Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 59 Filed 04/06/20 Page 1 of 20
`
`
`
`PAUL J. ANDRE (State Bar No. 196585)
`pandre@kramerlevin.com
`LISA KOBIALKA (State Bar No. 191404)
`lkobialka@kramerlevin.com
`JAMES HANNAH (State Bar No. 237978)
`jhannah@kramerlevin.com
`AUSTIN MANES (State Bar No. 284065)
`amanes@kramerlevin.com
`KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS & FRANKEL LLP
`990 Marsh Road
`Menlo Park, CA 94025
`Telephone: (650) 752-1700
`Facsimile: (650) 752-1800
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`FINJAN, INC.
`
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`OAKLAND DIVISION
`
`
`Case No.: 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
`
`PLAINTIFF FINJAN, INC.’S REPLY CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`Date: May 1, 20201
`Time:
`10:00 AM
`Place: Courtroom 1, 4th Floor
`Judge: Hon. Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers
`
`FINJAN, INC.,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`
`QUALYS INC.,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`1 Subject to the Court’s March 12, 2020 Order (Dkt. No. 48) suspending in-person appearances
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`FINJAN’S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`CASE NO.: 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
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`I.
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`II.
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`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 59 Filed 04/06/20 Page 2 of 20
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 1
`
`ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................... 1
`
`A.
`
`Terms in the ‘408 Patent .................................................................................................. 1
`
`Term 1. “instantiating, by the computer, a scanner for the specific
`programming language” (Claim 1) .................................................................. 1
`
`B.
`
`Terms in the ‘968 Patent .................................................................................................. 2
`
`Term 2. “dynamically generating a policy index” (Claims 26, 32, and 33) ................. 2
`
`Term 3. “known to be allowable relative to a given policy” / “allowable
`relative to a given policy” (Claims 1, 12, 13, 23, 26, 32, and 33) ................... 5
`
`Term 4. “memory storing a cache of digital content” (Claims 1, 13, 23, 26,
`and 32) ............................................................................................................. 6
`
`C.
`
`Terms in the ‘731 Patent .................................................................................................. 7
`
`Term 5. “incoming files from the internet” (Claim 1) .................................................. 7
`
`D.
`
`Terms in the ‘844 Patent .................................................................................................. 8
`
`Term 6. “web client” (Claims 1, 15, 22, 23, 32, and 41-44) ......................................... 8
`
`E.
`
`Terms in the ‘154 Patent .................................................................................................. 9
`
`Term 7. “a content processor” (Claims 1 and 6) ........................................................... 9
`
`Term 8. “security computer” (Claims 1 and 6) ........................................................... 11
`
`Term 9. “receiver” (‘494 Patent, Claim 10; ‘968 Patent, Claim 7; ‘154 Patent,
`Claims 1-2 and 6-7); and ............................................................................... 12
`
`Term 10. “transmitter” (‘968 Patent, Claim 6; ‘154 Patent, Claims 1-3 and 6-8) ........ 12
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`Qualys Fails to Overcome the Presumption That Terms 9 and
`10 are not Means-Plus-Function Elements in Step 1 of the 112
`Analysis............................................................................................... 12
`
`The Specification Discloses Structures for “Receiver” and
`“Transmitter” ...................................................................................... 15
`
`III.
