`
`
`
`
`
`Matthias A. Kamber (SB # 232147)
`matthiaskamber@paulhastings.com
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`101 California Street, 48th Floor
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Telephone: (415) 856-7000
`Facsimile: (415) 856-7100
`
`Robert W. Unikel (pro hac vice)
`robertunikel@paulhastings.com
`John A. Cotiguala (pro hac vice)
`johncotiguala@paulhastings.com
`Matthew R. Lind (pro hac vice)
`mattlind@paulhastings.com
`Grayson S. Cornwell (pro hac vice)
`graysoncornwell@paulhastings.com
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`71 S. Wacker Drive, Suite 4500
`Chicago, Illinois 60606
`Telephone: (312) 499-6000
`Facsimile: (312) 499-6100
`
`[ADDITIONAL COUNSEL LISTED ON
`SIGNATURE PAGE]
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`GOOGLE LLC
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
`
`VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.,
`Plaintiff,
`
`vs.
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`
`
`CASE NO. 3:22-cv-03199-JD
`
`DEFENDANT GOOGLE LLC’S REPLY
`IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR
`JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
`Date:
`October 20, 2022
`Time:
`10:00 a.m.
`Place:
`Courtroom 11, 19th Floor
`Judge:
`The Hon. James Donato
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`GOOGLE LLC’S REPLY ISO MTN FOR
`JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
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`CASE NO. 3:22-cv-03199-JD
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`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 90 Filed 10/07/22 Page 2 of 16
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`
`Page
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`Claim 1 is representative of all asserted claims. ................................................................. 1
`Claim 1 is patent-ineligible. ................................................................................................ 2
`A.
`The Court should disregard the Mangione-Smith Declaration. .............................. 3
`B.
`Claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of routing a communication based
`on the participants’ characteristics. ......................................................................... 3
`1.
`Claim 1 recites broad functions without structure. ..................................... 3
`2.
`Claim 1 is analogous to preexisting call-routing practices. ........................ 5
`3.
`Claim 1 performs routine calling card and other routing functions
`with known technology. .............................................................................. 7
`Claim 1 lacks an inventive concept. ........................................................................ 8
`C.
`Dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. ........................................................................... 10
`
`
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`I.
`II.
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`III.
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`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 90 Filed 10/07/22 Page 3 of 16
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
`573 U.S. 208 (2014) .............................................................................................................. 2, 9
`
`Avocent Huntsville, LLC v. ZPE Sys.,
`No. 3:17-cv-04319-WHO, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47655 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21,
`2018) ......................................................................................................................................... 5
`
`BroadSoft, Inc. v. CallWave Commc’n,
`282 F. Supp. 3d 771 (D. Del. 2017) .......................................................................................... 7
`
`CarDx, Inc. v. Natera, Inc.,
`40 F.4th 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ................................................................................................ 10
`
`Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n,
`776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ................................................................................................. 2
`
`Coop. Ent., Inc. v. Kollective Tech., Inc.,
`No. 2021-2167, 2022 WL 4488902 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 28, 2022) ................................................ 9
`
`DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.,
`773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ................................................................................................. 9
`
`Dropbox, Inc. v. Synchronoss Techs., Inc.,
`815 Fed. App’x 529 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ........................................................................................ 8
`
`Gerow v. Wash.,
`383 Fed. App’x 677 (9th Cir. 2010) .......................................................................................... 3
`
`Glasswall Sols. Ltd. v. Clearswift Ltd.,
`754 Fed. App’x 996 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ...................................................................................... 10
`
`Juniper Networks Inc. v. Swarm Tech. LLC,
`No. 3:20-cv-03137-JD, 2022 WL 3031211 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2022) ..................................... 2
`
`Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Gemalto M2M GmbH,
`942 F.3d 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ................................................................................................. 4
`
`Linquet Techs., Inc. v. Tile, Inc.,
`559 F. Supp. 3d 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2021) .................................................................................... 9
`
`MyMail, Ltd. v. OoVoo, LLC,
`Case No. 17-CV-04487-LHK, 2020 WL 2219036 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2020),
`aff’d, No. 2020-1825, 2021 WL 3671364 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 2021) ....................................... 4
