`
`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 453 Filed 06/26/19 Page 1 of 14
`
`
`
`J. DAVID HADDEN (CSB No. 176148)
`dhadden@fenwick.com
`SAINA S. SHAMILOV (CSB No. 215636)
`sshamilov@fenwick.com
`TODD R. GREGORIAN (CSB No. 236096)
`tgregorian@fenwick.com
`PHILLIP J. HAACK (CSB No. 262060)
`phaack@fenwick.com
`RAVI R. RANGANATH (CSB No. 272981)
`rranganath@fenwick.com
`CHIEH TUNG (CSB No. 318963)
`ctung@fenwick.com
`FENWICK & WEST LLP
`Silicon Valley Center
`801 California Street
`Mountain View, CA 94041
`Telephone:
`650.988.8500
`Facsimile:
`650.938.5200
`Attorneys for AMAZON.COM, INC.
`and AMAZON WEB SERVICES, INC.
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`SAN JOSE DIVISION
`
`IN RE: PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES,
`LLC ET AL., PATENT LITIGATION,
`
` Case No.: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`
`AMAZON.COM, INC., and AMAZON WEB
`SERVICES, INC.,
`Plaintiffs,
`
`v.
`PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES, LLC and
`LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES, LLC and
`LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,
`Counterclaimants,
`
`v.
`
`AMAZON.COM, INC., and AMAZON WEB
`SERVICES, INC.,
`
`Counterdefendants.
`
`Case No.: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`AMAZON.COM, INC., AND AMAZON
`WEB SERVICES, INC.’S REPLY IN
`SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR JUDG-
`MENT ON THE PLEADINGS ON IN-
`FRINGEMENT CLAIMS AGAINST
`CLOUDFRONT
`Date:
`October 3, 2019
`Time:
`9:00 a.m.
`Dept:
`Courtroom 3, 5th Floor
`Judge:
`Hon. Beth L. Freeman
`Trial Date: March 16, 2020
`
`REPLY ISO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
`PLEADINGS
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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 453 Filed 06/26/19 Page 2 of 14
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`INTRODUCTION ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
`PERSONALWEB LACKS STANDING TO ASSERT INFRINGEMENT BY
`AMAZON CLOUDFRONT ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
`THE COURT CAN RESOLVE THIS MOTION ON THE PLEADINGS OR
`ALTERNATIVELY AS A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -------------------- 4
`THE COURT SHOULD DENY PERSONALWEB LEAVE TO AMEND ITS
`COUNTERCLAIM YET AGAIN ---------------------------------------------------------------- 6
`CONCLUSION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9
`
`I.
`II.
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`V.
`
`
`
`
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`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
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`FENWICK & WEST LLP
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`PLEADINGS
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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 453 Filed 06/26/19 Page 3 of 14
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`
`
`Cases:
`
`Page(s):
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC,
`625 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010) -------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
`
`Alfred E. Mann Found. for Scientific Research v. Cochlear Corp.,
`604 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2010) -------------------------------------------------------------------- 3
`
`Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc.,
`434 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006) -------------------------------------------------------------------- 7
`
`Averbach v. Vnescheconombank,
`280 F. Supp. 2d 945 (N.D. Cal. 2003) ------------------------------------------------------------ 4
`
`Buckhorn, Inc. v. Orbis Corp.,
`618 F. App’x 1000 (Fed Cir. 2015) ---------------------------------------------------------------- 4
`
`Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of Fort Peck
`Reservation,
`323 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 2003) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 5
`
`Calderon v. Kan. Dep’t of Soc. and Rehab. Servs.,
`181 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 1999) -------------------------------------------------------------------- 7
`
`Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
`477 U.S. 317 (1986) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5
`
`Clear-View Techs., Inc. v. Rasnick,
`No. 13–cv–02744–BLF, 2015 WL 1307112 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2015) --------------------- 8
`
`Desoto Cab Co. v. Picker,
`714 F. App’x 783 (9th Cir. 2018) ------------------------------------------------------------------ 1
`
`English v. Apple Inc.,
`No. 3:14-CV-01619-WHO, 2017 WL 106299 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2017) -------------------- 6
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc.,
`No. 18-cv-02621-WHO, 2019 WL 1455333 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2019) ----------------------- 8
`
`Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354,
`753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir. 1985) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 4
`
`In re Yahoo! Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig.,
`153 F. Supp. 3d 1107 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ----------------------------------------------------------- 6
`
`Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc.,
`975 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1992) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 8
`
`REPLY ISO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
`PLEADINGS
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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 453 Filed 06/26/19 Page 4 of 14
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`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(Continued)
`
`Page(s):
`
`Kuyat v. BioMimetic Therapeutics, Inc.,
`747 F3d 435 (6th Cir. 2014) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 7
`
`Lancaster v. City of Pleasanton,
`No. 12-05267-WHA, 2013 WL 5182949 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2013) ------------------------- 8
`
`Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc.,
`560 U.S. 413 (2010) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7
`
`Long v. Satz,
`181 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 1999) -------------------------------------------------------------------- 7
`
`Phleger v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
`No. C 07-1686, 2008 WL 65677 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2008) ------------------------------------- 7
`
`Price v. W. Res., Inc.,
`232 F.3d 779 (10th Cir. 2000) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 5
`
`Qureshi v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
`No. 09–4198, 2010 WL 841669 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2010) ------------------------------------ 6
`
`Rubio v. U.S. Bank N.A.,
`No. 13-5752, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45677 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2014) ---------------------------- 4
`
`Sarmiento v. Sealy, Inc.,
`367 F. Supp. 3d 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2019) ----------------------------------------------------------- 7
`
`Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop,
`211 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2000) -------------------------------------------------------------------- 3
`
`Thommeny v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,
`Civ. No. 10-6951, 2011 WL 2899340 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 13, 2011) ------------------------------ 6
`
`United States v. Corinthian Colls.,
`655 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2011) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 7
`
`Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A.,
`944 F.2d 870 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ------------------------------------------------------------------- 2–3
`
`WiAV Solutions LLC v. Motorola, Inc.,
`631 F.3d 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ----------------------------------------------------------------- 2–3
`
`Wilbur v. Locke,
`423 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2005) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 6
`
`
`
`
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`PLEADINGS
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`Statutes and Rules:
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(Continued)
`
`Page(s):
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`35 U.S.C. § 261 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5–6
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`PLEADINGS
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`In every one of its scores of complaints and counterclaims, including all amendments, Per-
`sonalWeb alleged that it was not suing in Level 3’s field of use. (See, e.g., Dkt. 257, Amended
`Counterclaim, ¶ 3.) Accordingly, PersonalWeb has never given Level 3 the required notice of suit
`under the Kinetech-Digital Island Agreement. (Dkt. 414-1 (“Agreement”).) Nor has PersonalWeb
`done anything else to obtain the right to sue in Level 3’s field of use. See id. Eighteen months into
`this case, those allegations are now established facts.
`Indeed, until its opposition to this motion, PersonalWeb had argued exclusively that its
`claims against CloudFront fell into its own field of use, not Level 3’s field, based on a tortured
`interpretation of the Agreement. (See, e.g., Dkt. 354-1 at Ex. 1 (arguing Level 3’s field of use “does
`not extend generically to all CDNs, . . . but is expressly limited to CDNs deployed at ISPs.”).) Per-
`sonalWeb has now abandoned that argument, asserting instead for the first time that it has standing
`to bring claims in Level’s 3 field of use and that it did in fact do so in these cases—directly contrary
`to the unequivocal allegations in its numerous complaints and amendments thereof.
`Recognizing the flaw in its new argument, PersonalWeb wants to amend its pleadings yet
`again. But standing is assessed based on the facts that existed when the lawsuit was filed; the court
`may exercise jurisdiction only if the plaintiff had standing to sue on that date. See Abraxis Biosci-
`ence, Inc. v. Navinta LLC, 625 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Desoto Cab Co. v. Picker, 714 F.
`App’x 783, 784 (9th Cir. 2018). Whatever new tactic PersonalWeb may wish to attempt, it may
`not do so retroactively. These cases must be dismissed.
`
`II.
`
`PERSONALWEB LACKS STANDING TO ASSERT INFRINGEMENT BY
`AMAZON CLOUDFRONT.
`
`Under the Agreement, PersonalWeb has no rights in the field of CDNs. Level 3 owns all
`such rights, including the right to exclude PersonalWeb itself from practicing or licensing in that
`field, the right to bring and control any infringement suit in that field without seeking Personal-
`Web’s input or consent, and the right to license any party in that field, including those that Person-
`alWeb might otherwise wish to sue. Because PersonalWeb has no exclusionary rights as to the
`field of CDNs, it has suffered no injury in fact, and therefore lacks standing to assert any claims
`
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`against CloudFront. See WiAV Solutions LLC v. Motorola, Inc., 631 F.3d 1257, 1265 (Fed. Cir.
`2010) (“[T]he touchstone of constitutional standing in a patent infringement suit is whether a party
`can establish that it has an exclusionary right in a patent that, if violated by another, would cause
`the party holding the exclusionary right to suffer legal injury.”).
`PersonalWeb argues that because it is a co-owner of the patents, rather than a licensee, it
`has standing to sue for infringement without the need to consider the Agreement at all. (Dkt. 442
`(“Opp.”) at 2-4). But that is not the law. While the Patent Act confers those rights on the patent
`owner in the first instance, the owner may transfer some or all of them by contract, such that it no
`longer has standing to sue for infringement. See, e.g., Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica
`Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 873–74 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also 35 U.S.C. § 261 (“patents shall
`have the attributes of personal property”). Here, the parties did just that. They limited their rights
`of co-ownership through the Agreement:
`4.1. DI [predecessor to Level 3] will refrain from using, practicing, licens-
`ing or sublicensing The Patent or the inventions disclosed therein other than
`in the Field of Use.
`4.2. KINETECH [predecessor to PersonalWeb] will refrain from using,
`practicing, licensing or sublicensing The Patents or the inventions disclosed
`therein in the DI Field of Use.
`(Agreement, §§ 4.1-4.2.) In other words, the Agreement prohibits PersonalWeb from practicing or
`licensing in Level 3’s field (i.e., Level 3 can exclude PersonalWeb from that field entirely), and
`PersonalWeb has no right to exclude others from that field. These rights carry through the rest of
`the contract. The parties have the right to sue for infringement “except as otherwise limited by this
`Agreement.” (Id. § 6.2.) Level 3 has the first right to file suit in its field of use. (Id. § 6.4.1.)
`PersonalWeb must support Level 3’s enforcement efforts (id. §§ 3.4, 6.8), but aside from approving
`Level 3’s selection of counsel it has no right to control or direct decisions in the litigation. Instead,
`the Agreement leaves to Level 3’s “sole discretion” what actions it deems necessary to assert any
`right under the patents. (Id. § 3.5.)
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`And although under the Agreement, PersonalWeb can sue in Level 3’s field after it has
`given Level 3 notice and a 180-day waiting period for Level 3 to sue or license the alleged infringer
`(id. § 6.4.1), the Federal Circuit has held on similar facts that this right is “illusory.” In Speedplay,
`Inc. v. Bebop, 211 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2000), an agreement between the parties gave the transferee
`Speedplay the exclusive right to manufacture, use, and sell products covered by the patents. Id. at
`1250. Speedplay could also enforce the patents, and the transferors, Bryne and Zoumaras, had no
`rights to manage or participate in infringement actions brought by Speedplay. Id. at 1251. Bryne
`and Zoumaras kept only the option to file suit against an alleged infringer in their own names if
`Speedplay failed to bring such a suit within three months. Id. The Court held that clause was an
`“illusory” retention of the right to sue because Speedplay could “render that right nugatory by
`granting the alleged infringer a royalty-free sublicense.” Id. So, too, here. PersonalWeb possesses
`only an illusory exclusionary right: Even if PersonalWeb has given notice to Level 3 and the wait-
`ing period has expired, Level 3 may at any time license the accused infringer without Personal-
`Web’s approval or consent.
`And in this case, PersonalWeb’s illusory right has not even vested under the Agreement.
`See Alfred E. Mann Found. for Scientific Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed.
`Cir. 2010) (“While AMF’s right to choose to sue an infringer does not vest until AB chooses not to
`sue that infringer, it is otherwise unfettered. Once its right to sue an infringer activates, AMF can
`decide whether or not to bring suit . . . .”). PersonalWeb affirmatively alleged that it has not given
`Level 3 notice of suit because it is not suing in Level 3’s field of use. Amended Counterclaim,
`¶¶ 2-4. It has no current right to bring suit for infringement in Level 3’s field.
`PersonalWeb’s argument that Amazon “lacks standing” to challenge standing is too clever
`by half. (See Opp. at 1.) Nearly every Federal Circuit case addressing standing involves a defend-
`ant who is neither a party nor an express beneficiary of the contract that transferred rights to the
`patent at issue, and on which the standing challenge is based. See, e.g., WiAV, 631 F.3d at 1260,
`Vaupel, 944 F.2d at 871-72, Mann, 604 F.3d at 1356. This makes sense because those defendants
`are not attempting to enforce contract obligations; the contract is simply evidence of who owns the
`relevant patent rights. PersonalWeb’s cited cases do not hold otherwise; in fact, neither case even
`
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`concerns a standing challenge to a claim of patent infringement. See Buckhorn, Inc. v. Orbis Corp.,
`618 F. App’x 1000 (Fed Cir. 2015) (non-party to contract could not enforce indemnification provi-
`sion to recover its own attorney’s fees); Rubio v. U.S. Bank N.A., No. 13-5752, U.S. Dist. LEXIS
`45677 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2014) (plaintiff challenging foreclosure of his San Francisco property
`could not assert related claims under a pooling agreement to which he was not a party). That Am-
`azon is neither a party to, nor an intended third-party beneficiary of, the Agreement is therefore
`irrelevant to the Court’s analysis.
`
`III. THE COURT CAN RESOLVE THIS MOTION ON THE PLEADINGS OR
`ALTERNATIVELY AS A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
`
`Under Rule 12(c), the Court can consider not only the four corners of the pleadings, but also
`the Agreement itself because the pleadings reference and rely on it. (See Mot. at 5.) It can also
`properly rely on PersonalWeb’s judicial admissions that CloudFront is a CDN. (See RJN at 3-4.)
`PersonalWeb did not dispute this, nor did it file an opposition to Amazon’s request for judicial
`notice, and, indeed, PersonalWeb itself cited to the Agreement in opposing the motion. (Opp. at
`2:15.) Thus, the Court may resolve this motion under Rule 12(c) without converting it to a motion
`for summary judgment. But even if the Court decides to convert the motion to one for summary
`judgment, no further briefing is required, as PersonalWeb requests. (See Opp. at 6.)
`In its motion, Amazon asked the Court to grant summary judgment if the Court was not
`inclined to rule on the pleadings. (Mot. at 1.) PersonalWeb had notice of that express request and
`the opportunity to present its evidence in opposition, and it failed to do so. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
`12(d); Averbach v. Vnescheconombank, 280 F. Supp. 2d 945, 951 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“When a party
`is represented by counsel, formal notice that a motion to dismiss is being treated as a motion for
`summary judgment is unnecessary when a party has reason to know that the court will consider
`matters outside the pleadings.”); see also Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1533
`(9th Cir. 1985) (conversion is proper where the parties have notice that the matter may be consid-
`ered as a motion for summary judgment).
`Indeed, in its opposition, PersonalWeb did not dispute that:
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`1. The Kinetech-Digital Island Agreement (Dkt. 414-1 (“Agreement”)) grants each co-
`owner the rights to practice and enforce the patents in their respective field of use (Dkt. 413
`(“Mot.”) at 2-3);
`2. Under the plain terms of the Agreement, Level 3’s field of use is content delivery net-
`works (CDNs) (Id. at 3-4); and
`3. CloudFront is indisputably a CDN and thus within Level 3’s field, as confirmed by Per-
`sonalWeb’s judicial admissions to that effect. (Id. at 4.)
`Instead, it asked permission to submit unspecified witness testimony about contract meaning at
`some later date—to no useful effect given that the Court can determine that meaning as a matter of
`law. (Opp. at 2:6-8.) PersonalWeb was on notice to come forward with this evidence, but did not.
`The Court should also deny PersonalWeb’s request to defer a ruling “under Rule 56(f)
`[sic].” (Opp. at 6:15-17.) The relevant rule, Rule 56(d), does not apply here. Rule 56(d) allows a
`party to avoid summary judgment when it has not had sufficient time to develop evidence. Bur-
`lington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of Fort Peck Reservation, 323 F.3d 767,
`773 (9th Cir. 2003). “The general principle […] is that ‘summary judgment should be refused
`where the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to
`his opposition.’” Price v. W. Res., Inc., 232 F.3d 779, 783 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Anderson v.
`Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 250 n.5 (1986)). PersonalWeb has known of the standing defense for
`six months. (Dkt. 350 at 8.) It received two extensions to file its opposition brief to this motion.
`(Dkts. 424, 435.) And discovery is nearly complete (Dkt. 374). See, e.g., Burlington N. Santa Fe
`R.R. Co, 323 F.3d at 773; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986) (stating that where a
`motion for summary judgment was filed a full year after an action commenced, “no serious claim
`can be made that respondent was in any sense ‘railroaded’ by a premature motion for summary
`judgment”). PersonalWeb had ample time to develop any evidence it required to oppose the mo-
`tion. In any event, any evidence about the scope of the Agreement would be in PersonalWeb’s
`possession as the successor to the Agreement; Amazon has no such discovery.
`PersonalWeb also failed to meet any of the requirements of the rule. A party seeking a
`continuance under Rule 56(d) must show “(1) that they have set forth in affidavit form the specific
`
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`PLEADINGS
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`facts that they hope to elicit from further discovery; (2) that the facts sought exist; and (3) that these
`sought-after facts are ‘essential’ to resist the summary judgment motion.” English v. Apple Inc.,
`No. 3:14-CV-01619-WHO, 2017 WL 106299, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2017) (quoting State of
`Cal., on Behalf of Cal. Dep't of Toxic Substances Control v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir.
`1998)), appeal docketed, No. 17-15251 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2017). PersonalWeb did not even attempt
`to establish any one of these elements: it submitted no declaration, and it did not identify even a
`single missing fact that it needed to oppose the motion. It also failed to show that it has already
`made a diligent attempt to obtain the needed evidence in discovery. This provides yet another
`independent basis to deny a 56(d) continuance. See English, 2017 WL 106299, at *1; Thommeny
`v. Paramount Pictures Corp., Civ. No. 10-6951, 2011 WL 2899340, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 13, 2011).
`By failing to address Amazon’s contentions regarding the scope of the Agreement, Person-
`alWeb has waived its arguments on each of the unaddressed points. See In re Yahoo! Inc. S’holder
`Derivative Litig., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1124 n.11 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (granting motion to dismiss as
`plaintiffs’ failure to argue both parts of a two-part test waived argument on the unaddressed issue);;
`Qureshi v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 09–4198, 2010 WL 841669, at *6 n.2 (N.D. Cal.
`Mar. 10, 2010) (granting motion to dismiss and deeming plaintiff’s failure to address in its opposi-
`tion brief allegations challenged in a motion to dismiss an “abandonment of those claims”). Ac-
`cordingly, whether the Court decides this motion under Rule 12(c) or Rule 56, it should dismiss
`PersonalWeb’s claims against CloudFront: PersonalWeb’s pleadings allege infringement in its
`own field of use, not in Level 3’s field of use, and PersonalWeb did not, and now cannot, dispute
`that Level 3’s field of use is CDNs and that CloudFront is a CDN.
`
`IV.
`
`THE COURT SHOULD DENY PERSONALWEB LEAVE TO AMEND ITS
`COUNTERCLAIM YET AGAIN.
`
`PersonalWeb ends its brief by asking the Court yet again to grant it leave to amend to correct
`the “deficiencies” in its Amended Counterclaim. (Opp. at 6-8.) But any realistic proposed amend-
`ment would be futile. PersonalWeb cannot simply allege a change in intervening facts—i.e., that
`it gave notice to Level 3 recently. “The party invoking the jurisdiction of the court cannot rely on
`events that unfolded after the filing of the complaint to establish its standing.” Wilbur v. Locke, 423
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`F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted); abrogated on other grounds by Levin v. Com-
`merce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413 (2010); see also Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc., 434
`F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[A] party’s standing to sue must exist at the time an original
`complaint is filed[.]”); Reply Br., above, at 1. Any notice to Level 3 after the filing date would
`therefore not suffice to establish PersonalWeb’s standing to assert claims against CloudFront.
`
`PersonalWeb would instead need to change its complaints to allege exactly the opposite of
`what it has said for 18 months. Allowing such an amendment would be reversible error. “Leave
`to amend is warranted if the deficiencies can be cured with additional allegations that are ‘consistent
`with the challenged pleading’ and that do not contradict the allegations in the original complaint.”
`United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); see also
`Sarmiento v. Sealy, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (same). PersonalWeb pled
`at the time it filed, and again at the time it amended its claims, that it had not given Level 3 notice
`of suit for any claims because it was not suing in Level 3’s exclusive field. (Dkt. 257, Amended
`Counterclaim, ¶ 3.) No hypothetical amendment could cure the defect in PersonalWeb’s pleadings
`while remaining “consistent” with the originals.
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`Futility of amendment alone requires that the Court deny leave. But the Court has ample
`
`other grounds on which to deny PersonalWeb’s request. PersonalWeb did not submit its proposed
`amended pleading with the opposition brief or otherwise disclose how it would amend. A “bare
`request” such as this prevents the Court from fully analyzing the propriety of the amendment and
`violates the Federal Rules. See Kuyat v. BioMimetic Therapeutics, Inc., 747 F3d 435, 444 (6th Cir.
`2014) (liberal policy of FRCP 15(a) does not apply to “one-sentence” request in opposition brief);
`Calderon v. Kan. Dep’t of Soc. and Rehab. Servs., 181 F.3d 1180, 1187 (10th Cir. 1999) (statement
`in opposition brief not a proper request for leave to amend as it included no statement of the grounds
`for amendment); Long v. Satz, 181 F.3d 1275, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 1999) (request for leave to amend
`improper where plaintiff failed to attach proposed amendment or set forth its substance); see also
`Phleger v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. C 07-1686 SBA, 2008 WL 65677, at *4-5 (N.D.
`Cal. Jan. 4, 2008) (denying leave based on related violation of Local Rules).
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`PLEADINGS
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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 453 Filed 06/26/19 Page 13 of 14
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`Nor did PersonalWeb’s brief address the requirements of Rule 16, which applies once a
`court has entered a scheduling order, as the Court has done here: “Only if the moving party estab-
`lishes good cause to modify the scheduling order under Rule 16 should the court consider whether
`the moving party also has demonstrated that amendment is appropriate under Rule 15(a).” Finjan,
`Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., No. 18-cv-02621-WHO, 2019 WL 1455333, at *2 (N.D.
`Cal. Apr. 2, 2019); see also Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir.
`1992). The record makes clear that no good cause exists.
`
`Under Rule 16, “[g]ood cause requires diligence by the moving party.” Lancaster v. City
`of Pleasanton, No. 12-05267-WHA, 2013 WL 5182949, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2013); see also
`Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. After PersonalWeb repeatedly changed its infringement contentions, the
`Court set an October 4, 2018 deadline for PersonalWeb to amend its pleadings. (Dkts. 157 & 162.)
`And PersonalWeb’s counsel expressly acknowledged that this deadline would finally settle the
`pleadings. (See Dkt. No. 121 at 17:1.) Now, nine months later, PersonalWeb seeks to amend its
`counterclaim and complaints again. But, it claims that it intended to accuse CloudFront from the
`very beginning of the case. (Dkt. 354-1, Ex. 1 at 2:9-11.) There is therefore no excuse for Person-
`alWeb’s failure to include its CloudFront allegations, including any allegations it believed relevant
`to establish its standing, either in its original complaints or in its October 2018 amendments.
`
`PersonalWeb and Level 3 have been aware of Amazon’s arguments on standing for six
`months (Dkt. 350 at 8), and the Court has repeatedly invited Level 3 to comment on the standing
`issue. (See, e.g., Dkts. 376 at 77:15-19; 394 at 10.) If PersonalWeb wanted to attempt to amend
`the counterclaims to support an argument about the scope of Level 3’s field of use, it should have
`done so long before forcing Amazon to incur the time and expense of preparing this motion and
`forcing the Court to decide the issue. This game-playing gives the Court ample additional basis to
`deny amendment here, and it should. See Clear-View Techs., Inc. v. Rasnick, No. 13-cv-02744-
`BLF, 2015 WL 1307112, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2015) (no good cause shown where the movant
`knew the facts underlying the proposed amendment for over eighteen months and had multiple
`opportunities to assert its claims but chose not to do so).
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`REPLY ISO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
`PLEADINGS
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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 453 Filed 06/26/19 Page 14 of 14
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`V.
`
`CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant Amazon’s motion for judgment on the
`pleadings.
`
`
`June 26, 2019
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`FENWICK & WEST LLP
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`
`
`By: /s/ J. David Hadden
`J. David Hadden
`Saina S. Shamilov
`Todd R. Gregorian
`Phillip J. Haack
`Ravi R. Ranganath
`Chieh Tung
`Counsel for AMAZON.COM, INC.
`and AMAZON WEB SERVICES, INC.
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`REPLY ISO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
`PLEADINGS
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