`
`CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................... 15
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`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 59 Filed 04/06/20 Page 3 of 20
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`
`
`Federal Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Absolute Software, Inc. v. Stealth Signal, Inc.,
`659 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2011)...................................................................................................... 4, 6
`
`Apex Inc. v. Raritan Computer, Inc.,
`325 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003)........................................................................................................ 12
`
`Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.,
`757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014), overruled on other grounds by
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ................................................ 12
`
`Aventis Pharms. Inc. v. Amino Chems. Ltd.,
`715 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013).............................................................................................. 2, 7, 8, 9
`
`Cadence Pharms. Inc. v. Exela PharmSci Inc.,
`780 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2015).......................................................................................................... 2
`
`Cioffi v. Google, Inc.,
`632 F.App’x 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ................................................................................................. 12
`
`Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog, LLC,
`703 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012)........................................................................................................ 10
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Bitdefender, Inc.,
`No. 17-cv-04790-HSG, 2019 WL 634985 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2019) ....................................... 12, 14
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Juniper Networks, Inc.,
`387 F. Supp. 3d 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2019) ............................................................................................. 9
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Proofpoint, Inc.,
`No. 13-cv-05808, 2015 WL 7770208 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2015) .............................................. 6, 7, 11
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Rapid7, Inc.,
`No. 18-1519 (MN), 2020 WL 565377 (D. Del. Feb. 5, 2020) ................................................. 2, 9, 10
`
`GE Lighting Sols., LLC v. AgiLight, Inc.,
`750 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................ 4, 5, 10
`
`Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp.,
`755 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014).......................................................................................................... 6
`
`Huawei Techs. Co. v. T-Mobile US, Inc.,
`No. 2:16-cv-00052-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 1376436 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 15, 2017) ................................ 14
`
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`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 59 Filed 04/06/20 Page 4 of 20
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`
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`Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp.,
`163 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1998)........................................................................................................ 10
`
`Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc. v. Arm Holdings, PLC.,
`403 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005)...................................................................................................... 6, 7
`
`On-Line Techs., Inc., v. Bodenseewerk Perkin-Elmer GmbH,
`386 F.3d 1133 (Fed. Cir. 2004).................................................................................................. 4, 6, 8
`
`Personalized Media Commc’ns v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`161 F.3d 696 (Fed. Cir. 1999).................................................................................................... 12, 13
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).......................................................................................... 1
`
`Techtronic Indus. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`944 F.3d 901 (Fed. Cir. 2019)............................................................................................................ 5
`
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................. passim
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015).................................................................................................. 14, 15
`
`Federal Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112(6) ............................................................................................................... 12, 13, 14, 15
`
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`FINJAN’S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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`CASE NO.: 5:17-cv-00072-BLF-SVK
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`The claim terms before the Court do not require construction because each and every one of
`them have a plain and ordinary meaning that is well-known to a person of ordinary skill in the art of
`computer science (“POSITA”). Qualys does not dispute this dispositive fact. Instead, for Terms 1-8,
`Qualys asks the Court to turn the claim construction process on its head by reading limitations from the
`specification into the claims. Reading limitations into the claims is the rare exception, not the rule, and
`requires a showing that the meaning of the terms is unclear to a POSITA (which Qualys does not even
`attempt to show) or that the inventors redefined the meaning of the terms (which Qualys fails to show).
`For Terms 9 and 10, Qualys argues that the Court should deem “receiver” and “transmitter” to
`be means-plus-function elements. Qualys fails to overcome the heavy presumption against doing so
`because the applicant drafted the claims without using “means for” wording. Moreover, these terms
`have well-known structural meanings to POSITAs, precluding a finding that they are means-plus-
`function elements. Qualys ignores that all courts to previously construe these terms did so without
`finding them to be means-plus-function elements, and there is no reason for the Court to do so here.
`Thus, the Court should reject Qualys’ invitation to rewrite the claims, and instead give them
`their undisputed plain and ordinary meanings as the applicants intended.
`ARGUMENT
`II.
`Terms in the ‘408 Patent
`A.
`
` “instantiating, by the computer, a scanner for the specific programming
`language” (Claim 1)
`
`Finjan’s Proposed Construction
`No construction necessary – Plain and ordinary
`meaning.
`
`Qualys’ Proposed Construction
`substituting specific data, instructions, or both
`into a scanner to make it usable for scanning the
`specific programming language
`
`Term 1 needs no further construction because it has a clear, plain and ordinary meaning to a
`POSITA — creating an instance of a scanner. Dkt. No. 42, Finjan’s Opening Brief (“Br.”) at 3-5;
`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Qualys concedes that the
`term has a plain and ordinary meaning, fails to show that the ‘408 Patent uses the term in a way that is
`
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`inconsistent with its plain and ordinary meaning, and does make any attempt to distinguish (or even
`acknowledge) the Rapid7 claim construction order, which expressly rejects the same construction that
`Qualys proposes. By ignoring Finjan’s arguments and evidence, the Opposition fails to overcome the
`presumption that the plain and ordinary meaning applies. Aventis Pharms. Inc. v. Amino Chems. Ltd.,
`715 F.3d 1363, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“There is a heavy presumption that claim terms are to be given
`their ordinary and customary meaning.”).
`The only argument Qualys advances in support of its infirm construction is to point to the
`construction from the SonicWall case. Dkt. No. 52, Qualys’ Responsive Brief (“Opposition” or
`“Opp.”) at 3-4. However, referring to that order does not remedy the fatal flaw in Qualys’ construction
`— there is nothing in the specification or the claims to support narrowing the claims beyond their plain
`and ordinary meaning to require substituting specific data, instructions or both into a scanner. Qualys
`invites error by proposing limiting the claim to an exemplary embodiment. Cadence Pharms. Inc. v.
`Exela PharmSci Inc., 780 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“even if all of the embodiments discussed
`in the patent included a specific limitation, it would not be proper to import … limitations that are not
`found in the claims themselves”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
`This was the exact finding in Rapid7, which had the benefit of the SonicWall Order but still
`rejected the construction Qualys advances by noting that “substituting” is not used in the ‘408 Patent
`and “the concept of requiring substitution appears to be inconsistent with the description of a scanner
`repository as referenced in the ‘408 Patent.” Finjan, Inc. v. Rapid7, Inc., No. 18-1519 (MN), 2020 WL
`565377, at *13 (D. Del. Feb. 5, 2020). And, as explained in Finjan’s Opening Brief, it was based on a
`word from the PTAB applying a different standard. Br. at 4-5. Thus, the Court should reject Qualys’
`narrow construction and give this term its plain and ordinary meaning.
`Terms in the ‘968 Patent
`B.
`“dynamically generating a policy index” (Claims 26, 32, and 33)
`
`
`Finjan’s Proposed Construction
`No construction necessary – Plain and ordinary
`meaning.
`
`Qualys’ Proposed Construction
`creating or updating a policy index in response
`to user requests for cached or non-cached
`content
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`Qualys does not dispute that “dynamically generating a policy index” has a plain and ordinary
`meaning. See Opp. at 5-6. Qualys also does not dispute that the phrase “creating or updating” captures
`only a portion of the meaning of “dynamically generating,” and therefore cannot serve as a construction
`for this term. Br. at 6-7; Opp. at 5-6. Qualys tacitly admits that the Court should deny the “creating or
`updating” portion of Qualys’ proposal as immaterial, calling Finjan’s distinctions between Qualys’
`proposal and the claim language “a straw man argument” and otherwise ignoring them. Opp. at 5-6.
`Having abandoned the first part of its proposal, Qualys limits its argument for this term to
`asking the Court to add to the claim a requirement that dynamically generating must occur “in response
`to a user request for content.” Id. at 6.2 There are multiple infirmities with this argument. First, as
`Qualys concedes, its construction requires the Court to import a limitation from the specification, and
`that such a construction requires a finding of “a disavowal of scope,” a high bar it fails to clear. Id. at 5
`(claiming disavowal of scope as basis for construction); Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362, 1366-68 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (improper to “read limitations from the specification into
`claims”).
`Second, Qualys argues that, even though this limitation does not appear anywhere in the claims,
`the Court should add it because it is supposedly found in every embodiment. Opp. at 5. A review of
`the patent demonstrates that Qualys’ is incorrect. The ‘968 Patent describes embodiments where the
`policy is not generated “in response to a user request for content.” Specifically, the specification
`explains that the policy index may be dynamically generated when a brand new policy is added to the
`cache that has never seen a user request. Dkt. No. 42-5, ‘968 Patent at 8:1-3 (“When a new policy is
`added, policy-based cache index 190 is updated accordingly.”). The addition of the new policy is not in
`response to a user’s request for content because the “new” policy is set to an initial baseline of NULL,
`such that it has not yet processed any content, and the index is updated accordingly. Id. (“A new policy
`is added, with all of its pointers set to NULL.”). In other words, the policy and index are generated
`before the user has requested any content. Thus, because there are embodiments where generation is
`
`
`2 Qualys makes similar infirm arguments for Terms 3 through 5. Qualys does not dispute that each of
`these terms has a plain and ordinary meaning but, in the name of “clarification,” invites error by asking
`the Court to import into these terms limitations from exemplary embodiments in the specification.
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`not in response to a user request for content, the Court should not read such a requirement into the
`claims.
`As a further example of how Qualys’ construction violates the specification, the ‘968 Patent
`describes that the index can also be “synchronized” or “reset” when the cache manager purges all
`content and resets the policy index by setting a policies’ pointers to NULL. Id. at 7:57-63 (“policy-
`based cache index 190 is preferably synchronized . . . content can be purged from cache 140, and cache
`manager 150 can reset policy-based cache [index] 190 by setting the pointers from a changed policy to
`NULL”). Nothing in the intrinsic record suggests that this “synchronizing/resetting” type of update
`occurs in response to a user request. Further, Qualys admits that this “synchronizing/resetting” function
`qualifies as “creating or updating” an index, but claims that the function is only used in response to a
`user request. Opp. at 6. Qualys offers no support for this claim and cites no evidence relating these
`types of “synchronizing/resetting” index updates to user requests. Id.
`These examples prove that the specification is not limited to generating or updating the index in
`response to user requests and confirm that the functionality may be used without any user request.
`Therefore, there was no disavowal of this claim scope, and Qualys’ construction should be rejected as
`excluding these preferred embodiments. On-Line Techs., Inc., v. Bodenseewerk Perkin-Elmer GmbH,
`386 F.3d 1133, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“a claim interpretation that excludes a preferred embodiment …
`is ‘rarely, if ever, correct.’”) (citation omitted).
`Qualys essentially relies on the single use of the phrase “the present invention” for a specific
`embodiment to support its disavowal of claim scope argument. Opp. at 5-6. However, the Federal
`Circuit has directed that such a phrase, “absent a clear indication in the intrinsic record that the patentee
`intended the claims to be so limited,” is not sufficient to narrow claim scope. GE Lighting Sols., LLC v.
`AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding the standards for finding disavowal are
`“exacting”). This is especially true where the use of the phrase “the present invention” is “not uniform,
`or where other portions of the intrinsic evidence do not support applying the limitation to the entire
`patent.” Absolute Software, Inc. v. Stealth Signal, Inc., 659 F.3d 1121, 1136-37 (Fed. Cir. 2011).3 Here
`
`3 Unlike here, Qualys’ authorities are limited to clear cases of disavowal. Opp. at 5-6. For example,
`Techtronic found disavowal due to statements distinguishing the prior art, only a single embodiment,
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`the specification also uses the phrase “the present invention” at least 39 times in various contexts,
`including twice to say that “present invention has many diverse applications,” none of which are
`intended to limit the scope of the invention. Further, the only use of “the present invention” cited in the
`Opposition is the permissive, and non-limiting, statement that “the present invention allows for policy-
`based cache index 190 to be updated dynamically….” This permissive language precludes a finding of
`disavowal, and the Court should reject Qualys’ construction. GE Lighting, 750 F.3d at 1309.
`“known to be allowable relative to a given policy” / “allowable relative
`
`to a given policy” (Claims 1, 12, 13, 23, 26, 32, and 33)
`
`Qualys’ Proposed Construction
`Finjan’s Proposed Construction
`Whether the given digital content may be sent to
`No construction necessary – Plain and ordinary
`the web client
`meaning.
`Term 3 is readily understandable to the jury — i.e., if something known is allowable under a
`policy - and Qualys offers no reason to depart from this plain and ordinary meaning. Br. at 7-8;
`Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365 (the plain and ordinary meaning applies unless the patentee acted as
`lexicographer or disavowed claim scope). Qualys states that it seeks “clarification” about the meaning
`of “allowable relative to a given policy,” but admits its construction is based on importing an unclaimed
`transmission-to-user limitation from the specification. Opp. at 6-8, citing ‘968 Patent, Fig. 2.
`Qualys’ construction is contrary to the claims of the ‘968 Patent at least because it imports
`requirements related to specific web clients. Claim 1 is directed to a policy-based cache manager, and
`includes a memory storing a cache of digital content, a content scanner, and a content evaluator, which
`inter alia performs the action of determining if the digital content is allowable relative to a given
`“policy” and then saves the results into the policy index. ‘968 Patent, Claim 1. This claim does not
`recite a requirement of transmitting the content to a specific web-client or user, as Qualys proposes. In
`contrast, Claim 32, for example, states that “the policy index indicat[es] the allowability or the non-
`allowability of the digital content relative to the given user policy.” Id., Claim 32 (emphasis added).
`Thus, the applicant drafted certain claims to reflect an embodiment where the policy is specific to a
`particular user (a “user policy”) and other claims that do not include this requirement (reciting just a
`
`and a statement describing the “principal aspect of the present invention” as including the limitation read
`into the claims. Techtronic Indus. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 944 F.3d 901, 905, 908 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
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`“policy”). The applicant drafted the claims to not recite the narrower “user policy,” and not include the
`“web client” or “end-user” limitations Qualys seeks to inject.
`Thus, Qualys’ construction would improperly import limitations from the specification into the
`claims and would also violate the principle of claim differentiation. Finjan, Inc. v. Proofpoint, Inc., No.
`13-cv-05808, 2015 WL 7770208, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2015) (improper to import limitations from
`the specification); see also Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc. v. Arm Holdings, PLC., 403 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed.
`Cir. 2005) (improper to read limitations from one claim into another). Qualys’ construction also injects
`a requirement that the content be “sent,” although none of the claims require transmitting information.
`Br. at 8. Qualys’ arguments about prior Finjan statements regarding “web clients” are a non-sequitur
`because the claims at issue do not include a “web client” limitation.
`To the extent Qualys is arguing there was disavowal of claim scope (it does not explicitly so), it
`fails to identify any support for that theory. Indeed, the first preferred embodiment disclosed in the
`specification, which closely tracks Claim 1, does not require or disclose a user or a web-client. ‘968
`Patent at 2:28-38. And as described above, the patentee’s use of “the present invention” is so varied
`that the inventor never “demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope using ‘words or
`expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.’” Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d
`1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citation omitted); Absolute Software, 659 F.3d at 1136-37. A construction
`reading out a preferred embodiment, as Qualys proposes, is “rarely” correct, and the Court should reject
`Qualys’ unfounded construction. On-Line Techs., 386 F.3d at 1138.
` “memory storing a cache of digital content” (Claims 1, 13, 23, 26, and 32)
`Finjan’s Proposed Construction
`Qualys’ Proposed Construction
`No construction necessary – Plain and ordinary
`a memory storing [memory for storing] a
`meaning.
`collection of digital content previously requested
`and retrieved for a web client
`Qualys’ proposed construction for Term 4 has the same flaws as its proposed construction for
`Term 3 (“allowable relative to a given policy”). “Memory storing a cache of digital content” needs no
`construction because it has a plain, ordinary meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Thorner,
`669 F.3d at 1365; Br. at 8-9. Qualys does not argue that there is anything unclear about these words
`that the applicant chose for the claim and its construction essentially repeats and does not clarify the
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`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 59 Filed 04/06/20 Page 11 of 20
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`meaning of these words. Instead, just as for Term 3, Qualys admits its construction is based on reading
`in a limitation from embodiments in the specification that the content must be requested by and be
`intended for “web clients.” Opp. at 8-9. Just as for Term 3, Qualys ignores that some of the claims of
`the ‘968 expressly recite that the content is for particular users and others do not, and that some of the
`embodiments, including the first preferred embodiment do not include a user or web-client requirement.
`‘968 Patent at 2:28-38.
`Thus, the Court should give Term 4 a plain and ordinary meaning construction, and reject
`Qualys’ construction because it improperly imports limitations from the specification into the claims,
`would exclude preferred embodiments, and would also violate the principle of claim differentiation.
`Proofpoint, 2015 WL 7770208, at *1; see also Nazomi, 403 F.3d at 1370.
`Terms in the ‘731 Patent
`C.
`“incoming files from the internet” (Claim 1)
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`Qualys’ Proposed Construction
`Internet files requested by an intranet computer
`
`Finjan’s Proposed Construction
`No construction necessary – Plain and ordinary
`meaning.
`For Term 5, Qualys repeats its pattern of asking the Court to “clarify” a term that needs no
`clarification by reading limitations from the specification into the claim. Here, a POSITA (as well as a
`layperson) would readily understand the plain English words “incoming files from the internet”—
`meaning files that come in from the internet. Br. at 9-10; Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365.
`Qualys seeks to limit this term to “Internet files,” but it is unclear if this means something more
`than “files from the internet.” If not, then there is no need to include a reshuffling of the words as a
`construction. If it does have some narrower language than the actual language of the claims, the
`construction should be rejected as unsupported.
`Qualys also asks the Court to limit the term to files requested by “an intranet computer.” Qualys
`claims that “Finjan’s attempt to broaden the scope of incoming files . . . is unsupported.” But Finjan
`does not propose broadening anything; Finjan proposes to leave this term as is and apply its plain and
`ordinary meaning. It is Qualys that bears the burden to overcome the plain and ordinary meaning
`presumption, and establish that the claim should be narrowed. Aventis Pharms., 715 F.3d at 1373.
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`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 59 Filed 04/06/20 Page 12 of 20
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`Qualys does not point to any statements in the specification where the Applicant acted as a
`lexicographer and assigned some special meaning to this term, and Qualys’ claim that every example is
`limited to files requested by an intranet computer is incorrect.
`To the contrary, the specification lists multiple preferred embodiments where the same
`computer gateway and the same scanner process files that are not requested by any computer, let alone
`an intranet computer. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 42-6, ‘731 Patent at 4:29-38 (preferred embodiment scanning
`outgoing files with no request); 4:39-53 (same, where the file was sent, not requested); 4:54-67 (same),
`10:53-11:5 (“For another example, client software other than a web browser may download web
`objects directly from the Internet”: i.e., without a request from an intranet computer). Thus, the term
`should not be so limited. On-Line Techs., 386 F.3d at 1138 (construction should not read out preferred
`embodiments).
`Qualys’ proposed construction should also be rejected because it is inconsistent with the claims.
`As noted in Finjan’s Opening Brief, Claim 6, which depends from Claim 1, states that “the computer
`gateway receives a request for a file stored among the intranet of computers.” This is the same
`computer gateway of Claim 1 that receives the incoming content, so it cannot be construed as being
`unable to receive requests for intranet content (as opposed to Internet content), as Qualys proposes. See
`‘731 Patent, Claims 1, 6. The Court should, therefore, reject Qualys’ proposal for Term 5.
`Terms in the ‘844 Patent
`D.
`“web client” (Claims 1, 15, 22, 23, 32, and 41-44)
`
`Finjan’s Proposed Construction
`Qualys’ Proposed Construction
`No construction necessary – Plain and ordinary
`an application on the end-user’s computer that
`meaning.
`requests a downloadable from the web server
`The term “web client” has a plain and ordinary meaning to POSITA — a client that is
`connected to the web, which “may imply the entire user machine or refer to a handheld device that
`provides Web access,” and therefore needs no further construction. Br. at 10, citing Dkt. 42-9, Ex. 8;
`Aventis Pharms., 715 F.3d at 1373.
`Qualys offers no affirmative justification for its proposed construction. It points to nothing in
`the claims, the specification, the file history or the extrinsic evidence that supports its construction.
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`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 59 Filed 04/06/20 Page 13 of 20
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`Opp. at 12-13. Instead, Qualys relies solely on statements that Finjan made in other cases presenting
`different infringement and validity issues and that do not conflict with Finjan’s position that no further
`construction is necessary to the plain and ordinary meaning here. Thus, Qualys has not met its burden
`to show why “web client” requires additional construction. Aventis Pharms., 715 F.3d at 1373.
`Terms in the ‘154 Patent
`E.
`“a content processor” (Claims 1 and 6)
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`Finjan’s Proposed Construction
`No construction necessary – Plain and ordinary
`m