Case5:14-cv-03928-PSG Document21 Filed08/14/14 Page1 of 13
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
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`CASE NO. 14-22134-CIV-MIDDLEBROOKS
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`ROTHSCHILD DIGITAL MEDIA
`INNOVATIONS, LLC,
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`Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,
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`v.
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`SONY COMPUTER ENTERTAINMENT
`AMERICA LLC,
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`Defendant/Counterplaintiff.
`_____________________________________
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`DEFENDANT'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE
`UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1404
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`Defendant Sony Computer Entertainment America LLC ("SCEA") hereby submits this
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`Reply in support of its Motion to Transfer this action to the United States District Court for the
`Northern District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) [Dkt. #15] (the "Motion").
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`SCEA's Motion to Transfer Venue should be granted. When the posturing and
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`dissembling is stripped from Plaintiff's Opposition, it remains undisputed that the center of
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`gravity of this case is in the Northern District of California. This case has been brought against a
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`company with its headquarters and principal place of business in California, that markets and
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`distributes the accused products in California, and that employs its relevant witnesses in
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`California. The relevant third parties are also located in California. In contrast, Plaintiff has no
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`substantial business operations, in Florida or anywhere else, other than the assertion of the
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`patent-in-suit. An examination of the relevant transfer factors leaves no doubt that transfer is
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`appropriate here. Plaintiff spends most of its time arguing that it has previously litigated other
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`cases in Florida and that it is not currently litigating in California – but that simply obscures the
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`Section 1404(a) analysis that shows the Northern District of California is more convenient for
`this case based on the relevant facts under the applicable law.
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`Case5:14-cv-03928-PSG Document21 Filed08/14/14 Page2 of 13
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`I.
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`DISCUSSION
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`As stated in SCEA’s Motion, the test in this District is 1) whether the case could have
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`been brought in the forum to which the transfer is sought, and 2) a balancing test to weigh
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`various private and public interest factors to compare the relative conveniences of the current
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`district against the transferee district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Here, it is undisputed that the
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`case could have been brought in the Northern District of California, and the conveniences clearly
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`favor that District as well.
`A.
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`Plaintiff Does Not Dispute That This Case Could Have Been Brought In The
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`Northern District Of California
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`As a preliminary matter, the threshold question under Section 1404(a) is whether the case
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`at issue could have been brought in the forum to which transfer is sought. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
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`Plaintiff does not address this requirement in its Opposition (the "Opposition"). It therefore is
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`undisputed that this action could have been brought in the Northern District of California and
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`that the threshold requirement for transfer is met.
`B.
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`Convenience Dictates That This Matter Should Proceed In The Northern
`District Of California
`i. Deference to Plaintiff's Choice of Forum is Outweighed By The Fact That
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`The Operative Facts Occurred In The Northern District of California
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`Plaintiff has not articulated a reason why it needs to litigate in the Southern District of
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`Florida, nor stated a particular connection between this case and the Southern District of Florida
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`other than that is where the inventor, Mr. Rothschild, resides. Rather, Plaintiff simply repeats the
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`mantra that "Plaintiff's choice of forum should not be disturbed" and suggests that this Court's
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`application of law in Mayfonk, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., No. 0:13-cv-60755-DMM, Dkt. #37, at *5 (S.D.
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`Fla. June 18, 2013) ("Mayfonk") was incorrect. See Opposition, at 7-9. Plaintiff's argument is
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`unpersuasive.
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`The Federal Circuit examined Mayfonk under a writ of mandamus and affirmed the same.
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`In re Mayfonk, 554 Fed. Appox. 943, *3 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (denying a petition for mandamus,
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`finding this Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to transfer). Further, the
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`"center of gravity" is not a separate test, but a short-hand used by this Court and others to refer to
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`the location where the pertinent activities in patent infringement cases have taken place. It is
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`routinely used by the District Courts of Florida when adjudicating motions to transfer in patent
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`infringement cases. See e.g., Capella Photonics v. Cisco Sys., ___F. Supp. 2d___, 2014 WL
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`3673314, at *10 (S.D. Fla. July 23, 2014); Wi-Lan v. Alcatel-Lucent USA, 2013 WL 358385, at
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`*9 (S.D. Fla Jan. 29, 2013); World Wide Medical Tech v. Oncura, 2012 WL 1252423, at *4-5
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`(N.D. Fla Apr. 13 2012); Suomen Colorize Oy v. Dish Network LLC, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1338
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`(M.D. Fla. July 8, 2011); Trace-Wilco, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 2009 WL 455432, at *2 (S.D. Fla
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`Feb. 23, 2009). As stated in these cases, the Eleventh Circuit law is not that plaintiff's choice of
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`forum may never be disturbed, but that it is entitled to deference unless outweighed by other
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`considerations. Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bill, PC, 74 F.3d 253, 260 (11th Cir. 1996). And the
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`deference accorded is less where, as here, the operative facts underlying the cause of action did
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`not occur in the forum chosen by the plaintiff. Suomen Colorize Oy, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1338
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`(applying the Eleventh Circuit test and noting that, while the plaintiff's choice of forum is
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`normally given deference, "in patent cases, the preferred forum is the defendant's place of
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`business as that usually constitutes the center of gravity of the alleged patent infringement").
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`Further, Plaintiff's reliance on Mason v. Smithkline Beecham Clinical Labs is not well
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`founded. See Opposition, at 10. First, that case was a personal injury matter where the plaintiff
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`established that she could not litigate outside her home forum. 146 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1360 (S.D.
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`Fla. 2001). Specifically, the plaintiff provided a declaration disclosing her assets, income, and
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`debt to show that she did not have the financial means to litigate elsewhere and it was undisputed
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`that she was in poor physical health, which would make travel difficult. Conversely, Mr.
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`Rothschild's declaration waxes poetically about his business efforts and philanthropic activities
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`in Florida (Decl. of Leigh M. Rothschild at ¶ 8 (Aug. 4, 2014) ("Rothschild Decl.")) and does not
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`dispute that he has the means and stamina to support over a dozen other patent infringement
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`cases filed in other jurisdictions or that Plaintiff has the means to litigate this case in California.
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`Accordingly, Mr. Rothschild's, and thus Plaintiff's, situation is hardly analogous to Mason.
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`Given the foregoing, Plaintiff has not shown that its choice of forum is entitled to
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`significant deference or rebutted SCEA's showing that said deference is outweighed by the fact
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`that the "center of gravity" is in the Northern District of California.
`ii. Convenience of Parties and Witnesses Favors Transfer
`1. Convenience of the Parties Favors Transfer
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`Plaintiff's argument that SCEA has more significant connections to Florida than asserted
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`in its Motion is unavailing. As a primary matter, Plaintiff's claim that SCEA has agreed that
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`venue is proper in this district is flatly incorrect. See Opposition, at 4. SCEA has specifically
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`denied that either personal jurisdiction or venue is proper in this Court. Answer at ¶¶ 5, 6
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`[Dkt. #6]. With regards to the counterclaims SCEA has asserted, the analysis for venue focuses
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`on Plaintiff's activities as the counterdefendant - not SCEA's. See 28 USC § 1400(b) ("a civil
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`action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant
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`resides…") (emphasis added).
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`Further, Plaintiff attempts to manufacture a connection by attributing the activities of
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`what it has dubbed "SCEA-related entities" to SCEA, and specifically the filing of cases in the
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`District Courts of Florida by said entities. See Opposition, at 4, 14. First, SCEA is the only
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`named defendant in this case. Compl. at ¶2 [Dkt. #1]. Accordingly, the fact that various third
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`parties are availing themselves of the District Courts of Florida is irrelevant to whether SCEA has
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`a significant enough connection to this District. Second, to come up with these so-called
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`"SCEA-related entities," Plaintiff merely searched PACER for case filings by entities with the
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`word "Sony" in their name. Decl. of Ernesto M. Rubi at ¶ 5 (Aug. 4, 2014) ("Rubi Decl.") [Dkt.
