throbber
1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`
`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 399 Filed 04/08/19 Page 1 of 32
`
`MICHAEL A. SHERMAN (SBN 94783)
`masherman@stubbsalderton.com
`JEFFREY F. GERSH (SBN 87124)
`jgersh@stubbsalderton.com
`SANDEEP SETH (SBN 195914)
`sseth@stubbsalderton.com
`WESLEY W. MONROE (SBN 149211)
`wmonroe@stubbsalderton.com
`STANLEY H. THOMPSON, JR. (SBN 198825)
`sthompson@stubbsalderton.com
`VIVIANA BOERO HEDRICK (SBN 239359)
`vhedrick@stubbsalderton.com
`STUBBS, ALDERTON & MARKILES, LLP
`15260 Ventura Blvd., 20th Floor
`Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
`Telephone:
`(818) 444-4500
`Facsimile:
`(818) 444-4520
`
`Attorneys for PersonalWeb Technologies, LLC
`[Additional Attorneys listed below]
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`SAN JOSE DIVISION
`
`IN RE PERSONAL WEB TECHNOLOGIES,
`LLC, ET., AL., PATENT LITIGATION
`
`
`CASE NO.: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`
`
`AMAZON.COM, INC., et., al.,
`
` Plaintiffs,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
`et., al.,
`
`
`
` Defendants.
`
`PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES, LLC
`and LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`Counterclaimants,
`
`AMAZON.COM, INC. and AMAZON WEB
`SERVICES, INC.,
`
`Counterdefendants.
`
`
`
`PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, a
`Texas limited liability company, and
`
`
`
`
`PERSONALWEB’S OPENING CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case No.: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`
`Case No.: 5:18-cv-05619-BLF
`
`PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES,
`LLC’S OPENING CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`CASE NO: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
`
`

`

`
`
`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 399 Filed 04/08/19 Page 2 of 32
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,
`a Delaware limited liability company,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`TWITCH INTERACTIVE, INC. a Delaware
`corporation,
`
`
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`
`
`PERSONALWEB’S OPENING CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`
`
`
`
`CASE NO: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
`
`

`

`
`
`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 399 Filed 04/08/19 Page 3 of 32
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
`
`DISPUTED CONSTRUCTIONS ........................................................................................1
`
`A.
`
`“Authorization” Terms.............................................................................................1
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`This group of claim phrases does not need to be construed because
`their plain and ordinary meaning suffices. ...................................................2
`
`Amazon’s proposal erroneously makes the term “unauthorized”
`synonymous with the term “unlicensed” contradicting the specification
`and prosecution history. ...............................................................................4
`
`3.
`
`Collateral Estoppel Does Not Apply............................................................6
`
`B.
`
`“Selectively” Terms .................................................................................................7
`
`1.
`
`“Selectively permit” (’420 at Claim 166) ....................................................7
`
`a)
`
`b)
`
`The plain and ordinary meaning of this term is sufficient. ..............8
`
`Amazon’s proposed construction renders the claim element
`internally inconsistent and confusingly redundant. .........................8
`
`2.
`
`“selectively allowing a copy of the particular sequence of bits to be
`provided to or accessed by or from at least one of the computers in a
`network of computers” (’420 at Claim 25) ..................................................9
`
`a)
`
`b)
`
`The plain and ordinary meaning of this term is sufficient. ............10
`
`Amazon’s proposed construction is inconsistent with the claim
`language. ........................................................................................10
`
`C.
`
`“Permitting”/“Allowing” Terms ............................................................................11
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`“the first device (A) permitting the content to be provided to or
`accessed by the at least one other computer if it is not determined that
`the content is unauthorized or unlicensed, otherwise, (B) if it is
`determined that the content is unauthorized or unlicensed, not
`permitting the content to be provided to or accessed by the at least one
`other computer” (’310 at Claim 20) ...........................................................11
`
`a)
`
`b)
`
`The Court should apply the plain and ordinary meaning of this
`term. ...............................................................................................11
`
`Amazon’s proposed construction is inconsistent with the claim
`language. ........................................................................................12
`
`“based on whether or not it is determined that access to the data item is
`authorized or unauthorized, to allow the data item to be provided to or
`accessed by the second computer if it is not determined that access to
`the data item is unauthorized” (’310 at Claim 69) .....................................12
`
`a)
`
`b)
`
`The Court should apply the plain and ordinary meaning of this
`term. ...............................................................................................13
`
`Amazon’s proposed construction is inconsistent with the claim
`language. ........................................................................................13
`
`
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`PERSONALWEB’S OPENING CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`i
`
`
`
`
`
`CASE NO: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
`
`