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`GOOGLE LLC’S REPLY ISO MTN FOR
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`CASE NO. 3:22-cv-03199-JD
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`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 90 Filed 10/07/22 Page 4 of 16
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`
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`RingCentral, Inc. v. Dialpad, Inc.,
`372 F. Supp. 3d 988 (N.D. Cal. 2019) ...................................................................................... 8
`
`Rothschild Digit. Confirmation, LLC v. Skedulo Holdings Inc.,
`No. 3:19-cv-02659-JD, 2020 WL 1307016 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2020) .................................... 9
`
`Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chi. Transit Auth.,
`873 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ................................................................................................. 2
`
`Stormborn Techs., LLC v. Topcon Positioning Sys.,
`444 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2020) .................................................................................... 5
`
`Telinit Techs., LLC v. Alteva, Inc.,
`No. 2:14-cv-00369, 2015 WL 5578604 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2015) ......................................... 6
`
`TriDim Innovations LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`207 F. Supp. 3d 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2016) .................................................................................. 10
`
`Twitter, Inc. v. VoIP-Pal.com, Inc.,
`No. 3:21-cv-09773-JD, Dkt. 38 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2022) ....................................................... 3
`
`Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns,
`LLC, 874 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ....................................................................................... 4
`
`VoIP-Pal.Com, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`375 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2019) .................................................................................... 2
`
`VoIP-Pal.Com, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`411 F. Supp. 3d 926 (N.D. Cal. 2019) ........................................................................ 5, 6, 8, 10
`
`Yakima Valley Mem’l Hosp. v. Wash. State Dept. of Health,
`654 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2011) ..................................................................................................... 3
`
`Other Authorities
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) ....................................................................................................................... 3
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`GOOGLE LLC’S REPLY ISO MTN FOR
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`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 90 Filed 10/07/22 Page 5 of 16
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`VoIP-Pal’s arguments fail to refute that, as a matter of law, the asserted claims of the ’234
`and ’721 patents claim ineligible subject matter because they (1) are directed to the abstract idea
`of routing a communication based on the participants’ characteristics and (2) lack an inventive
`concept. The Court should grant judgment of invalidity and dismiss this case with prejudice.
`I.
`
`Claim 1 is representative of all asserted claims.
`VoIP-Pal’s attempts to distinguish Claim 1 from the other asserted claims fail. First,
`whether certain asserted claims are “written from the perspective of the claimed server” rather
`than “from the perspective of the recited mobile telephone” is irrelevant for purposes of patent
`eligibility. See Dkt. 88 at 4. Despite adopting different “perspectives,” all the asserted claims are
`directed to the same fundamental process for routing communications, including the generic use
`of an access code. Indeed, Claim 1 captures the same generic steps for “producing” an access
`code as the supposed “server” claims, including by transmitting a request “to an access server to
`seek an access code from a pool of access codes” and receiving “from the access server . . . an
`access code.” Compare ’234 patent at 34:49–55 (Claim 1) with id. at 38:12–22 (Claim 30).
`Moreover, whether Claim 1 captures the mirrored steps for “producing” an access code is
`inconsequential because a missing detail in every claim is how to first generate the claimed
`access codes. The claims recite “producing” an access code by selecting it from a pre-existing
`pool. However, as VoIP-Pal concedes, “Claim 1 does not even recite generating an access code”
`(Dkt. 88 at 7) (emphasis in original), nor does any of the purported “server” claims. No asserted
`claim recites how codes in that pool are generated, and nothing indicates the codes are anything
`other than conventional IP addresses or telephone numbers. See, e.g., ’234 patent at 34:39–48,
`36:38–48. Accordingly, Claim 1 is representative, and all asserted claims are patent-ineligible.
`is
`Second, whether certain claims contain means-plus-function (“MPF”)
`terms
`inconsequential. VoIP-Pal does not explain how any asserted MPF claim would materially affect
`the ineligibility analysis if “corresponding structures and algorithms” were considered. To the
`contrary, the constructions in VoIP-Pal’s Exhibits 3 and 4 confirm that the MPF claims
`substantively match Claim 1 for § 101 purposes. Compare, e.g., ’234 patent at 34:35–57 (Claim
`1) with 39:31–51 (claim 46). The proposed constructions’ referenced “structures” are just basic
`
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`GOOGLE LLC’S REPLY ISO MTN FOR
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`computing and call-routing components like “a dialing input,” “network interface,” “wireless
`device,” “microprocessor,” and “access server,” which further confirms that the claims are
`directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea with no inventive concept. See Dkt. 88-4 at 3–4; Dkt.
