throbber
Case5:10-cv-01917-LHK Document43 Filed01/31/11 Page1 of 17
`
`
`
`Case No.: 10-CV-01917-LHK
`
`ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION
`FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
`
`
`
`))
`
`
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Defendants.
`
`Plaintiff Autodesk, Inc., moves for default judgment against Defendants Guillermo Flores,
`
`Greg Flowers, and Gregorio Flores. Although Plaintiff initially had some contact with Defendants
`
`regarding possible settlement of the case, Defendants did not file an Answer or otherwise appear in
`
`this case. The Court has considered the motion and declarations submitted by Plaintiff. Pursuant
`
`to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds that this motion is appropriate for determination without
`
`oral argument and vacates the motion hearing scheduled for February 3, 2011. For the reasons set
`
`forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, permanent injunction,
`
`statutory damages, and post-judgment interest. The Court denies Plaintiff’s request for costs and
`
`attorney’s fees without prejudice.
`
`
`
`Case No.: 10-CV-01917-LHK
`ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
`
`1
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`SAN JOSE DIVISION
`
`
`AUTODESK, INC., a Delaware
`corporation,
`
`
`
` Plaintiff,
`v.
`
`
`
`GUILLERMO FLORES, an individual;
`GREG FLOWERS, an individual;
`GREGORIO FLORES, an individual; and
`DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`For the Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`
`Case5:10-cv-01917-LHK Document43 Filed01/31/11 Page2 of 17
`
`
`
`I. Background
`Plaintiff Autodesk, Inc., develops, markets, distributes, and licenses a variety of
`
`copyrighted software products, including computer aided design programs. First Amended Compl.
`
`(“FAC”) ¶¶ 11, 16-17. Its copyrights are registered with the Copyright Office and cover products
`including AutoCAD® 2009 software and AutoCAD® 2010 software, as well as numerous other
`products. FAC ¶ 16. Autodesk also owns trademarks associated with its products, including the
`trademarks AutoCAD® and Autodesk®, which are registered with the United States Patent and
`Trademark Office. FAC ¶19.
`
`According to the memorandum and declarations submitted in support of its motion for
`
`default judgment, Autodesk began investigating the conduct underlying this action in October
`
`2009, when it received an email notifying it that advertisements offering illegal copies of Autodesk
`
`products had been posted on the website www.craigslist.org (“Craigslist”). Decl. of Evelyn R.
`
`LaHaie (“LaHaie Decl.”) ¶ 9 & Ex. A. The initial advertisement was titled “AutoCAD 2009
`
`AutoCAD 2010” and indicated that the seller was located in San Diego, California. The
`
`advertisement offered to sell copies of the two Autodesk products and stated “you’re getting a
`
`$4,000.00 program for 70 bucks.Please [sic] save the questions like, does it come with the manual
`
`and box, etc. It’s the full program, it works. You save tons of money.” Decl. of Eric A. Handler
`
`(“Handler Decl.”) ¶ 2 & Ex. A. At the time, the suggested retail price for the Autodesk products
`
`was $3,995. LaHaie Decl. ¶ 4. The ad also instructed interested buyers to “Call, text, or email”
`
`and provided a telephone number. Handler Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. A. The person who emailed Autodesk
`
`about the ad stated that when he contacted the seller and asked if the products were original, the
`
`seller responded with the following email:
`They’re backed up from an original bro. I sell several a week and have no
`complaints about me on craigslist or anything negative for that matter. I can help
`install prior to payment to show you it works just fine. If not no problem however
`you won't find this 4,000 dollar program for such a good price. Take care.
`- Memo
`LaHaie Decl. Ex. A.
`
`Case No.: 10-CV-01917-LHK
`ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
`
`2
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`For the Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`Case5:10-cv-01917-LHK Document43 Filed01/31/11 Page3 of 17
`
`
`
`Subsequent investigation indicated that Defendant Gregorio Flores, aka Greg Flowers,1 had
`posted numerous ads on Craigslist offering various versions of several different Autodesk products,
`including AutoCAD® software, AutoCAD® Civil 3D® software, Autodesk® Revit® software, and
`Autodesk® 3ds Max® software. Handler Decl., ¶¶ 6, 7, 10-13, Ex. D. Autodesk’s investigator
`purchased one of the products advertised by Defendants on Craigslist and received by mail a
`
`recordable digital videodisc (“DVD+R”) on which was hand-written “AUTOCAD 2010.” Id. at
`
`¶ 5 & Ex. E. Autodesk subjected the disc to forensic analysis and determined that it contained an
`unauthorized copy of AutoCAD® 2010 software, as well as software used to circumvent the
`copyright protection measures built into the AutoCAD® 2010 software. LaHaie Decl. Ex. C. The
`disc also contained instructions for installing the AutoCAD® software in conjunction with the
`circumvention software so that the AutoCAD® software could be run without an activation code
`from Autodesk. Id.
