Case5:11-cv-01333-LHK Document27 Filed10/26/11 Page1 of 11
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`SAN JOSE DIVISION
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` Plaintiff,
`v.
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`PETE BE, et al.,
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` Defendant.
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`Case No.: 11-CV-01333-LHK
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`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
`MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
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`JOE HAND PROMOTIONS, INC.,
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`The Clerk of the Court entered default against Defendant Pete Be, individually, and as an
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`officer, director, shareholder, and/or principal of Da Kine Café Inc., d/b/a Da Kine Café and Da
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`Kine Café, Inc. (“Defendant”), after Defendant failed to appear or otherwise respond to the
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`Summons and Complaint within the time prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
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`ECF No. 22 at 1. Before the Court is Plaintiff Joe Hand Promotion, Inc.’s motion for default
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`judgment. See ECF No. 24, 24-1. Defendant, not having appeared in this action to date, has not
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`opposed the motion. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds this matter appropriate
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`for resolution without oral argument. Accordingly, the October 27, 2011 hearing on this motion is
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`vacated. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is GRANTED.
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`Case No.: 11-CV-01333-LHK
`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
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`For the Northern District of California
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`United States District Court
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`Case5:11-cv-01333-LHK Document27 Filed10/26/11 Page2 of 11
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`I. BACKGROUND
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`Plaintiff is a distributor of sports and entertainment programming, and alleges that it owns
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`commercial distribution rights to broadcast the program “UCF 119: Mir v. Cro Cop” (“Program”),
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`originally broadcast nationwide on September 25, 2010. See Compl. ¶ 14. Plaintiff alleges that the
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`Program was unlawfully intercepted and exhibited by Defendant at his commercial establishment,
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`Da Kine Café, which is located in Sunnyvale, California. Id. at ¶ 9. On March 21, 2011, Plaintiff
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`filed this action for violation of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §
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`605 and 47 U.S.C. § 553, as well as violations of California law against conversion. In the pending
`motion for default judgment, however, Plaintiff seeks damages only under § 6051 and for
`conversion.
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`As it has in countless similar actions filed around the country, Plaintiff requests the
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`maximum $10,000 available in statutory damages for violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II),
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`and the maximum $100,000 available in enhanced damages for willful violation of 47 U.S.C. §
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`605(e)(3)(C)(ii). See ECF No. 24-1 at 8, 13. With respect to its conversion claim, Plaintiff seeks
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`$1800.00, “the amount Defendant would have been required to pay had he ordered the [Program]
`from Plaintiff.”2 See id. at 19. Plaintiff also seeks $1038.98 in costs and $3,962.50 in attorneys’
`fees pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 605(e)(3)(B)(iii). See id.
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`II. LEGAL STANDARD
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`The Clerk of the Court may enter default if the defendant has “failed to plead or otherwise
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`defend” within the permitted time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Once the clerk enters default, all well-
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`pleaded allegations regarding liability are taken as true, except as to the amount of damages. Fair
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`Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). This is because the plaintiff must still
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`This Court has held that “where liability exists under both sections 553 and 605, the district
`court should impose damages pursuant to section 605 instead of imposing the lesser damages
`available under section 553.” Kingvision Pay-Per-View v. Guzman, No. 09-00217, 2009 WL
`1475722, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2009) (Breyer, J.).
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`This request for conversion damages conflicts with other assertions made by Plaintiff that
`Defendant should have paid a sublicensing fee of $900 or $1,100 based on its occupancy rate. See,
`e.g., ECF 24-1 at 4.
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`Case No.: 11-CV-01333-LHK
`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
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`For the Northern District of California
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`United States District Court
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`Case5:11-cv-01333-LHK Document27 Filed10/26/11 Page3 of 11
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`establish the relief to which it is entitled. Id. at 906. Entry of judgment by default is subject to the
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`court’s discretion. See Lau Ah Yew v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 415, 415 (9th Cir. 1956) (holding that trial
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`court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for default judgment). Therefore, a
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`defendant’s default does not automatically entitle plaintiff to judgment. See, e.g., Draper v.