`

`
`
`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 399 Filed 04/08/19 Page 4 of 32
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`
`D.
`
`“the request including at least a content dependent name of a particular data
`item” (’310 at Claim 20) and “the request including at least a content-
`dependent name for the data item” (’310 patent, 69) .............................................13
`
`E.
`
`“Names for Data Items” Terms ..............................................................................14
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`“Content‐dependent name of a particular data item” (’310 at Claim
`20), “content-dependent name for the data item” (’310 at Claim 69),
`and “content-dependent name for a particular sequence of bits” (’420
`patent, claim 25).........................................................................................14
`
`a)
`
`b)
`
`PersonalWeb’s construction flows from the claim language. ........15
`
`PersonalWeb’s construction is consistent with the
`specification. ..................................................................................16
`
`“Name for a data file” (’442 patent, claim 10) ..........................................16
`
`“content-dependent digital identifier” (’420 patent, claim 166) and
`“content-dependent digital identifiers for said particular data item”
`(’420 patent, claim 166) .............................................................................17
`
`“digital key for the particular file” / “file key for each particular file”
`(’544 patent, claims 46, 52) .......................................................................17
`
`F.
`
`“Based on a Function” Terms ................................................................................18
`
`1.
`
`“[being] based at least in part on a function of at least some of the data
`comprising the particular data item” (’310 at claim 20) ............................18
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`5.
`
`6.
`
`a)
`
`b)
`
`The Court should apply the plain and ordinary meaning of this
`term. ...............................................................................................19
`
`PersonalWeb’s alternative construction flows from the claim
`language. ........................................................................................19
`
`“[being] based at least in part on a function of the data in the data item,
`wherein the data used by the function to determine the content-
`dependent name comprises at least some of the contents of the data
`item” (’310 patent, claim 69) and “[being] based at least in part on a
`given function of the data, wherein the data used by the function
`comprises the contents of the particular file” (’442 patent, claim 10) .......19
`
`“at least in part by applying a particular function to at least some of the
`particular sequence of bits” (’420 patent, claim 25) ..................................20
`
`“based at least in part on a given function of at least some of the bits in
`the particular sequence of bits” (’420 patent, claim 166) ..........................20
`
`“being based on a first function of the contents of the specific part”
`(’544 patent, claim 46) ...............................................................................21
`
`“wherein the particular digital key for the particular file is determined
`using a second function of the one or more of part values of said first
`one or more parts” (’544 patent, claim 46) ................................................21
`
`a)
`
`Only “particular digital key for the particular file” and “part
`value” should be construed in this term. ........................................22
`
`b)
`
`Amazon’s proposed construction of the phrase as a whole
`
`
`PERSONALWEB’S OPENING CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`ii
`
`
`
`
`
`CASE NO: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
`
`

`

`
`
`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 399 Filed 04/08/19 Page 5 of 32
`
`improperly rewrites the claim. .......................................................22
`
`7.
`
`“the file key for each particular file being based on a second hash
`function of the part values of the one or more parts of that file” (’544
`patent, claim 52).........................................................................................23
`
`G.
`
`H.
`
`“Database” (’544 patent, claims 46, 52, 55) ..........................................................23
`
`“part” (’544 patent, claims 46, 52).........................................................................24
`
`
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`
`
`
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`
`
`PERSONALWEB’S OPENING CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`iii
`
`
`
`
`
`CASE NO: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
`
`

`

`
`
`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 399 Filed 04/08/19 Page 6 of 32
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp.,
`64 F.3d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1995) .......................................................................................................... 4
`
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp.,
`626 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2010)......................................................................................................... 3
`
`
`Garcia v. United States,
`469 U.S. 70 (1984) ............................................................................................................................ 4
`
`
`Gonzalez v. Infostream Group, Inc.,
`Case No. 2:14–cv–906–JRG–RSP, 2015 WL 5604448 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2015) ........................ 4
`
`
`Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp.,
`204 F.3d 880 (9th Cir. 2000) ............................................................................................................ 6
`
`
`IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`430 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................................. 15, 20
`
`
`Libel-Flarsheim,
`358 F.3d ........................................................................................................................ 16, 17, 18, 24
`
`
`Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Med. Device Alliance, Inc.,
`244 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001)................................................................................................... 3, 12
`
`
`Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.,
`395 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005)......................................................................................................... 4
`
`
`O2 Micro Int'l v. Beyond Innovation, Tech.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008)......................................................................................................... 3
`
`
`PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp.,
`No. 6:12-CV-659 (Dkt. 103), 2016 WL 922880 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2016).................................... 7
`
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)......................................................................................................... 1
`
`
`Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
`442 U.S. 330 (1979) .......................................................................................................................... 4
`
`
`Thorner,
`669 F.3d .................................................................................................................................... 16, 24
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`PERSONALWEB’S OPENING CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`iv
`
`
`
`
`
`CASE NO: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
`
`

`

`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`
`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 399 Filed 04/08/19 Page 7 of 32
`
`United States Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc.,
`103 F.3d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1997)............................................................................................... 3, 8, 12
`
`
`Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont'l Auto. Sys.,
`853 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2017)......................................................................................................... 5
`
`Other Authority
`
`The IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical and Electronics Terms 251 (6th Ed. 1996) …………...24
`
`
`
`
`
`
`PERSONALWEB’S OPENING CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`v
`
`
`
`
`
`CASE NO: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
`
`

`

`
`
`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 399 Filed 04/08/19 Page 8 of 32
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`PersonalWeb’s proposed constructions “stay[] true to the claim language and most naturally
`
`align[] with the patent's description of the invention [and, therefore,] will be, in the end, the correct
`
`construction.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). In contrast,
`
`Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon Web Services, Inc., and Twitch's (collectively, “Defendants’”) proposed
`
`constructions: (i) rewrite claims; (ii) improperly read-in additional limitations from the specification
`
`that appear nowhere in the claims and significantly lengthen them; (iii) ignore express claim language;
`
`and (iv) confuse rather than clarify the meaning of the claims. Accordingly, PersonalWeb requests the
`
`Court adopt its proposed constructions and reject Defendants’ constructions.
`
`10
`
`II.
`
`DISPUTED CONSTRUCTIONS
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`In this brief, bold underline indicates that a term or phrase has an agreed construction, and
`
`italicized bold underline indicates that a term or phrase has a disputed construction that is part of this
`
`Markman proceeding.
`
`A.
`
`“Authorization” Terms
`
`’310 (Decl. of Stanley H. Thompson, Jr., Ex. 1) at Claim 20: “based at least in part on
`
`said content-dependent name of said particular data item, the first device (A) permitting
`
`the content to be provided to or accessed by the at least one other computer if it is not
`
`determined that the content is unauthorized or unlicensed, otherwise, (B) if it is
`
`determined that the content is unauthorized or unlicensed, not permitting the content
`
`to be provided to or accessed by the at least one other computer”
`
`’442 (Ex. 2) at Claim 10: “determining whether a copy of the data file that is present
`
`on a at least one of said computers is an unauthorized copy or an unlicensed copy of
`
`the data file”
`
`’442 at Claim 11: “allowing the file to be provided from one of the computers having
`
`an authorized or licensed copy of the file”
`
`“Unauthorized or unlicensed” (’310 at Claim 20)
`
`PersonalWeb’s Proposed Construction
`
`Amazon’s Proposed Construction
`
`
`
`
`PERSONALWEB’S OPENING CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`1
`
`
`
`
`
`CASE NO: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
`
`
`
`