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`#20-2]. Plaintiff has provided no basis for its assertion that the activities of said entities are
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`attributable to SCEA. And there is none; each corporation listed in Exhibit B [Dkt. #20-4] is a
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`separate corporate entity from SCEA.
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`With regards to the two cases filed by SCEA that Plaintiff raises, closer scrutiny shows
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`that they are entitled to no consideration in the present venue analysis. First, neither case is
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`recent, one being filed in 2007 and the other in 1999. See Sony Computer Ent. Am. Inc. v. Nasa
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`Electronics Corp. et al., 1:07-cv-20819 (S.D. Fla. 2007); Sony Computer Ent. Am. Inc. v. Media
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`Optik, Inc., 1:99-cv-02618 (S.D. Fla. 1999). Second, the Media Optik case was brought by
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`SCEA to enforce a settlement agreement in Florida litigation where SCEA was originally the
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`defendant, and therefore did not voluntarily avail itself of the Florida court system. See Media
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`Optik, Compl. at ¶ 1 [Dkt. #1]. The complaint in the Nasa Electronics Corp. was brought to
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`enjoin the distribution and sale of counterfeit "PlayStation" videogame consoles against
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`numerous Florida individuals who may not have been subject to personal jurisdiction elsewhere.
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`See Nasa Electronics, Compl. at ¶¶ 1, 5-13 [Dkt #1]. It would be manifestly unjust to hold that a
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`corporation must choose between protecting its consumers by virtue of bringing suit in the only
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`jurisdiction possible and forever being forced to defend itself in an inconvenient forum.
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`Finally, with regards to Plaintiff's assertion that SCEA sells "tens of millions" (and at
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`some points in the brief, even "tens of billions") of dollars worth of product in Florida, Plaintiff's
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`"supporting" evidence merely shows that third parties, such as Costco, Target, BestBuy, and
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`GameStop, sell said product here. Rubi Decl. at ¶¶ 8, 9, Exh. C, D [Dkt. #20-5, 20-6]. But these
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`same third parties also sell the same product throughout the nation. This does not suggest that
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`the Southern District of Florida has any meaningful connection to this lawsuit. It is for this
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`reason that this Court has found that nationwide sale of an accused product does not favor any
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`particular venue. Mayfonk, at *6-7 (products "sold throughout the United States" confer "no
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`more or less meaningful connection to one venue or another") (citations omitted); see also
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`Capella Photonics, ___F. Supp. 2d___, 2014 WL 3673314, *10 ("Defendants offer the accused
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`products for sale nationwide, which does not give rise to a substantial interest in any specific
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`venue") (citing In re Acer Am. Corp., 626 F.3d 1252, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2010)); Seal Shield v. Otter
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`Prod., 2013 WL 6017330, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2013) (same).
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`As for Plaintiff's connection with this forum, Plaintiff admits that it was formed on the
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`eve of litigation with the specific purpose of bringing this litigation. Opposition, at 4-5; Decl. of
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`Leigh M. Rothschild at ¶ 10 (Aug. 4, 2014) [Dkt. #20-1]. To try to obscure this fact, Plaintiff
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`stresses the connection of Mr. Rothschild to Florida. Mr. Rothschild, however, is not the
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`plaintiff. Further, this argument is particularly unavailing when Plaintiff has responded so
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`indignantly to the suggestion that Mr. Rothschild's zealous and contemporaneous enforcement of
`his patents in other jurisdictions should be given consideration.1 See Opposition at 2, 4. It is an
`undisputed fact that Mr. Rothschild concurrently filed more than a dozen patent infringement
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`1 Plaintiff spends a significant portion of its brief making scurrilous remarks about SCEA and
`suggesting that SCEA intended to mislead the Court by falsely asserting that all thirteen of the
`other suits filed by Mr. Rothschild were in California. SCEA declines the invitation to engage in
`a mud-slinging match. SCEA very clearly - and expressly - stated that only one of the cases was
`filed in California. See Motion, at 6 ("Indeed, one of these lawsuits, Rothschild GPS Sharing
`Innovations, LLC v. Nissan North America, Inc., No. 2:2014-cv-00819, was filed in
`California…") (emphasis added). Further, that the California case was voluntarily dismissed for
`some undisclosed reason is a non sequitur, particularly when Plaintiff, by virtue of Mr.
`Rothschild, is certainly aware of the reason and thus there is no reason to speculate. The fact
`remains that the thirteen law suits demonstrate Mr. Rothschild's willingness to litigate in other
`districts outside of Florida, including California, and therefore indicate that there is no reason for
`this case to proceed in any jurisdiction outside the center of gravity of the alleged infringement.
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`cases in other jurisdictions, so clearly this is not the only forum for Plaintiff. Either Plaintiff can
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`accept attribution of all of Mr. Rothschild's activities, or none - it cannot pick and choose.
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`Accordingly, it cannot seriously be disputed that transfer of this case to the Northern
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`District of California would be far more convenient for the parties.
`2. Convenience of the Witnesses Favors Transfer
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`Plaintiff's position that only expert witnesses are of consequence in a patent infringement
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`matter is unpersuasive. Opposition, at 11-12. While expert witnesses are undoubtedly
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`important, experts base their opinions on fact and much of those facts will come from fact
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`witnesses. SCEA has identified two party witnesses in the Northern District of California,
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`Mr. Koller and Mr. Wong, who are expect to testify in this case. Although Plaintiff is dismissive
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`of the importance of witnesses on marketing and financial matters, it cannot seriously do so at
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`the same time it asserts that the potential damages are "tens of millions" (Opposition at 4) to
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`"tens of billions" (Opposition at 17) of dollars. Further, even setting aside Mr. Koller and
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`Mr. Wong, SCEA has made a clear, undisputed record that any witnesses that are needed to
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`testify from any relevant department of SCEA would likely be employed in the Northern District
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`of California. See Motion, Exh. B, Decl. of John Koller, at ¶ 14 (July 8, 2014) [Dkt. # 15-2];
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`Exh. C, Decl. of Sally Buchanan at ¶¶ 3, 7 (July 14, 2014) [Dkt. # 15-3].
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`Further, SCEA has identified third party witnesses in the Northern District of California
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`who are not subject to the subpoena power of this Court, including the very company, Sony
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`Network Entertainment International LLC ("SNEI"), that operates the network that Plaintiff
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`accuses of infringement. Plaintiff has no substantive response to this point, other than to make
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`the bizarre argument that SNEI is not an “individual.” Opposition, at 12. Plaintiff does not
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`dispute that SNEI is a relevant third party witness, that individuals at SNEI would be
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`knowledgeable about the accused network, or that SNEI is not subject to the subpoena power of
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`this Court. These undisputed facts compellingly favor transfer.
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`Conversely, Plaintiff has only named Mr. Rothschild, the inventor, and attempts to
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`bolster the importance of his testimony by citing to a 1999 journal article discussing various
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`witnesses in a patent litigation case. See Opposition, at 13 (citing Edward G. Poplawski,
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`Selection and Use of Experts in Patent Cases, 9 Fed. Cir. Bar. J. 145, 145 (1999)). However,
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`courts' consideration of inventor testimony has evolved in the past 15 years, and this Court has
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`explained as recently as last year that an inventor's location should be given minimal
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`consideration in determining whether to transfer a case as their testimony is entitled to "little
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`deference. " See Mayfonk, at *5. This is particularly true where the inventor has shown himself
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`willing to litigate in other jurisdictions by contemporaneously filing numerous complaints in
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`various district courts, as here.
`iii. Prior Litigation In Florida Between Non-Parties Does Not Make This
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`District More Convenient For The Parties
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`Plaintiff is simply mistaken that prior litigation between non-parties regarding the '534
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`patent is relevant to the transfer analysis here. The '534 patent was asserted three times in this
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`District by different plaintiffs (Trust Licensing, LLC, and Rothschild Trust Holdings, LLC)
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`against different defendants (InterActual Technology, Inc., Orb Networks, Inc., Citrix Systems,
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`Inc., and Citrix Online, LLC). These other cases do not make it more convenient for the parties
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`in the instant case to litigate in this District.
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`Plaintiff's suggestion that SCEA has failed to meet its duty of candor by not discussing
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`the Court's decisions in Trust Licensing, LLC v. InterActual Tech., Inc., No. 1:03-cv-20672 (S.D.
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`Fla Nov. 3, 2002) [Dkt. #20-7] and Rothschild Trust Holdings, LLC v. Orb Networks, Inc., No.
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`1:06-cv-22921 (S.D. Fla May 14, 2007) [Dkt. #20-8] is thus not well taken. First, the Eleventh
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`Circuit's analysis under 28 USC § 1404(a) is a balancing test that weighs specific factors.
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`Whether a patent has been litigated in that forum in the past is not one of them. Plaintiff has
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`cited no case for the proposition that, once a patent is asserted in a given forum, a motion to
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`transfer under 28 USC § 1404(a) should be denied where all the other factors overwhelmingly
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`weigh in favor of transfer. Second, both the InterActual and Orb Network decisions are
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`extremely brief and give limited review of the facts of those cases. Both cases also involved
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`different plaintiffs and defendants than this case. Thus, it is not possible to determine the
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`relevance of those decisions to the facts of this case. And third, in Orb Network, the Court's
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`central criticism of Orb Network's motion was the failure to name any specific party or third-
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`party witnesses located in the alternate district. Orb Network, at *3-5. Contrary to this, SCEA
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`has named several party and third party witnesses in California.
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`Lastly, Plaintiff's proposition that prior claim construction rulings have precedential
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`effect in the district court where they are rendered (see Opposition at 6, 18) is incorrect as a
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`matter of law and must be rejected. It is well-settled that a second alleged infringer is not bound
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`by a prior district court claim construction - even when the subsequent case is before the same
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`district court. See, e.g., Costar Reality Information v. Civix-DDI, 2013 WL 5346440, at *7 (N.D.
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`Ill. Sept. 23, 2013) (reviewing prior claim construction orders from the same district court and
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`acknowledging that "[d]istrict court opinions are not binding authority even in the district in
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`which they are rendered"); Third Wave Technologies, Inc. v. Stratagene Corp., 381 F. Supp.2d
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`891, 914 (W.D. Wis. 2005) (reviewing a prior claim construction order from the same district
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`court and finding "a second alleged infringer is not bound by prior claim construction unless it
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`had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the construction in the first infringement action"). See
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`also Indus. Eng. & Dev. v. Static Control Components, 2013 WL 2406267, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June
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`3, 2013) (acknowledging that a prior claim construction order was not binding); Johnson &
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`Johnson Vision Care v. Ciba Vision Corp., 540 F. Supp.2d 1233, 1242 (M.D. Fla. 2008) ("the
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`Court is not bound to automatically accept the claim construction by [the prior Court]…Rather,
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`the Court has an independent obligation to determine the meaning of the claims, and to render its
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`own independent claim construction"). See generally McGinley v. Houston, 361 F.3d 1328,
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`1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (the general rule is that a district judge's decision does not bind another
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`district judge).
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`Although Plaintiff cites to the Supreme Court's decision in Markman for its proposition
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`that SCEA - which was not party to the prior litigation - is bound by the non-final claim
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`construction order in Rothschild Trust Holdings, LLC v. Citrix Systems, Inc., No. 1:06-cv-21359-
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`KING (SD Fla. 2006), it quite starkly fails to cite any subsequent case law so interpreting or
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`applying Markman. That is because there is none; while District Courts have varied slightly on
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`the amount of deference they are willing to accord other District Court claim construction orders,
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`none have applied stare decisis. Pediatric Medical Devices v. Indiana Mills & Mfg., 961
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`F.Supp.2d 1241, 1246 (N.D. Ga 2013) (citing Rambus Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., 569 F.
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`Supp.2d 946, 965 (N.D. Cal. 2008)).
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`Accordingly, SCEA is entitled to a new and independent claim construction order. This
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`is particularly so in light of Plaintiff's subsequent disavowal of claim scope during the
`reexamination of the patent-in-suit. 2 Thus, the prior claim construction order issued in
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`2 Plaintiff's assertion that the reexamination of the patent-in-suit ultimately concluded with
`"confirmation of the validity of all claims" (Opposition at 6, fn. 1) is flatly incorrect, as Plaintiff
`should be aware. Claim 2 was cancelled and Claim 22 was not reexamined. See U.S. Patent No.
`6,101,534, Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate Issued Under 35 U.S.C. §307 [Dkt. #1-3].
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`Rothschild Trust Holdings, LLC v. Citrix Systems, Inc., No. 1:06-cv-21359-KING (S.D. Fla. May
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`26, 2006) has no bearing on the present transfer of venue analysis.
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`Accordingly, Plaintiff has not rebutted that the convenience of the parties and witnesses
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`strongly favors transferring this matter to the Northern District of California.
`C.
`Plaintiff has provided no evidence to suggest this factor is anything but neutral. First,
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`The Relative Means Of The Parties Is Neutral
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`Plaintiff again vacillates between asserting that it is coterminous with Mr. Rothschild and
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`attempting to use the corporate structure to prevent being colored with Mr. Rothschild's filing
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`thirteen actions outside this District in 2014 alone. Plaintiff has provided no evidence regarding
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`its, or for that matter Mr. Rothschild's, actual assets, income, or debt to suggest that it would be a
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`hardship for it to litigate outside the Southern District of Florida. To the extent Plaintiff is
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`asserting that its finances are equivalent to Mr. Rothschild's personal wealth, Mr. Rothschild
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`took great pains in his supporting declaration to discuss his significant philanthropic activities.
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`Rothschild Decl., at ¶ 8. He has further found the means to concurrently litigate over a dozen
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`different patent litigation cases in other forums (Delaware and California), including against
`large corporate entities such as Deere & Company3, Mitek Systems Inc.4, Mix Telematics North
`America, Inc.5 and others. See Decl. of Nikia L. Gray, Appx. 6, 12, 16 (July 15, 2014) [Dkt.
`#15-1]. There is absolutely no basis to believe that Plaintiff does not have adequate means to
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`comfortably litigate this matter in the Northern District of California. Accordingly this factor, if
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`anything, is neutral.
`D.
`Plaintiff's argument that this Motion is mooted because the Court has already issued a
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`SCEA's Motion Is Not Mooted
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`Scheduling Order is unfounded. First, the present Motion was filed before the July 24, 2014
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`Scheduling Conference. At the Conference, the Court raised the issue of SCEA's Motion but
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`Furthermore, Plaintiff disavowed claim scope in order to gain confirmation. See generally Ex
`Parte Rothschild, No. 90/008,591 (PTAB 2010).
`3 Reported 2013 Revenue of $37.8 Million. Deere & Company, Annual Report 2013, at 2,
`http://www.deere.com/wps/dcom/en_US/corporate/our_company/investor_relations/annual_repo
`rts_and_ceo_message/annual_reports_and_ceo_message.page? (accessed Aug. 10, 2014).
`4 Reported 2013 Revenue of $14.8 Million. Mitek Systems, Inc., 2013 Form 10-Q, available
`http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html (accessed Aug. 10, 2014).
`5 Reported 2013 Revenue of $12.6 Million. Mix Telematics, Integrated Annual Report 2014, at
`10 (available http://investor.mixtelematics.com/annual-reports, (accessed Aug. 10, 2014).
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`declined to rule on it. There is no basis to penalize SCEA for this. Second, SCEA's Motion does
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`not seek to transfer this case to the Northern District of California for the purpose of an early
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`claim construction hearing, but because that venue is more convenient. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
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`SCEA raised the fact that it would seek an early claim construction if the case was transferred -
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`in a footnote - simply to show that the present Motion is not being asserted as a delay tactic.
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`Accordingly, there is no basis for finding SCEA's Motion moot.
`II.
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`CONCLUSION
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`SCEA's Motion to Transfer Venue to the Northern District of California should be
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`granted. The majority of the factors substantially favor transfer while the remainder are neutral.
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`Accordingly, SCEA has established that the Northern District of California is the most
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`convenient venue to litigate this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
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`Dated: August 14, 2014
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`By: /s/ Jeremy T. Elman
`Jeremy T. Elman (Florida Bar No. 37448)
`Jeremy.Elman@dlapiper.com
`DLA Piper LLP
`200 South Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 2500
`Miami, Florida 33131
`Phone: (305) 423-8514
`Fax: (305) 503-7551
`
`Gregory P. Sitrick (admitted pro hac vice)
`Gregory.Sitrick@quarles.com
`Quarles & Brady LLP
`One Renaissance Square
`Two North Central Avenue
`Phoenix, Arizona 85004
`Phone: (602) 229-5317
`Fax: (602) 229-5690
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`David R. Cross (admitted pro hac vice)
`David.Cross@quarles.com
`Quarles & Brady LLP
`411 East Wisconsin Avenue
`Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202
`Phone: (414) 277-5669
`Fax: (414) 271-3552
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`EAST\80402758. 110
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`Case5:14-cv-03928-PSG Document21 Filed08/14/14 Page11 of 13
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`Christopher J. Fahy (admitted pro hac vice)
`Christopher.Fahy@quarles.com
`Quarles & Brady LLP
`300 North LaSalle Street
`Suite 4000
`Chicago, Illinois 60654
`Phone: (312) 715-5000
`Fax: (312) 715-5155
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`Nikia L. Gray (admitted pro hac vice)
`Nikia.Gray@quarles.com
`Quarles & Brady LLP
`One South Church Avenue, Suite 1700
`Tucson, Arizona 85701-1621
`Phone: (520) 770-8700
`Fax: (520) 623-2418
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` Attorneys for Defendant
`Sony Computer Entertainment America LLC
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`EAST\80402758. 111
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`Case5:14-cv-03928-PSG Document21 Filed08/14/14 Page12 of 13
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that on August 14, 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing document
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`with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF filing system. I also certify that the foregoing
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`document is being served this date on all counsel of record or pro se parties on the Service List
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`below in the manner specified, either via transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated
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`by the CM/ECF system or in some other authorized manner for those counsel or parties who are
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`not authorized to receive Notices of Electronic Filing.
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`/s/ Jeremy T. Elman
`Jeremy T. Elman (Florida Bar No. 37448)
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`EAST\80402758. 112
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`Case5:14-cv-03928-PSG Document21 Filed08/14/14 Page13 of 13
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`SERVICE LIST
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`
`John C. Carey
`jcarey@careyrodriguez.com
`Ernesto M. Rubi
`erubi@careyrodriguez.com
`CAREY RODRIGUEZ
`O'KEEFE MILIAN GONYA, LLP
`1395 Brickell Avenue, Suite 700
`Miami, Florida 33131
`Phone: (305) 372-7474
`Fax: (305) 372-7475
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`Counsel for Plaintiff
`Electronically served via CM/ECF
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`EAST\80402758. 113