throbber
Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 90 Filed 10/07/22 Page 1 of 16
`
`
`
`
`
`Matthias A. Kamber (SB # 232147)
`matthiaskamber@paulhastings.com
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`101 California Street, 48th Floor
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Telephone: (415) 856-7000
`Facsimile: (415) 856-7100
`
`Robert W. Unikel (pro hac vice)
`robertunikel@paulhastings.com
`John A. Cotiguala (pro hac vice)
`johncotiguala@paulhastings.com
`Matthew R. Lind (pro hac vice)
`mattlind@paulhastings.com
`Grayson S. Cornwell (pro hac vice)
`graysoncornwell@paulhastings.com
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`71 S. Wacker Drive, Suite 4500
`Chicago, Illinois 60606
`Telephone: (312) 499-6000
`Facsimile: (312) 499-6100
`
`[ADDITIONAL COUNSEL LISTED ON
`SIGNATURE PAGE]
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`GOOGLE LLC
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
`
`VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.,
`Plaintiff,
`
`vs.
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`
`
`CASE NO. 3:22-cv-03199-JD
`
`DEFENDANT GOOGLE LLC’S REPLY
`IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR
`JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
`Date:
`October 20, 2022
`Time:
`10:00 a.m.
`Place:
`Courtroom 11, 19th Floor
`Judge:
`The Hon. James Donato
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`
`
`GOOGLE LLC’S REPLY ISO MTN FOR
`JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
`
`
`
`
`CASE NO. 3:22-cv-03199-JD
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 90 Filed 10/07/22 Page 2 of 16
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`Page
`
`Claim 1 is representative of all asserted claims. ................................................................. 1
`Claim 1 is patent-ineligible. ................................................................................................ 2
`A.
`The Court should disregard the Mangione-Smith Declaration. .............................. 3
`B.
`Claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of routing a communication based
`on the participants’ characteristics. ......................................................................... 3
`1.
`Claim 1 recites broad functions without structure. ..................................... 3
`2.
`Claim 1 is analogous to preexisting call-routing practices. ........................ 5
`3.
`Claim 1 performs routine calling card and other routing functions
`with known technology. .............................................................................. 7
`Claim 1 lacks an inventive concept. ........................................................................ 8
`C.
`Dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. ........................................................................... 10
`
`
`
`I.
`II.
`
`III.
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`- i -
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 90 Filed 10/07/22 Page 3 of 16
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
`573 U.S. 208 (2014) .............................................................................................................. 2, 9
`
`Avocent Huntsville, LLC v. ZPE Sys.,
`No. 3:17-cv-04319-WHO, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47655 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21,
`2018) ......................................................................................................................................... 5
`
`BroadSoft, Inc. v. CallWave Commc’n,
`282 F. Supp. 3d 771 (D. Del. 2017) .......................................................................................... 7
`
`CarDx, Inc. v. Natera, Inc.,
`40 F.4th 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ................................................................................................ 10
`
`Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n,
`776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ................................................................................................. 2
`
`Coop. Ent., Inc. v. Kollective Tech., Inc.,
`No. 2021-2167, 2022 WL 4488902 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 28, 2022) ................................................ 9
`
`DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.,
`773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ................................................................................................. 9
`
`Dropbox, Inc. v. Synchronoss Techs., Inc.,
`815 Fed. App’x 529 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ........................................................................................ 8
`
`Gerow v. Wash.,
`383 Fed. App’x 677 (9th Cir. 2010) .......................................................................................... 3
`
`Glasswall Sols. Ltd. v. Clearswift Ltd.,
`754 Fed. App’x 996 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ...................................................................................... 10
`
`Juniper Networks Inc. v. Swarm Tech. LLC,
`No. 3:20-cv-03137-JD, 2022 WL 3031211 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2022) ..................................... 2
`
`Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Gemalto M2M GmbH,
`942 F.3d 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ................................................................................................. 4
`
`Linquet Techs., Inc. v. Tile, Inc.,