`
`Based on the information from its investigations, Autodesk filed the instant action on May
`
`4, 2010, against Defendants Greg Flowers and Gregorio Flores, asserting the following four claims:
`
`(1) copyright infringement in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 501; (2) violation of the circumvention
`
`technology provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a), (b); (3)
`
`trademark infringement and counterfeiting, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1) and 1125(a); and
`
`(4) false designation of origin, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). Further investigation revealed
`
`that Guillermo Flores was the owner of the telephone number listed on the Craigslist ads and had
`
`lived at the return address listed on the package received by Autodesk’s investigator. Accordingly,
`
`on May 12, 2010, Autodesk filed a First Amended Complaint adding Guillermo as a defendant.
`
`Handler Decl. ¶ 7. By June 18, 2010, Autodesk had served all Defendants with the First Amended
`
`Complaint. See Certificate of Service, ECF Nos. 12-14. Around the same time, Autodesk also
`
`contacted Defendants to determine whether litigation might be avoided. Id. at ¶ 9. In an initial
`
`phone conference, Autodesk was able to confirm that Defendants used the names, addresses, and
`
`phone number associated with the ads, and Defendants gave Autodesk access to one PayPal
`
`
`1 It appears that Gregorio Flores uses the name “Greg Flowers” as an alias and that Gregorio Flores
`and Greg Flowers are in fact one person. See Handler Decl. ¶ 10.
`3
`
`Case No.: 10-CV-01917-LHK
`ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
`
`For the Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`
`Case5:10-cv-01917-LHK Document43 Filed01/31/11 Page4 of 17
`
`
`
`account apparently owned by Gregorio and used by Guillermo to conduct business. Id. at ¶ 13.
`
`However, out-of-court talks eventually broke down, and Autodesk gave Defendants notice that it
`
`would seek entry of default if Defendants did not file and serve responses to the First Amended
`
`Complaint by August 23, 2010. Id. at 23. Defendants failed to respond to the Autodesk’s
`
`pleadings, and on September 2, 2010, the clerk entered default. Autodesk now moves for entry of
`
`default judgment and issuance of a permanent injunction against all Defendants. Autodesk also
`
`seeks an award of attorney’s fees incurred in this action.
`II. Motion for Default Judgment
`A. Default Judgment
`Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), a party may apply to the court for entry of
`
`judgment by default. “The district court’s decision whether to enter a default judgment is a
`
`discretionary one.” Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In exercising
`
`discretion to enter default judgment, courts typically consider the following factors: (1) the
`
`possibility of prejudice to plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the
`
`sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a
`
`dispute concerning the material facts, (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7)
`
`the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.
`
`Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986).
`1.
`After entry of default, “well-pled allegations in the complaint regarding liability are deemed
`
`Merits of Plaintiff’s Claims and Sufficiency of the Complaint
`
`true.” Fair Housing of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). The Court will
`
`therefore consider the merits of Autodesk’s claims and the sufficiency of its pleadings together. In
`
`addition to the allegations in its FAC, Autodesk has also submitted extensive documentation of
`
`Defendants’ advertisements on Craiglist and on-line transactions via PayPal, as well as detailed
`
`declarations documenting Autodesk’s investigation of Defendants’ activities. The Court will also
`
`consider these submissions in evaluating the merits of Autodesks’s substantive claims.
`
`
`
`Case No.: 10-CV-01917-LHK
`ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
`
`4
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`For the Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`Case5:10-cv-01917-LHK Document43 Filed01/31/11 Page5 of 17
`
`
`
`a. Copyright Infringement
`Autodesk’s first cause of action asserts copyright infringement in violation of 17 U.S.C.
`
`§ 501. The Copyright Act grants the copyright owner the exclusive right to reproduce a
`
`copyrighted work, to distribute copies of the work, and to authorize reproduction or distribution.
