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`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 484 Filed 12/29/17 Page 1 of 26
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`
`
`DARALYN J. DURIE (SBN 169825)
`ddurie@durietangri.com
`STEPHEN ELKIND (Pro Hac Vice)
`selkind@durietangri.com
`DURIE TANGRI LLP
`217 Leidesdorff Street
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Telephone:
`(415) 362-6666
`Facsimile:
`(415) 236-6300
`
`STEFANI E. SHANBERG (SBN 206717)
`sshanberg@mofo.com
`NATHAN B. SABRI (SBN 252216)
`nsabri@mofo.com
`ROBIN L. BREWER (SBN 253686)
`rbrewer@mofo.com
`EUGENE MARDER (SBN 275762)
`emarder@mofo.com
`MADELEINE E. GREENE (SBN 263120)
`mgreene@mofo.com
`MICHAEL J. GUO (SBN 284917)
`mguo@mofo.com
`ALEX N. HADDUCK (SBN 312962)
`ahadduck@mofo.com
`MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
`425 Market Street
`San Francisco, California 94105
`Telephone:
`(415) 268-7000
`Facsimile:
`(415) 268-7522
`
`DAVID A. NELSON (Pro Hac Vice)
`davenelson@quinnemanuel.com
`NATHAN A. HAMSTRA (Pro Hac Vice)
`nathanhamstra@quinnemanuel.com
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
`SULLIVAN LLP
`500 W. Madison Street, Suite 2450
`Chicago, Illinois 60661
`Telephone:
`(312) 705-7400
`Facsimile:
`(312) 707-7401
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`BLUE COAT SYSTEMS LLC
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`SAN JOSE DIVISION
`
`FINJAN, INC., a Delaware Corporation,
`
`Case No.: 15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`BLUE COAT SYSTEMS LLC, a Delaware
`Corporation,
`
`Defendant.
`
`BLUE COAT SYSTEMS LLC’S
`OPPOSITION TO FINJAN’S PARTIAL
`RENEWED MOTION FOR
`JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
`
`
`
`BLUE COAT’S OPPOSITION TO FINJAN’S PARTIAL RENEWED MOTION FOR JMOL
`15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 484 Filed 12/29/17 Page 2 of 26
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`Page
`LEGAL STANDARD ......................................................................................................... 1 
`NONINFRINGEMENT ...................................................................................................... 2 
`The Evidence Does Not Require a Finding of Infringement of the ’844
`A. 
`Patent. ...................................................................................................................... 2 
`The Evidence Does Not Require a Finding of Infringement of the ’494
`Patent. ...................................................................................................................... 4 
`III.  WILLFULNESS ................................................................................................................. 5 
`A. 
`Finjan’s Primary Willfulness Argument is Unsupported by Law and Fact. ........... 5 
`B. 
`Finjan’s Remaining Willfulness Arguments Are Unsupported, Conclusory,
`and Contrary to This Court’s Orders. ...................................................................... 8 
`The Jury’s Finding in Blue Coat II Underscores that Finjan Is Not Entitled
`to JMOL of Willfulness. ......................................................................................... 8 
`DAMAGES ......................................................................................................................... 9 
`Finjan’s Damages Claim for the ’844 Patent Is Unsupported by Law or
`A. 
`Fact. ......................................................................................................................... 9 
`Finjan’s Damages Claim for the ’494 Patent Is Unsupported by Law or
`Fact. ....................................................................................................................... 12 
`Finjan’s Claim to Worldwide Damages is Unsupported by Law or Fact. ............ 13 
`1. 
`Finjan’s collateral estoppel argument is waived and inapplicable. ........... 13 
`2. 
`Finjan continues to apply the rejected “benefit and control” test. ............ 14 
`3. 
`Finjan’s definition of “made” is incorrect. ................................................ 15 
`Finjan’s Attacks on Blue Coat’s Damages Expert Are Baseless. ......................... 17 
`D. 
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 19 
`
`B. 
`
`C. 
`
`B. 
`
`C. 
`
`
`I. 
`II. 
`
`IV. 
`
`IV. 
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`BLUE COAT’S OPPOSITION TO FINJAN’S PARTIAL RENEWED MOTION FOR JMOL
`15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
`
`
`
`i
`
`

`

`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 484 Filed 12/29/17 Page 3 of 26
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. BMW N. Am, LLC,
`783 F. Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. Tex. 2011) ........................................................................................6
`
`Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc. v. Air Asia Co.,
`880 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1989) .......................................................................................................1
`
`Ansel Commc’ns, Inc. v. Novell, Inc.,
`No. C-97-21088, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22737 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 1999) ............................14
`
`Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`No. 2:13-CV-01015-JRG-RSP, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93166 (E.D. Tex. May
`18, 2017) ...................................................................................................................................10
`
`Centillion Data Sys. LLC v. Quest Commc’ns. Int’l,
`631 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2011) .................................................................................................16
`
`Clark v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc.,
`966 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1992) ...................................................................................................14
`
`CNET Networks, Inc. v. Etilize, Inc.,
`528 F. Supp. 2d 985 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ......................................................................................16
`
`Cotton v. City of Eureka,
`860 F. Supp. 2d 999 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ......................................................................................13
`
`Decca Ltd. v. United States,
`210 Ct. Cl. 546 (1976) ..............................................................................................................15
`
`Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.,
`406 U.S. 518 (1972) ..................................................................................................................16
`
`Digital Reg of Tex., LLC v. Adobe Sys.,
`No. 12-1971, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161044 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2014) .................................2
`
`Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`No. 99 C 626, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13482 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2003) ....................................16
`
`Ericsson Inc. v. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd.,
`No. 2:15-cv-00011-RSP, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183216 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 4,
`2017) ...........................................................................................................................................8
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Cisco Sys.,
`Case No. 17-cv-00072-BLF, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87657 (N.D. Cal. June 7,
`2017) ...........................................................................................................................................7
`
`BLUE COAT’S OPPOSITION TO FINJAN’S PARTIAL RENEWED MOTION FOR JMOL
`15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 484 Filed 12/29/17 Page 4 of 26
`
`
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Sophos, Inc.,
`No. 14-cv-01197-WHO, 2016 U.S. Dist. Lexis 107831 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15,
`2016) ...................................................................................................................................12, 13
`
`Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd.,
`753 F.3d 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .............................................................................................6, 12
`
`Good Tech. Corp. v. Mobileiron, Inc.,
`Case No. 5:12-cv-05826-PSG, 2015 WL 4090431 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 2015) ...........................10
`
`Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc.,
`136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) ........................................................................................................5, 6, 7
`
`Imperium IP Holdings (Cayman), Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`No. 4:14-cv-371, 2017 WL 4038884 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 13, 2017) ................................................6
`
`Kern v. Levolor Lorentzen, Inc.,
`899 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1990) .......................................................................................................1
`
`KW Plastics v. U.S. Can Co.,
`131 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (M.D. Ala. 2001) .............................................................................10, 11
`
`LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Comput., Inc.,
`694 F.3d 51, 67 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .................................................................................................9
`
`Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc.,
`778 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985) ...................................................................................................14
`
`Little v. United States,
`794 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1986) .....................................................................................................14
`
`Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.,
`580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ...................................................................................................9
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,
`550 U.S. 437 (2007) ..................................................................................................................16
`
`Monolithic Power Sys., Inc. v. Silergy Corp.,
`127 F. Supp. 3d 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ......................................................................................6
`
`NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd.,
`418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .................................................................................................15
`
`Oiness v. Walgreen Co.,
`88 F.3d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1996) .....................................................................................................9
`
`Radware, Ltd. v. F5 Networks, Inc.,
`No. 5:13-cv-02024-RMW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112504 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22,
`2016) ...........................................................................................................................................6
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`BLUE COAT’S OPPOSITION TO FINJAN’S PARTIAL RENEWED MOTION FOR JMOL
`15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
`
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 484 Filed 12/29/17 Page 5 of 26
`
`
`
`ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc.,
`594 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ...................................................................................................12
`
`Roy-G-Biv Corp. v. ABB, Ltd.,
`Case No. 6:11-cv-622, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188699 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 1,
`2014) .........................................................................................................................................10
`
`Simple Air, Inc. v. Google Inc.,
`204 F. Supp. 3d 908 (E.D. Tex. 2016) ............................................................................6, 12, 18
`
`Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp.,
`90 F.3d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1996) .....................................................................................................4
`
`Tortu v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t,
`556 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2009) ...................................................................................................13
`
`Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011) .................................................................................................10
`
`VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys.,
`767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .................................................................................................11
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 271(a) ..............................................................................................................14, 15, 16
`
`35 U.S.C. § 271(g) ..........................................................................................................................16
`
`35 U.S.C. § 284 ...............................................................................................................................12
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Rule 50(a) ........................................................................................................................................13
`
`Rule 50(b) .......................................................................................................................................13
`
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`BLUE COAT’S OPPOSITION TO FINJAN’S PARTIAL RENEWED MOTION FOR JMOL
`15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
`
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 484 Filed 12/29/17 Page 6 of 26
`
`
`
`TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
`
`Plaintiff Finjan, Inc.
`Defendant Blue Coat Systems LLC
`U.S. Patent No. 6,154,844
`U.S. Patent No. 6,965,968
`U.S. Patent No. 7,418,731
`U.S. Patent No. 8,677,494
`Malware Analysis Appliance
`Dynamic Real Time Rating
`Global Intelligence Network
`Content Analysis System
`Advanced Secure Gateway
`Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems LLC, No. 13-cv-03999-BLF (N.D.
`Cal. filed Aug. 28, 2013)
`Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems LLC, No. 15-cv-03295-BLF (N.D.
`Cal. filed July 15, 2015)
`Finjan, Inc. v. Sophos, Inc., No. 14-cv-01197-WHO (N.D. Cal.)
`Finjan Software Ltd. v. Secure Computing Corp., No. 6-cv-00369-GMS
`(D. Del.)
`Plaintiff Finjan, Inc.’s Notice of Motion and Partial Renewed Motion
`for Judgment as a Matter of Law Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), Dkt.
`No. 469
`
`Finjan or Plaintiff
`Blue Coat or Defendant
`’844 patent
`’968 patent
`’731 patent
`’494 patent
`MAA
`DRTR
`GIN
`CAS
`ASG
`Blue Coat I
`
`Blue Coat II
`
`Sophos
`Secure Computing
`
`Mot. or motion
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`BLUE COAT’S OPPOSITION TO FINJAN’S PARTIAL RENEWED MOTION FOR JMOL
`15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
`
`
`
`v
`
`

`

`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 484 Filed 12/29/17 Page 7 of 26
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`Finjan has a disturbing track record of applying the incorrect legal standard. That
`
`continues here: Throughout its motion, Finjan argues that it is entitled to JMOL because it
`
`provided “substantial evidence” in support of its claims, and because Blue Coat failed to present
`
`sufficient evidence that it does not infringe. That is not the standard for Finjan to obtain JMOL
`
`contrary to or in the absence of a jury verdict, and Finjan cannot flip the burden of proof to Blue
`Coat. “Substantial evidence” is the standard to uphold a jury verdict in the moving party’s favor,
`
`and it does not apply to Finjan’s motion. Finjan does not acknowledge the correct standard which
`
`requires Finjan to show that it met its burden and the evidence permits “only one reasonable
`
`conclusion.” Finjan fails to meet the correct standard and also the incorrect one that it applied.
`
`In fact, the evidence shows precisely the opposite: Finjan failed to meet its burden at trial
`
`of proving infringement, willfulness, and damages, far from leading to only one reasonable
`
`conclusion in its favor. Finjan’s arguments on infringement are conclusory and ignore the
`
`contrary evidence. Finjan’s arguments on willfulness rely on evidence not even before the jury,
`
`again ignore Blue Coat’s contrary evidence, and ignore the actual results from this jury that
`
`reinforce the reasonableness of Blue Coat’s position. Finjan’s argument on damages underscores
`
`the legal fallacy of its claim for worldwide damages and reinforces that the requested $46 million
`
`in damages is based on nothing more than Finjan’s view of the world. Because Finjan is unable
`
`to show that the evidence supported only one reasonable conclusion in its favor, Finjan is not
`
`entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its affirmative claims and its motion should be denied.
`
`I.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
`“Judgment as a matter of law is proper if the evidence, construed in the light most
`
`favorable to the non-moving party, allows only one reasonable conclusion.” Headwaters Forest
`
`Defense v. County of Humboldt, 240 F.3d 1185, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (applying standard in
`
`context of hung jury, noting “substantial evidence” standard applied to jury verdict is
`
`“procedurally wholly distinguishable” from hung jury) (vacated on other grounds). “Where there
`
`is sufficient conflicting evidence, or where reasonable minds could differ over the verdict,
`
`judgment as a matter of law after the verdict is improper.” Id. (citing Kern v. Levolor Lorentzen,
`
`Inc., 899 F.2d 772, 775 (9th Cir. 1990); Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc. v. Air Asia Co., 880 F.2d 176,
`
`BLUE COAT’S OPPOSITION TO FINJAN’S PARTIAL RENEWED MOTION FOR JMOL
`15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 484 Filed 12/29/17 Page 8 of 26
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`181 (9th Cir. 1989)).
`
`II.
`
`NONINFRINGEMENT
`A.
`The Evidence Does Not Require a Finding of Infringement of the ’844 Patent.
`Finjan is not entitled to JMOL that Blue Coat infringes claim 15 of the ’844 patent
`
`because Finjan did not present evidence that leads to only a conclusion of infringement. Reciting
`
`claim limitations followed by record cites with no explanation as to the content or relevance of
`the cited material does not meet Finjan’s high burden of showing that the trial evidence “requires
`
`a finding [in Finjan’s favor].” Digital Reg of Tex., LLC v. Adobe Sys., No. 12-1971, 2014 U.S.
`
`Dist. LEXIS 161044, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2014) (emphasis added). At trial, Finjan failed
`
`to provide sufficient evidence of infringement and relied upon expert testimony that ignored the
`
`Court’s claim construction. Finjan’s motion should be denied.
`
`Blue Coat presented fact evidence and expert testimony showing that the accused products
`
`do not include a “Downloadable security profile that identifies suspicious code in a
`
`Downloadable,” as required by claim 15. Dr. Seth Nielson, Blue Coat’s technical expert,
`
`discussed the exemplary MAA reports and MAA-related evidence on which Finjan relies in its
`
`motion and explained that none of the “events” listed in the MAA report identify code because
`
`there are “different ways, maybe an infinite number of ways, of writing code that can all cause the
`
`same event.” Trial Tr. (Nielson) at 1605:23-1608:8, 1609:12-16, 1616:21-1618:18, 1621:6-
`
`1622:12 (discussing claim 15 requirements, MAA reports, and PTX-564). Dr. Nielson walked
`
`through the MAA source code to explain why its process of capturing events is agnostic to, and
`
`therefore cannot identify, the code that causes events. Id. at 1618:19-1621:5 (discussing PTX-
`
`1025 at 3439). A principal developer at Blue Coat further reinforced this missing claim element,
`
`testifying that no JavaScript functions included in MAA reports are considered suspicious. See
`
`id. (Rohan) at 1476:4-25, 1484:19-1486:1, 1488:23-1489:17; see also PTX-368 at BC2-0003663.
`
`Blue Coat also presented evidence that the accused products cannot meet the claim
`
`limitation requiring “linking the first Downloadable security profile to the Downloadable before a
`
`web server makes the Downloadable available to web clients,” as required by claim 15. Dr.
`
`Nielson explained that while “a non-network gateway web server makes the Downloadable
`
`BLUE COAT’S OPPOSITION TO FINJAN’S PARTIAL RENEWED MOTION FOR JMOL
`15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 484 Filed 12/29/17 Page 9 of 26
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`available” by publishing it on the internet, Blue Coat’s accused products can only inspect content
`and link it to a security profile, including through the accused instrumentality, after that has
`
`happened. Trial Tr. (Nielson) at 1608:9-1610:1, 1612:6-1616:16. Dr. Nielson’s testimony took
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`into account the Court’s construction, as well as the preferred embodiments explicitly recited in
`
`the patent, in which a downloadable is inspected and linked to its security profile before it is
`
`published by the web server. See id. at 1609:3-11, 1615:14-18, 1784:1-1788:2; ’844 patent at
`
`Fig. 6. Blue Coat engineer Djordje Sorgic further confirmed that the Blue Coat products are
`
`unable to inspect content until after a web server has made it available, and therefore incapable of
`
`meeting the claim requirement. Trial Tr. (Sorgic) at 1446:1-7, 1446:18-25.
`
`Finjan’s unsupported argument that Dr. Nielson failed to apply the appropriate claim
`
`construction is belied by the trial record. Dr. Nielson applied the claim language and testified to
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`the faulty logic of Finjan’s arguments and deficiencies in the exhibits used by Finjan’s expert,
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`using actual examples from the patent to show why Finjan’s argument is incorrect. See, e.g.,
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`Trial Tr. (Nielson) at 1605:23-1622:12, 1784:1-1788:2. More importantly, Finjan—who bears
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`the burden of proof—presented an expert who ignored the claim requirements. For example, at
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`counsel’s repeated prompting, Dr. Cole falsely asserted that “operations” are “the same thing” as
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`suspicious code. See, e.g., Trial Tr. (Cole) at 521:11-14 (“Q. And the suspicious operations, is
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`that the same thing as identifying suspicious code? A. Yes.”), 527:5-7 (“Suspicious operations
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`and suspicious code are both the same thing and it’s in the file and looking for what actions the
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`code would take that could be harmful.”). To the contrary, the Court’s claim construction and the
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`jury instructions provide that “‘code’ and ‘operations’ are not the same.” Dkt. No. 428 at 47.
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`Finjan’s doctrine of equivalents theory similarly does not require a conclusion in its favor.
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`Rather, Finjan presented a legally insufficient, conclusory argument, and Blue Coat presented
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`extensive evidence to the contrary. Dr. Nielson presented a specific analysis regarding the
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`doctrine of equivalents, notwithstanding Finjan’s failure to do so. Id. at 1627:1-1628:8
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`(explaining why identifying suspicious operations is distinct from identifying suspicious code due
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`to potential ameliorative actions available in each scenario), 1628:13-1630:5 (explaining why
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`performing security profile linking at web server is not equivalent to doing so at gateway due to
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`BLUE COAT’S OPPOSITION TO FINJAN’S PARTIAL RENEWED MOTION FOR JMOL
`15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
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`3
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`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 484 Filed 12/29/17 Page 10 of 26
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`policy-setting abilities and limiting distribution of malware). By contrast, Dr. Cole repeated the
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`same argument he had recited for literal infringement. Id. (Cole) at 538:8-539:9. While Finjan
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`argues that background discussion should be used to prop up Dr. Cole’s dearth of opinion
`regarding equivalence, Mot. at 4, there is nothing to tie any of the background discussion to an
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`equivalents argument—Dr. Cole said nothing of the products that can be construed as such.
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`Rather, Dr. Cole’s opinion was entirely coextensive with and subsumed by his literal
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`infringement analysis, which is insufficient to establish infringement by equivalents. Texas
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`Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1566-68 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
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`(upholding grant of JMOL regarding doctrine of equivalents where “overwhelming majority of
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`[expert’s] testimony . . . was solicited for purposes of establishing literal infringement.”)
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`B.
`The Evidence Does Not Require a Finding of Infringement of the ’494 Patent.
`As with the ’844 patent, Finjan’s motion fails to provide a basis for granting JMOL of
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`infringement of claim 10 of the ’494 patent. Finjan’s allegations parrot the claim language and
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`string cite to allegedly relevant trial testimony and evidence, failing to provide analysis or
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`application of the claims to the accused product. This approach mirrors the testimony offered by
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`Dr. Cole, who glossed over key disputed limitations in providing his infringement opinion.
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`Dr. Nielson addressed this dearth of evidence in the context of the claim 10 limitation
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`requiring security profile data including a “list of suspicious computer operations.” Specifically,
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`Dr. Nielson explained that YARA rules—the only scanning functionality accused by Finjan of
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`infringing the ’494 patent—are text searches for particular strings within web content, and would
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`not result in a listing of suspicious operations because the YARA rule is merely “looking for that
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`text. It’s not looking for the operation.” Trial Tr. (Nielson) at 1601:5-14; see also id. at 1591:20-
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`1594:17, 1597:5-1601:14. Blue Coat also offered evidence as to why the only two YARA rules
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`cited by Dr. Cole cannot be used to derive a list of suspicious computer operations. The first,
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`“generic_javascript_obfuscation,” see id. (Cole) at 548:19-549:25, can be triggered by at least
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`three different operations, and therefore a listing of its name does not list the specific operations
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`that a file may attempt. See id. (Larsen) at 1543:11-1546:21, 1554:9-1556:16; id. (Nielson) at
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`1599:23-1601:14. The second, “Unknown_JS_Injection_Patrik1,” see PTX-516 at 155; Trial Tr.
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`BLUE COAT’S OPPOSITION TO FINJAN’S PARTIAL RENEWED MOTION FOR JMOL
`15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
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`4
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`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 484 Filed 12/29/17 Page 11 of 26
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`(Cole) at 550:3-21, does not even belong to the “malware” category of YARA rules. See id. (C.
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`Larsen) at 1543:25-1544:2; PTX-516 at 155 (showing that “Unknown_JS_Injection_Patrik1” has
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`no assigned category and a confidence rating of 5). Finjan’s attempt to disparage Dr. Nielson’s
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`testimony by saying he “failed to apply the plain and ordinary meaning and Court’s construction”
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`is without merit and unsupported. See Motion at 5; see also Trial Tr. (Nielson) at 1591:13-18.
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`Finjan fails to show evidence that would lead only to a conclusion of infringement.
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`As to doctrine of equivalents, Finjan’s evidence was as deficient as with the ’844 patent.
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`Dr. Cole’s testimony amounted to less than a page of transcript comprising a conclusory
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`argument that a single element was met under the doctrine of equivalents for the same exact
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`reasons as it allegedly literally infringed. Compare Trial Tr. (Cole) at 551:24-552:15 (’494 literal
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`infringement testimony regarding security profile and list of suspicious operations) with id. at
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`553:4-16 (’494 doctrine of equivalents testimony regarding same). Again, Dr. Cole failed to even
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`refer back to generally applicable technical background testimony and merely presented an
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`equivalence opinion as a fallback. See, e.g., id. at 559:11-14 (“Q. And at the very least, does
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`GIN function in the same way—function in such a way that would be substantially similar to the
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`third element of claim 10 of the ’494 patent? A. Yes, it does.”). Dr. Nielson, on the other hand,
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`addressed equivalence on the merits explaining that because the claims are focused on predicting
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`what a downloadable is going to do, “whereas the YARA rules are focused on signature matching
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`and identifying previously identified malware . . . that has already been identified . . . . The
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`functions are different.” Id. (Nielson) at 1601:15-1604:8. Finjan has failed to show that it is
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`entitled to JMOL of infringement of the ’494 patent under the doctrine of equivalents.
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`III. WILLFULNESS
`To prove willful infringement, Finjan must show that Blue Coat’s behavior was egregious,
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`such as where infringement is malicious, deliberate, consciously wrongful, or done in bad faith.
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`See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932-33 (2016). Finjan did not
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`present evidence even close this standard, much less sufficient to justify JMOL of willfulness.
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`A.
`Finjan’s Primary Willfulness Argument is Unsupported by Law and Fact.
`Finjan’s primary argument that Blue Coat did not make a good faith effort to avoid
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`BLUE COAT’S OPPOSITION TO FINJAN’S PARTIAL RENEWED MOTION FOR JMOL
`15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
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`5
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`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 484 Filed 12/29/17 Page 12 of 26
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`infringement after the Blue Coat I verdict is self-contradictory and illogical. Mot. at 6-7. Finjan
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`argues (1) that Blue Coat willfully infringes because it added new functionality and “made no
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`efforts to design around [the ’844 and ’494] patents in the development of GIN/WebPulse” and
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`(2) that Blue Coat willfully infringes because it did “nothing to substantively change its products
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`following the jury’s verdict of infringement in Blue Coat I.” Id. Of course, neither is required in
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`view of the Blue Coat I verdict. Finjan elected to seek, and the Blue Coat I verdict awarded, a
`lump sum to compensate Finjan for Blue Coat’s infringement for the life of the now-expired ’844
`patent, to which the now-expired ’494 patent is terminally disclaimed. See JTX-3014 at
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`FINJAN-BLCT 003339; see also Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., 753 F.3d 1208, 1214
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`(Fed. Cir. 2014) (terminal disclaimer “is tantamount for all practical purposes to having all the
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`claims in one patent.”); accord Simple Air, Inc. v. Google Inc., 204 F. Supp. 3d 908, 913-14 (E.D.
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`Tex. 2016). With lump sum damages awarded, there was no reason for Blue Coat to redesign its
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`products or to design around the patents when adding new functionality. The cases cited by
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`Finjan do not suggest a different conclusion. Mot. at 7 (citing Imperium IP Holdings (Cayman),
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`Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 4:14-cv-371, 2017 WL 4038884, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 13, 2017)
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`(citing Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. BMW N. Am, LLC, 783 F. Supp. 2d 891, 898-905 (E.D. Tex.
`2011))). Neither Imperium nor Affinity Labs involved the existence of a fully paid up lump sum
`verdict or reliance upon such verdict as a defense to willfulness in a second follow-on lawsuit.
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`See Imperium, 2017 WL 4038884, at *1 (involving determination of ongoing royalty rate after
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`infringement found in single case); Affinity Labs, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 895 (same). Instead, they
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`both addressed calculating a running royalty for ongoing infringement, and whether, under the
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`circumstances, the infringement was willful and would impact the running royalty rate. See
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`Imperium, 2017 WL 4038884, at *1-5; Affinity Labs, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 901-05.
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`Finjan’s continued reference to the Blue Coat I verdict is misleading. The Blue Coat I
`verdict is of limited to no relevance as it occurred after the filing of the Blue Coat II complaint.
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`Radware, Ltd. v. F5 Networks, Inc., No. 5:13-cv-02024-RMW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112504, at
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`*20-21 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2016) (noting that “post-complaint conduct is of limited relevance”
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`and that Halo did not change this principle); Monolithic Power Sys., Inc. v. Silergy Corp., 127 F.
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`BLUE COAT’S OPPOSITION TO FINJAN’S PARTIAL RENEWED MOTION FOR JMOL
`15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
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`6
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`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 484 Filed 12/29/17 Page 13 of 26
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`Supp. 3d 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Finjan’s argument that Blue Coat was aware of the asserted
`patents prior to the filing of Blue Coat II (Mot. at 6) is also unavailing. Finjan points to evidence
`outside of the trial record to support its assertion that Blue Coat knew of the ’844 and ’494
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`patents before the filing of the instant suit. See Mot. at *6 (citing Pretrial Statement as evidence).
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`Even if the evidence were properly before the jury, mere awareness of a patent is insufficient to
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`establish willfulness as a matter of law, as clearly set forth in the jury instruction. See, e.g.,
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`Finjan, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Case No. 17-cv-00072-BLF, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87657, at *14-15
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`(N.D. Cal. June 7, 2017) (