`88-5 at 2; see also Juniper Networks Inc. v. Swarm Tech. LLC, No. 3:20-cv-03137-JD, 2022 WL
`3031211, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2022) (finding ineligibility for a claim that “simply recites
`ordinary steps, performed in a conventional order, on conventional computer technology”).
`As in a prior VoIP-Pal case, the “same logic applies” for ineligibility across the asserted
`claims because “[t]he specification lacks any additional detail” and “contains only generic
`computer components.” VoIP-Pal.Com, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1135 (N.D. Cal.
`2019) (“the algorithmic structure . . . do[es] not actually transform claim 28’s limitations into a
`non-abstract idea,” and “claim 1 is still representative of means-plus-function claim 28”). Claim 1
`thus is representative of the asserted MPF claims, which disclose “performance of the same basic
`process” and offer no “meaningful difference.” Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chi. Transit Auth.,
`873 F.3d 1364, 1368 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v.
`Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (affirming
`representativeness where “the claims of the asserted patents are substantially similar in that they
`recite little more than the same abstract idea”). Just as in Alice, “draftsman’s art” cannot change
`the eligibility analysis. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 226 (2014) (“[T]he
`system claims are no different from the method claims in substance. The method claims recite the
`abstract idea implemented on a generic computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic
`computer components configured to implement the same idea.”).
`II.
`
`Claim 1 is patent-ineligible.
`VoIP-Pal’s arguments rest on a declaration outside the pleadings and so should be
`disregarded. Claim 1 also fails both steps of the § 101 analysis on the merits. Tellingly, VoIP-Pal
`does not address Google’s cited decisions, including those where claims concerning substantially
`similar technologies—VoIP-Pal’s own among them—were found ineligible. Instead, VoIP-Pal
`deems those decisions irrelevant simply because the cases were not formally deemed related,
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`even though this Court has recognized that the patents involve “similar technology.” See Twitter,
`Inc. v. VoIP-Pal.com, Inc., No. 3:21-cv-09773-JD, Dkt. 38 at 3–4 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2022).
`A.
`The Court should disregard the Mangione-Smith Declaration.
`To avoid ineligibility, VoIP-Pal offers a declaration from its expert, Dr. William
`Mangione-Smith, “as a proffer of evidence . . . [but] not for the purpose of converting Google’s
`motion into a motion for summary judgment.” Dkt. 88 at 15. VoIP-Pal nevertheless substantively
`relies on this declaration dozens of times, including as the sole basis for eligibility arguments in
`Section III.B of its brief. See id. at nn. 40, 44, 46, 48–51, 53–60, 64, 73, 79–81. “Judgment on the
`pleadings,” however, “is limited to material included in the pleadings.” Yakima Valley Mem’l
`Hosp. v. Wash. State Dept. of Health, 654 F.3d 919, 925 n.6 (9th Cir. 2011). And if “matters
`outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated
`as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (emphasis added).
`Accordingly, because VoIP-Pal resists converting Google’s motion to one for summary judgment,
`both the declaration and Section III.B should be disregarded. See Gerow v. Wash., 383 Fed.
`App’x 677, 678–79 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Because a district court may not consider materials outside
`the pleadings in adjudicating a Rule 12(c) motion, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
`striking [the plaintiff’s] supplemental materials.”) (citation omitted); Yakima Valley, 654 F.3d at
`925 n.6 (finding no abuse of discretion in declining to convert a Rule 12(c) motion into a
`summary-judgment motion and disregarding expert reports submitted late in opposition).
`
`B.
`
`Claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of routing a communication based on
`the participants’ characteristics.
`1.
`Claim 1 recites broad functions without structure.
`VoIP-Pal does not seriously dispute that Claim 1 fails to disclose how to achieve its broad,
`functional steps. Dkt. 88 at 6–7. Instead, VoIP-Pal attempts to sidestep this problem by arguing
`that the claim reflects some “improvement” over prior art call-routing systems. Relatedly, the
`Court should reject VoIP-Pal’s contention that Claim 1 “does not concern routing at all,” which is
`contradicted by Claim 1’s plain language and by VoIP-Pal’s own argument that the claim is an
`“improvement over prior art call routing systems.” Dkt. 88 at 1, 8.
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`Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Gemalto M2M GmbH—the only case VoIP-Pal discusses in
`detail—does not support VoIP-Pal’s position. 942 F.3d 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2019). In Koninklijke, the
`Federal Circuit reiterated well-established precedent: “An improved result, without more stated in
`the claim, is not enough to confer eligibility to an otherwise abstract idea. To be patent-eligible,
`the claims must recite a specific means or method that solves a problem in an existing
`technological process.” 942 F.3d at 1150 (citations omitted). But unlike the patent-eligible claims
`in Koninklijke, which solved the problem of system errors in defective check data, VoIP-Pal
`identifies no purported unsolved problem that Claim 1 solves. Thus, Koninklijke is inapplicable.
`See MyMail, Ltd. v. OoVoo, LLC, Case No. 17-CV-04487-LHK, 2020 WL 2219036, at *16 (N.D.
`Cal. May 7, 2020), aff’d, No. 2020-1825, 2021 WL 3671364 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 2021) (“In
`contrast to Koninklijke, the [asserted patents] fail to identify ‘a problem in an existing
`technological process’ that is solved by the [claimed technology]. Thus, Koninklijke is
`inapplicable . . . .”) (citations omitted).
`Claim 1 also is ineligible because its alleged, unspecified “improvement” is itself an
`abstract idea and does not recite specific means for implementing it. Generically invoking the use
`of an “access code” to enable calls begs more questions than it answers. Claim 1 does not explain
`how an access code actually enables a local call to be made or even how it is generated, as VoIP-
`Pal concedes. Dkt. 88 at 7. Accordingly, Claim 1 does not recite “a sufficiently specific
`implementation . . . of an existing tool . . . that improves the functioning of the overall
`technological process,” but instead “simply recite[s], without more, the mere desired result[s]” of
`“receiving” a callee identifier, “transmitting” an access code request message, “receiving” an
`access code, and “initiating” a call. Koninklijke, 942 F.3d at 1151; ’234 patent at 34:35–57.
`Claim 1 is analogous to the claims in Two-Way Media, which Koninklijke distinguishes
`for not reciting a specific implementation of the alleged improvement. Id. at 1153. Like the claim
`in Two-Way Media, Claim 1 does not contain a specific implementation; it only claims the
`“functional results” of call routing without reciting how to achieve those results in a non-abstract
`way. Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1337 (Fed. Cir.
`2017) (ineligible claim “recites a method for routing information using result-based functional
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`language. The claim requires the functional results of ‘converting,’ ‘routing,’ ‘controlling,’
`‘monitoring,’ and ‘accumulating records,’ but does not sufficiently describe how to achieve these
`results in a non-abstract way.”); VoIP-Pal.Com, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 926, 955
`(N.D. Cal. 2019) (same). This defect also negates the (improper) Mangione-Smith Declaration,
`which broadly states that the claimed invention “dynamically provides an optimal communication
`channel” but lacks support in the patent for how it does so. See, e.g., Dkt. 89-1 ¶¶ 38, 46–51
`(describing only a POSITA’s familiarity with basic dialing functions, and concluding that Claim
`1 “does not require an explanation of ‘how’ for every step”); see also VoIP-Pal v. Apple, 411 F.
`Supp. 3d at 974 (finding VoIP-Pal’s “proffer of evidence,” including a declaration from Dr.
`Mangione-Smith, to be “orthogonal to the Alice inquiry,” where “neither the claims nor the
`specification provide the critical ‘how,’” and “the Patents-in-Suit did not disclose how to
`achieve” the alleged improvements).
`VoIP-Pal’s other footnoted cases are inapposite because they involved patent claims that
`expressly disclosed components and structures that overcame ineligibility. See Stormborn Techs.,
`LLC v. Topcon Positioning Sys., Inc., 444 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1125 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 2020)
`(concluding a claim was “better suited for a challenge under section 112,” rather than a 101
`challenge, where the claim “lays out the components needed to accomplish the claimed
`invention”); Avocent Huntsville, LLC v. ZPE Sys., No. 3:17-cv-04319-WHO, 2018 U.S. Dist.
`LEXIS 47655, at *20 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2018) (same, where the claims were “tied to concrete
`structures, with the specific goal of improving the functioning of network management systems”).
`Not so with Claim 1 here.
`2.
`Claim 1 is analogous to preexisting call-routing practices.
`VoIP-Pal misidentifies several aspects of the historical analogues of switchboard
`operators and calling cards. As an initial matter, VoIP-Pal’s arguments rely almost entirely on the
`Mangione-Smith Declaration, which should be disregarded. See Dkt. 88 at 8–10.
`VoIP-Pal’s (and Dr. Mangione-Smith’s) arguments also fail on the merits. For
`switchboard calling, VoIP-Pal argues that “the Complaint does not state that the switchboard
`operator uses the caller’s location to determine how to route the call,” but then concedes that
`
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`“[t]he operator knows—by definition—that this caller is already connected to the switchboard.”
`Dkt. 88 at 8. The caller’s location determines which switchboard first handles the call, and thus
`how the call is routed to the callee. This is analogous to Claim 1’s reliance on the caller’s location
`to provide a routing path for a phone call. Claim 1 also states that a location can be “pre-
`associated with the [] telephone,” as it naturally would be in a landline context. ’234 patent at
`34:49–55. Further, an analogous “access code” is provided by a switchboard when a call must be
`routed via multiple switchboards and trunk lines; like Claim 1’s local access code, switchboards
`and trunk lines enable a call to be routed to the callee. And just as Claim 1 contemplates access
`code request and reply messages that establish the routing path for a phone call, switchboard
`calling involves operators determining the appropriate routing path for a phone call and then
`establishing that path. See Dkt. 1 ¶ 15; Telinit Techs., LLC v. Alteva, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-00369,
`2015 WL 5578604, at *17 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2015) (finding a claimed computer that “acts as a
`‘gateway through which the call will be directed from the network through the telephone lines’”
`describes “precisely the function of a telephone operator,” and the claim “does not contain any
`specific structural components—beyond a generic ‘processor’ and generic ‘networks’—that
`remove it from the realm of an abstract idea”).
`In short, switchboard call routing included the same basic steps as in Claim 1, even as
`VoIP-Pal contends that preexisting practices must exactly match the invention to be “analogous.”
`See VoIP-Pal v. Apple, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 957 (concluding that the asserted claim’s “basic
`process is analogous to, for example, a human operator receiving the name of the callee from the
`caller, comparing the switchboard for the callee to the switchboard for the caller, and directing the
`call by plugging the cord into the appropriate socket on the appropriate switchboard”).
`VoIP-Pal also points to nothing in the patents or the complaint to support its argument that
`Claim 1 is directed to a different concept: “dynamically providing an optimal point-of-access
`connection to the communication network for a mobile device based on its changing location.”
`Dkt. 88 at 9. For example, as Claim 1 makes explicit, the benefits of the purported invention can
`be achieved even when a mobile phone’s location is “pre-associated” and thus fixed, rather than
`based on a dynamically “changing location.” ’234 patent at 34:49–55.
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`Calling cards also are an appropriate real-world analogy—in fact, the patents themselves
`indicate that the claimed invention is designed to automate calling card functionality. See ’234
`patent at 1:20–32. Calling card providers have long produced intermediate, and perhaps
`temporary, phone numbers to callers so they can “place a call to a local telephone number . . .
`instead of placing the call directly to the callee,” and “thus avoid the long distance charges of the
`mobile telephone service provider.” See id. at 1:20–28. This longstanding practice necessarily
`relies on the caller’s location. VoIP-Pal is mistaken that the user provides the calling card number
`to the calling card provider—like Claim 1, the provider provides a phone number to a caller via a
`calling card, and the user uses that number to route a call to the callee. The caller is unaware of
`the number until it receives the calling card and/or decides to initiate a call to a particular callee.
`VoIP-Pal does not explain how Claim 1 discloses something meaningfully different. Nor could it,
`given the specification’s own portrayal of calling cards as the fundamental analogue that is
`reflected in and automated by the purported invention. Claim 1 also does not specify that “the
`user’s phone needs nothing but the access code to complete a call to the callee,” as VoIP-Pal
`claims. Dkt. 88 at 10. Instead, it merely claims initiating a call using the access code. ’234 patent
`at 34:56–57.
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`3.
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`Claim 1 performs routine calling card and other routing functions
`with known technology.
`Claim 1’s physical components, a mobile telephone and an access server, are “known
`telephony elements” and “perform [] routine functions” like “accessing stored information and
`directing the call in accordance with the stored instructions.” BroadSoft, Inc. v. CallWave
`Commc’n, 282 F. Supp. 3d 771, 781 (D. Del. 2017). Ultimately, Claim 1 is not “rooted in solving
`a problem specific to telephone technology.” Id. Instead, it merely automates conventional calling
`practices. VoIP-Pal offers no rebuttal, nor does it distinguish Claim 1 from the other call-routing
`claims previously found ineligible, including its own.
`As the specification reflects, the asserted claims are designed to avoid the “cumbersome
`and undesirable” technique of manually using a calling card “to place a call to a local telephone
`number or to a less-expensive telephone number . . . instead of placing the call directly to the
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`callee,” which “may require the user of the mobile telephone to follow a number of complicated
`or cumbersome steps in order to initiate a call to the callee.” ’234 patent at 1:22–32. To that end,
`Claim 1 automates that process—establishing an intermediate access point that then indirectly
`routes a call to the callee—using conventional components. VoIP-Pal does not explain how Claim
`1 constitutes an improvement over an existing technological process except by relying on
`preexisting and abstract routing concepts themselves, nor does it argue how this analysis for
`Claim 1 differs from the analyses in analogous VoIP-Pal cases. See VoIP-Pal v. Apple, 411 F.
`Supp. 3d at 956–57 (“Representative Claim 1 is analogous to preexisting practices of manual call
`routing” and “provides simple automation of a task previously performed manually.”); see also
`RingCentral, Inc. v. Dialpad, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 3d 988, 999 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“[T]he claim is
`directed to the abstract ideas of routing telephone calls based on routing parameters . . . and
`allowing a user to modify those routing parameters. . . . [T]hese are functions that humans have
`routinely performed and are therefore abstract.”). Thus, Claim 1’s mere automation of preexisting
`call-routing practices does “doom the claim.” Dkt. 88 at 11.
`C.
`Claim 1 lacks an inventive concept.
`Claim 1 recites nothing more than applying the abstract idea of routing a communication
`based on the participants’ characteristics via conventional technology. VoIP-Pal’s conclusory
`suggestion that Claim 1 “recites the inventive concept of using an access code to provide an
`optimized point-of-access to a network for calling a callee based on the calling device’s current
`location and not based on conventional roaming” is, at best, a bare “allegation about
`inventiveness, wholly divorced from the claims or the specification,” which cannot defeat
`Google’s motion. Dkt. 88 at 11; Dropbox, Inc. v. Synchronoss Techs., Inc., 815 Fed. App’x 529,
`538 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). It also is inaccurate; Claim 1 expressly contemplates that
`a caller’s location may be “pre-associated with the mobile telephone” rather than a ‘current
`location.’ ’234 patent at 34:49–55.
`VoIP-Pal cannot show that Claim 1 recites anything other than generic computer and
`network components, which “are insufficient to transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible
`invention.” VoIP-Pal v. Apple, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 969 (citation omitted). VoIP-Pal asserts Claim
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`1 is inventive because “the caller’s home service provider is able to retain the caller to place a
`local call on its network.” Dkt. 88 at 13. This restates the abstract concepts and routing steps of
`Claim 1 and its historical analogues: routing a communication based on the participants’
`characteristics (like using a local switchboard or calling card). Because VoIP-Pal points to
`“simply another formulation of the abstract idea . . . this analysis is prima facie insufficient to
`allege an inventive concept.” Rothschild Digit. Confirmation, LLC v. Skedulo Holdings Inc., No.
`3:19-cv-02659-JD, 2020 WL 1307016, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2020) (citation omitted).
`VoIP-Pal also ignores that an inventive concept must be found in the claims. See Alice,
`573 U.S. at 217 (stating that step 2 considers “the elements of each claim . . . to determine
`whether the additional elements transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible
`application”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also cf. Coop. Ent., Inc. v.
`Kollective Tech., Inc., No. 2021-2167, 2022 WL 4488902, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 28, 2022)
`(concluding “[t]he claim language, the written description, and the amended complaint describe
`how [the patent’s] particular arrangements of elements is a technical improvement over prior art
`ways of arranging networks,” where, for example, “[t]he record here contains concrete allegations
`in the complaint and the specification that the [] limitation was not well-understood, routine, or
`conventional and recites a specific technique for improving computer network functioning”)
`(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
`Finally, VoIP-Pal does not explain how Claim 1’s ordering of steps is materially different
`than that used previously in call routing, much less how any differences in ordering qualify as an
`inventive concept. See Linquet Techs., Inc. v. Tile, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1112 (N.D. Cal.
`2021) (finding ineligibility where an allegation of “an unconventional combination is again
`purely conclusory, and does not state how the combination and ordering of the components was
`unconventional”). On this point, VoIP-Pal’s reliance on the Federal Ci