`

`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`
`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 399 Filed 04/08/19 Page 9 of 32
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`Alternative construction: Not permitted or Not
`legally permitted
`
`not compliant with a valid license
`
`“authorized” / “unauthorized” / “authorization” (’310 patent, claims 20, 69; ’442
`patent, claims 10, 11; ’420 patent, claims 25, 66)
`
`PersonalWeb’s Proposed Construction
`“un-/authorized:” plain and ordinary meaning
`“authorization:” plain and ordinary meaning
`
`Alternative constructions:
`
`“authorized”: permitted
`“unauthorized”: not permitted
`“authorization”: permission
`
`Amazon’s Proposed Construction
`compliant / not compliant with a valid license /
`a valid license
`
`“unauthorized copy or an unlicensed copy” (’442 patent, claim 10)
`
`PersonalWeb’s Proposed Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`Alternative construction: a copy that is not
`permitted or not legally permitted
`
`Amazon’s Proposed Construction
`a copy that is not compliant with a valid license
`
`“licensed” / “unlicensed” (’310 patent, claim 20; ’442 patent, claim 10)
`
`PersonalWeb’s Proposed Construction
`“un-/licensed:” plain and ordinary meaning
`
`Alternative Construction: “un-/licensed:” not
`legally / legally permitted
`
`Amazon’s Proposed Construction
`valid / invalid right to content
`
`1.
`
`This group of claim phrases does not need to be construed because
`their plain and ordinary meaning suffices.
`
`The plain and ordinary meaning of “authorize” connotes that something is given permission to
`
`perform an action. Consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning, the specification includes several
`
`examples of certain exemplary embodiments of the inventive system permitting, or not permitting,
`
`certain actions to take place on the basis of a given criteria. For example, the specification discusses
`
`that a “region” (directory) can be set as read-only, meaning another computer would not have
`
`permission to change the contents of the region. ’310 at 10:23-35, Fig. 5. The specification also
`
`discusses that a file can be locked so that another computer does not have permission to modify it. ’310
`
`at 9:23-26, Fig. 3. The flowchart in Fig. 26(a) also discloses in block S422 “PROHIBIT OPEN” that
`
`a computer may not be permitted to open a file in a non-read only mode if it is in a read-only
`
`
`
`PERSONALWEB’S OPENING CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`
`
`CASE NO: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 399 Filed 04/08/19 Page 10 of 32
`
`directory. ’310 at 20:19-22, Fig. 26(a). The plain and ordinary meaning of “authorize” is applicable
`
`without regard to a concept of licensing. This intrinsic evidence is confirmed by the dictionary
`
`definition of “authorize” which is “to give permission for.” Ex. 10, The American Heritage Dictionary
`
`of the English Language (5th ed. 2019) (https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=authorize).
`
`A “license,” on the other hand, means something narrower. It is a specific kind of authorization.
`
`The specification discusses licenses in the sense of having legal permission to have a copy of a file.
`
`For example, the specification states that a license table 136 maintains a record of the True Names of
`
`“key files in the product (that is, files which are required in order to use the product, and which do not
`
`occur in other products)[.] Typically, for a software product, this would include the main executable
`
`image and perhaps other major files such as clip-art, scripts, or online help.” ’310 at 31:17-22. This
`
`demonstrates the specification contemplates having a license is having legal permission to possess
`
`things like program executables and images such as clip-art, items that may be the subject, for
`
`example, of a copyright license, or a license granted by the Terms of Service of a website. The
`
`specification also discusses mechanisms for enforcing licenses. For example, the specification
`
`discusses active and passive enforcement of licenses (’310 at 31:9-12), and the license table (LT) 136
`
`in Fig. 1(b) “is a table identifying files, which may only be used by licensed users.” ’310 at 8:60-61.
`
`Using the plain and ordinary meaning of a term is often correct. See Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Med.
`
`Device Alliance, Inc., 244 F.3d 1365, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he court properly instructed the jury
`
`that [‘irrigating’ and ‘frictional heat’] should receive their ordinary meanings.”). All words have
`
`definitions and thus may be rewritten using different words. This does not mean that all words in a
`
`claim should be construed. See, e.g., O2 Micro Int'l v. Beyond Innovation Tech., 521 F.3d 1351, 1362
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[D]istrict courts are not (and should not be) required to construe every limitation
`
`present in a patent’s asserted claims.”); Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1207
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2010) (upholding district court’s rejection of defendant’s proposed construction, and finding
`
`that no construction is necessary). In other words, claim construction is “not an obligatory exercise in
`
`redundancy.” United States Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
`
`Where a term is used in accordance with its plain meaning, the court should not re-characterize it using
`
`different language.
`
`
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`PERSONALWEB’S OPENING CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`
`
`CASE NO: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 399 Filed 04/08/19 Page 11 of 32
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`Thus, because the terms are not confusing to a jury, no further construction of these terms is
`
`required. If the Court believes the terms require construction, PersonalWeb believes “authorized”
`
`should be construed as “permitted,” and “licensed” should be construed as “legally permitted.”
`
`Amazon’s proposed constructions are inconsistent with the claim language and violate canons of claim
`
`construction.
`
`2.
`
`Amazon’s proposal erroneously makes the term “unauthorized”
`synonymous with
`the
`term “unlicensed” contradicting
`the
`specification and prosecution history.
`
`Amazon contends that (1) various words and forms of the word “unauthorized” and (2) various
`
`forms of the phrase “unauthorized or unlicensed” should both be construed as meaning the same thing:
`
`“not compliant with a valid license.”
`
`Amazon’s proposed construction not only departs from the plain and ordinary meaning of the
`
`term “unauthorized” (i.e., not permitted), but it also conflates the term with the separate term
`
`“unlicensed” which is a specific species of the genus “unauthorized” that connotes something that is
`
`not legally permitted under a contract or agreement. But “[c]anons of construction indicate that terms
`
`connected in the disjunctive in this manner be given separate meanings.” Garcia v. United States, 469
`
`U.S. 70, 73 (1984). See also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979) (the use of the term “or”
`
`indicates an intent to give the nouns their separate, normal meanings); Gonzalez v. Infostream Group,
`
`Inc., Case No. 2:14–cv–906–JRG–RSP, 2015 WL 5604448, at *17–19 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2015)
`
`(recognizing that “or” is not restricted to mutually exclusive alternatives (A or B, [but not both]) and
`
`may be used to denote an inclusive list (A, or B [or both]), depending on context.). So a proper
`
`construction must give meaning to both words in the phrase “unauthorized or unlicensed.” See Merck
`
`& Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A claim construction that
`
`gives meaning to all terms of the claim is preferred over one that does not do so.”); Exxon Chem.
`
`Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“We must give meaning to all
`
`the words in Exxon’s claims.”). Thus, Amazon’s proposed construction is erroneous. If
`
`“unauthorized” were defined in terms of unlicensed, which is what would effectively result from
`
`Amazon’s proposed construction, then either the presence of “unauthorized” in Claim 20 would be
`
`superfluous and/or the word “or” would be construed as “and.” Such a construction would be contrary
`
`
`
`
`PERSONALWEB’S OPENING CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`
`
`CASE NO: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 399 Filed 04/08/19 Page 12 of 32
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`to law, by disregarding the claim term “or” and its clear, disjunctive meaning.
`
`In order to narrow a claim term beyond its normal meaning, there must be clear disavowal of
`
`the scope given to a claim term. Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont'l Auto. Sys., 853 F.3d 1272, 1281-82 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2017) (“It is axiomatic that we will not narrow a claim term beyond its plain and ordinary meaning
`
`unless there is support for the limitation in the words of the claim, the specification, or the prosecution
`
`history. If the intrinsic record supports several definitions of a term, the term may be construed to
`
`encompass all such consistent meanings. Therefore, absent a clear disavowal or alternative
`
`lexicography by a patentee, he or she is free to choose a broad term and expect to obtain the full scope
`
`of its plain and ordinary meaning”) (internal citations omitted).
`
`Amazon cannot point to any such clear disavowal of claim scope for the term “unauthorized.”
`
`First, there is no discussion in the specification that is inconsistent with the plain and ordinary meaning
`
`of the term “unauthorized” and the disjunctive term “or.” Second, the prosecution history also supports
`
`separate meanings to “unauthorized” and “unlicensed”. Indeed, the prosecution history of the ’442
`
`patent unambiguously shows that the patentee was not using the words “authorized” to mean
`
`“licensed”, but rather was using the term “authorized” as a broader “genus” term, and the term
`
`“licensed” as a narrower “species” term. For example, PersonalWeb amended claim 23 to only recite
`
`the term “unauthorized” and moved the term “unlicensed” into a new claim 25 that depended from
`
`18
`
`claim 23:
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Ex. 5 (Response to Final Office Action (Feb. 14, 2010)), at 9-10. See also id. at 14 (“Nor does
`
`Gardener teach or in any suggest (as per claim 23) that ‘an unauthorized copy of a file is not allowed
`
`to be provided from one of the computers.’ Nor does Gardner teach or in any way suggest (as per
`
`claim 25) that an unlicensed copy of a file is not allowed to be provided from one of the computers.”
`
`
`
`
`PERSONALWEB’S OPENING CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`5
`
`
`
`
`
`CASE NO: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
`
`

`

`
`
`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 399 Filed 04/08/19 Page 13 of 32
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`(original emphasis))
`
`3.
`
`Collateral Estoppel Does Not Apply.
`
`It is anticipated that Amazon will argue that collateral estoppel applies for its proposed
`
`construction of “unlicensed or unauthorized” because that proposed construction is based upon a prior
`
`construction in a case between PersonalWeb and IBM. In that case, Judge Rodney Gilstrap of the
`
`Eastern District of Texas separately construed “licensed,” “unlicensed,” “authorized,” “unauthorized”
`
`and “authorization.” Ex. 6, Memorandum Opinion and Order (Dkt. 103) at 25, 28, PersonalWeb
`
`Techs., LLC v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., No. 6:12-cv-00661 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2016). After that
`
`matter was transferred to the Northern District of California, the parties eventually reached a
`
`settlement and stipulated to dismiss the case with prejudice. Ex. 7, Order of Dismissal With Prejudice
`
`(Dkt. 381), PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., No. 5:16-cv-01266 (Dkt. 381)
`
`(N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2017). In another Eastern District case, PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v. Amazon.com
`
`Inc., No. 6:11-cv-00658 (E.D. Tex. Filed Dec. 8, 2011) (“Amazon I”), which actually involved
`
`Amazon (in contrast to the IBM ruling upon which Amazon now relies), Judge Leonard Davis
`
`ruled that no construction of the terms “licensed” and “unlicensed” was needed. Ex. 8, Memorandum
`
`Opinion and Order (Dkt. 140) at 26, 47, PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., No. 6:11-cv-
`
`00658 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2013). Neither claim construction ruling is binding here.
`
`“Under collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its
`
`judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action
`
`involving a party to the first case.” Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp., 204 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2000).
`
`Under both California and federal law, collateral estoppel applies only where it is established that “(1)
`
`the issue necessarily decided at the previous proceeding is identical to the one which is sought to be
`
`relitigated; (2) the first proceeding ended with a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against
`
`whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party at the first proceeding.” Id.
`
`The conditions for collateral estoppel are not met here. First, neither of the prior Eastern
`
`District of Texas claim construction rulings made any determination of the scope or meaning of the
`
`identical phrase “unauthorized or unlicensed” at issue in this case. In other words, the issue of the
`
`separation of these words by the disjunctive phrase “or” was never considered and ruled upon. Second,
`
`
`
`
`PERSONALWEB’S OPENING CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`6
`
`
`
`
`
`CASE NO: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 399 Filed 04/08/19 Page 14 of 32
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`there was no final judgment that relied upon any claim construction from the IBM case because that
`
`case settled and the parties did not have the opportunity to appeal. Further, Amazon cannot show that
`
`a construction of terms “authorized” and “licensed” were in any manner outcome determinative
`
`regarding the products in that case. Accordingly, Amazon cannot demonstrate that collateral estoppel
`
`applies to Judge Gilstrap’s decision. Thus, “unauthorized or unlicensed” should be given its plain and
`
`ordinary meaning, which necessarily includes the disjunctive term “or.” If construed, however, the
`
`phrase should be construed as “not permitted or not legally permitted.”
`
`Amazon’s proposed constructions are based on a prior construction of these individual terms.
`
`PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., No. 6:12-CV-659 (Dkt. 103), 2016 WL
`
`922880 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2016). As discussed above, collateral estoppel does not apply to Judge
`
`Gilstrap’s construction, which is not even from Amazon I. Moreover, Judge Gilstrap’s decision is
`
`different from and in conflict with the construction of Judge Davis (in Amazon I). Judge Davis held
`
`the term “authorized” did not require any construction, which is consistent with the plain usage of the
`
`term, and the claim language, specification a

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket