Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 88 Filed 09/26/22 Page 1 of 22
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`
`
`Lewis E. Hudnell, III (CASBN 218736)
`lewis@hudnelllaw.com
`Nicolas S. Gikkas (CASBN 189452)
`nick@hudnelllaw.com
`HUDNELL LAW GROUP P.C.
`800 W. El Camino Real Suite 180
`Mountain View, California 94040
`Telephone: 650.564.3698
`Facsimile: 347.772.3034
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
`
`Case No. 3:22-CV-03199-JD
`
`PLAINTIFF VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.’S
`OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
`JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
`
`Honorable James Donato
`
`Date: October 20, 2022
`Time: 10:00 a.m.
`Courtroom 11, 19th Floor
`
`
`VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.,
`Plaintiff,
`
` v.
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`Defendant.
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`PLAINTIFF VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No.: 3:22-CV-03199-JD
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`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 88 Filed 09/26/22 Page 2 of 22
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 1 
`
`LEGAL STANDARD ............................................................................................................. 1 
`
`I. 
`
`II. 
`
`III.  ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................... 3 
`
`A. 
`
`B. 
`
`Claim 1 Is Not Representative Of All Asserted Claims. ..................................................... 3 
`
`Claim 1 Is Patent Eligible. ................................................................................................... 6 
`
`1.  Claim 1 is not directed toward an abstract idea. ...................................................................... 6 
`
`a.  The allegedly functional terms in Claim 1 do not render it abstract. ...................................... 6 
`
`b.  Claim 1 is not analogous to preexisting call routing practices. ............................................... 8 
`
`c.  Claim 1 does not automate preexisting calling functions. ..................................................... 10 
`
`2.  Claim 1 recites an inventive concept. .................................................................................... 11 
`
`C. 
`
`D. 
`
`The Court Should Reject Google’s Undeveloped Ineligibility Arguments. ...................... 13 
`
`The Court Should Grant VoIP-Pal Leave To Amend. ....................................................... 14 
`
`IV.  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 15 
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`PLAINTIFF VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No.: 3:22-CV-03199-JD
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`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 88 Filed 09/26/22 Page 3 of 22
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`Cases
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .............. 2, 3, 15
`
`Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) ................................................. 2, 3, 11
`
`Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 915 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ........... 11
`
`Avocent Huntsville, LLC v. ZPE Sys., Case No. 3:17-cv-04319-WHO, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47655
`
`(N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2018) .................................................................................................................. 7
`
`BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .................. 13
`
`Card Verification Solutions, LLC v. Citigroup Inc., 13 C 6339, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137577 (N.D.
`
`Ill. Sept. 29, 2014) .............................................................................................................................. 3
`
`CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc., 955 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2020) .................................................. 12
`
`Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., 927 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ............................................... 2, 3, 14
`
`CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty, 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ...................................................... 3
`
`DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ......................................... 13
`
`DealerTrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ................................................................ 2
`
`Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) ............................................. 15
`
`Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ........................................................ 11
`
`Enron Oil Trading & Transp. Co. v. Walbrook Ins. Co., Ltd., 132 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 1997) ............... 2
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ............................................................. 7
`
`Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .......................................... 13
`
`Geinosky v. City of Chi., 675 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2012) ....................................................................... 15
`
`Herrera v. Zumiez, Inc., 953 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2020) ........................................................................ 1
`
`In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ............................................................................. 6
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`PLAINTIFF VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No.: 3:22-CV-03199-JD
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`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 88 Filed 09/26/22 Page 4 of 22
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`
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`Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Gemalto M2M GmbH, 942 F.3d 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2019)................................. 7
`
`Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) .................................... 3
`
`McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................ 6, 11
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) ........................................................... 3
`
`Nat. Alts. Int’l, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC, 918 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ............................. 2
`
`Nice Ltd. v. CallMiner, Inc., No. 18-2024-RGA-SRF, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20516 (D. Del. Feb. 3,
`
`2020) .................................................................................................................................................. 6
`
`Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ............................................................... 4
`
`PPS Data, LLC v. Jack Henry & Assocs., 404 F. Supp. 3d 1021 (E.D. Tex. 2019) .......................... 4, 6
`
`Pragmatus Telecom, LLC v. Genesys Telecomms. Labs., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 192 (D. Del. 2015) .... 4
`
`Prompt Med. Sys., L.P. v. Allscripts Healthcare Solutions, Inc., 6:10-cv-71, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
`
`30694 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2012) ....................................................................................................... 7
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`Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ........................................... 2
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`Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 897 F.2d 511 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ......................... 12
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`Stormborn Techs., LLC v. Topcon Positioning Sys., 444 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2020) .............. 7
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`Townsend v. Univ. of Alaska, 543 F.3d 478 (9th Cir. 2008) ................................................................ 15
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`Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ........................................................... 2
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`Univ. of Fla. Research Found., Inc. v. GE Co., 916 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2019) .................................. 3
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`Vineyard Investigations v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 510 F. Supp. 3d 926 (E.D. Cal. 2020) .................... 4
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`Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ............................................. 15
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`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. §101 .............................................................................................................................. passim
`
`35 U.S.C. §112(f) ................................................................................................................................... 5
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`PLAINTIFF VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No.: 3:22-CV-03199-JD
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`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 88 Filed 09/26/22 Page 5 of 22
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`TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
`
`ABBREVIATION
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`TERM
`
`VoIP-Pal
`
`Google
`
`The ’234 patent
`
`The ’721 patent
`
`The Mobile Gateway patents or the patents-
`in-suit
`
`Claim 1
`
`POSITA
`
`WDTX
`
`PTO
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiff VoIP-Pal.com, Inc.
`
`Defendant Google LLC
`
`U.S. Patent No. 8,630,234
`
`U.S. Patent No. 10,880,721
`
`The ’234 and ’721 patents
`
`
`Claim 1 of the ’234 patent
`
`Person of ordinary skill in the art
`
`Western District of Texas
`
`United States Patent and Trademark Office
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`PLAINTIFF VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No.: 3:22-CV-03199-JD
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`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 88 Filed 09/26/22 Page 6 of 22
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`I. INTRODUCTION
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`The Court should deny Google’s Motion because Google has not met its burden to show that
`
`Claim 1 is representative of the 62 asserted claims nor has it proved that Claim 1 is ineligible under 35
`
`U.S.C. §101 by clear and convincing evidence. Claim 1 is not directed to an abstract idea of routing
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`communications based on the participant’s characteristics; in fact it does not concern routing at all.
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`Consequently, Google erroneously analogizes Claim 1 to allegedly well-known call-routing practices
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`that are fundamentally different than the claimed invention. Even if Claim 1 is directed to an abstract
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`idea, which it is not, Claim 1 is still patent eligible because it recites the inventive concept of using an
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`access code to allow for an unconventional form of mobile telephone roaming based on the location of
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`the caller’s mobile device. Google ignores express intrinsic evidence that shows the claimed inventive
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`concept was not well-known, routine, or conventional and that precludes dismissal at the Rule 12 stage.
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`Largely, Google’s Motion attempts to piggyback off of two decisions by Judge Lucy Koh
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`invalidating six other VoIP-Pal patents under §101. Those decisions, however, are irrelevant because
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`they concern different inventions claimed in different VoIP-Pal patents from a different patent family
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`asserted against a different defendant. In fact, Judge Koh herself determined that the subject matter of
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`her VoIP-Pal cases is sufficiently distinct from the subject matter of cases involving the patents-in-suit
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`before the Court by denying three requests to relate such cases.1 Thus, Judge Koh’s eligibility decisions
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`have no bearing on any issue that the Court needs to decide in this case. When properly considered on
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`the merits in this case, it is apparent that Google’s Motion should be denied.
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`
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`II. LEGAL STANDARD
`
`A Rule 12(c) motion requires the Court to take as true the plausible and nonconclusory factual
`
`allegations in the complaint, and draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff’s
`
`favor.2 Patent eligibility under §101 is a question of law that may involve underlying questions of fact.3
`
`Patent eligibility may be determined at the Rule 12 stage, but only when there are no factual allegations
`
`
`1 Ex. 1. All exhibits are attached to the supporting declaration of Lewis E. Hudnell, III.
`2 See Herrera v. Zumiez, Inc., 953 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2020).
`PLAINTIFF VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No.: 3:22-CV-03199-JD
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`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 88 Filed 09/26/22 Page 7 of 22
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`that, if taken as true, prevent resolving the eligibility question as a matter of law.4 Plausible factual
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`allegations may preclude dismissing a case under §101 where, for example, nothing in the record refutes
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`those allegations as a matter of law or justifies dismissal under Rule 12.5 “While a fact-finder may
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`ultimately determine that [a claim] limitation was well-understood, routine, and conventional, absent a
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`clear statement to that effect in the specification, complaint, or other material properly before the court,
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`when disputed such a determination may not be made on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.”6
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`“Judgment may only be granted when the pleadings show that it is beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
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`prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”7
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`The Supreme Court has “set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of
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`nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those
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`concepts.”8 First, the Court must “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those
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`patent-ineligible concepts.”9 “If not, the claims pass muster under §101.”10 Courts, however, must
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`“tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle less it swallow all of patent law.”11 Thus, “for
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`abstractness to invalidate a claim it must ‘exhibit itself so manifestly as to override the broad statutory
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`categories of eligible subject matter and the statutory context that directs primary attention on the
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`patentability criteria of the rest of the Patent Act.’”12 Second, if the answer to the first step is “yes,” then
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`the Court must “consider the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’
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`to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible
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`
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`3 See Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
`4 See Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see
`also Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., 927 F.3d 1306, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (vacating Rule 12(c)
`dismissal where complaint made plausible allegations of eligibility).
`5 Id.
`6 See Nat. Alts. Int’l, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC, 918 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
`7 See Enron Oil Trading & Transp. Co. v. Walbrook Ins. Co., Ltd., 132 F.3d 526, 529 (9th Cir. 1997)
`(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
`8 See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014).
`9 Id.
`10 See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 714 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
`11 See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354.
`12 See DealerTrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Research Corp. Techs.
`v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
`PLAINTIFF VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No.: 3:22-CV-03199-JD
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`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 88 Filed 09/26/22 Page 8 of 22
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`application.”13 This step essentially asks whether the claims add an “inventive concept” that is
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`“sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
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`ineligible concept itself.”14 Determining whether claims recite an inventive concept, or something more
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`than well-understood, routine, or conventional activities previously known to the industry, may turn on
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`underlying questions of fact.15
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`Issued patents are entitled to a presumption of validity that applies to §101 challenges, placing a
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`heavy burden on the party alleging that claims are patent ineligible.16 The Federal Circuit has held that
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`ineligibility is an invalidity defense under 35 U.S.C. §282.17 Thus, Google bears the burden to prove
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`ineligibility by clear and convincing evidence.18
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`III. ARGUMENT
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`A. Claim 1 Is Not Representative Of All Asserted Claims.
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`Incredibly, Google asserts that Claim 1 is representative of 62 other asserted claims.19 It is not;
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`nor is Google’s representative claim analysis sound. 35 U.S.C. §282 provides that “[e]ach claim of a
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`patent … shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other claim … even though
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`dependent upon an invalid claim.” Thus, patent eligibility must be evaluated for each individual
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`13 See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
`1289, 1297 (2012)).
`14 See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297) (modification marks omitted).
`15 See Cellspin, 927 F.3d at 1315 (citing Aatrix, 882 F.3d at 1128).
`16 See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty, 717 F.3d 1269, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Lourie, J., concurring,
`joined by Dyk, Prost, Reyna, Wallach, JJ.) (“[A]s with obviousness and enablement, that presumption
`[of validity] applies when §101 is raised as a basis for invalidity in district court proceedings.”); id. at
`1304-05 (Rader, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part, joined by Linn, Moore, O’Malley, JJ.)
`(“Because we believe the presumption of validity applies to all challenges to patentability, including
`those under Section 101 and the exceptions thereto, [such challenges] must be proven by clear and
`convincing evidence.”); Card Verification Solutions, LLC v. Citigroup Inc., 13 C 6339, 2014 U.S. Dist.
`LEXIS 137577, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2014) (“dismissal is appropriate solely when the only plausible
`reading of the patent is that there is clear and convincing evidence of ineligibility.”).
`17 See Univ. of Fla. Research Found., Inc. v. GE Co., 916 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“§282’s
`defenses include a §101 eligibility challenge … .”).
`18 See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011) (holding that invalidity
`defenses under §282 must be proved by clear and convincing evidence).
`19 Dkt. No. 85 at 4.
`PLAINTIFF VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No.: 3:22-CV-03199-JD
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`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 88 Filed 09/26/22 Page 9 of 22
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`claim.20 Even assuming that it is proper to evaluate the eligibility of individual claims based on
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`allegedly representative claims, Google bears the initial burden to establish the representative claims.21
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`Indeed, “[e]rroneously determining that a claim is representative has constitutional consequences.”22
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`The Court should not let Google oversimplify the claims for its own expediency at the expense of
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`VoIP-Pal’s constitutional rights.23
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`Google glosses over that fact that Claim 1 is written from the perspective of the recited mobile
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`telephone whereas claims 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 51, 53, 54, 61, 62, 64,
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`65, 70, 72, and 75 of the ’234 patent and claims 51, 63, 77, 103, 104, 109, 110, 124, 130, 133, 138, and
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`139 of the ’721 patent are written from the perspective of the claimed server. This difference is
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`meaningful because the server claims do not merely recite the allegedly basic call-routing functions of
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`receiving, transmitting, receiving, and initiating. Rather, the server claims also require “producing an
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`access code” as well as providing the details as to what the access code is and how it is produced.24
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`Google’s own argument proves the significance of these additional limitations. In asserting that
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`allegedly representative Claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, Google contends that the claim “does
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`not disclose how the access code is generated.” That is because the details as to how the access code is
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`produced are recited in the server claims, not the mobile telephone claims. For example, in producing
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`an access code, the server claims require “selecting said access code from a pool of access codes”
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`(claim 30 of the ’234 patent), “selecting an access code associated with a calling area matching said
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`local calling area associated with the mobile telephone” (claim 33 of the ’234 patent), “associating said
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`caller identifier included in said access code request message with the selected access code” (claim 40
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`of the ’234 patent), and “associating a timestamp with said access code, for use in determining when the
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`20 See Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“grounds of invalidity must be
`analyzed on a claim-by-claim basis”) (citations omitted).
`21 See PPS Data, LLC v. Jack Henry & Assocs., 404 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1030 (E.D. Tex. 2019);
`Pragmatus Telecom, LLC v. Genesys Telecomms. Labs., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 192, 200 (D. Del. 2015).
`22 See Vineyard Investigations v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 510 F. Supp. 3d 926, 944 n.7 (E.D. Cal. 2020)
`(citations omitted).
`23 Id.
`24 See Ex. 2 at 7-10, 12-15, 24, 26-27, 29-32, and 34-35.
`PLAINTIFF VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No.: 3:22-CV-03199-JD
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`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 88 Filed 09/26/22 Page 10 of 22
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`usability of said access code to initiate a call to the callee will expire” (claim 43 of the ’234 patent).25
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`Google fails to explain how Claim 1 accounts for these additional limitations. Thus, the server claims
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`recite meaningful distinctions over Claim 1 that are relevant to assessing the eligibility of these claims.
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`Claim 1 also is meaningfully different from claims 46, 47, 48, 51, 53, 54, and 61of the ’234
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`patent and claims 20, 25, 34, and 77 of the ’721 patent, all of which recite means-plus-function
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`limitations. Consequently, the Court cannot merely consider the plain claim language when evaluating
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`eligibility. Rather, the Court also must consider the corresponding structures and algorithms disclosed
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`in the specification for performing the claimed functions.26 Google fails to inform the Court that the
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`parties already have agreed to constructions for seven means-plus-function terms recited in these claims
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`and that the WDTX has construed two others.27 Google also fails to explain how Claim 1 accounts for
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`the structural limitations required by the means-plus-function construction of these terms not present in
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`Claim 1, including “a dialing input,” “a voice recognition unit,” “a parameter memory,” “a network
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`interface,” “a microprocessor programmed to implement the algorithm in Figure 3” of the patents-in-
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`suit, “I/O ports,” “an access server,” “a routing controller,” and “a microprocessor programmed to
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`implement the algorithm in Figure 7” of the patents-in-suit.28
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`These distinctions are meaningful because Google argues that Claim 1 is directed to an abstract
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`idea because it “relies on functional routing terms to describe desired results without explaining how to
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`achieve those results.”29 This argument makes little sense in the context of the means-plus-function
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`limitations. First, these limitations are not even present in Claim 1. Second, the patent statute expressly
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`allows these limitations to be written in functional terms. Third, means-plus-function claims do not
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`need to explain how a function is achieved. Those details are provided by the structures and algorithms
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`disclosed in the specification. Google does not and cannot show how using Claim 1 as allegedly
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`25 Dkt. No. 1-2 at 38:20-21, 38:35-37, 38:65-67, 39:14-16.
`26 See 35 U.S.C. §112(f) (“An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step
`for performing a specified function … and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding
`structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.”).
`27 Exs. 3-4.
`28 See Ex. 3 at 3 of 14-4 of 14; Ex. 4 at 3 of 3.
`PLAINTIFF VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No.: 3:22-CV-03199-JD
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`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 88 Filed 09/26/22 Page 11 of 22
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`representative of the means-plus-function claims would allow the Court to perform this statutorily
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`mandated inquiry.30
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`In sum, because Google has not satisfied its burden to show that Claim 1 is representative of the
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`other asserted claims, the Court must confine its eligibility analysis to Claim 1—the only claim that
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`Google actually analyzed—lest it deprive VoIP-Pal of its property rights without due process.31
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`B. Claim 1 Is Patent Eligible.
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`1. Claim 1 is not directed toward an abstract idea.
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`Claim 1 is not directed to the alleged abstract idea of routing a call based on the participant
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`characteristics. This assertion overgeneralizes the claim, which is improper.32 And it is plainly
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`inaccurate—Claim 1 does not even mention routing. Claim 1 recites a specific improvement over prior
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`art systems and Google’s three-part analysis fails to show that Claim 1 is abstract.
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`a. The allegedly functional terms in Claim 1 do not render it abstract.
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`The allegedly broad and functional nature of Claim 1 does not show that the claim is directed to
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`an abstract idea. Google observes, unremarkably, that Claim 1 recites allegedly basic call-routing
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`functions, such as “receiving,” “transmitting,” “receiving,” and “initiating.”33 The field of the invention
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`is telecommunications, so even if Claim 1 recites calling functions, this observation proves nothing.34
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`Google’s argument that Claim 1 does not disclose how to achieve any of these functions is not
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`the proper inquiry.35 The eligibility inquiry concerns whether the claim recites a sufficiently specific
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`structure or act for achieving the desired result, not how each individual limitation of the claim is
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`29 Dkt. No. 85 at 7.
`30 See In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[W]e hold that [§ 112(f)] applies
`regardless of the context in which the interpretation of means-plus-function language arises, i.e., … part
`of a validity or infringement determination in a court.”).
`31 See Nice Ltd. v. CallMiner, Inc., No. 18-2024-RGA-SRF, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20516, at *13 (D.
`Del. Feb. 3, 2020), report and recommendation adopted by 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5477 (D. Del. Mar.
`30, 2020); PPS Data, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 1031-33.
`32 See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“We have
`previously cautioned that courts ‘must be careful to avoid oversimplifying the claims’ by looking at
`them generally and failing to account for the specific requirements of the claims.”).
`33 Dkt. No. 85 at 7.
`34 Dkt. No. 1-2 at 1:11-14.
`PLAINTIFF VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No.: 3:22-CV-03199-JD
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`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 88 Filed 09/26/22 Page 12 of 22
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`implemented.36 As the Federal Circuit has recognized, it is improper for a district court to find claims
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`ineligible based on how questions that are either irrelevant or too granular to pertain to the patentee’s
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`asserted improvements.37 Even courts in this district have recognized that a claim is not ineligible
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`merely because it lacks specific implementation details.38 Arguing, as Google does, that Claim 1 is
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`ineligible because it does not explain how the mobile telephone receives a telephone number, which
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`even a layperson knows can be accomplished through a keypad, or because it does not explain how the
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`mobile telephone initiates a call using an access code, which Google interprets as a telephone number, is
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`absurd.39 These are basic telephone functions.40 Similarly, arguing that Claim 1 does not disclose how
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`the access code is generated proves nothing—Claim 1 does not even recite generating an access code.
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`The details for producing an access code are recited in the server claims, not the mobile device claims.
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`The Federal Circuit articulated the proper how inquiry in Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Gemalto M2M
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`GmbH. It found the appealed claims were not directed to an abstract idea because they sufficiently
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`captured the claimed improvement “by reciting how the solution specifically improves the function of
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`prior art error detection systems.”41 The Court accordingly reversed the district court’s ineligibility
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`ruling in part because the district court fixated on implementation details that the claims did not need to
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`recite in order to enable the asserted improvement.42 Similarly, Google raises an assortment of how
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`questions regarding implementation details irrelevant to the eligibility inquiry. Rather, the proper
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`35 Dkt. No. 85 at 7.
`36 See Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Gemalto M2M GmbH, 942 F.3d 1143, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Finjan,
`Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., 879 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (claims that recite specific steps for
`accomplishing the desired result are not abstract).
`37 See KPN, 942 F.3d at 1148, 1151, 1153.
`38 See Stormborn Techs., LLC v. Topcon Positioning Sys., 444 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1125 n.3 (N.D. Cal.
`2020) (“Whether or not these steps are specific enough to detail how to implement the claimed invention
`is better suited for a challenge under section 112.”); Avocent Huntsville, LLC v. ZPE Sys., Case No.
`3:17-cv-04319-WHO, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47655, at *20 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2018); see also Prompt
`Med. Sys., L.P. v. Allscripts Healthcare Solutions, Inc., 6:10-cv-71, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30694, at
`*21-22 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2012).
`39 Dkt. No. 85 at 8 (quoting 23:62-64 of the ’234 patent: “In the illustrated embodiment, the access code
`is a PSTN telephone.”).
`40 Proffered Declaration of William Mangione-Smith (“Mangione-Smith Decl.”) at ¶¶46-51.
`41 See KPN, 942 F.3d at 1151.
`42 Id.
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`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 88 Filed 09/26/22 Page 13 of 22
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`inquiry is whether the claim sufficiently recites how to achieve a specific improvement over prior art
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`call routing systems, which it does—by using an access code to enable a local call to be made to a callee
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`based on the calling device’s current location.
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`b. Claim 1 is not analogous to preexisting call routing practices.
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`Google’s argument that Claim 1 is analogous to preexisting call routing practices is woefully
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`deficient. Not only does Google not specify what call routing concepts are allegedly analogous to Claim
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`1, but Google deliberately recharacterizes VoIP-Pal’s allegations in a false and misleading way.
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`The Complaint gives a hypothetical example in which a caller lifts a handset off the hook to alert
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`a switchboard operator that he or she wishes to make a call to a callee.43 The operator knows—by
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`definition—that this caller is already connected to the switchboard, but does not know whether the callee
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`is connectable on the same switchboard. Google, however, distorts this example by stating that the
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`operator “would direct the call based on where the caller was located.”44 This mischaracterization of the
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`Complaint is the key to Google’s claim that Claim 1’s invention is routing a call based on the caller’s
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`location and is analogous to allegedly well-known telecommunications practices.45 But the Complaint
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`does not state that the switchboard operator uses the caller’s location to determine how to route the call.
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`Rather, in the preexisting practice described in the Complaint, the switchboard operator uses the callee’s
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`location (whether the callee is available on the same switchboard as the caller) to determine how to
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`route the call. Thus, Google has no evidence that the invention recited in Claim 1, which is based on the
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`caller’s location, was long-standing or well-known.
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`Google argues that Claim 1 allegedly autom