`
`
`PAUL ANDRE (State Bar No. 196585)
`pandre@kramerlevin.com
`LISA KOBIALKA (State Bar No. 191404)
`lkobialka@kramerlevin.com
`JAMES HANNAH (State Bar No. 237978)
`jhannah@kramerlevin.com
`KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS & FRANKEL LLP
`990 Marsh Road
`Menlo Park, CA 94025
`Telephone: (650) 752-1700
`Facsimile: (650) 752-1800
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`FINJAN, INC.
`
`
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`SAN JOSE DIVISION
`FINJAN, INC., a Delaware Corporation,
`Case No.: 15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
`
`
`
`PLAINTIFF FINJAN INC.’S
`
`OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S
`MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4 RE
`IRRELEVANT AGREEMENTS
`
`Date:
`October 5, 2017
`
`Time:
`1:30 pm
`Place: Courtroom 3, 5th Floor
`Judge: Hon. Beth Labson Freeman
`
`
`
`BLUE COAT SYSTEMS LLC, a Delaware
`Corporation,
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`
`
`
`
`Defendant.
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`REDACTED VERSION OF DOCUMENT SOUGHT TO BE SEALED
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`
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`PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO BLUE COAT’S
`MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4
`
`Case No. 15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
`
`
`
`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 329 Filed 09/28/17 Page 2 of 7
`
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`Finjan’s OEM Agreement with Blue Coat and Finjan’s patent license agreements for the
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`Asserted Patents and related patents are probative of the hypothetical negotiation and the factors from
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`Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) used for
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`determining reasonable royalty damages. Finjan’s OEM Agreement is probative of the beginnings of
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`Finjan’s relationship with Blue Coat that continued over the years, which eventually culminated in
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`litigation, and is evidence of the parties’ state of mind at the hypothetical negotiation. The Microsoft
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`agreement, which licenses the Asserted Patents, is probative of issues of secondary considerations of
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`nonobviousness, the early interest in Finjan’s patented technology and the financial support Finjan
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`received for its technology. Further, Finjan’s patent license agreements are probative of Georgia
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`Pacific Factors No. 1 and 2 (“royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit”
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`and “rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the patent in suit”) because
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`they are licenses to Finjan’s Asserted Patents and related patents. 318 F. Supp. at 1120. Like the OEM
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`Agreement, they also provide context and relevant information regarding royalties for the Asserted
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`Patents, the parties’ relationship and how the parties would negotiate a license.
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`Blue Coat seeks to exclude the overwhelming majority of Finjan’s patent license agreements,
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`broadly calling them settlement agreements, even though the overwhelming majority of them are not
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`borne out of litigation. These agreements, however, are licenses for the Asserted Patents and related
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`patents, and Finjan accounts for how they are being used and the specific circumstances for each
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`agreement. The Federal Circuit has recognized that the “most reliable license” for assessing a
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`reasonable royalty can be one that arises out of litigation. ResQNet.com v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860,
`
`872 (Fed. Circ. 2010); Prism Techs. LLC v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 849 F.3d 1360, 1369-71 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2017) (confirming no error to admit settlement agreement involving other patents and other unrelated
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`patents despite prejudice objections). Finjan’s jury instruction regarding the appropriate use of
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`settlement agreements, and the discussion Finjan’s expert will provide at trial regarding the
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`circumstances surrounding Finjan’s various agreements and how she used them, ensures that Blue Coat
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`will not be prejudiced.
`
`1
`PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO BLUE COAT’S
`MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4
`
`Case No. 15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
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`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 329 Filed 09/28/17 Page 3 of 7
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`A.
`
`The OEM Agreement Between Finjan and Blue Coat Evidences the Parties’
`History and Relationship
`Finjan’s 2002 OEM agreement, under which Blue Coat agreed to sell Finjan’s computer
`
`security products, is evidence of Finjan’s relationship over time with Blue Coat. See Dkt. No. 305-9,
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`Declaration of Robin L. Brewer (“Brewer Decl.”), Ex. 1, Meyer Rpt. at ¶ 65. This history between the
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`parties as partners and competitors in the computer security market is probative of Finjan’s relationship
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`with Blue Coat and the considerations the respective parties had at the time of the hypothetical
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`negotiation, which is part of the analysis for calculating a reasonable royalty. See Georgia-Pacific, 318
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`F. Supp. at 1120-21.
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`Blue Coat’s attempt to characterize the OEM agreement as a non-comparable license is a red
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`herring because the analysis of whether a license is “comparable” is for agreements relied upon for
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`determining a reasonable royalty. Here, this agreement shows the history and relationship of the parties
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`and Finjan’s backstory as a company, and is not being relied upon for damages, such that Blue Coat’s
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`cited law does not apply here. See Motion at 2:17-18 (citing TV Interactive Data Corp. v. Sony Corp.,
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`No. 10-cv-000475-JCS, Dkt. No. 686, slip op. at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2013) (Daubert ruling
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`involving precluding an expert from relying on non-comparable licenses to support his royalty rate)).
`B.
`Because Finjan’s license agreement with Microsoft covers the Asserted Patents in this case, it is
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`The Microsoft License, Which Licenses the Asserted Patents, Is Probative
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`probative of wide range of issues, including the early interest in Finjan’s patented technology, the
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`financial support Finjan received for its technology, Finjan’s licensing of its patents and validity. This
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`agreement was one of Finjan’s first patent license agreements, and
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` showing Finjan’s decision to “retain an
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`increased measure of control over its patents” and also noted
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`
`
`.
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`Brewer Decl., Ex. 1, Meyer Rpt. at ¶¶ 66-67.
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` and decision to license Finjan’s patents
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`at that time when Finjan was a startup company is probative of Finjan’s development of its patented
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`technology and third party interest in it.
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`Furthermore, contrary to Blue Coat’s claim, Dr. Meyer did not claim that the Microsoft
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`agreement has no value at all. Rather, she testified that she analyzed all the agreements, including the
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`2
`PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO BLUE COAT’S
`MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4
`
`Case No. 15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
`
`
`
`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 329 Filed 09/28/17 Page 4 of 7
`
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`Microsoft agreement, and identified how it informed her opinion. Declaration of Hannah Lee (“Lee
`
`Opp. Decl.”) filed herewith, Ex. 12, Meyer 5/8/17 Depo Tr. at 122:13-125:7 (testifying that her
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`testimony was taken out of context and that she could not assign relative importance of the Microsoft
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`agreement versus other information contained in her report). While this agreement may not be
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`“informative as to the hypothetical license that would have occurred between Finjan and Blue Coat,”
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`(Brewer Decl., Ex. 1 at ¶ 112) it is probative of Georgia Pacific Factor 1 which is “royalties received
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`by the patentee for licensing of the patent in suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty.”
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`Id., ¶ 62. For this very reason, this agreement was admitted in other cases, even though Finjan’s expert
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`in those cases, including in Blue Coat I and Sophos, did not rely upon them.
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`Also, while finding the Microsoft license fundamentally different because it involved an
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` addition to a monetary license fee, Dr. Meyer explains that the Microsoft license had an
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`element common to Finjan’s other license agreements, e.g.,
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`
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` Brewer Decl., Ex. 1, Meyer Rpt. at ¶¶ 66-67,
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`120, 123. Based on the common licensing provision in Microsoft and other licenses, Dr. Meyer
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`explained that
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`
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`, showing Finjan’s intent and policies regarding licensing its
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`patents, as well as the nature and scope of its licenses. Id.; Georgia-Pacific factor 3 and 4 (“nature and
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`scope” and restrictions on license and “licensor’s established policy”). Thus, the Microsoft license is
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`also probative of various Georgia Pacific factors.
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`Finally, the Microsoft agreement, like the other licenses covering the Asserted Patents, is
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`probative of secondary considerations of non-obviousness. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed.
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`Cir. 1995) (“Licenses taken under the patent in suit may constitute evidence of nonobviousness”).
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`Finjan’s three validity experts, Drs. Jaegar, Goodrich and Lyon, provided opinion testimony regarding
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`this agreement. Lee Opp. Decl., Ex. 26, Goodrich Reb. Rpt. at ¶¶ 443-47; id. Ex. 27, Dr. Jaeger Reb.
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`Rpt. at ¶¶ 266-70, id. Ex. 28, Dr. Lyon Reb. Rpt. at ¶¶ 290-93. Thus, it should not be excluded.
`
`C.
`
`Finjan’s Patent License Agreements For the Asserted Patents Are Probative Of
`The Issue of Validity and Damages
`Finjan’s license agreements with Intel/McAfee, Webroot, Websense, F-Secure, Proofpoint,
`3
`PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO BLUE COAT’S
`MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4
`
`Case No. 15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
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`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 329 Filed 09/28/17 Page 5 of 7
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` F5, Veracode, Sophos, and Avira are all licenses that cover the
`Avast,
`Asserted Patents, such Blue Coat has no support for its claim that they are “non-comparable.”1 First,
`for the same reasons explained above, they are probative of secondary considerations of
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`nonobviousness. In re GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1580.
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`Second, Finjan’s settlement agreements (which are only the Intel, Webroot, Websense,
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`Proofpoint and Sophos agreements out of the 14 total agreements Blue Coat raised) where the Asserted
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`Patents are licensed is probative of Georgia Pacific factors 1-4, as they evidence royalties Finjan has
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`received for the Asserted Patents, rates that licensees are willing to pay for the Asserted Patents, the
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`scope and restrictions on Finjan’s licenses, and Finjan’s licensing practices. For this reason, Finjan’s
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`settlement agreements were admitted in prior litigations, including in Blue Coat I and Sophos. Further,
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`this information regarding Finjan’s licensing practices and Blue Coat’s position for the hypothetical
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`negotiation provided Dr. Meyer background and the basis for those agreements she found to be the
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`most informative or relied upon for her opinion. Brewer Decl., Ex. 1, Meyer Rpt. at ¶¶ 109-111.
`
`Settlements are often admissible where they involve the Asserted Patents. Prism, 849 F.3d
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`1360 at 1369-71 (admitting settlement covering patents in suit where there was “consideration of
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`various aspects … of the particular litigation settlements offered for admission into evidence”); see also
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`In re MSTG, Inc., 675 F.3d 1337, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“settlement agreements can be pertinent to the
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`issue of reasonable royalties.”). Here, Dr. Meyer considered all Finjan agreements that license the
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`Asserted Patents, and accounted for the similarities and differences in the agreements and how they
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`impacted her ultimate opinion. Brewer Decl. Ex. 1, Meyer Rpt. at ¶¶ 64-123. She found Finjan’s
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`settlement license agreements relevant because aside from the Asserted Patents, there is significant
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`overlap in the technology covered in the agreements with the Asserted Patents and consistency across
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`agreements in Finjan’s approach to licensing. Id., ¶¶ 64, 73-82, 89-90, 109-111, 114-117, 119. Her
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`discussion included describing the circumstances of the Intel agreement and how she used the facts
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`leading up to that agreement, which is a license for all the Asserted Patents. Id., ¶¶ 73-77, 111, 114-
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`115. The amount of the license alone does not make it inadmissible.
`
`
`1 Georgia Pacific factor 2 for comparability addresses “other patents”, i.e., not the patents-in-suit.
`4
`PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO BLUE COAT’S
`MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4
`
`Case No. 15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
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`
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`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 329 Filed 09/28/17 Page 6 of 7
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`Thus, Finjan’s agreements are admissible because they are more probative than prejudicial.
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`See, e.g. Mformation Techs., Inc., v. Research In Motion Ltd., No. C 08-04990-JW, 2012 WL 2339762,
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`at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2012) (denial of similar motion in limine where expert explained “how she
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`used each licensing agreement” and how the agreement “would be adjusted to account for
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`differences”); Blue Coat I, Dkt. No. 367 at 8:14-17 (settlements admitted where “…the jury is provided
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`evidence of these similarities and differences so that they may consider the relevance of the challenged
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`settlement agreements”); Sentius Int’l, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 5:13-cv-00825-PSG, 2015 WL
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`451950, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2015) (to rely on settlement for damages, patentee must only show
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`consideration of it “is sufficiently reliable to be admissible under Daubert”); GPNE Corp. v. Apple,
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`Inc., Case No. 5:12–cv–02885–LHK, 2014 WL 1494247, at *9–10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2014)
`(permitting a damages expert to testify where he relied on litigation settlement agreements).2
`Blue Coat misquotes Dr. Meyer who explained how the settlement agreements were probative
`
`in her report and at deposition. She testified how she used the agreements and that the “license
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`agreements rising out of settlement are generally consistent with both agreements reached outside of
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`settlement, with documents, showing Finjan’s licensing model and with discussions that I’ve had with
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`[Finjan] about [its] licensing approach” and therefore “is informative.” Lee Opp. Decl., Ex. 12, 5/8/17
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`Meyer at 119:9-21. She also testified that she explains “the relevance of the settlement agreements”
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`and “the probative nature of those settlement agreements,” pointing to her report. Lee Opp. Decl., Ex.
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`12, 5/8/17 Meyer 121:10-122:12; Brewer Decl., Ex. 1, Meyer Rpt. at ¶¶ 109-110.
`
`Finally, Finjan’s proposed jury instruction regarding settlement agreements, like one given in
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`Blue Coat I (Blue Coat I, Dkt. No. 437 at 47), describes how a settlement agreement is different from
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`other license agreements. This in combination with Dr. Meyer’s explanation ensures no prejudice to
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`Blue Coat. For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Blue Coat’s Motion in Limine No. 4.
`
`
`2 Blue Coat’s cases are not analogous. Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc. only dealt with offers to
`license. 718 F.2d 1075, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The agreements excluded in ResQNet.com involved
`different technology and was not a license to the patents-in-suit. 594 F.3d at 872-73. LaserDynamics,
`Inc. v. Quanta Comp., Inc. is nothing like this case, where the settlement agreement was executed
`shortly before trial and the defendant had been subjected to numerous sanctions. 694 F.3d 51, 77-78
`(Fed. Cir. 2012).
`
`5
`PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO BLUE COAT’S
`MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4
`
`Case No. 15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
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`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 329 Filed 09/28/17 Page 7 of 7
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`
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`DATED: September 28, 2017
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`By: /s/ Lisa Kobialka
`
`
`Paul J. Andre (State Bar. No. 196585)
`Lisa Kobialka (State Bar No. 191404)
`James Hannah (State Bar No. 237978)
`KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS
` & FRANKEL LLP
`990 Marsh Road
`Menlo Park, CA 94025
`Telephone: (650) 752-1700
`Facsimile: (650) 752-1800
`pandre@kramerlevin.com
`lkobialka@kramerlevin.com
`jhannah@kramerlevin.com
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`FINJAN, INC.
`
`6
`PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO BLUE COAT’S
`MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4
`
`Case No. 15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
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