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`Matthias A. Kamber (SB # 232147)
`matthiaskamber@paulhastings.com
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`101 California Street, 48th Floor
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Telephone: (415) 856-7000
`Facsimile: (415) 856-7100
`
`Robert W. Unikel (pro hac vice)
`robertunikel@paulhastings.com
`John A. Cotiguala (pro hac vice)
`johncotiguala@paulhastings.com
`Matthew R. Lind (pro hac vice)
`mattlind@paulhastings.com
`Grayson S. Cornwell (pro hac vice)
`graysoncornwell@paulhastings.com
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`71 S. Wacker Drive, Suite 4500
`Chicago, Illinois 60606
`Telephone: (312) 499-6000
`Facsimile: (312) 499-6100
`
`[ADDITIONAL COUNSEL LISTED ON
`SIGNATURE PAGE]
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`GOOGLE LLC
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
`
`VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.,
`Plaintiff,
`
`vs.
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`CASE NO. 3:22-cv-03199-JD
`
`DEFENDANT GOOGLE LLC’S NOTICE
`AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
`AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS
`MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
`PLEADINGS
`
`Date:
`Time:
`Place:
`Judge:
`
`October 20, 2022
`10:00 a.m.
`Courtroom 11, 19th Floor
`The Hon. James Donato
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`GOOGLE’S MOT. FOR JUDGMENT
`ON THE PLEADINGS
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`CASE NO. 3:22-cv-03199-JD
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`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 85 Filed 09/02/22 Page 2 of 21
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION ................................................................................... 1
`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ........................................................... 1
`I.
`INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED .................... 1
`II.
`STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................ 1
`III.
`LEGAL STANDARDS .................................................................................................. 2
`IV.
`ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................. 4
`Claim 1 of the ’234 patent is representative of all asserted claims. ......................... 4
`A.
`The asserted claims are patent-ineligible under Section 101. .................................. 6
`B.
`1.
`Alice step one: Claim 1 is directed toward an abstract idea. ........................ 6
`a) Claim 1 uses broad, functional terms. .................................................. 7
`b) Claim 1 is analogous to preexisting call routing practices. .................. 8
`c) Claim 1 uses only known technology to perform routine functions. .... 9
`2.
`Alice step two: Claim 1 lacks an inventive concept. .................................. 11
`a) The individual claim elements do not provide an inventive concept. 11
`b) The ordered combination of claim elements do not provide an
`inventive concept. ............................................................................... 12
`None of the other asserted claims are patent-eligible. ............................... 12
`3.
`Dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. ................................................................ 14
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 14
`
`C.
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`V.
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`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 85 Filed 09/02/22 Page 3 of 21
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`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`838 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ...................................................................................................7
`
`Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC,
`838 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .................................................................................................13
`
`Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank. Int’l,
`573 U.S. 208 (2014) ................................................................................................................2, 3
`
`Broadcom Corp. v. Netflix Inc.,
`__ F. Supp. 3d __, No. 3:20-cv-04677-JD, 2022 WL 1105073 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
`13, 2022) .....................................................................................................................................3
`
`BroadSoft, Inc. v. CallWave Commc’ns, LLC,
`282 F. Supp. 3d 771 (D. Del. 2017), aff’d, 739 F. App’x 985 (Fed Cir. 2018) ........................10
`
`Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs.,
`859 F.3d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2017) .................................................................................................10
`
`Dropbox, Inc. v. Synchronoss Techs., Inc.,
`815 Fed. Appx. 529 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ........................................................................................13
`
`Foman v. Davis,
`371 U.S. 178 (1962) ..................................................................................................................14
`
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Cap. One Fin. Corp.,
`850 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ...................................................................................................3
`
`Juniper Networks Inc. v. Swarm Tech. LLC,
`No. 3:20-cv-03137-JD, 2022 WL 3031211 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2022) .....................................12
`
`Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
`566 U.S. 66 (2012) ....................................................................................................................12
`
`RingCentral, Inc. v. Dialpad, Inc.,
`372 F. Supp. 3d 988 (N.D. Cal. 2019) ........................................................................................8
`
`Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chi. Transit Auth.,
`873 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ...................................................................................................6
`
`Twitter, Inc. v. VoIP-Pal.com, Inc.,
`No. 3:21-cv-09773-JD, Dkt. 38 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2022) .........................................................2
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`GOOGLE’S MOT. FOR JUDGMENT
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`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 85 Filed 09/02/22 Page 4 of 21
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`Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC,
`874 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ...................................................................................................7
`
`VoIP-Pal.Com, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`375 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 798 Fed. Appx. 644 (Fed. Cir.
`2020) .....................................................................................................................................1, 14
`
`VoIP-Pal.Com, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`411 F. Supp. 3d 926 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 828 Fed. Appx. 717 (Fed. Cir.
`2020) ................................................................................................................................. passim
`
`Yu v. Apple Inc.,
`1 F.4th 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ......................................................................................................3
`
`Yu v. Apple Inc.,
`No. 3:18-cv-06181-JD, 2020 WL 1429773 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2020) ......................................9
`
`Statutes
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`35 U.S.C. § 101 .................................................................................................................................2
`
`Other Authorities
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) ...................................................................................................................14
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`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 85 Filed 09/02/22 Page 5 of 21
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`NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
`At 10:00 a.m. on October 20, 2022 in Courtroom 11, 19th floor, 450 Golden Gate Avenue,
`San Francisco, California, before the Honorable James Donato, Defendant Google LLC (“Google”)
`will and does now move for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).
`Google respectfully requests the Court find the patent claims asserted by Plaintiff VoIP-Pal.com,
`Inc. (“VoIP-Pal”) in this case to be invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for claiming patent-ineligible
`subject matter and to dismiss this case with prejudice.
`
`I.
`
`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
`INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED
`The issue is whether VoIP-Pal’s asserted patent claims recite patent-eligible subject matter
`under 35 U.S.C. § 101. They do not. The claims relate to routing a phone call between two
`participants (a caller and a callee or “destination node”) based on their identity and location
`information. Under the Supreme Court’s two-step Alice framework, the asserted claims (1) are
`directed to the abstract idea of routing a communication based on the participants’ characteristics,
`and (2) lack an inventive concept to make the claims patent-eligible. Like VoIP-Pal’s other patent
`claims that this District previously invalidated under § 101, the asserted claims here simply
`automate well-known call-routing practices using conventional computer components.
`Accordingly, the Court should grant Google judgment of invalidity for failure to recite patent-
`eligible subject matter under § 101 and dismiss this case with prejudice.
`
`II.
`
`STATEMENT OF FACTS
`VoIP-Pal has a history of unsuccessful patent lawsuits in this District. VoIP-Pal previously
`asserted six patents against other parties; however, Judge Lucy Koh, previously of this District,
`invalidated all of the asserted claims for failure to claim patentable subject matter, and the Federal
`Circuit affirmed. VoIP-Pal.Com, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d,
`798 Fed. Appx. 644 (mem.) (Fed. Cir. 2020); VoIP-Pal.Com, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d
`926 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 828 Fed. Appx. 717 (mem.) (Fed. Cir. 2020).
`VoIP-Pal then filed suit against Google and others in the Western District of Texas, alleging
`infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 8,630,234 (the “’234 patent”) and 10,880,721 (the “’721 patent”).
`
`CASE NO. 3:22-cv-03199-JD
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`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 85 Filed 09/02/22 Page 6 of 21
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`See, e.g., Dkt. 1 (“Compl.”). On May 31, 2022, this case was transferred here. Dkt. 64. Judge Koh,
`who previously invalidated VoIP-Pal’s six other patents, “noted the similarity” between those
`invalidated patents and the ’234 and ’721 patents that VoIP-Pal now asserts against Google, and
`this Court has likewise recognized that the ’234 and ’721 patents “involve[] similar technology” to
`the previously invalidated patents, which share an inventor and original assignee. Twitter, Inc. v.
`VoIP-Pal.com, Inc., No. 3:21-cv-09773-JD, Dkt. 38 at 3–4 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2022).
`The ’721 patent is a continuation of the ’234 patent, so they share the same title, inventors,
`and specification. The patents relate “generally to telecommunication, and more particularly to . . .
`initiating or enabling a call with a mobile telephone to a callee.” ’234 patent, Dkt. 1-2 at 1:11–14.
`They explain that “[m]obile telephone service providers often charge significant fees for long
`distance telephone calls, particularly when the mobile telephone is roaming,” and that a “calling
`card” is a “known technique for avoiding the long distance charges” but “can be cumbersome and
`undesirable, because it may require the user of the mobile telephone to follow a number of
`complicated or cumbersome steps in order to initiate a call to the callee.” Id. at 1:16–32. The patents
`therefore describe a technique that allegedly automates some call routing steps. See id. at 1:36–47,
`9:18–22, Fig. 1. Specifically, they disclose “[a] method of initiating a call to a callee using a mobile
`telephone” by “receiving . . . a callee identifier” from the caller; “transmitting an access code
`request message” with “a [caller] location identifier”; “receiving an access code reply message”;
`and “initiating a call with the mobile telephone using said access code.” Id. at Abstract, 1:50–52.
`The system’s transmitted “access code” automatically provides the same type of calling card
`information that a caller would otherwise dial manually. See id.
`
`III. LEGAL STANDARDS
`A patent may claim “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
`matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. “Abstract ideas” are not
`patentable, however. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank. Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).1
`Patent eligibility is evaluated under the two-part Alice test. At step one, a court determines
`
`
`1 All citations and internal quotation marks are omitted unless indicated otherwise. All emphasis
`is added unless indicated otherwise.
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`“whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept,” like an abstract idea. Alice,
`573 U.S. at 218. The court ascertains “the focus of the claimed advance over the prior art to
`determine if the claim’s character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.” Intellectual
`Ventures I LLC v. Cap. One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2017). A court can
`“compare claims at issue to those claims already found to be directed to an abstract idea in previous
`cases for purposes of the step one analysis,” and “may also take into account undisputed facts about
`well-known practices that have stood the test of time.” Broadcom Corp. v. Netflix Inc., __ F. Supp.
`3d __, No. 3:20-cv-04677-JD, 2022 WL 1105073, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2022).
`At step two, the court decides whether the patent claims contain an “inventive concept” that
`“transform[s] the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18.
`This requires “something significantly more than the abstract idea itself.” Broadcom, 2022 WL
`1105073, at *4. “[M]ere recitation of concrete, tangible components is insufficient to confer patent
`eligibility to an otherwise abstract idea.” Id. “In addition, merely reducing an abstract concept to a
`particular technical platform is not enough to provide the inventive element needed to support a
`patent. If a claim’s only ‘inventive concept’ is the application of an abstract idea using conventional
`and well-understood techniques, the claim has not been transformed into a patent-eligible
`application of an abstract idea.” Id. A claim is also not patent-eligible if it “is recited at a high level
`of generality and merely invokes well-understood, routine, conventional components to apply the
`abstract idea,” and the “generic hardware limitations . . . merely serve as a conduit for the abstract
`idea.” Yu v. Apple Inc., 1 F.4th 1040, 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
`A § 101 challenge may be resolved via a Rule 12(c) motion, including before formal claim
`construction. Broadcom, 2022 WL 1105073, at *2–4. A court considering a Rule 12(c) motion
`“takes as true the plausible and nonconclusory factual allegations in the complaint, and draws all
`reasonable inferences from those allegations in plaintiffs’ favor.” Id. But “a patentee cannot avoid
`dismissal for ineligible claims purely on the basis of conclusory or generalized statements.” Id.
`
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`IV. ARGUMENT
`
`A. Claim 1 of the ’234 patent is representative of all asserted claims.
`Claim 1 of the ’234 patent (“Claim 1”) is representative of all asserted claims of the ’234
`and ’721 patents.2 Claim 1 recites only basic call-routing functions of “receiving” a callee identifier
`(when the caller types a telephone number into the caller’s mobile phone, for example),
`“transmitting” an access code request message including the callee identifier and the caller’s
`location to the network provider, “receiving” an access code from the network, and “initiating” a
`call using the access code:
`
`1. A method of roaming with a mobile telephone, the method
`comprising:
`receiving, from a user of the mobile telephone, a callee identifier
`associated with the callee;
`transmitting an access code request message to an access server to
`seek an access code from a pool of access codes wherein each access
`code in said pool of access codes identifies a respective telephone
`number or Internet Protocol (IP) network address that enables a local
`call to be made to call the callee identified by the callee identifier,
`said access code request message including said callee identifier and
`a location identifier separate and distinctive from said callee
`identifier, said location identifier identifying a location of the mobile
`telephone;
`receiving an access code reply message from the access server in
`response to said access code request message, said access code reply
`message including an access code different from said callee identifier
`and associated with said location identifier and/or associated with a
`location pre-associated with the mobile telephone and wherein said
`access code expires after a period of time; and
`initiating a call with the mobile telephone using said access code to
`identify the callee.
`’234 patent at 34:35–57.
`The ’234 patent’s other asserted claims are just marginal iterations of this same purported
`invention for purposes of assessing patent eligibility. For example, claims 11 and 20 recite this
`invention as a system (i.e., apparatus), rather than a method like Claim 1. Claims 30, 46, and 62, as
`
`
`2 For the ’234 patent, VoIP-Pal asserts claims 1, 10, 11, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33,
`35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 51, 53, 54, 61, 62, 64, 65, 70, 72, and 75 against Google. For
`the ’721 patent, VoIP-Pal asserts claims 1, 6, 15, 16, 20, 25, 34, 38, 39, 43, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51, 63,
`77, 103, 104, 109, 110, 124, 130, 133, 135, 136, 138, 139, and 140 against Google. The arguments
`below apply equally to both patents’ unasserted claims, for which Claim 1 also is representative.
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`a further example, recite the same invention from the perspective of the network provider’s server
`rather than from the perspective of the caller’s mobile phone, so what is “transmitt[ed]” versus
`“receiv[ed]” is switched relative to Claim 1. The remaining asserted claims add other immaterial
`limitations, such as referencing a generic “routing controller” element to provide the access code
`that Claim 1 already requires (claim 10), or specifying that Claim 1’s steps happen specifically on
`a “non-voice network” (claim 21), “such as an internet,” or in an IP environment (claim 22), such
`as “WiFi.” ’234 patent at 35:21–32, 36:57–67, 11:51–52, 37:5–7, 9:11. None of those specific
`features are alleged to be novel or otherwise materially contributing to the benefits or utility of the
`purported invention. See Compl. ¶¶ 9–24.
`As highlighted in Appendix 1, asserted claim 1 of the ’721 patent discloses the same basic
`process as Claim 1 of the ’234 patent, but substitutes a “destination node” for the “callee.” Neither
`the claims nor the common specification suggests a material distinction between a “destination
`node” and a “callee,” and the terms are essentially used interchangeably in the claims. See ’721
`patent at 48:10–15 (stating that the “destination node,” like a callee, can be a “PSTN telephone”);
`see also Appendix 1. Specifying that the access code identifies a “channel” likewise has no impact,
`since that is fundamental to basic call routing, as the asserted patents recognize. See ’234 patent at,
`e.g., 9:22–24 (“The channels 20, 22, and 24 maybe [sic] telephone lines in a Public Switched
`Telephone Network (PSTN) 29.”). The other asserted claims of the ’721 patent include minor
`modifications similar to those in the asserted ’234 patent claims.
`The following table summarizes the immaterial variations across the asserted claims relative
`to Claim 1:
`Variation
`
`System version of method Claim 1
`
`Claim 1 from the perspective of the server instead of the
`mobile phone
`
`30, 31, 32, 33,
`35, 37, 38, 39,
`40, 43, 45
`
`’234 patent
`claim(s)
`11, 19, 20, 21,
`22, 24, 25, 28
`
`’721 patent
`claim(s)
`20, 25, 34, 38,
`39, 43, 45, 46,
`49, 50
`51, 63, 130,
`133, 138
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`Variation
`
`System version of method Claim 1 from the perspective of the
`server instead of the mobile phone
`
`A “routing controller” is specifically introduced to provide the
`access code or route Claim 1’s communication
`Claim 1’s network is a specific kind of network (e.g., “non-
`voice network” or WiFi network)
`Claim 1 specifically involving an IP network or IP address
`
`’234 patent
`claim(s)
`46, 47, 48, 51,
`53, 54, 61, 62,
`64, 65, 70, 72,
`75
`10, 19, 28, 32,
`48, 64
`21, 25, 31, 45,
`47, 61
`22, 35, 38, 39,
`51, 54, 70
`
`24, 37, 53
`33, 65
`
`Claim 1’s location identifier is “user-configured”
`Claim 1’s access code is specifically associated with the
`caller’s “local calling area”
`Claim 1’s access code is associated with the “caller identifier” 40, 72
`Claim 1’s expiration period is specifically based on a
`43, 75
`“timestamp”
`A gateway may be used in Claim 1’s network
`Transmission of two types of information in Claim 1 are
`specifically performed at the same time
`
`N/A
`N/A
`
`’721 patent
`claim(s)
`77, 103, 104,
`109, 110, 124,
`139
`
`15, 16, 34, 49,
`51, 77, 109
`39, 46, 104,
`109, 135
`6, 25, 43, 50,
`63, 130, 133,
`138, 139, 140
`45
`110
`
`N/A
`124
`
`133
`136
`
`Ultimately, there is no “meaningful difference” between Claim 1 (of the ’234 patent) and
`any of the other asserted claims for purposes of assessing patent eligibility; they all disclose
`“performance of the same basic process.” Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chi. Transit Auth., 873
`F.3d 1364, 1368 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Claim 1 thus is representative of all asserted claims for
`purposes of this motion.
`
`B. The asserted claims are patent-ineligible under Section 101.
`1. Alice step one: Claim 1 is directed toward an abstract idea.
`Claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of routing a communication based on the
`participants’ characteristics. The Federal Circuit and this District previously found claims in similar
`VoIP-Pal patents to be directed to this same abstract concept because the representative claim was
`(1) “worded in such broad, functional terms, so as to describe a desired result—routing the
`communication—without explaining how that result it achieved,” (2) was “analogous to preexisting
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`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 85 Filed 09/02/22 Page 11 of 21
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`practices of manual call routing,” and (3) “[did] not focus on a specific means or method that
`improves the relevant technology and is instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract
`idea and merely invokes generic processes and machinery.” VoIP-Pal v. Apple, 411 F. Supp. 3d at
`952, 956, 963. The same three-part analysis applies here, as discussed in turn below.
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`a) Claim 1 uses broad, functional terms.
`Claim 1 discloses its elements in terms of basic call-routing functions: “receiving” a callee
`identifier (telephone number), “transmitting” an access code request message, “receiving” an
`access code, and “initiating” a call using the access code. ’234 patent at 34:35–57. It does not
`disclose how any of these functions are achieved, such as how the access code is used to initiate the
`call. Also, the representative claim does not disclose how the access code is generated; just that the
`transmitted access code is “associated with said location identifier . . .” and “enables a local call”
`like a generic calling card’s “local telephone number.” Id. at 34:43, 34:52–53, 1:22–26; see infra
`§ B.1.b. The “purely functional nature of the claim confirms that it is directed to an abstract idea,
`not to a concrete embodiment of that idea.” Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 838
`F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`The Federal Circuit and this District have repeatedly found similarly functional claims in
`the call-routing context to be directed to an abstract idea, including in similar VoIP-Pal patents in
`which the representative claim “contain[ed] no instructions for how each step of the routing process
`is accomplished.” See VoIP-Pal v. Apple, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 955 (“The claim simply requires the
`functional results of ‘receiving,’ ‘processing,’ and ‘classifying’ a call based on the participant
`identifiers, and then ultimately ‘identifying’ an appropriate Internet address.”); Two-Way Media
`Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Claim 1 recites a
`method for routing information using result-based functional language. The claim requires the
`functional results of ‘converting,’ ‘routing,’ ‘controlling,’ ‘monitoring,’ and ‘accumulating
`records,’ but does not sufficiently describe how to achieve these results in a non-abstract way.”).
`Here too, Claim 1 relies on functional routing terms to describe desired results without explaining
`how to achieve those results, indicating that the claim is directed to an abstract idea. Indeed, none
`of the representative claim’s elements, such as the transmitted “callee identifier” and received
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`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document 85 Filed 09/02/22 Page 12 of 21
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`“access code,” suggest how to accomplish the recited functions. Rather—as the specification
`admits—they are just generic routing concepts found in conventional technologies. ’234 patent at
`11:39–41 (“The callee identifier is associated with a desired callee, and may be a telephone number
`of the callee”), 23:62–64 (“In the illustrated example, the access code is the PSTN telephone
`number”); Compl. ¶¶ 16–18; see infra § B.1.b.
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`b) Claim 1 is analogous to preexisting call routing practices.
`Claim 1’s purported invention of routing a call based on the participants’ characteristics
`(specifically, the callee’s identity and the caller’s location) is directly analogous to well-known,
`longstanding practices in telephone communications. As addressed in VoIP-Pal’s previous case and
`as VoIP-Pal itself admitted in its complaint, these concepts for call routing have existed for decades.
`See VoIP-Pal v. Apple, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 956–57 (“Representative Claim 1 is analogous to
`preexisting practices of manual call routing” and “provides simple automation of a task previously
`performed manually”); Compl. ¶¶ 15–22; see also RingCentral, Inc. v. Dialpad, Inc., 372 F. Supp.
`3d 988, 999 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“[T]he claim is directed to the abstract ideas of routing telephone
`calls based on routing parameters . . . and allowing a user to modify those routing parameters. . . .
`[T]hese are functions that humans have routinely performed and are therefore abstract.”).
`At heart, Claim 1 uses only an identity and location to determine how best to route a
`telephone call. Even in the “earliest telephone systems,” a caller would identify a callee by “say[ing]
`the name of the person they wish to call to the operator,” who would direct the call based on where
`the caller was located, for example based on whether the caller was on the same switchboard as the
`callee (when both participants were local). Compl. ¶ 15. If not, “a second operator would be
`involved to bridge the gap to the appropriate switchboard.” Id. Later, callers identified callees by
`dialing their telephone numbers rather than talking to human operators, but calls still were routed
`based on the participants’ locations, with conventional “trunk lines” connecting participants on
`different networks. Id. ¶¶ 16–19. Claim 1 merely reiterates these longstanding and well-known call-
`routing practices using generic computer elements to automate the process rather than using a
`human operator to route a call, just like in VoIP-Pal’s previously invalidated patent claims. See
`VoIP-Pal v. Apple, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 958–59 (holding that it was “unconvinced by Plaintiff’s
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`attempt to distinguish Representative Claim 1 from switchboard operators”).
`Claim 1 reflects the same basic concepts long implemented with calling cards. See Yu v.
`Apple Inc., No. 3:18-cv-06181-JD, 2020 WL 1429773, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2020) (A “useful
`cross-check is to look for ‘fundamental [and] long prevalent’ implementations or practices of the
`same basic concept.”) (quoting Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1314
`(Fed. Cir. 2016)). As alleged in the Complaint, callers could use calling cards to avoid long-distance
`charges by manually placing a call to a local telephone or other number, which would ultimately
`connect to the callee. Compl. ¶ 22; see also ’234 patent at 1:22–26 (“A ‘calling card’ may permit
`the user of the mobile telephone to place a call to a local telephone number or to a less-expensive
`telephone number (such as a toll-free number for example) instead of placing the call directly to
`the callee.”). The patents therefore teach that the calling card’s “local telephone number” functions
`just like Claim 1’s “access code.” The only difference is that in Claim 1, the access code is provided
`automatically by the telephone network provider, as opposed to conventional calling cards where
`information was entered manually.
`The direct parallels to conventional calling card practices and switchboard operators are
`another strong signal that Claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. Claim 1’s basic routing process
`has been implemented with switchboard operators and calling cards for decades. It recites steps that
`“are no different than the ones that would have been previously performed manually by the caller
`or by a human operator,” including with calling cards, and merely “provide simple automation of
`a task previously performed manually.” VoIP-Pal v. Apple, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 957.
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`c) Claim 1 uses only known technology to perform routine
`functions.
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`The specification and VoIP-Pal’s complaint explain that the purported invention is designed
`to automate preexisting calling-card functionality. See ’234 patent at 1:28–32; Compl. ¶ 22. But the
`“mere automation of manual processes using generic computers does not constitute a patentable
`improvement in computer technology.” Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044,
`1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017). This is particularly true where, as here, the “technological elements of the
`claim are ‘known telephony technology’ performing ‘routine functions’” to automate such pre-
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`Case 3:22-cv-03199-JD Document