Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 44 Filed 02/28/20 Page 1 of 11
`
`EDWARD G. POPLAWSKI (SBN 113590)
`epoplawski@wsgr.com
`OLIVIA M. KIM (SBN 228382)
`okim@wsgr.com
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
`Professional Corporation
`633 West Fifth Street, Suite 1550
`Los Angeles, CA 90071
`Telephone: (323) 210-2901
`Facsimile: (866) 974-7329
`
`RYAN R. SMITH (SBN 229323)
`rsmith@wsgr.com
`CHRISTOPHER D. MAYS (SBN 266510)
`cmays@wsgr.com
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
`Professional Corporation
`650 Page Mill Road
`Palo Alto, CA 94304-1050
`Telephone: (650) 493-9300
`Facsimile: (650) 493-6811
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`QUALYS INC.
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`OAKLAND DIVISION
`
`CASE NO.: 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
`
`DEFENDANT QUALYS INC.’S
`MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
`ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE
`DEFENSES
`
`Judge:
`
`Hon. Yvonne Gonzalez
`Rogers
`
`April 7, 2020
`Date:
`2:00 pm
`Time:
`Location: Courtroom 1, 4th Floor
`
`))))))))))))))
`
`FINJAN, INC., a Delaware Corporation,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`QUALYS INC., a Delaware Corporation,
`
`Defendant.
`
`CASE NO. 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
`
`MOT. TO AMEND ANSWER
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`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 44 Filed 02/28/20 Page 2 of 11
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`I.
`
`NOTICE OF MOTION
`PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on April 7, 2020 at 2:00 pm or as soon thereafter as this
`matter may be heard before Judge Gonzales Rogers of the United States District Court for the
`Northern District of California in Courtroom 1, 4th Floor, of 1301 Clay Street in Oakland,
`California, defendant Qualys, Inc. (“Qualys”) will move to file an Amended Answer and
`Affirmative Defenses pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2).
`For the reasons set forth below, Qualys requests that the Court grant this motion and allow
`Qualys to file additional defenses for patent exhaustion, implied license, and preclusion.
`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORIES
`INTRODUCTION1
`Qualys brings this Motion seeking leave to file a Second Amended Answer. This proposed
`amendment would add three new affirmative defenses: patent exhaustion, implied license, and
`preclusion.
`After filing its First Amended Answer in March 2019, Qualys subsequently learned of new
`facts supporting these defenses. For example, in January 2020, the United States Patent and
`Trademark Office (“Patent Office”) confirmed that several claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,975,305
`(“the ’305 Patent”) were invalid and issued a Reexamination Certificate canceling them. However,
`these claims (which until recently plaintiff Finjan, Inc. (“Finjan”) asserted against Qualys) are
`immaterially different from the remaining ’305 patent claims Finjan continues to assert against
`Qualys. Because Finjan is precluded from continuing to assert these claims, Qualys seeks to add
`collateral estoppel as an affirmative defense.
`Additionally, on September 3, 2019, Finjan produced a license agreement between it and
`a third party, Trend Micro Inc. (“Trend Micro”). In this agreement (the “Trend Micro License”),
`Finjan licensed every Trend Micro product to Finjan’s entire patent portfolio (which includes the
`Patents-in-Suit here). Finjan nonetheless accuses Qualys products, including functionality of those
`products that incorporate licensed Trend Micro software, of patent infringement. This gives rise
`
`1 Unless stated otherwise, all emphasis in quotes is added.
`
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`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 44 Filed 02/28/20 Page 3 of 11
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`to both a patent exhaustion and an implied license defense, and Qualys seeks to add these as
`affirmative defenses.
`Qualys only brings this motion after having gone to great lengths to seek an agreement
`from Finjan on these defenses. For example, Qualys asked Finjan to confirm that it would not
`accuse any Trend Micro software (as found in Qualys products) of infringement in this case.
`Finjan eventually declined to confirm this, but did hold out the possibility that it would stipulate
`to the amended answer if Qualys produced relevant documents showing its use of Trend Micro’s
`software. Qualys spent the next two months searching, collecting, and producing technical
`documents (including software source code) showing precisely how it uses Trend Micro’s
`software. Finjan’s response was to demand yet more documents. Qualys has acted in good faith
`to informally resolve these issues, and only brings this Motion after months of meet and confer
`efforts with Finjan resulted in an impasse.
`II.
`ISSUES TO BE DECIDED
`Whether the Court shall grant leave for Qualys to file its proposed Second Amended
`Answer, which adds affirmative defenses under patent exhaustion, implied license, and preclusion.
`III.
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND
`A.
`Preclusion: The Patent Office Invalidated Claims of the ’305 Patent That Are
`Immaterially Different From Claims Finjan Still Asserts
`On December 11, 2015, an Ex Parte Reexamination Request (“Request”) was filed with
`the Patent Office. See Ex. B.2 The Request asked the Patent Office to reconsider the validity of
`claims 1, 2, 5, and 13 of the ’305 Patent. Id. The Patent Office granted this request. On January
`29, 2020 the Patent Office issued an Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate that canceled claims 1,
`2, 5, and 13.3 Id. at 1:10. As pled in the proposed Second Amended Answer, the canceled ’305
`
`2 All exhibits are attached to the Declaration of Christopher Mays in Support of Qualys’s
`Motion Seeking Leave to Amend its Answer (“Mays Decl.”), filed concurrently herewith.
`3 For the sake of brevity, Qualys omits the details of these lengthy Ex Parte Reexamination
`proceedings, which culminated in a Federal Circuit decision affirming the Patent Office.
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`MOT. TO AMEND ANSWER
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`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 44 Filed 02/28/20 Page 4 of 11
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`claims are not materially different from ’305 claims 6-12, 14, and 17-25 that Finjan continues to
`assert against Qualys.4 See Ex. A at ¶ 317. Finjan is therefore collaterally estopped from asserting
`these additional claims.
`B.
`Patent Exhaustion and Implied License: Finjan Accuses of Infringement
`Software It Previously Licensed
`Qualys’ patent exhaustion and implied license defenses share the same common set of
`facts. In 2011, Qualys and Trend Micro announced a business partnership and product integration.
`See Ex. A. at ¶ 309; Ex. C. Through this partnership, Trend Micro provided software to Qualys,
`who then integrated that software into Qualys’ own products. Ex. A. at ¶ 309. For example,
`Qualys uses Trend Micro’s antivirus software in its products. Id.
`Before this litigation even began, however, Finjan gave Trend Micro a license covering
`every Trend Micro product for every Patent-in-Suit. See Ex. A at ¶ 308; Ex. D at -4294. In
`exchange for this license, Finjan received $13.4 million from Trend Micro and ownership of Trend
`Micro patents. Ex. D at -4292, 4294 at § 3.1(a), -4313.
`Finjan sued Qualys for patent infringement on November 29, 2018, five months after
`licensing Trend Micro to the Patents-in-Suit. On April 19, 2019, Finjan filed its “Initial Disclosure
`of Asserted Claims and Infringement Contentions” pursuant to Patent Local Rule 3-1
`(“Infringement Contentions”). Mays Decl. ¶ 5. Finjan’s infringement contentions accuse, among
`other things, “antivirus operations” that “download[] and scan[] documents such as PDFs on the
`site using antivirus software.” Ex. E at 2 (referencing anti-virus functionality) (emphasis in
`original); see also id. at 35-36; Ex. F at 5, 8 (same); Ex. G- at 5, 27, 42, 43, 66, 105, 111 (same);
`Ex. H at 6 (same). Qualys’ proposed Second Amended Answer pleads that these “antivirus
`operations” refer to Trend Micro’s antivirus software that is already licensed under the Patents-in-
`Suit. See Ex. A at ¶ 310. The defenses of patent exhaustion and implied license therefore apply.
`IV.
`ARGUMENT
`
`4 Finjan previously also asserted claims 1, 2, 5, and 13, but withdrew these in light of the
`’305 Reexamination proceedings.
`
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`Rule 15(a) permits a party to seek leave of Court to amend its pleadings. FED. R. CIV. P.
`15(a). Courts freely grant leave when justice so requires, and public policy strongly encourages
`courts to permit amendments. Id.; Outdoor Sys., Inc. v. City of Mesa, 997 F.2d 604, 614 (9th
`Cir.1993). The policy of allowing amendments “is to be applied with extreme liberality.” Waldrip
`v. Hall, 548 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244
`F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir.2001). As this Court has stated,
`Courts may decline to grant leave to amend only if there is strong evidence of undue
`delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure
`deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing
`party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, or futility of amendment, etc.
`
`Buchanan v. Tata Consultancy Servs., Ltd., No. 15-CV-01696-YGR, 2017 WL 6611653, at *4
`(N.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2017) (citing and quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Johnson
`v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004); Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d
`1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003); Sonoma County. Ass’n of Retired Emps. v. Sonoma County., 708 F.3d
`1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2013)). “Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining . . .
`factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” Finjan,
`Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., No. 18-CV-02621-WHO, 2019 WL 1455333, at *2 (N.D.
`Cal. Apr. 2, 2019) (quoting Eminence, 316 F.3d at 1052) (emphasis in original). Each of these
`factors weighs in favor of granting Qualys leave to amend.
`A.
`Qualys’s Proposed Second Amended Answer is not Futile
`“If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject
`of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits.” Foman v. Davis,
`371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Futility requires a finding that “the pleading could not possibly be cured
`by the allegation of other facts.” Nunes v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Doe
`v. U.S., 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir.1995)). Qualys’s proposed defenses for patent exhaustion,
`implied license, and preclusion are not futile.
`1.
`Qualys’s Preclusion Defense Is Not Futile
`
`Preclusion prevents a party from relitigating an issue from a prior litigation where three
`elements are met:
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`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 44 Filed 02/28/20 Page 6 of 11
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`(1) the issue at stake must be identical to the one alleged in the prior litigation; (2)
`the issue must have been actually litigated by the party against whom preclusion is
`asserted in the prior litigation; and (3) the determination of the issue in the prior
`litigation must have been a critical and necessary part of the judgment in the earlier
`action.
`
`Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 923 (9th Cir. 1996) (quotations omitted).
`In Patent Law, a final judgment of invalidity in a Patent Office proceeding “has an
`immediate issue-preclusive effect on any pending or co-pending actions involving the patent.” XY,
`LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, 890 F.3d 1282, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2018). “A patentee, having been
`afforded the opportunity to exhaust his remedy of appeal from a holding of invalidity, has had his
`day in court, and a defendant should not have to continue defending a suit for infringement of an
`adjudged invalid patent.” Id. (citations omitted); see also MaxLinear, Inc. v. CF CRESPE LLC,
`880 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[W]here a single issue is before a court and an
`administrative agency, preclusion also often applies.”).
`Preclusion applies even where there is not complete overlap between patent claims
`cancelled by the Patent Office and the ones asserted in litigation. “Complete identity of claims is
`not required to satisfy the identity-of-issues requirement for claim preclusion.” Soverain Software
`LLC v. Victoria’s Secret Direct Brand Mgmt., LLC, 778 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
`Preclusion applies where the differences between the claims canceled in the patent office and the
`claims asserted in litigation “do not materially alter the question of invalidity.” Id.; see also Ohio
`Willow Wood Co. v. Alps South., LLC, 735 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (preclusion applies
`where the claims invalidated in the Patent Office use “slightly different language to describe
`substantially the same invention”).
`Here, the proposed Second Amended Answer properly states a claim for preclusion barring
`Finjan from asserting claims 6-12, 14, and 17-25 of the ’305 Patent against Qualys. The
`differences between these claims and the ones canceled in the Patent Office (claims 1, 2, 5, and
`13) do not materially alter the question of invalidity. Ex. A at ¶ 317. For example, the following
`table shows that claim 2 (invalidated) and 14 of the ’305 Patent are materially identical:
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`Claim 2
`(invalidated by Patent Office)
`
`Claim 14
`(presently asserted by Finjan)
`
`2. The security system of claim 1 wherein said
`database of parser and analyzer rules stores
`parser and analyzer rules in the form of
`pattern-matching engines.
`
`14. The method of claim 13 wherein said
`database of parser and analyzer rules stores
`parser and analyzer rules in the form of
`pattern-matching engines.5
`
`Compare Ex. I at 30:48-50 with id. at 31:30-32.
`Preclusion also applies to other final adjudications. One example is the pending Federal
`Circuit appeal in the Finjan v. Juniper case. In that case, the Federal Circuit is considering the
`proper construction of the term “content processor.” See D.I. 41 at 1. Finjan has appealed a
`construction of that term adopted by another court within this district. Id. Assuming the Federal
`Circuit rejects Finjan’s arguments, preclusion will apply. See, e.g., Hemphill v. Proctor & Gamble
`Co., 85 F. App’x 765, 767 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (affirming district court’s use of collateral estoppel in
`applying construction of terms from one claim of a patent made in a prior decision that the patentee
`lost to the identical terms as present in another claim).
`2.
`Qualys’s Proposed Patent Exhaustion and Implied License Defenses
`Are Not Futile
`
`The Patent Act grants patentees the “right to exclude others from making, using, offering
`for sale, or selling [their] invention[s].” 35 U.S.C. § 154(a). However, the doctrine of patent
`exhaustion “limits that right to exclude.” Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 137 S. Ct.
`1523 at 1531 (2017). “Once a patentee decides to sell—whether on its own or through a licensee—
`that sale exhausts its patent rights, regardless of any post-sale restrictions the patentee purports to
`impose, either directly or through a license.” Id. at 1535.
`So long as a licensee complies with the license when selling an item, the patentee
`has, in effect, authorized the sale. That licensee’s sale is treated, for purposes of
`patent exhaustion, as if the patentee made the sale itself. The result: The sale
`exhausts the patentee’s rights in that item.
`
`Id. at 1535; see also Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008). (“an
`initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.”); TransCore,
`
`5 The fact that claim 2 states that it depends on claim 1 while claim 14 depends on claim 13 is
`of no moment. The Patent Office found both Claim 1 and 13 invalid as well. Ex. B at 1:10.
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`LP v. Elec. Transaction Consultants Corp., 563 F.3d 1271, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The only issue
`relevant to patent exhaustion is whether [licensee’s] sales were authorized, not whether [patentee]
`and [licensee] intended, expressly or impliedly, for the covenant to extend to [licensee’s]
`customers.”). Implied license, a related doctrine, estops a patentee from asserting infringement
`where the patentee “licensed or assigned a right, received consideration, and then sought to
`derogate from the right granted.” Id. at 1279 (citing Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am.,
`Inc., 103 F.3d 1571, 1581 (Fed.Cir.1997)).
`Here, Finjan’s actions give rise to a patent exhaustion defense. First, Finjan authorized
`Trend Micro’s sales to Qualys. See Ex. A at ¶ 308. Second, Finjan licensed all of Trend Micro’s
`products to every Patent-in-Suit. See id.; Ex. D at -4294 (§ 3.2), -4291. It permitted Trend Micro
`to sell licensed software to third parties and allowed those customers to use that software and
`combine it with their own respective. Ex. A at ¶ 308; Ex. D at -4294 (§ 3.2), -4296 (§§ 3.5(b),
`3.5(c)), and -4291 (§ 1.12). Third, Finjan now accuses that licensed Trend Micro software of
`infringing the Patents-in-Suit when incorporated into Qualys’ products. Ex. A at ¶ 310. This
`adequately states a claim for patent exhaustion.
`Neither is Qualys’ proposed implied license futile. In addition to the above facts, Finjan
`received valuable consideration—$13.4 million dollars and Trend Micro patents—in exchange for
`its license. See Ex. A at ¶ 312; Ex. D at -4292, -4294, and -4313. Finjan now seeks to derogate
`from the rights it granted by accusing licensed Trend Micro software of infringement simply
`because that software is used in Qualys’ own products. Ex. A at ¶ 313.
`Consequently, none of Qualys’s proposed new defenses are futile.
`B.
`There is No Prejudice to Finjan
`“Prejudice to the opposing party carries the ‘greatest weight’ in the leave to amend
`inquiry.” Buchanan, 2017 WL 6611653, at *4 (quoting Dupree v. Apple, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist.
`LEXIS 7765 at *12; Eminence, 316 F.3d at 1048, 1052). The party opposing the amendment bears
`the burden of showing prejudice. Finjan, Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., No. 18-CV-
`02621-WHO, 2019 WL 1455333, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2019) (citing DCD Programs, Ltd. v.
`Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1987)). “[T]he prospect of additional discovery needed by
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`the non-moving party does not in itself constitute a sufficient showing of prejudice.” Finjan, 2019
`WL 1455333 at *3 (quoting Stearns v. Select Comfort Retail Corp., 763 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1158
`(N.D. Cal. 2010). Prejudice is particularly difficult to show where fact discovery remains open
`and the claim construction phase has not completed. See id. (“This case is still in an early stage:
`no claims have been construed, there is not an operative set of infringement contentions, fact
`discovery does not close until December 13, 2019, and trial is not until the end of January 2021.”).
`Finjan will not be prejudiced by Qualys’ proposed Second Amended Answer. First, this
`case is still in its early stages. The claim construction hearing is not for several months. See D.I.
`39 at 1. Also, fact discovery remains open. See id. In fact, no depositions have been taken, the
`parties have not completed their respective document productions, and email discovery has not
`been exchanged. Mays Decl. ¶ 3.
`Second, the new defenses pled in Qualys’ proposed Second Amended Answer will not
`substantially increase Finjan’s burden of discovery in this case. Many of the relevant documents
`– such as the Trend Micro License, Qualys’ technical documents showing its use of Trend Micro’s
`software, and documents relating to the Patent Office’s cancellation of the ’305 claims – are
`already in Finjan’s possession, thus commensurately reducing any burden of discovery to Finjan.
`Mays Decl. ¶ 4. Also, because no depositions have yet occurred, no witnesses need be recalled.
`Finally, Finjan itself appears to concede that it would not be prejudiced. In the parties’
`meet and confer efforts subject to this issue, Finjan never articulated any prejudice that it would
`suffer from this amendment. See generally Ex. J (saying nothing about prejudice to Finjan).
`Accordingly, this factor favors granting Qualys’ motion.
`C.
`There is No Undue Delay, Bad Faith, or Dilatory Motive
`After prejudice, “[u]ndue delay is the next factor a court considers in deciding whether to
`grant leave to amend.” Buchanan, 2017 WL 6611653, at *6 (quoting Dupree, 2017 U.S. Dist.
`LEXIS at *12). Undue delay “cannot alone justify the denial of a motion to amend.” Id. (citing
`Square 1 Bank v. Lo, 2014 WL 1154031, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Owens, 244 F.3d at 712-13). To
`evaluate undue delay, courts must determine “whether the moving party knew or should have
`known
`the facts and
`theories raised by
`the amendment
`in
`the original pleading.”
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`AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal
`citations omitted).
`Here, there is no undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive. Qualys could not have brought
`its proposed exhaustion, implied license, and preclusion defenses when it served its First Amended
`Answer on March 6, 2019. See D.I. 26. Finjan did not produce the Trend Micro License until
`about six months ago, on September 3, 2019.6 And, as to Qualys’ preclusion defense, the Patent
`Office issued the Reexamination Certificate for the ’305 Patent less than a month ago, on January
`29, 2020. These predicate documents were not available to Qualys when it served its First
`Amended Answer. Once it became aware of the relevant documents, Qualys acted diligently in
`preparing these defenses and seeking leave to amend. This factor, therefore, weighs in favor of
`granting Qualys’s motion.
`Qualys understands that Finjan contends that this motion is untimely. Not so. In addition
`to the fact that these issues only recently came to Qualys’ knowledge, Qualys sought to resolve
`this dispute without motion practice. When Qualys raised these issues with Finjan, Finjan
`responded by peppering Qualys with demands for technical documents showing Qualys’s use of
`Trend Micro’s antivirus software. See Ex. J at 5 (“once Finjan requested that we search for and
`identify relevant technical documents, we immediately began such a search…”). Qualys complied
`with these demands, only for Finjan to then refuse to consent to the proposed Second Amended
`Answer because Qualys did not produce a different document – namely, a license agreement
`between Qualys and Trend Micro. Id. at 2. Finjan provided no explanation for this demand.7
`Qualys diligently sought an informal resolution to this dispute with Finjan. When that attempt
`failed, Qualys was also diligent in bringing this Motion.
`
`6 Finjan produced the Trend Micro License several months late. Patent L.R. 3-2 requires that
`Finjan produce all licenses alongside its Infringement Contentions. Patent L.R. 3-2(f).
`However, Finjan produced the Trend Micro License on September 3, 2019, five months after
`serving its Infringement Contentions on April 19. Mays Decl. ¶ 5.
`7 An agreement between Qualys and Trend Micro has limited relevance. Patent exhaustion
`focuses on Finjan’s license with Trend Micro, not Trend Micro’s agreements with its
`downstream customers. See TransCore, 563 F.3d at 1277 (“The only issue relevant to patent
`exhaustion is whether [licensee’s] sales were authorized [by patent owner]”). In any event,
`Finjan’s document demands are a matter for discovery, and are not a proper basis to refuse to
`consent to the filing of an amended pleading.
`
`CASE NO. 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
`
`-9-
`
`MOT. TO AMEND ANSWER
`
`

`

`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 44 Filed 02/28/20 Page 11 of 11
`
`V.
`
`CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, Qualys’s motion should be granted.
`
`DATED: February 28, 2020
`
`By:
`
`/s/ Christopher D. Mays
`EDWARD G. POPLAWSKI (SBN 113590)
`epoplawski@wsgr.com
`OLIVIA M. KIM (SBN 228382)
`okim@wsgr.com
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
`Professional Corporation
`633 West Fifth Street, Suite 1550
`Los Angeles, CA 90071
`Telephone: (323) 210-2901
`Facsimile: (866) 974-7329
`
`RYAN R. SMITH (SBN 229323)
`rsmith@wsgr.com
`CHRISTOPHER D. MAYS (SBN 266510)
`cmays@wsgr.com
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
`Professional Corporation
`650 Page Mill Road
`Palo Alto, CA 94304-1050
`Telephone: (650) 493-9300
`Facsimile: (650) 493-6811
`
`Counsel for Defendant
`QUALYS INC.
`
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`CASE NO. 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
`
`-10-
`
`MOT. TO AMEND ANSWER
`
`