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`Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming district court’s denial of motions for default
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`judgment where the moving party could not show prejudice as a result of delays).
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`When a court is considering whether to enter a default judgment, it has “an affirmative duty
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`to look into its jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties.” In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707,
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`712 (9th Cir. 1999). Satisfied of its subject matter jurisdiction (federal statutes 47 U.S.C. § 553
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`and § 605 are at issue) and personal jurisdiction (Defendant resides and does business in
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`California), the Court shall proceed to review Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment.
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`III. DISCUSSION
`A. Default Judgment is Proper Because Eitel Factors are Met.
`In exercising its discretion to enter default judgment, the Court may consider:
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`“(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s
`substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at
`stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts, (6)
`whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy
`underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.”
`Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v.
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`Burleson, No. 11-00499, 2011 WL 4905631, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2011). Applying the Eitel
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`factors to the instant case, the Court finds that default judgment is proper.
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`First, the Court recognizes the possibility that Plaintiff will be prejudiced if default
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`judgment is not entered against Defendant. Denying judgment against a defendant who does not
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`participate in litigation deprives the plaintiff of a remedy until such time as the defendant chooses
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`to litigate. See, e.g., Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1061 (N.D. Cal.
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`2010) (“[W]here a defendant’s failure to appear makes a decision on the merits impracticable, if
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`not impossible, entry of default judgment is warranted.”) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, the
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`first factor weighs in favor of granting of default judgment.
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`Case No.: 11-CV-01333-LHK
`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
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`For the Northern District of California
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`United States District Court
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`Case5:11-cv-01333-LHK Document27 Filed10/26/11 Page4 of 11
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`Next, Plaintiff has satisfied the second and third Eitel factors by showing it is entitled to
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`relief under 47 U.S.C. § 605 and for conversion. To state a claim for a violation of Section 605,
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`the plaintiff must plead that the defendant received, assisted in receiving, or transmitted the
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`plaintiff’s satellite transmission without authorization. See DirecTV, Inc. v. Webb, 545 F.3d 837,
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`844 (9th Cir. 2008) (satellite television signals are among the “communications” protected by the
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`Communications Act, prohibiting unauthorized receipt and use of radio communications for one’s
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`own benefit or for benefit of another not entitled thereto). Plaintiff asserts that it “was granted the
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`right to distribute the [Program], including all undercard bouts and the entire television broadcast . .
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`. via closed circuit television and via encrypted satellite signal.” Compl. ¶ 14. Plaintiff also alleges
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`that Defendant willfully and unlawfully intercepted the Program at the time of its transmission at
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`his commercial establishment in Sunnyvale, California. Comp. ¶¶ 9, 17. Thus, Plaintiff has
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`adequately set forth a claim under Section 605.
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`The elements of conversion are: 1) ownership of a right to possession of property; 2)
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`wrongful disposition of the property right of another; and 3) damages. See G.S. Rasmussen &
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`Assoc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., 958 F.2d 896, 906 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff alleges ownership of the
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`distribution rights to the Program, misappropriation of those rights by Defendant’s unlawful
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`interception, and damages. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 25, 32. Plaintiff has therefore also sufficiently stated a
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`claim for conversion.
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`In analyzing the fourth Eitel factor, the sum of money at stake, “the Court considers
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`Plaintiff’s declarations, calculations, and other documentation of damages in determining if the
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`amount at stake is reasonable.” Truong Giang Corp. v. Twinstar Tea Corp., No. 06-03594, 2007
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`WL 1545173, at *12 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2007). Default judgment is disfavored when a large sum
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`of money is involved or the damages sought are unreasonable in light of the defendant’s actions.
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`See id. Where a plaintiff’s request for damages is excessive, the court may mitigate the impact of
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`this factor by reducing the amount awarded. See, e.g., Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Burleson, No.
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`11-00499, 2011 WL 4905631, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2011). Here, the Court finds Plaintiff’s
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`request for $100,000 in enhanced damages unreasonable in light of the circumstances of the case.
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`Case No.: 11-CV-01333-LHK
`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
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`For the Northern District of California
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`United States District Court
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`Case5:11-cv-01333-LHK Document27 Filed10/26/11 Page5 of 11
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`See id. However, because, as discussed below, the Court awards Plaintiff a substantially smaller
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`sum, this factor does not weigh strongly against the entry of default judgment.
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`The remaining Eitel factors also support default judgment. There is no genuine issue of
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`material fact because the allegations in the complaint are taken as true, see id., at *4, there is no
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`evidence that Defendant’s failure to participate in the litigation is due to excusable neglect, and the
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`policy favoring decision on the merits generally weighs strongly in favor of entering default
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`judgment, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
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`The Court therefore finds that default judgment is appropriate in this case.
`B. The Court Awards Statutory Damages under Section 605(e)(3)(c)(i)(II)
`Section 605(e)(3)(c)(i)(II) provides that an aggrieved party may recover a sum of not less
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`than $1,000 and not more than $10,000 for each violation of Section 605(a), as the Court considers
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`just. “A traditional method of determining statutory damages is to estimate either the loss incurred
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`by the plaintiff or the profits made by the defendants.” Joe Hand Promotions v. Kim Thuy Ho, No.
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`C-09-01435 RMW (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2009) (citing cases).
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`The loss incurred by the plaintiff may be estimated by calculating a hypothetical lost
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`licensing fee. See id. Here, Plaintiff alleges that its commercial sublicense fee is based on the
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`sublicensing establishment’s maximum capacity. See ECF No. 24-1, Ex. A-3 (“Rate Card”).
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`Plaintiff offered evidence that the Da Kine Café’s capacity was seventy-five persons, and that a
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`commercial license of the Program would therefore have cost Defendant $1,100. See Affidavit of
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`Joe Hand, Jr., President of J&J Sports Productions, Inc., Exh. 1 at 3 (“Hand Affidavit”); see also
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`Affidavit of Investigator Tad Whitaker, Ex. A-2 (“Whitaker Affidavit”). However, Plaintiff also
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`submitted conflicting evidence that the establishment’s capacity was fifty persons. See Affidavit of
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`Investigator Antonio Villalobos, Ex. A-2 (“Vollalobos Affidavit”) (“In my opinion, the
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`approximate capacity of this establishment is 50 people”) (emphasis in original). An establishment
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`with a 50-person capacity would have been charged $900 for the Program, not $1,100. See Rate
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`Card.
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`As to Defendant’s profits, Plaintiff submits evidence that up to 38 patrons were present at
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`Da Kine Café at the time the Program was shown, but that there was no cover charge. See
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`Case No.: 11-CV-01333-LHK
`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
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`For the Northern District of California
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`United States District Court
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`Case5:11-cv-01333-LHK Document27 Filed10/26/11 Page6 of 11
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`Villalobos Affidavit, ECF No. 24-1, Ex. A-2. Because there is no evidence of how much
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`Defendant made during the unlawful exhibition of the Program, the Court shall base statutory
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`damages on the cost of a hypothetical commercial license for an establishment with a 50-person
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`capacity (the lower of the two estimates submitted by Plaintiff): $900. See id. The $900 amount,
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`however, is below the $1,000 statutory minimum allowed under Section 605. Accordingly,
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`the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to $1,000 in statutory damages.
`C. The Court Awards Enhanced Damages under Section 605(e)(3)(C)(ii)
`Enhanced damages of up to $100,000 are available under Section 605 when the violation
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`was committed willfully and for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain.
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`See 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(ii). In this case, there is no evidence that Defendant advertised the
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`fact that the Program would be shown, charged a cover, or had a minimum purchase requirement.
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`Nevertheless, according to Plaintiff’s investigators, there were three televisions displaying the
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`Program during regular business hours, indicating that Defendant’s use of the Program served
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`some commercial purpose. See Whitaker Affidavit; Villalobos Affidavit. Plaintiff also submits
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`that the broadcast was encrypted, and thus Defendant “must have undertaken specific wrongful
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`actions” to intercept the Program. See ECF No. 24-1 at 4. These facts suggest that Defendant
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`acted willfully for commercial advantage and private financial gain.
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`The $100,000 maximum, however, is not warranted under these circumstances. Plaintiff
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`offers no authority supporting a damage award of this magnitude where the Defendant is not a
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`repeat offender. Compare J & J Sports Production, Inc. v. Ferreyra, 2008 WL 4104315 (E.D. Cal.
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`2008) (Mueller, Magistrate J.) (maximum enhanced damages imposed under § 605 because
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`defendant was a repeat offender, but statutory damages under § 553 and conversion denied as
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`cumulative); see also Joe Hand Productions, Inc. v. Streshly, 655 F. Supp. 2d. 1136, 1139 (S.D.
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`Cal. 2009) (“[T]he Court will not . . . indulge Plaintiff’s attempt to obtain the biggest judgment it
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`can by filing cookie-cutter pleadings that trivialize the particular facts of this case and ignore the
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`voluminous case law that reveals its requested judgment [of $100,875] to be so wildly out of the
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`question”). Courts in this District have found a $5,000 enhancement proper where there was a
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`modest number of patrons and the Defendant imposed a cover charge. See, e.g., Garden City
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`Case No.: 11-CV-01333-LHK
`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
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`For the Northern District of California
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`United States District Court
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`Case5:11-cv-01333-LHK Document27 Filed10/26/11 Page7 of 11
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`Boxing Club, Inc. v. Lan Thu Tran, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71116, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20,
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`2006) (Whyte, J.) (awarding $1,000 in statutory damages and $5,000 in enhanced damages when
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`40 patrons were present and a $10 cover charge was imposed).
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`Here, there were between 30 and 38 patrons present, and Defendant did not impose a cover
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`charge. See Whitaker Affidavit; Villalobos Affidavit. Plaintiff does not submit any evidence that
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`Defendant is a repeat offender. Under these circumstances, an additional $1,000 is a reasonable
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`enhancement.
`D. The Court Awards Damages for Conversion
`Plaintiff also seeks $1800 in damages for conversion under California Civil Code § 3336.
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`See ECF No. 24-1 at 19. While a claim for conversion generally lies only where the property
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`allegedly converted is tangible, “courts in recent years have significantly relaxed this rule.” Don
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`King Productions/Kingvision v. Lovato, 911 F. Supp. 419, 423 (N.D. Cal. 1995); DirecTV, Inc. v.
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`Pahnke, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1189-90 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (granting plaintiff’s motion for summary
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`judgment for violations of 47 U.S.C. § 605, conversion, and other federal statutes, after first noting
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`that “[c]onversion is generally applied to tangible property,” but “courts have relaxed this
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`requirement”); but see J. & J. Sports Productions, Inc. v. Kigo, No. 10-05512, 2011 WL 3418394,
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`at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2011) (denying copyright and conversion claims against an establishment
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`owner for the unauthorized showing of a boxing match while emphasizing that California state and
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`federal courts have reached different conclusions as to whether conversion applies to intangible
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`property not merged with or reflected in something tangible). Some courts have also denied
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`recovery for conversion as “cumulative” where statutory damages were already awarded. Pahnke,
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`405 F. Supp. 2d at 1193 (having already awarded $10,000 in statutory damages under § 605, the
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`court denied plaintiff’s additional request for damages of $50,000 for conversion as “cumulative
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`and excessive”); see also Kingvision Pay-Per-View v. Guzman, No. 09-00217, 2009 WL 1475722,
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`at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2009) (Breyer, J.) (granting default judgment and total statutory damages
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`of $8,000 under § 605, while dismissing § 553 and conversion claims); but see Joe Hand
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`Promotions, Inc. v. Burleson, No. 11-00499, 2011 WL 4905631, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2011)
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`(awarding damages for statutory and conversion claim in default judgment). While acknowledging
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`Case No.: 11-CV-01333-LHK
`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
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`For the Northern District of California
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`United States District Court
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`Case5:11-cv-01333-LHK Document27 Filed10/26/11 Page8 of 11
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`that the law on this issue is unsettled, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s well-pleaded claim for
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`conversion justifies an award of damages.
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`Damages for conversion are based on the value of the property at the time of conversion.
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`See Arizona Power Corp. v. Smith, 119 F.3d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1941). Plaintiff seeks conversion
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`damages in the amount of $1,800. ECF No. 24-1 at 19. However, as previously noted, the Rate
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`Card submitted by Plaintiff indicates that, for an establishment like Defendant’s with a 50-person
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`capacity, the proper sublicensing fee is $900. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to $900 in damages
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`for conversion.
`E. The Court Awards Partial Costs and Denies Fees
`Costs and reasonable attorney’s fees are recoverable under 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(b)(iii).
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`District courts must calculate awards for attorney’s fees using the “lodestar” method. See Ferland
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`v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Caudle v. Bristow Optical
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`Co., Inc., 224 F.3d 1014, 1028 (9th Cir. 1996). The lodestar is calculated by multiplying the
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`number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly
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`rate. Id. The party seeking an award of fees should “submit evidence supporting the hours worked
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`and rates claimed,” and if the evidence is lacking, “the district court may reduce the award
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`accordingly.” Hensley v. Eckerhard, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
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`“In determining a reasonable number of hours, the Court must review detailed time records
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`to determine whether the hours claimed by the applicant were unnecessary, duplicative or
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`excessive.” Defenbaugh v. JBC & Assoc., Inc., No. 03-0651, 2004 WL 1874978 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
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`10, 2004) (citing Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986)). Where
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`there is a lack of opposition to a party’s motions, or where the instant action is routine or
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`substantially similar to prior actions brought by the same attorney, a court may find requests for
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`attorney’s fees excessive. E.g., Owen v. Brachfeld, No. 07-4400, 2008 WL 5130619 (N.D. Cal.
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`Dec. 5, 2008) (where counsel requested reimbursement for a total of 8.9 attorney hours for
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`preparing a summary judgment motion, the court awarded only half the requested fees because
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`defendants did not oppose the motion and the drafting document was “a matter of course in his
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`practice” and “almost identical to that filed in connection with a similar motion”); Sanchez v. Bank
`8
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`Case No.: 11-CV-01333-LHK
`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
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`For the Northern District of California
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`United States District Court
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`Case5:11-cv-01333-LHK Document27 Filed10/26/11 Page9 of 11
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`of Am., No. 09-5574, 2010 WL 2382347, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2010) (in calculating attorney’s
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`fees, the court reduced the number of reasonable hours from 89.8 to thirty, in light of the fact that
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`defendant had “defended itself in near-identical prior actions by other plaintiffs” represented by the
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`same attorney).
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`In this case, Plaintiff’s counsel first seeks recovery of $1038.98 in costs, including $500 for
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`investigation, $350 for the complaint filing fee, and $188.98 for service of process charges. See
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`Declaration of Plaintiff’s Counsel Re Attorneys [sic] Fees (“Counsel’s Declaration”), ECF No. 24-
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`1, Ex. B at 4. Plaintiff submits no records supporting its request for investigation costs, and the
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`invoice attached to the Counsel’s Declaration suggests that service of process may have cost only
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`$60. See id., Ex. B-1. Without clearer evidence supporting Plaintiff’s allegations of recoverable
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`costs, the Court will only allow reimbursement for the $350 complaint filing fee.
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`Plaintiff additionally seeks $3,962.50 in attorney’s fees. In support of its request, Plaintiff’s
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`counsel submitted a declaration and a chart describing the services rendered and hours billed.
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`However, counsel’s declaration indicates that the chart is not based on billing records, but a
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`“reconstruction” based on the file and created long after services were rendered for the purpose of
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`justifying an award of attorney’s fees. See Counsel’s Declaration at 2 (explaining the lack of any
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`“computerized time sheets or electronic legal billing software,” by noting that “in light of our
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`routine handling of these types of matters, we are extremely capable of reconstructing an accurate
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`outline of our billable time on this file.”). Id. According to the declaration, billable hours are
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`broken down as follows:
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`a. Attorney = 8.8 hours at $300.00 per hour = $2640.00
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`b. Paralegal = 2.1 hours at $150.00 per hour = $315.00
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`c. Administrative Assistant = .1 hours at $75 per hour = $7.50
`See id. at 4.
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`Without actual billing records, however, the Court gives little weight to these figures. See
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`Zynga Game Network Inc. v. Erkan, No. 09–3264, at *2, 2010 WL 3463630 (N.D. Cal. Aug.31,
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`2010) (denying motion for attorney’s fees where plaintiff failed to attach “actual billing records”).
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`Case No.: 11-CV-01333-LHK
`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
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`9
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`For the Northern District of California
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`United States District Court
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`Case5:11-cv-01333-LHK Document27 Filed10/26/11 Page10 of 11
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`Furthermore, counsel has not shown that his alleged billing rates are reasonable in this
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`District. See Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008) (in determining
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`the prevailing market rate, “generally, the relevant community is the forum in which the district
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`court sits”). Counsel states: “Our rates for legal, administrative and paralegal time are well within
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`the guidelines of the prevailing market rates within Los Angeles County and the United States.”
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`Counsel’s Declaration at 2. Los Angeles County is in the Central District of California, while this
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`Court is located in the Northern District of California.
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`That error and others suggest that the pleadings submitted in this case are boilerplate
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`documents. For example, Plaintiff’s counsel’s chart references an initial demand letter sent to
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`“Defendant Christopher J. Trimble,” while the Defendant in this case is Pete Be. See id. Another
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`declaration submitted by Plaintiff’s counsel to the Court identifies the defendants as “James B.
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`Johring, Jodi Ann Montes and Big Jim’s Grill.” ECF No. 19 ¶¶ 1-2.
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`In addition, the motion for default judgment cites the defendant’s establishment’s “90-
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`person capacity” and “five large television screens,” but the figures offered by Plaintiff’s
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`investigators indicate a 50- or 75-person capacity and three television screens. Furthermore,
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`counsel’s own assertions indicate that this matter is “routine.” See Counsel’s Declaration at 2
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`(“My firm routinely handles the civil prosecution of commercial signal piracy claims on behalf of
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`Joe Hand Promotions.”); (“In light of our routine handling of these types of matters, we are
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`extremely capable of reconstructing an accurate outline of our billable time on this file.”).
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`Given the “routine” nature of counsel’s work on this matter, the lack of opposition to
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`Plaintiff’s motions, and the boilerplate nature of the pleadings, the Court is reluctant to allow
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`recovery for 8.8 billable attorney hours at a rate of $300 per hour. Furthermore, counsel has
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`provided no documentation to justify recovery of attorney’s, paralegal or administrative fees, such
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`as a curriculum vitae or resume, billing and cost records (not merely a reconstruction of services
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`and hours long after the fact), or other relevant information. See Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Tu
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`Minh Nguyen, No. 10-3504, 2011 WL 1642306, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2011); Joe Hand
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`Promotions, Inc. v. Nguyen, No. 10-02536, 2011 WL 704441, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2011).
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`Unless additional documentation supporting Plaintiff’s calculation of costs and attorney’s fees is
`10
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`Case No.: 11-CV-01333-LHK
`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
`
`For the Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
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`

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`Case5:11-cv-01333-LHK Document27 Filed10/26/11 Page11 of 11
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`submitted by November 9, 2011, Defendant is ordered to pay only $350 for the complaint filing
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`fee.
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`IV. ORDER
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`For the reasons detailed above, Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is GRANTED.
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`Judgment shall be entered in favor of Plaintiff Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. and against Defendant
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`Pete Be, d/b/a Da Kine Café, in the amount of $2,900 in damages and $350 in costs. Plaintiff may
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`submit an affidavit of attorney’s fees and costs by November 9, 2011. The Clerk shall close the
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`file.
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`IT IS SO ORDERED.
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`Dated: October 26, 2011
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`_________________________________
`LUCY H. KOH
`United States District Judge
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`Case No.: 11-CV-01333-LHK
`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
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`For the Northern District of California
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`United States District Court