`
`See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(3). To establish copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove: (1)
`
`ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) that the defendant violated at least one exclusive right
`
`granted to plaintiff under 17 U.S.C. § 106. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004,
`
`1013 (9th Cir. 2001). Autodesk has clearly met this standard. As to the first element, the FAC
`
`alleges that Autodesk owns copyrights in at least fourteen different Autodesk products, including
`the AutoCAD® 2010 and AutoCAD® 2009 software explicitly offered in Defendants’ Craiglist
`advertisements. See FAC ¶ 17 & Ex. A; Handler Decl. Exs. A-D. These copyrights are registered
`
`with the Copyright Office, and Autodesk has provided a list of the registration numbers,
`
`registration dates, and product titles as an exhibit to the FAC. FAC Ex. A. As to the second
`
`element of infringement, Autodesk alleges that Defendants copied and distributed copyrighted
`
`Autodesk products without authorization. FAC ¶ 22. Autodesk has also submitted declarations
`
`stating that forensic analysis of a product purchased from Defendants included an unauthorized
`copy of AutoCAD® 2010 software. LaHaie Decl. ¶ 11 & Ex. C. These allegations are sufficient to
`establish a claim for copyright infringement pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 501.
`b. Circumvention of Technological Measures
`Autodesk’s second cause of action alleges that Defendants sold, distributed, or trafficked in
`
`circumvention technology, in violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), 17
`U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)-(b).2 FAC ¶¶ 22, 29-31. The DCMA prohibits the sale or trafficking in “any
`
`2 The FAC does not identify which subsections within §§ 1201(a) and (b) Defendants allegedly
`violated. In its motion, however, Autodesk indicates that it intended to allege violations of 17
`U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1)(A), (a)(2), and (b)(1). The Federal Circuit has described the differences
`between these sections as follows: “Defendants who traffic in devices that circumvent access
`controls in ways that facilitate infringement may be subject to liability under § 1201(a)(2).
`Defendants who use such devices may be subject to liability under § 1201(a)(1) whether they
`infringe or not. Because all defendants who traffic in devices that circumvent rights controls
`necessarily facilitate infringement, they may be subject to liability under § 1201(b).” Chamberlain
`Group, 381 F.3d at 1195 (emphasis added). The FAC is focused on allegations that Defendants
`sold or trafficked in circumvention technology and does not allege that they actually used the
`technology themselves. Thus, Autodesk does not appear to have pled a claim under
`5
`
`Case No.: 10-CV-01917-LHK
`ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
`
`For the Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`
`Case5:10-cv-01917-LHK Document43 Filed01/31/11 Page6 of 17
`
`
`
`technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof” that is primarily designed “for the
`
`purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
`
`protected under [federal copyright laws].” 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2). The Federal Circuit has stated
`
`that a plaintiff alleging a violation of § 1201(a)(2) must prove:
`(1) ownership of a valid copyright on a work, (2) effectively controlled by a
`technological measure, which has been circumvented, (3) that third parties can
`now access (4) without authorization, in a manner that (5) infringes or facilitates
`infringing a right protected by the Copyright Act, because of a product that (6) the
`defendant either (i) designed or produced primarily for circumvention; (ii) made
`available despite only limited commercial significance other than circumvention;
`or (iii) marketed for use in circumvention of the controlling technological
`measure.
`
`Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The
`
`DCMA provides that a technological measure “effectively controls access to a work” if the
`
`measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of information, with the
`
`authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work. Id. § 1201(a)(3)(B). The DMCA
`
`defines “circumvent a technological measure” to include avoiding, bypassing, removing,
`
`deactivating, or impairing a technological measure, without the authority of the copyright owner.
`
`17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A).
`
`Here, Autodesk alleges that Defendants trafficked in technology primarily designed to
`
`circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to one or more of Autodesk’s
`
`software products. FAC ¶¶ 14(b), 22(b)-(c). Autodesk also provides declarations establishing that
`the AutoCAD® 2010 software includes technology that controls access to the copyrighted work by
`requiring users to input an activation code provided by Autodesk. See LaHaie Decl. ¶ 12.
`
`Autodesk claims, moreover, that the disc its investigator purchased from Defendants contained
`software and instructions designed to permit access to the AutoCAD® 2010 software without an
`activation code, thereby bypassing Autodesk’s access controls. Id. at ¶ 11-12 & Ex. C. These
`
`
`§ 1201(a)(1)(A). In addition, although the difference between § 1201(a)(2) and (b)(1) is not
`entirely clear, Autodesk’s claim appears to better correspond to § 1201(a)(2), which bars
`circumvention of measures that require authorization to access a work, than to § 1201(b), which
`bars circumvention of measures that prevent the exercise of rights belonging to the copyright
`owner. Because Autodesk seeks damages only for a single violation of § 1201, the Court will
`consider its claim solely under § 1201(a)(2).
`
`Case No.: 10-CV-01917-LHK
`ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
`
`6
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`For the Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`Case5:10-cv-01917-LHK Document43 Filed01/31/11 Page7 of 17
`
`
`
`allegations are sufficient to establish that Defendants trafficked in technology primarily designed to
`circumvent the technological measures that control access to Autodesk’s copyrighted AutoCAD®
`2010 software. Accordingly, Autodesk has established a claim for violations of the DCMA.
`c. Trademark Infringement and Counterfeiting
`Autodesk’s third cause of action alleges trademark infringement and counterfeiting under
`
`Sections 32(1) and 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1) and 1125(a). To prove
`
`trademark infringement, Autodesk must show: (1) it has a valid, protectable trademark; (2)
`
`Defendants have used in commerce without authorization a copy, reproduction, counterfeit or
`
`colorable imitation of Autodesk’s mark in connection with the sale, distribution, or advertising of
`
`goods and services; and (3) Defendants’ use of the mark is likely to cause confusion. See Applied
`
`Info. Scis. Corp. v. eBay, Inc., 511 F.3d 966, 969 (9th Cir. 2007); Brookfield Communications, Inc.
`
`v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1046 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1999); 15 U.S.C.
`
`§§ 1114(1), 1125(a). Registration of a mark on the principal register in the Patent and Trademark
`
`Office is prima facie evidence of the validity of the mark. See Applied Info., 511 F.3d at 970.
`
`Autodesk alleges that it owns trademarks registered with the Patent and Trademark Office,
`
`including the AutoCAD® and Autodesk® marks, and Autodesk lists its trademarks, registration
`numbers, and registration date in an exhibit to the FAC. FAC ¶ 19 & Ex. B. The FAC also alleges
`
`that Defendants used Autodesk’s trademarks, without authorization, in Internet commerce and on
`
`unauthorized copies of Autodesk products, and that such use has caused consumer confusion as to
`
`the source, quality, or nature of the unauthorized and unlicensed goods sold by Defendants. FAC
`
`¶¶ 34-39. In support of these allegations, Autodesk has submitted copies of Craigslist ads allegedly
`
`posted by Defendants that offer “AutoCAD” and “Autodesk” software. Handler Decl. Exs. B, D.
`
`These ads also include claims that the product offered is “the full suite, not a trial or demo,” a “full
`
`version program,” and “the full suite, fully activated license guaranteed.” Id. This use of
`
`Autodesk’s marks could certainly cause confusion and lead consumers to believe that they are
`
`purchasing software authorized and licensed by Autodesk, when in fact they are not. Accordingly,
`
`the Court agrees that Autodesk has sufficiently established a claim for trademark infringement.
`
`
`
`Case No.: 10-CV-01917-LHK
`ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
`
`7
`
`For the Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`
`Case5:10-cv-01917-LHK Document43 Filed01/31/11 Page8 of 17
`
`
`
`d. False Designation of Origin and False Descriptions
`Autodesk’s fourth and final cause of action alleges false designation of origin and false
`
`descriptions in violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). Section 43(a)
`
`prohibits the use in commerce of
`any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false
`designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or
`misleading representation of fact, which –
`
`
`
`(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
`affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to
`the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
`activities by another person, or
`
`
`
`(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
`characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's
`goods, services, or commercial activities,
`
`15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). Autodesk alleges that Defendants used the Autodesk trademark to falsely
`
`designate the origin of their products and made misleading descriptions of fact concerning those
`
`products. FAC ¶ 44. Autodesk further alleges that these false designations and descriptions have
`
`caused consumer confusion regarding the affiliation of Autodesk with Defendants’ products and
`
`the approval by Autodesk of Defendants’ products. FAC ¶ 45. In addition, as discussed above,
`
`Autodesk has submitted copies of advertisements in which Defendants used the Autodesk
`
`trademark and suggest that they are selling fully licensed versions of Autodesk software. Handler
`
`Decl. Exs. B, D. This false description of Defendants’ products and use of Autodesk’s trademarks
`
`could lead consumers to believe that Defendants are offering products affiliated with and
`
`originated by Autodesk. Thus, Autodesk has sufficiently established a claim for false designation
`
`of origin and false description.
`2.
`Remaining Eitel Factors
`Based on the above analysis, the Court concludes that Autodesk’s well-pleaded complaint
`
`and the merits of its substantive claims favor entry of default judgment. The Court also finds that
`
`the remaining Eitel factors support Autodesk’s motion. First, Autodesk will be prejudiced if
`
`default judgment is not entered. Because Defendants have refused to respond to the FAC or
`8
`
`Case No.: 10-CV-01917-LHK
`ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`For the Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`Case5:10-cv-01917-LHK Document43 Filed01/31/11 Page9 of 17
`
`
`
`otherwise take part in the litigation, Autodesk will be denied the right to adjudicate its claims and
`
`obtain relief if default judgment is not granted. Second, as to the sum of money at stake, Autodesk
`
`seeks $102,500 in statutory damages. Although entry of default judgment may not be appropriate
`
`where a large sum of money is at stake, see Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d at 1472, here the damages
`
`sought are statutory, and the amount is left to the Court’s discretion. Moreover, Autodesk seeks
`
`damages based only on two instances of copyright and trademark infringement and one instance of
`
`trafficking in circumvention technology, even though there is evidence to suggest that Defendants’
`
`infringing activities may have been more extensive. Third, given Defendants’ admissions to
`
`Autodesk and the evidence submitted with Autodesk’s motion, it seems unlikely that the case
`
`would be subject to serious disputes concerning the material facts. Fourth, it does not appear that
`
`Defendants’ default was due to excusable neglect. Autodesk had two telephone conferences with
`
`Defendants, served them with all litigation documents, and gave notice that Autodesk would seek
`
`default judgment if Defendants failed to respond to the First Amended Complaint by a specified
`
`date. Handler Decl. ¶¶ 20-22. Defendants thus had notice and plenty of opportunity to appear in
`
`this litigation before Autodesk moved for default judgment. Finally, although federal policy favors
`
`decisions on the merits, it does not appear that resolution on the merits will be possible in this case.
`
`Based on this analysis of the Eitel factors, the Court concludes that entry of default judgment is
`
`appropriate and GRANTS the motion for default judgment.
`B. Determination of Relief
`In its motion for default judgment, Autodesk seeks a permanent injunction and statutory
`
`damages in the amount of $102,500 based on two instances of copyright infringement, two
`
`instances of trademark infringement, and one instance of trafficking in circumvention technology.
`
`Autodesk also seeks an award of costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, and post-judgment interest. The
`
`Court will consider each form of requested relief in turn.
`1.
`Autodesk seeks issuance of a permanent injunction under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.
`
`Injunctive Relief
`
`§ 502(a), the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(1), and the Lanham Act, 15
`
`U.S.C. §§ 1114(2) and 1116(a). These statutes permit the issuance of a permanent injunction to
`9
`
`Case No.: 10-CV-01917-LHK
`ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
`
`For the Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`Case5:10-cv-01917-LHK Document43 Filed01/31/11 Page10 of 17
`
`
`
`prevent future infringement. A plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must demonstrate: “ (1)
`
`that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary
`
`damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
`
`hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the
`
`public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
`
`L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
`
`In this case, each of these four factors supports granting a permanent injunction. With
`
`regard to the first two factors, copyright and trademark infringement are generally presumed to
`
`give rise to irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law. Marlyn Nutraceuticals,
`
`Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[i]n a trademark
`
`infringement claim, irreparable injury may be presumed from a showing of likelihood of success
`
`on the merits”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Cadence Design Systems, Inc. v. Avant!
`
`Corp., 125 F.3d 824, 826-27 (9th Cir. 1997) (“a presumption of irreparable injury arises if the
`
`plaintiff is able to show a likelihood of success on the merits of its copyright infringement claim”);
`
`Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sanlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Injunctive relief
`
`is the remedy of choice for trademark and unfair competition cases, since there is no adequate
`
`remedy at law for the injury caused by a defendant’s continuing infringement.”). As to the third
`
`factor, while Autodesk will be harmed by continued infringement, the Court perceives no potential
`
`harm to Defendants as an injunction would simply require them to comply with the Copyright and
`
`Lanham Acts. As to the fourth factor, a permanent injunction would likely serve the public interest
`
`by reducing consumer confusion, see Internet Specialties West, Inc. v. Milon-DiGiorgio
`
`Enterprises, Inc., 559 F.3d 985, 993 (9th Cir. 2009), and by “upholding” the rights that “Congress
`
`has elected to grant . . . to the owner of a copyright in a protected work.” Apple Computer, Inc. v.
`
`Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1255 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting Klitzner Industries, Inc. v.
`
`H. K. James & Co., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1249, 1259-60 (D. Pa. 1982)).
`
`The Court notes, in addition, that Autodesk has submitted evidence indicating that
`
`Defendants posted numerous advertisements during 2009 and 2010 offering products that infringed
`
`Autodesks copyrights and trademarks. Defendants’ unwillingness to appear in this matter has
`10
`
`Case No.: 10-CV-01917-LHK
`ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
`
`For the Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`Case5:10-cv-01917-LHK Document43 Filed01/31/11 Page11 of 17
`
`
`
`given the Court no assurance that they will cease their infringing activities and makes it difficult
`
`for Autodesk to prevent further infringement. Based on these facts and the analysis above, the
`
`court finds that Autodesk is entitled to a permanent injunction.
`2.
`The Copyright Act authorizes statutory damages of up to $30,000 per infringed work. 17
`
`Statutory Damages
`
`U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). In cases where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving that the
`
`infringement was committed willfully, the Copyright Act authorizes enhanced statutory damages of
`
`up to $150,000 per infringed work. Id. § 504(c)(2). The Lanham Act, similarly, authorizes
`
`statutory damages of up to $200,000 per mark, as well as enhanced statutory damages of up to $2
`
`million per mark for willful infringement. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c). In addition, under the DMCA, a
`
`copyright owner can receive an award of up to $2,500 in statutory damages for each act of
`
`circumvention or for each circumventing product. 17 U.S.C. § 1203(c)(3). Here, Autodesk argues
`
`that Defendants acted willfully and requests the following statutory damages: enhanced statutory
`damages of $30,000 each for infringement of the copyrighted AutoCAD® 2009 and AutoCAD®
`2010 software ($60,000 total); enhanced statutory damages of $20,000 each for infringement of the
`AutoCAD® and Autodesk® trademarks ($40,000 total); and the statutory maximum of $2,500 for
`one instance of trafficking in circumvention technology, as documented by Autodesk’s
`
`investigator. In the aggregate, Autodesk seeks $102,500 in statutory damages.
`
`As a threshold matter, the Court agrees that there is sufficient evidence to support a finding
`
`that Defendants’ conduct was willful. Under the Copyright and Lanham Acts, willfulness may be
`
`found where the defendant’s infringing actions are undertaken either with knowledge that the
`
`conduct constitutes infringement or with reckless disregard for the copyright or trademark owner’s
`
`rights. See In re Barboza, 545 F.3d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing willfulness standard in
`
`copyright cases); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Products, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 501 (C.D.
`
`Cal. 2003) (noting that “courts faced with determining statutory damages under the [Lanham] Act
`
`have analogized to the body of case law interpreting a similar provision in the Copyright Act”).
`
`Willfulness may also be inferred or admitted based on a defendant’s failure to defend. See Derek
`
`Andrew, Inc. v. Poof Apparel Corp., 528 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2008) (“all factual allegations in
`11
`
`Case No.: 10-CV-01917-LHK
`ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
`
`For the Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`Case5:10-cv-01917-LHK Document43 Filed01/31/11 Page12 of 17
`
`
`
`the complaint are deemed true, including the allegation of [defendant’s] willful infringement”);
`
`Philip Morris, 219 F.R.D. at 500 (accepting allegations of willfulness as true upon default).
`
`In this case, Autodesk has both alleged willful infringement, FAC ¶¶ 23, 25, 29, 33, and
`
`submitted evidence that strongly supports a finding of willfulness. As noted above, Defendants
`
`posted numerous ads that used Autodesk’s registered trademarks, without authorization, to sell
`
`pirated copies of Autodesk’s copyrighted software. Many of these ads contained a “disclaimer”
`
`stating that “you’re getting a $4,000.00 program for 70 bucks.Please save the questions like, does it
`
`come with the manual and box, etc.” Handler Decl. Ex. A, B. Other ads state, “if it’s cardboard
`
`and a piece of paper you want, you can pay over 1-2,000 dollars.” Id. Ex. C. This language
`
`suggests that Defendants knew that they were offering unauthorized versions of Autodesk’s
`
`software and were at least reckless in their disregard for Autodesk’s rights in its copyrighted
`
`software and registered trademarks. Moreover, Defendants’ products contained software and
`
`instr

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket