” Id. at 430 (quoting
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`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 430 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)). Indeed, the
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`preference of giving meaning to all terms “is overcome where [] the evidence indicates that the
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`patentee used the two terms interchangeably.” Baran v. Med. Device Techs., Inc., 616 F.3d 1309,
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`1316 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (upholding the district court’s finding that the terms “releasably” and
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`“detachable” have the same meaning in the patent at issue).
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`Here, while PersonalWeb’s argument in favor of separate meanings has superficial appeal,
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`the intrinsic record reveals that the patentee used the words “authorized” and “licensed”
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`interchangeably in the ’310 patent. The specification is “the single best guide to the meaning of a
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`disputed term.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315. As pointed out by Amazon, see Responsive Br. at 5,
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`the ’310 patent specification describes a “license table” that “records a relationship between a
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`licensable data item and the user licensed to have access to it,” see ’310 Patent at 11:33–36. Each
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`record in the license table includes the following: (1) a “True Name”—the “True Name of a data
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`item subject to license validation”; and (2) a “licensee”—the “identify of a user authorized to
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`have access to this object.” See ’310 Patent at 11:33–45 (emphasis added). In the same vein, the
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`specification later describes “Track[ing] for Licensing Purposes,” a “mechanism [to] ensure[] that
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`licensed files are not used by unauthorized parties.” Id. at 31:4–6 (emphasis added). The
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`specification further provides that “[e]nforcing use of valid licenses can be active (for example, by
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`refusing to provide access to a file without authorization) or passive (for example, by creating a
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`report of users who do not have proper authorization).” Id. at 31:9–12. Thus, the specification
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`explicitly equates holding a “valid license” with “authorization.” See id. (emphasis added).
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`In its reply brief, PersonalWeb responds that “Amazon’s reference to the license table is
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`unremarkable because PersonalWeb has not taken the position that a license is not a form of
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`authorization.” See Reply Br. at 7, ECF 420. That may be so. However, PersonalWeb’s corollary
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`argument—that “[j]ust because all licenses grant authorization does not mean that all
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`authorizations are licenses,” see id., is without support. In other words, PersonalWeb’s argument
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`that the ’310 patent contemplates authorizations not related to license status fails because the ’310
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`patent is completely absent of any such more general authorizations. As previously discussed,
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`PersonalWeb raises two purported examples of general, genus level authorizations: (1) “that a
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`‘region’ (directory) can be set as read-only, meaning another computer would not have permission
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`to change the contents of the region”; and (2) that “[t]he specification [] discusses that a file can be
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`locked so that another computer does not have permission to modify it.” See Opening Br. at 2;
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`’310 Patent at 10:23–35, 20:19–22. Amazon counters that these are merely “conventional [data]
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`techniques . . . [and have] nothing to do with ‘authorizing’ access to content.” See Responsive Br.
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`at 7.
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`The Court agrees with Amazon. The plain language of claim 20 provides that the
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`“unauthorized or unlicensed” determination is a prerequisite to “permitting [or not permitting] the
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`content to be provided to or accessed by the at least one other computer.” See ’310 Patent
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`at 39:24–31 (emphasis added). This determination informs whether to permit content to be
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`provided or accessed, and thus does not encompass PersonalWeb’s purported examples which
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`concern modification/alteration. PersonalWeb states that “if the region (directory) or file at issue
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`is read-only or locked, respectively . . . . then certain actions, such as altering them, are
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`unauthorized.” See Reply Br. at 8. This point is not in meaningful dispute. However,
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`PersonalWeb goes on to argue that “[o]nce [a read-only flag or lock flag] is detected, the [next]
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`step [under claim 20] is preventing access to make unauthorized alterations.” See id. This
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`argument is without merit. Claim 20 concerns whether “the content is unauthorized or
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`9
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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 485 Filed 08/16/19 Page 10 of 34
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`unlicensed,” not whether alterations to the content are unauthorized. See ’310 Patent at 39:24–31
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`(emphasis added). Put differently, “read-only” and “lock” flags restrict modification, not access.
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`Thus, “read-only” and/or “lock” flags do not form a basis under claim 20 to prevent access to
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`content, because qualified content would be “provided” or “accessed” notwithstanding the
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`presence of “read-only” and/or “lock” flags. Accordingly, PersonalWeb’s “read-only” and “lock”
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`flag examples are not evidence of more general, genus level content-access authorizations.
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`If anything, the remoteness of PersonalWeb’s “read-only” and “lock” flag examples from
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`having anything to do with content-access authorization demonstrates the merit of Amazon’s
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`proposed construction. Although a “patentee is free to choose a broad term and expect to obtain
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`the full scope of its plain and ordinary meaning unless the patentee explicitly redefines the term or
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`disavows its full scope,” Thorner v. Sony Computer Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
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`2012), here, as previously discussed, the specification explicitly and interchangeably uses the
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`words “authorized” and “licensed” to describe the same concept—regulating access to licensed
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`content. Thus, PersonalWeb’s argument in favor of giving separate meaning to the different
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`words “unauthorized” and “unlicensed” is unpersuasive. Baran, 616 F.3d at 1316.
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`PersonalWeb separately argues that “the prosecution history of the [’420]3 patent
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`unambiguously shows that the patentee was not using the words ‘authorized’ to mean ‘licensed,’
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`but rather was using the term ‘authorized’ as a broader ‘genus’ term, and the term ‘licensed’ as a
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`narrower ‘species’ term.” See Opening Br. at 5. In support of this proposition, PersonalWeb cites
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`to proposed claim amendments to the ’420 patent in 2010 that split the term “unauthorized or
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`unlicensed copy” into the term “unauthorized copy” in one proposed claim and the term
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`“unlicensed copy” in a separate proposed claim. See 2/14/2010 Response to Final Office Action at
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`9–10, Ex. 3 to Thompson Decl., ECF 406-4. PersonalWeb’s prosecution history argument fails
`
`for at least two independent reasons. First, the proposed claims identified by PersonalWeb were
`
`not included in the issued ’420 patent and thus not part of the claimed invention. See generally
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`’420 Patent. “An inventor in entitled to claim in a patent what [she] has invented, but no more.”
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`3 PersonalWeb’s opening brief describes the prosecution history as relating to the ’442 patent;
`however, the recited excerpts are from the file history of the ’420 patent.
`10
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`

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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 485 Filed 08/16/19 Page 11 of 34
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`MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Here, the proposed claim
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`amendments are not part of the claimed invention. Nor are the proposed claim amendments
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`disclosed in the ’420 patent specification, which is identical to the ’310 patent specification.
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`Second, even if these claims had been issued, which they were not, “[c]laim differentiation cannot
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`overcome . . . a contrary construction dictated by the written description or prosecution history.”
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`Wi-LAN USA, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 830 F.3d 1374, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and
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`citation omitted). As previously discussed, the Court finds that the patentee used “authorized” and
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`“licensed” interchangeably in the specification. Accordingly, claim differentiation based on the
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`proposed claim amendments would not control. Wi-LAN, 830 F.3d at 1391.
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`
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`Finally, the Court notes that both parties discuss two Markman orders from the Eastern
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`District of Texas involving some of the patents-in-suit in the instant action: (1) PersonalWeb
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`Techs., LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., No. 6:11-cv-658, Dkt. No. 140 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2013) (“Davis
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`Order”), Ex. 6 to Hadden Decl., ECF 412-7; and (2) PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v. IBM Corp., No.
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`6:12-cv-661-JRG, Dkt. No. 103 at 25, 28 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2016) (“Gilstrap Order”), Ex. 5 to
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`Hadden Decl., ECF 412-6. PersonalWeb argues that neither the Davis Order nor the Gilstrap
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`Order “is binding here.” See Opening Br. at 6. The Court agrees. Neither order addressed the
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`“unauthorized or unlicensed” term found in claim 20 of the ’310 patent. Judge Davis declined to
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`construe “licensed” and “unlicensed” as used in certain claims of the ’442 patent. See Davis Order
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`at 24–26. On the other hand, Judge Gilstrap construed “unlicensed” as used in claims 7 and 23 of
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`the ’442 patent to mean “invalid rights to content.” See Gilstrap Order at 21, 25. Judge Gilstrap
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`also construed the term “authorized” as used in claims 1, 2, and 16–19 of the ’310 patent to mean
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`“compliant with a valid license.” See id. at 25, 28. Similarly, Judge Gilstrap construed
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`“unauthorized” as used in claims 7 and 23 of the ’442 patent to mean “not compliant with a valid
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`license.” See id. at 26, 28. While neither the Davis Order nor the Gilstrap Order is directly on
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`point with the instant dispute, the Gilstrap Order is the closer of two and noted that
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`“‘authorization’ merely refers to a valid license,” see Gilstrap Order at 28. The Court finds the
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`Gilstrap Order persuasive and not inconsistent with the Court’s ruling on the instant dispute.
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`In sum, the Court construes the disputed term “unauthorized or unlicensed” in claim 20 of
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`11
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`

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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 485 Filed 08/16/19 Page 12 of 34
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`
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`the ’310 patent as “not compliant with a valid license.” Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court
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`need not and does not address any remaining arguments raised by the parties with respect to this
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`term.
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`2. “authorization” (claims 25 and 166 of ’420 patent)
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`PersonalWeb’s Proposal
`Plain and ordinary meaning
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`Alternatively:
`“permission”
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`Amazon’s Proposal
`“a valid license”
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`Court’s Construction
`“a valid license”
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`The parties’ arguments with respect to the term “authorization” in claims 25 and 166 of the
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`’420 patent are the same as the parties’ arguments made with respect to the term “unauthorized or
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`unlicensed” in claim 20 of the ’310 patent. See Opening Br. at 1–9; Responsive Br. at 3–9; Reply
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`Br. at 4–8. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in Section IV.A.1 supra, the Court adopts
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`Amazon’s proposed construction “a valid license” for the term “authorization” in claims 25 and
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`166 of the ’420 patent.
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`B. Additional disputed terms in the ’310 and ’420 patents
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`The parties dispute two additional terms in the ’310 and ’420 patents: (1) “the request
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`including at least a content-dependent name of a particular data item” (in claim 20 of the ’310
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`patent); and (2) “content-dependent name” (in claims 20 and 69 of the ’310 patent and claim 25 of
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`the ’420 patent). Claim 20 of the ’310 patent is representative of both terms and recites:
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`20. A computer-implemented method operable in a system which includes a plurality of
`computers, the method comprising:
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`controlling distribution of content from a first computer to at least one other
`computer, in response to a request obtained by a first device in the system from
`a second device in the system, the first device comprising hardware including at
`least one processor, the request including at least a content-dependent name
`of a particular data item, the content-dependent name being based at least in
`part on a function of at least some of the data comprising the particular data
`item, wherein the function comprises a message digest function or a hash
`function, and wherein two identical data items will have the same content-
`dependent name,
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`based at least in part on said content-dependent name of said particular data

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