`559 F. Supp. 3d 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2021) .................................................................................... 9
`
`MyMail, Ltd. v. OoVoo, LLC,
`Case No. 17-CV-04487-LHK, 2020 WL 2219036 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2020),
`aff’d, No. 2020-1825, 2021 WL 3671364 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 2021) ....................................... 4
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`
`
`GOOGLE LLC’S REPLY ISO MTN FOR
`JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
`
`
`
`
`CASE NO. 3:22-cv-03199-JD
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 90 Filed 10/07/22 Page 4 of 16
`
`
`
`RingCentral, Inc. v. Dialpad, Inc.,
`372 F. Supp. 3d 988 (N.D. Cal. 2019) ...................................................................................... 8
`
`Rothschild Digit. Confirmation, LLC v. Skedulo Holdings Inc.,
`No. 3:19-cv-02659-JD, 2020 WL 1307016 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2020) .................................... 9
`
`Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chi. Transit Auth.,
`873 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ................................................................................................. 2
`
`Stormborn Techs., LLC v. Topcon Positioning Sys.,
`444 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2020) .................................................................................... 5
`
`Telinit Techs., LLC v. Alteva, Inc.,
`No. 2:14-cv-00369, 2015 WL 5578604 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2015) ......................................... 6
`
`TriDim Innovations LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`207 F. Supp. 3d 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2016) .................................................................................. 10
`
`Twitter, Inc. v. VoIP-Pal.com, Inc.,
`No. 3:21-cv-09773-JD, Dkt. 38 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2022) ....................................................... 3
`
`Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns,
`LLC, 874 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ....................................................................................... 4
`
`VoIP-Pal.Com, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`375 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2019) .................................................................................... 2
`
`VoIP-Pal.Com, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`411 F. Supp. 3d 926 (N.D. Cal. 2019) ........................................................................ 5, 6, 8, 10
`
`Yakima Valley Mem’l Hosp. v. Wash. State Dept. of Health,
`654 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2011) ..................................................................................................... 3
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) ....................................................................................................................... 3
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`
`
`GOOGLE LLC’S REPLY ISO MTN FOR
`JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
`
`
`-iii-
`
`CASE NO. 3:22-cv-03199-JD
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 90 Filed 10/07/22 Page 5 of 16
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`VoIP-Pal’s arguments fail to refute that, as a matter of law, the asserted claims of the ’234
`and ’721 patents claim ineligible subject matter because they (1) are directed to the abstract idea
`of routing a communication based on the participants’ characteristics and (2) lack an inventive
`concept. The Court should grant judgment of invalidity and dismiss this case with prejudice.
`I.
`
`Claim 1 is representative of all asserted claims.
`VoIP-Pal’s attempts to distinguish Claim 1 from the other asserted claims fail. First,
`whether certain asserted claims are “written from the perspective of the claimed server” rather
`than “from the perspective of the recited mobile telephone” is irrelevant for purposes of patent
`eligibility. See Dkt. 88 at 4. Despite adopting different “perspectives,” all the asserted claims are
`directed to the same fundamental process for routing communications, including the generic use
`of an access code. Indeed, Claim 1 captures the same generic steps for “producing” an access
`code as the supposed “server” claims, including by transmitting a request “to an access server to
`seek an access code from a pool of access codes” and receiving “from the access server . . . an
`access code.” Compare ’234 patent at 34:49–55 (Claim 1) with id. at 38:12–22 (Claim 30).
`Moreover, whether Claim 1 captures the mirrored steps for “producing” an access code is
`inconsequential because a missing detail in every claim is how to first generate the claimed
`access codes. The claims recite “producing” an access code by selecting it from a pre-existing
`pool. However, as VoIP-Pal concedes, “Claim 1 does not even recite generating an access code”
`(Dkt. 88 at 7) (emphasis in original), nor does any of the purported “server” claims. No asserted
`claim recites how codes in that pool are generated, and nothing indicates the codes are anything
`other than conventional IP addresses or telephone numbers. See, e.g., ’234 patent at 34:39–48,
`36:38–48. Accordingly, Claim 1 is representative, and all asserted claims are patent-ineligible.
`is
`Second, whether certain claims contain means-plus-function (“MPF”)
`terms
`inconsequential. VoIP-Pal does not explain how any asserted MPF claim would materially affect
`the ineligibility analysis if “corresponding structures and algorithms” were considered. To the
`contrary, the constructions in VoIP-Pal’s Exhibits 3 and 4 confirm that the MPF claims
`substantively match Claim 1 for § 101 purposes. Compare, e.g., ’234 patent at 34:35–57 (Claim
`1) with 39:31–51 (claim 46). The proposed constructions’ referenced “structures” are just basic
`
`
`
`GOOGLE LLC’S REPLY ISO MTN FOR
`JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
`
`
`-1-
`
`CASE NO. 3:22-cv-03199-JD
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 90 Filed 10/07/22 Page 6 of 16
`
`
`
`computing and call-routing components like “a dialing input,” “network interface,” “wireless
`device,” “microprocessor,” and “access server,” which further confirms that the claims are
`directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea with no inventive concept. See Dkt. 88-4 at 3–4; Dkt.
`88-5 at 2; see also Juniper Networks Inc. v. Swarm Tech. LLC, No. 3:20-cv-03137-JD, 2022 WL
`3031211, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2022) (finding ineligibility for a claim that “simply recites
`ordinary steps, performed in a conventional order, on conventional computer technology”).
`As in a prior VoIP-Pal case, the “same logic applies” for ineligibility across the asserted
`claims because “[t]he specification lacks any additional detail” and “contains only generic
`computer components.” VoIP-Pal.Com, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1135 (N.D. Cal.
`2019) (“the algorithmic structure . . . do[es] not actually transform claim 28’s limitations into a
`non-abstract idea,” and “claim 1 is still representative of means-plus-function claim 28”). Claim 1
`thus is representative of the asserted MPF claims, which disclose “performance of the same basic
`process” and offer no “meaningful difference.” Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chi. Transit Auth.,
`873 F.3d 1364, 1368 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v.
`Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (affirming
`representativeness where “the claims of the asserted patents are substantially similar in that they
`recite little more than the same abstract idea”). Just as in Alice, “draftsman’s art” cannot change
`the eligibility analysis. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 226 (2014) (“[T]he
`system claims are no different from the method claims in substance. The method claims recite the
`abstract idea implemented on a generic computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic
`computer components configured to implement the same idea.”).
`II.
`
`Claim 1 is patent-ineligible.
`VoIP-Pal’s arguments rest on a declaration outside the pleadings and so should be
`disregarded. Claim 1 also fails both steps of the § 101 analysis on the merits. Tellingly, VoIP-Pal
`does not address Google’s cited decisions, including those where claims concerning substantially
`similar technologies—VoIP-Pal’s own among them—were found ineligible. Instead, VoIP-Pal
`deems those decisions irrelevant simply because the cases were not formally deemed related,
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`
`
`GOOGLE LLC’S REPLY ISO MTN FOR
`JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
`
`
`-2-
`
`CASE NO. 3:22-cv-03199-JD
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 90 Filed 10/07/22 Page 7 of 16
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`even though this Court has recognized that the patents involve “similar technology.” See Twitter,
`Inc. v. VoIP-Pal.com, Inc., No. 3:21-cv-09773-JD, Dkt. 38 at 3–4 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2022).
`A.
`The Court should disregard the Mangione-Smith Declaration.
`To avoid ineligibility, VoIP-Pal offers a declaration from its expert, Dr. William
`Mangione-Smith, “as a proffer of evidence . . . [but] not for the purpose of converting Google’s
`motion into a motion for summary judgment.” Dkt. 88 at 15. VoIP-Pal nevertheless substantively
`relies on this declaration dozens of times, including as the sole basis for eligibility arguments in
`Section III.B of its brief. See id. at nn. 40, 44, 46, 48–51, 53–60, 64, 73, 79–81. “Judgment on the
`pleadings,” however, “is limited to material included in the pleadings.” Yakima Valley Mem’l
`Hosp. v. Wash. State Dept. of Health, 654 F.3d 919, 925 n.6 (9th Cir. 2011). And if “matters
`outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated
`as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (emphasis added).
`Accordingly, because VoIP-Pal resists converting Google’s motion to one for summary judgment,
`both the declaration and Section III.B should be disregarded. See Gerow v. Wash., 383 Fed.
`App’x 677, 678–79 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Because a district court may not consider materials outside
`the pleadings in adjudicating a Rule 12(c) motion, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
`striking [the plaintiff’s] supplemental materials.”) (citation omitted); Yakima Valley, 654 F.3d at
`925 n.6 (finding no abuse of discretion in declining to convert a Rule 12(c) motion into a
`summary-judgment motion and disregarding expert reports submitted late in opposition).
`
`B.
`
`Claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of routing a communication based on
`the participants’ characteristics.
`1.
`Claim 1 recites broad functions without structure.
`VoIP-Pal does not seriously dispute that Claim 1 fails to disclose how to achieve its broad,
`functional steps. Dkt. 88 at 6–7. Instead, VoIP-Pal attempts to sidestep this problem by arguing
`that the claim reflects some “improvement” over prior art call-routing systems. Relatedly, the
`Court should reject VoIP-Pal’s contention that Claim 1 “does not concern routing at all,” which is
`contradicted by Claim 1’s plain language and by VoIP-Pal’s own argument that the claim is an
`“improvement over prior art call routing systems.” Dkt. 88 at 1, 8.
`
`
`
`GOOGLE LLC’S REPLY ISO MTN FOR
`JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
`
`
`-3-
`
`CASE NO. 3:22-cv-03199-JD
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 90 Filed 10/07/22 Page 8 of 16
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Gemalto M2M GmbH—the only case VoIP-Pal discusses in
`detail—does not support VoIP-Pal’s position. 942 F.3d 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2019). In Koninklijke, the
`Federal Circuit reiterated well-established precedent: “An improved result, without more stated in
`the claim, is not enough to confer eligibility to an otherwise abstract idea. To be patent-eligible,
`the claims must recite a specific means or method that solves a problem in an existing
`technological process.” 942 F.3d at 1150 (citations omitted). But unlike the patent-eligible claims
`in Koninklijke, which solved the problem of system errors in defective check data, VoIP-Pal
`identifies no purported unsolved problem that Claim 1 solves. Thus, Koninklijke is inapplicable.
`See MyMail, Ltd. v. OoVoo, LLC, Case No. 17-CV-04487-LHK, 2020 WL 2219036, at *16 (N.D.
`Cal. May 7, 2020), aff’d, No. 2020-1825, 2021 WL 3671364 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 2021) (“In
`contrast to Koninklijke, the [asserted patents] fail to identify ‘a problem in an existing
`technological process’ that is solved by the [claimed technology]. Thus, Koninklijke is
`inapplicable . . . .”) (citations omitted).
`Claim 1 also is ineligible because its alleged, unspecified “improvement” is itself an
`abstract idea and does not recite specific means for implementing it. Generically invoking the use
`of an “access code” to enable calls begs more questions than it answers. Claim 1 does not explain
`how an access code actually enables a local call to be made or even how it is generated, as VoIP-
`Pal concedes. Dkt. 88 at 7. Accordingly, Claim 1 does not recite “a sufficiently specific
`implementation . . . of an existing tool . . . that improves the functioning of the overall
`technological process,” but instead “simply recite[s], without more, the mere desired result[s]” of
`“receiving” a callee identifier, “transmitting” an access code request message, “receiving” an
`access code, and “initiating” a call. Koninklijke, 942 F.3d at 1151; ’234 patent at 34:35–57.
`Claim 1 is analogous to the claims in Two-Way Media, which Koninklijke distinguishes
`for not reciting a specific implementation of the alleged improvement. Id. at 1153. Like the claim
`in Two-Way Media, Claim 1 does not contain a specific implementation; it only claims the
`“functional results” of call routing without reciting how to achieve those results in a non-abstract
`way. Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1337 (Fed. Cir.
`2017) (ineligible claim “recites a method for routing information using result-based functional
`
`
`
`GOOGLE LLC’S REPLY ISO MTN FOR
`JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
`
`
`-4-
`
`CASE NO. 3:22-cv-03199-JD
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 90 Filed 10/07/22 Page 9 of 16
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`language. The claim requires the functional results of ‘converting,’ ‘routing,’ ‘controlling,’
`‘monitoring,’ and ‘accumulating records,’ but does not sufficiently describe how to achieve these
`results in a non-abstract way.”); VoIP-Pal.Com, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 926, 955
`(N.D. Cal. 2019) (same). This defect also negates the (improper) Mangione-Smith Declaration,
`which broadly states that the claimed invention “dynamically provides an optimal communication
`channel” but lacks support in the patent for how it does so. See, e.g., Dkt. 89-1 ¶¶ 38, 46–51
`(describing only a POSITA’s familiarity with basic dialing functions, and concluding that Claim
`1 “does not require an explanation of ‘how’ for every step”); see also VoIP-Pal v. Apple, 411 F.
`Supp. 3d at 974 (finding VoIP-Pal’s “proffer of evidence,” including a declaration from Dr.
`Mangione-Smith, to be “orthogonal to the Alice inquiry,” where “neither the claims nor the
`specification provide the critical ‘how,’” and “the Patents-in-Suit did not disclose how to
`achieve” the alleged improvements).
`VoIP-Pal’s other footnoted cases are inapposite because they involved patent claims that
`expressly disclosed components and structures that overcame ineligibility. See Stormborn Techs.,
`LLC v. Topcon Positioning Sys., Inc., 444 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1125 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 2020)
`(concluding a claim was “better suited for a challenge under section 112,” rather than a 101
`challenge, where the claim “lays out the components needed to accomplish the claimed
`invention”); Avocent Huntsville, LLC v. ZPE Sys., No. 3:17-cv-04319-WHO, 2018 U.S. Dist.
`LEXIS 47655, at *20 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2018) (same, where the claims were “tied to concrete
`structures, with the specific goal of improving the functioning of network management systems”).
`Not so with Claim 1 here.
`2.
`Claim 1 is analogous to preexisting call-routing practices.
`VoIP-Pal misidentifies several aspects of the historical analogues of switchboard
`operators and calling cards. As an initial matter, VoIP-Pal’s arguments rely almost entirely on the
`Mangione-Smith Declaration, which should be disregarded. See Dkt. 88 at 8–10.
`VoIP-Pal’s (and Dr. Mangione-Smith’s) arguments also fail on the merits. For
`switchboard calling, VoIP-Pal argues that “the Complaint does not state that the switchboard
`operator uses the caller’s location to determine how to route the call,” but then concedes that
`
`
`
`GOOGLE LLC’S REPLY ISO MTN FOR
`JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
`
`
`-5-
`
`CASE NO. 3:22-cv-03199-JD
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 90 Filed 10/07/22 Page 10 of 16
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`“[t]he operator knows—by definition—that this caller is already connected to the switchboard.”
`Dkt. 88 at 8. The caller’s location determines which switchboard first handles the call, and thus
`how the call is routed to the callee. This is analogous to Claim 1’s reliance on the caller’s location
`to provide a routing path for a phone call. Claim 1 also states that a location can be “pre-
`associated with the [] telephone,” as it naturally would be in a landline context. ’234 patent at
`34:49–55. Further, an analogous “access code” is provided by a switchboard when a call must be
`routed via multiple switchboards and trunk lines; like Claim 1’s local access code, switchboards
`and trunk lines enable a call to be routed to the callee. And just as Claim 1 contemplates access
`code request and reply messages that establish the routing path for a phone call, switchboard
`calling involves operators determining the appropriate routing path for a phone call and then
`establishing that path. See Dkt. 1 ¶ 15; Telinit Techs., LLC v. Alteva, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-00369,
`2015 WL 5578604, at *17 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2015) (finding a claimed computer that “acts as a
`‘gateway through which the call will be directed from the network through the telephone lines’”
`describes “precisely the function of a telephone operator,” and the claim “does not contain any
`specific structural components—beyond a generic ‘processor’ and generic ‘networks’—that
`remove it from the realm of an abstract idea”).
`In short, switchboard call routing included the same basic steps as in Claim 1, even as
`VoIP-Pal contends that preexisting practices must exactly match the invention to be “analogous.”
`See VoIP-Pal v. Apple, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 957 (concluding that the asserted claim’s “basic
`process is analogous to, for example, a human operator receiving the name of the callee from the
`caller, comparing the switchboard for the callee to the switchboard for the caller, and directing the
`call by plugging the cord into the appropriate socket on the appropriate switchboard”).
`VoIP-Pal also points to nothing in the patents or the complaint to support its argument that
`Claim 1 is directed to a different concept: “dynamically providing an optimal point-of-access
`connection to the communication network for a mobile device based on its changing location.”
`Dkt. 88 at 9. For example, as Claim 1 makes explicit, the benefits of the purported invention can
`be achieved even when a mobile phone’s location is “pre-associated” and thus fixed, rather than
`based on a dynamically “changing location.” ’234 patent at 34:49–55.
`
`
`
`GOOGLE LLC’S REPLY ISO MTN FOR
`JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
`
`
`-6-
`
`CASE NO. 3:22-cv-03199-JD
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 90 Filed 10/07/22 Page 11 of 16
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`Calling cards also are an appropriate real-world analogy—in fact, the patents themselves
`indicate that the claimed invention is designed to automate calling card functionality. See ’234
`patent at 1:20–32. Calling card providers have long produced intermediate, and perhaps
`temporary, phone numbers to callers so they can “place a call to a local telephone number . . .
`instead of placing the call directly to the callee,” and “thus avoid the long distance charges of the
`mobile telephone service provider.” See id. at 1:20–28. This longstanding practice necessarily
`relies on the caller’s location. VoIP-Pal is mistaken that the user provides the calling card number
`to the calling card provider—like Claim 1, the provider provides a phone number to a caller via a
`calling card, and the user uses that number to route a call to the callee. The caller is unaware of
`the number until it receives the calling card and/or decides to initiate a call to a particular callee.
`VoIP-Pal does not explain how Claim 1 discloses something meaningfully different. Nor could it,
`given the specification’s own portrayal of calling cards as the fundamental analogue that is
`reflected in and automated by the purported invention. Claim 1 also does not specify that “the
`user’s phone needs nothing but the access code to complete a call to the callee,” as VoIP-Pal
`claims. Dkt. 88 at 10. Instead, it merely claims initiating a call using the access code. ’234 patent
`at 34:56–57.
`
`3.
`
`Claim 1 performs routine calling card and other routing functions
`with known technology.
`Claim 1’s physical components, a mobile telephone and an access server, are “known
`telephony elements” and “perform [] routine functions” like “accessing stored information and
`directing the call in accordance with the stored instructions.” BroadSoft, Inc. v. CallWave
`Commc’n, 282 F. Supp. 3d 771, 781 (D. Del. 2017). Ultimately, Claim 1 is not “rooted in solving
`a problem specific to telephone technology.” Id. Instead, it merely automates conventional calling
`practices. VoIP-Pal offers no rebuttal, nor does it distinguish Claim 1 from the other call-routing
`claims previously found ineligible, including its own.
`As the specification reflects, the asserted claims are designed to avoid the “cumbersome
`and undesirable” technique of manually using a calling card “to place a call to a local telephone
`number or to a less-expensive telephone number . . . instead of placing the call directly to the
`
`
`
`GOOGLE LLC’S REPLY ISO MTN FOR
`JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
`
`
`-7-
`
`CASE NO. 3:22-cv-03199-JD
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 90 Filed 10/07/22 Page 12 of 16
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`callee,” which “may require the user of the mobile telephone to follow a number of complicated
`or cumbersome steps in order to initiate a call to the callee.” ’234 patent at 1:22–32. To that end,
`Claim 1 automates that process—establishing an intermediate access point that then indirectly
`routes a call to the callee—using conventional components. VoIP-Pal does not explain how Claim
`1 constitutes an improvement over an existing technological process except by relying on
`preexisting and abstract routing concepts themselves, nor does it argue how this analysis for
`Claim 1 differs from the analyses in analogous VoIP-Pal cases. See VoIP-Pal v. Apple, 411 F.
`Supp. 3d at 956–57 (“Representative Claim 1 is analogous to preexisting practices of manual call
`routing” and “provides simple automation of a task previously performed manually.”); see also
`RingCentral, Inc. v. Dialpad, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 3d 988, 999 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“[T]he claim is
`directed to the abstract ideas of routing telephone calls based on routing parameters . . . and
`allowing a user to modify those routing parameters. . . . [T]hese are functions that humans have
`routinely performed and are therefore abstract.”). Thus, Claim 1’s mere automation of preexisting
`call-routing practices does “doom the claim.” Dkt. 88 at 11.
`C.
`Claim 1 lacks an inventive concept.
`Claim 1 recites nothing more than applying the abstract idea of routing a communication
`based on the participants’ characteristics via conventional technology. VoIP-Pal’s conclusory
`suggestion that Claim 1 “recites the inventive concept of using an access code to provide an
`optimized point-of-access to a network for calling a callee based on the calling device’s current
`location and not based on conventional roaming” is, at best, a bare “allegation about
`inventiveness, wholly divorced from the claims or the specification,” which cannot defeat
`Google’s motion. Dkt. 88 at 11; Dropbox, Inc. v. Synchronoss Techs., Inc., 815 Fed. App’x 529,
`538 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). It also is inaccurate; Claim 1 expressly contemplates that
`a caller’s location may be “pre-associated with the mobile telephone” rather than a ‘current
`location.’ ’234 patent at 34:49–55.
`VoIP-Pal cannot show that Claim 1 recites anything other than generic computer and
`network components, which “are insufficient to transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible
`invention.” VoIP-Pal v. Apple, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 969 (citation omitted). VoIP-Pal asserts Claim
`
`
`
`GOOGLE LLC’S REPLY ISO MTN FOR
`JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
`
`
`-8-
`
`CASE NO. 3:22-cv-03199-JD
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 90 Filed 10/07/22 Page 13 of 16
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`1 is inventive because “the caller’s home service provider is able to retain the caller to place a
`local call on its network.” Dkt. 88 at 13. This restates the abstract concepts and routing steps of
`Claim 1 and its historical analogues: routing a communication based on the participants’
`characteristics (like using a local switchboard or calling card). Because VoIP-Pal points to
`“simply another formulation of the abstract idea . . . this analysis is prima facie insufficient to
`allege an inventive concept.” Rothschild Digit. Confirmation, LLC v. Skedulo Holdings Inc., No.
`3:19-cv-02659-JD, 2020 WL 1307016, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2020) (citation omitted).
`VoIP-Pal also ignores that an inventive concept must be found in the claims. See Alice,
`573 U.S. at 217 (stating that step 2 considers “the elements of each claim . . . to determine
`whether the additional elements transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible
`application”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also cf. Coop. Ent., Inc. v.
`Kollective Tech., Inc., No. 2021-2167, 2022 WL 4488902, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 28, 2022)
`(concluding “[t]he claim language, the written description, and the amended complaint describe
`how [the patent’s] particular arrangements of elements is a technical improvement over prior art
`ways of arranging networks,” where, for example, “[t]he record here contains concrete allegations
`in the complaint and the specification that the [] limitation was not well-understood, routine, or
`conventional and recites a specific technique for improving computer network functioning”)
`(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
`Finally, VoIP-Pal does not explain how Claim 1’s ordering of steps is materially different
`than that used previously in call routing, much less how any differences in ordering qualify as an
`inventive concept. See Linquet Techs., Inc. v. Tile, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1112 (N.D. Cal.
`2021) (finding ineligibility where an allegation of “an unconventional combination is again
`purely conclusory, and does not state how the combination and ordering of the components was
`unconventional”). On this point, VoIP-Pal’s reliance on the Federal Ci

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket