`
`
`
`Edward R. Nelson III (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
`Texas Bar No. 00797142
`Christopher G. Granaghan (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
`Texas Bar No. 24078585
`ed@nelbum.com
`chris@nelbum.com
`NELSON BUMGARDNER CONROY P.C.
`3131 West Seventh Street, Suite 300
`Fort Worth, Texas 76107
`Telephone: (817) 377-9111
`Facsimile: (817) 377-3485
`
`Timothy E. Grochocinski (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
`Illinois Bar No. 6295055
`Charles Austin Ginnings (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
`New York Bar No. 4986691
`tim@nelbum.com
`austin@nelbum.com
`NELSON BUMGARDNER CONROY P.C.
`15020 S. Ravinia Avenue, Suite 29
`Orland Park, Illinois 60462
`Telephone: (708) 675-1974
`
`Ryan E. Hatch
`California Bar No. 235577
`ryan@hatchlaw.com
`HATCH LAW PC
`13323 Washington Blvd., Suite 302
`Los Angeles, CA 90066
`Telephone: (310) 279-5076
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`FIRSTFACE CO., LTD.
`
`
`
`FIRSTFACE CO., LTD.,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`v.
`
`APPLE INC.,
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
` NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
`
`
`
`CASE NO. 3:18-cv-02245-JD
`
`PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF MOTION
`AND MOTION FOR PARTIAL
`SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT THE
`ACCUSED PRODUCTS PRACTICE
`THE POWER BUTTON LIMITATIONS;
`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
`AUTHORITIES
`
`DATE: March 30, 2023
`TIME: 10:00 a.m.
`PLACE: Courtroom 11
`JUDGE: Hon. James Donato
`
`PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`
`
`CASE NO: 3:18-CV-02245-JD
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`Case 3:18-cv-02245-JD Document 223 Filed 12/19/22 Page 2 of 22
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`INTRODUCTION. ........................................................................................................................... 1
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`FACTUAL BACKGROUND. .......................................................................................................... 2
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`LEGAL STANDARD ....................................................................................................................... 6
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`ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................... 6
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`I.
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`II.
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`III.
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`IV.
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`A.
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`B.
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`The Court should grant partial summary judgment because each Accused Product
`includes a power button for pressing to turn on the device. ................................................. 6
`
`
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`1) Apple’s non-infringement position implicates a claim construction issue for the
`Court to resolve.................................................................................................................. 7
`
`The Court should hold that “a power button for pressing to turn on/off the
`terminal” requires only that the power button turn on or off the terminal ....................... 8
`
`The Court should grant partial summary judgment because it is undisputed that
`the power button of each Accused Product turns on the device. ..................................... 11
`
`The Court should grant partial summary judgment even if the Court determines
`that the claims require a power button that turns on and off the terminal. ......................... 12
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`2)
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`3)
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`1) Apple is judicially estopped from arguing that the Accused Products do not
`include “a power button for pressing to turn on/off the terminal.” ................................ 12
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`2) The Accused Products’ power button turns on and off a terminal in response to a
`press ................................................................................................................................. 15
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`CONCLUSION. .............................................................................................................................. 16
`
`V.
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`CASE NO: 3:18-CV-02245-JD
`
`PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case 3:18-cv-02245-JD Document 223 Filed 12/19/22 Page 3 of 22
`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Case Page(s)
`
`Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
` 566 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ................................................................................................................. 6
`
`Absolute Software, Inc. v. Stealth Signal, Inc.,
` 659 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ................................................................................................................. 6
`
`Advanced Steel Recovery, LLC v. X-Body Equip., Inc.,
` 808 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ................................................................................................................. 6
`
`Ah Quin v. County of Kauai Dep’t of Transp.,
` 733 F.3d 267 (9th Cir. 2019) ................................................................................................................... 12
`
`Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
` 477 U.S. 242 (1986) .................................................................................................................................. 6
`
`Astra Aktiebolag v. Andrx Pharms, Inc.,
` 483 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ............................................................................................................... 15
`
`Baughman v. Walt Disney World Co.,
` 685 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................................. 12
`
`Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Maia Pharms., Inc.,
` 839 F. App’x 479 (Dec. 17, 2020) .......................................................................................................... 10
`
`Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
` 477 U.S. 317 (1986) .................................................................................................................................. 6
`
`Augme Techs., Inc. v. Yahoo!, Inc.,
` 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2012) ............................................................................. 11
`
`Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc.,
` 438 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ................................................................................................................. 9
`
`CytoLogics Corp. v. Ventanda Med. Sys., Inc.,
` 424 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ............................................................................................................. 7, 8
`
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`
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`PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`ii
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`CASE NO: 3:18-CV-02245-JD
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`Case 3:18-cv-02245-JD Document 223 Filed 12/19/22 Page 4 of 22
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`
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`Egenera, Inc. v. Cisco Sys.,
` 972 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ............................................................................................................... 13
`
`Hill-Rom Servs. v. Stryker Corp.,
` 755 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ........................................................................................................... 9, 10
`
`In re Hoopai,
` 581 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2009) ................................................................................................................. 14
`
`Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. Marilyn Monroe LLC,
` 692 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2011) ................................................................................................................... 12
`
`Negotiated Data Solutions, LLC v. Dell Inc.,
` 596 F. Supp. 2d 949 (E.D. Tex. 2009) .............................................................................................. 10, 11
`
`New Hampshire v. Maine,
` 532 U.S. 742 (2001) ................................................................................................................................ 12
`
`O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
` 521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ............................................................................................................. 7, 8
`
`Papst Licensing GmbH v. Apple Inc.,
` 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32379 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2017) ........................................................................ 10
`
`Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp.,
` 274 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ................................................................................................................. 9
`
`Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc.,
` 509 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2007) ..................................................................................................................... 6
`
`Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp.,
` 299 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ............................................................................................................... 15
`
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC,
` 669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................................. 9
`
`Versa Corp. v. Ag-Bag Int’l Ltd.,
` 392 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ................................................................................................................. 9
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`PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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`iii
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`CASE NO: 3:18-CV-02245-JD
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`Case 3:18-cv-02245-JD Document 223 Filed 12/19/22 Page 5 of 22
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`TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
`
`NOTICE OF MOTION
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`PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on March 30, 2023 at 10:00am, or as soon thereafter as the matter
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`may be heard in Courtroom 11 of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California,
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`located at 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California 94102, Plaintiff Firstface Co., Ltd.
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`(“Firstface”) will present for hearing and ruling Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that
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`the Accused Products Practice the “Power Button” Limitations. Firstface bases this Motion on this
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`Notice of Motion, its Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the pleadings, records, and files in this
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`action, and all other written or oral arguments or evidence that the parties may present to the Court
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`relating to this Motion.
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`STATEMENT OF RELIEF REQUESTED
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`Firstface respectfully requests that the Court enter an Order holding as a matter of law that the
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`Accused Products practice the limitation “a power button for pressing to turn on/off the terminal” in
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`claim 11 of U.S. Patent No. 9,633,373 and claim 10 of U.S. Patent No. 9,779,419.
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`PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`iv
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`CASE NO: 3:18-CV-02245-JD
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`Case 3:18-cv-02245-JD Document 223 Filed 12/19/22 Page 6 of 22
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`1
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`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
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`2
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Plaintiff Firstface Co., Ltd. (“Firstface”) requests that the Court grant partial summary judgment
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`that the Accused Products each meet the element, “a power button for pressing to turn on/off the
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`terminal,” of the asserted claims (“the power button limitations”). Each of the Accused Products is either
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`an iPhone or iPad device and has a button that Apple refers to interchangeably as the “sleep/wake
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`button,” the “side button,” or the “top button.”1 It is undisputed that a press of this button while the
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`device is off will turn on the device. Thus, partial summary judgment that the Accused Products meet
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`the “a power button for pressing to turn on/off the terminal” element is warranted.
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`Apple contends that the Accused Products do not have a “power button for pressing to turn
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`on/off the terminal” because
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` Ex. 52 (Apple Supplemental Response to Interrogatory No. 14) at 16, 22-23; see also Ex.
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`6 (Cockburn Rebuttal Report) at ¶¶ 85, 184. In other words, Apple believes that the power button of the
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`asserted claims must both turn on and turn off the terminal, and then argues that
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`Apple is wrong for two, independent reasons. First, the term “a power button for pressing to turn
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`on/off the terminal” does not require that the button be able to both turn on and turn off the terminal.
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`The slash between “on” and “off” means “or,” and the Court should construe it as such. Under that
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`proper construction, a button that turns on or off a device satisfies the power button limitations. It is
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`undisputed that the power button of the Accused Products turns on the device, so the Accused Products
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`practice this limitation.
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`Second, the power button of the Accused Products satisfies the power button limitations even if
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`the claims also require that the power button turn off the terminal. Apple argues that
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`1 For simplicity, this Motion will refer to each of these buttons as a “power button.”
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`2 All exhibits are exhibits to the Declaration of C. Austin Ginnings in Support of Plaintiff’s Motions for
`Partial Summary Judgment, filed contemporaneously herewith.
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`PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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`1
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`CASE NO: 3:18-CV-02245-JD
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`Case 3:18-cv-02245-JD Document 223 Filed 12/19/22 Page 7 of 22
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` First, Apple is judicially estopped from making this argument because
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`it successfully argued to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board that an iPhone button with identical
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`functionality (including an identical slider that the user must use in turning off the device) met the power
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`button limitations. Second, even if Apple is not estopped, the undisputed evidence shows that the
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`Accused Products’ power button turns on and off the device. To turn off an Accused Product, a user can
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`press and hold the power button, and then swipe the slider on the screen. The first step in this turn-off
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`process is a press of the power button. The claims do not preclude an input in addition to a press of the
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`power button to turn off the device. Thus, the Accused Products’ “power button” is a “power button for
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`pressing to turn . . . off the terminal.”
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`II.
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`FACTUAL BACKGROUND
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`Firstface accuses Apple of directly and indirectly infringing claims 11-14 and 18 of U.S. Patent
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`No. 9,633,373 (“the ’373 patent”) and claims 10, 12-13, and 15-17 of the U.S. Patent No. 9,779,419
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`(“the ’419 patent”) (collectively, with the ’373 patent, the “asserted patents”). See ECF 1 (Complaint) at
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`4-9. Claim 11 of the ’373 patent and claim 10 of the ’419 patent are independent claims. The remaining
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`claims of the ’373 patent depend from claim 11 of the ’373 patent, and the remaining claims of the ’419
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`patent depend from claim 10 of the ’419 patent. Each of the asserted claims is a method claim. Firstface
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`contends that Apple and end users of Apple products directly infringe these method claims via use of
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`certain Apple iPhone and iPad devices (“the Accused Products”).3 Id.
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`3 The “Accused Products” are the iPhone 6, iPhone 6 Plus, iPhone 6s, iPhone 6s Plus, iPhone SE, iPhone
`7, iPhone 7 Plus, iPhone 8, iPhone 8 Plus, iPad (2017 version, a/k/a the iPad (5th generation)), iPad
`(2018 version, a/k/a the iPad (6th generation)), iPad Air 2, iPad mini 3, iPad mini 4, iPad Pro (12.9 inch)
`(1st generation), iPad Pro (9.7 inch) (1st generation), iPad Pro (12.9 inch) (2nd generation), iPad Pro
`(10.5 inch) (2nd generation), iPad mini (5th generation), iPad Air (3rd generation), iPad (7th generation),
`iPad (8th generation), iPad (9th generation), iPhone SE (2nd generation). Ex. 36 (Infringement
`Contentions) at 2; see also ECF 138 at 6 (withdrawing allegations against iPad Air (4th generation) and
`iPad mini (6th generation).
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`PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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`2
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`CASE NO: 3:18-CV-02245-JD
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`Case 3:18-cv-02245-JD Document 223 Filed 12/19/22 Page 8 of 22
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`Claim 11 of the ’373 patent and claim 10 of the ’419 patent each require “providing a mobile
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`computing terminal which comprises . . . a power button for pressing to turn on/off the terminal.” Ex. 2
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`(’373 patent) at claim 11; Ex. 3 (’419 patent) at claim 10. Firstface contends that the button that Apple
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`refers to as either the “side button,” “sleep/wake button,” or “top button” satisfies the power button
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`limitations. This button, which this Motion refers to as the “power button,” is located on either the side
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`or the top of the device. For example, as shown in the image below, the iPhone 8’s “side button” is on
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`the side of the device.
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`Ex. 19.4 Regardless of its name or location, the power button works the same for purposes of this case.
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`The user guide for iOS 15 (the most recent version of Apple’s operating system at issue in this case) is
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`representative of how all Accused Products work:
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`4 The button is referred to as the “side button” in the iPhone SE (2nd generation) and iPhone 8 Plus. See
`Ex. 15 (iPhone SE (2nd generation); Ex. 20 (iPhone 8 Plus). The button is referred to as the “sleep/wake
`button” in the iPhone 7 Plus, iPhone 7, iPhone 6 Plus, iPhone 6s Plus, iPhone 6s, iPhone 6, iPhone SE,
`iPad Pro (all versions), iPad mini 3, iPad mini 4, iPad (5th generation), iPad (6th generation), iPad Air 2,
`and iPad Air (3rd generation). See Ex. 7 (iPad mini 3) Ex. 11 (iPad mini 4); Ex. 12 (iPad Pro); Ex. 13
`(iPhone 7); Ex. 14 (iPhone 7 Plus); Ex. 16 (iPhone SE); Ex. 17 (iPhone 6s and iPhone 6); Ex. 18 (iPhone
`6 Plus and iPhone 6s Plus), Ex. 57 (iPad (5th generation), iPad (6th generation), and iPad Air 2), Ex. 58
`(iPad Air (3rd generation)); Ex. 59 (iPad mini (5th generation)). The button is referred to as the “top
`button” in the iPad (7th generation), iPad (8th generation), and iPad (9th generation). See Ex. 8 (iPad (7th
`generation)); Ex. 9 (iPad (8th generation)); Ex. 10 (iPad (9th generation)). The number of exhibits cited
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`PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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`3
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`CASE NO: 3:18-CV-02245-JD
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`Case 3:18-cv-02245-JD Document 223 Filed 12/19/22 Page 9 of 22
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`Ex. 29.5 As the user guide shows, to turn on the device, a user must simply “[p]ress and hold” the power
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`button “until the Apple logo appears.” Id. To turn off the device, a user must “[p]ress and hold” the
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`power button, “then drag the slider” that appears on screen. Id.
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`The functionality of the Accused Products is identical to functionality that Apple argued satisfies
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`the power button limitations during inter partes review (“IPR”) proceedings against the asserted patents.
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`Apple’s discussion in IPR petitions for the ’373 and ’419 patents primarily focused on claim 1 of those
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`in this motion is necessary in light of the number of products accused of infringement. Apple has thus far
`not agreed to entertain stipulating to one or more representative products.
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`5 The user manuals for other versions of iOS and iPadOS are similar. See Ex. 33 (iPhone iOS 14); Ex. 32
`(iPhone iOS 13); Ex. 31 (iPhone iOS 12); Ex. 21 (iPhone iOS 11); Ex. 25 (iPhone iOS 10); Ex. 27
`(iPhone iOS 9); Ex. 26 (iPhone iOS 8); Ex. 28 (iPadOS 15); Ex. 30 (iPadOS 14); Ex. 23 (iPadOS 13);
`Ex. 22 (iPad iOS 12); Ex. 35 (iPad iOS 11); Ex. 24 (iPad iOS 10); Ex. 34 (iPad iOS 9); Ex. 7 (iPad iOS
`8). The parties have stipulated that “documents produced from the files of either party . . . will be deemed
`authentic for the purposes of this litigation,” and “documents posted by either party will be deemed
`authentic for purposes of this litigation.” ECF 174.
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`PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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`4
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`CASE NO: 3:18-CV-02245-JD
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`Case 3:18-cv-02245-JD Document 223 Filed 12/19/22 Page 10 of 22
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`patents (and for other claims, referred back to that discussion). Claim 1 of each patent requires “a power
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`button configured to turn on and off the terminal by pressing.” Ex. 2 (’373 patent) at claim 1; Ex. 3
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`(’419 patent) at claim 1 (emphasis added). Apple argued that the Apple iPhone OS 3.1 User Guide (“iOS
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`3.1 User Guide”) discloses this limitation as follows:
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`Ex. 38 (’419 IPR Petition) at 28, 66; see also Ex. 37 (’373 IPR Petition) at 30-31, 66-67. Apple
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`identified an iPhone “Sleep/Wake button” disclosed in the iOS 3.1 User Guide as “a power button
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`configured to turn on and off the terminal by pressing” because it instructed a user to “Press and hold the
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`Sleep/Wake button for a few seconds until the red slider appears, then drag the slider” to “Turn iPhone
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`completely off,” and to “Press and hold the Sleep/Wake button until the Apple logo appears” to “Turn
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`iPhone on.” Id. Apple relied on this same argument for the “power button for pressing to turn on/off the
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`terminal” limitations in the asserted claims. Ex. 38 (’419 IPR Petition) at 44-45, 78-79 (referring to
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`analysis for “claims [1a]-1[e] above”); Ex. 37 (’373 IPR Petition) at 46, 79-80 (same). The PTAB
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`agreed with Apple’s argument, finding that the “Sleep/Wake” button in the iOS 3.1 User Guide is a
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`“button that turns the power on and off.” Ex. 39 (’373 Final Written Decision) at 17-18, 51; Ex. 40 (’419
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`Final Written Decision) at 21, 54.
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`PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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`CASE NO: 3:18-CV-02245-JD
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`Case 3:18-cv-02245-JD Document 223 Filed 12/19/22 Page 11 of 22
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`III. LEGAL STANDARD
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`A court may “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
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`any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A
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`genuine dispute as to a material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
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`verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
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`“material fact” is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Id. “A party seeking
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`summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and of
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`identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the absence of a
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`genuine issue of material fact.” Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007)
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`(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “Where the moving party will have the
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`burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier
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`of fact could find other than for the moving party.” Id.
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`“Determining infringement requires two steps: construing the claims and comparing the properly
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`construed claims to the accused product.” Advanced Steel Recovery, LLC v. X-Body Equip., Inc., 808
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`F.3d 1313, 1316-17 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1288 (Fed. Cir.
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`2009)). “‘Infringement, whether literal or under the doctrine of equivalents, is a question of fact.’” Id. at
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`1317 (quoting Absolute Software, Inc. v. Stealth Signal, Inc., 659 F.3d 1121, 1129-30 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
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`IV. ARGUMENT
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`A.
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`The Court should grant partial summary judgment because each Accused Product
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`includes a power button for pressing to turn on the device.
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`The Court should hold that the Accused Products include “a power button for pressing to turn
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`on/off the terminal” because the power button in each Accused Product turns on the terminal when
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`pressed. Apple does not contest that the power button in each device turns on the terminal. It instead
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`argues that
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` Apple’s argument is premised on a
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`claim construction issue that Apple did not raise during claim construction—whether the term “a power
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`button for pressing to turn on/off the terminal” requires that the power button turn on or off the device
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`PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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`6
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`CASE NO: 3:18-CV-02245-JD
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`Case 3:18-cv-02245-JD Document 223 Filed 12/19/22 Page 12 of 22
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`by pressing, or that it turn on and off the device by pressing. In other words, Apple’s argument is
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`premised on the “/” being construed to mean “and,” when its proper construction and meaning in the
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`context of the asserted claims is “or.”
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`Despite Apple’s failure to timely raise this issue, Apple’s argument presents a claim construction
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`issue that the Court, not a jury, should resolve. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521
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`F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“When the parties raise an actual dispute regarding the proper scope
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`of these claims, the court, not the jury, must resolve that dispute.”); see also CytoLogics Corp. v.
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`Ventanda Med. Sys., Inc., 424 F.3d 1168, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The risk of confusing the jury is high
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`when experts opine on claim construction before the jury even when, as here, the district court makes it
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`clear to the jury that the district court’s claim constructions control.”).
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`As discussed below, the Court should hold that the term “a power button for pressing to turn
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`on/off the terminal” requires only that the power button turn on or off the terminal. Such a construction
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`is consistent with the claim language and the intrinsic evidence.
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`1)
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`Apple’s non-infringement position implicates a claim construction issue for the
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`Court to resolve.
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`Apple’s argument that the Accused Products do not include “a power button for pressing to turn
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`on/off the terminal” raises a belated claim construction dispute. Apple has had years to seek construction
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`of this limitation, but it has never done so. It did not identify the term for construction before the case
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`was stayed for several years. And it did not seek to have the Court construe the term after the stay was
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`lifted, even when the Court warned the parties against creating O2 Micro issues later in the case.6 It was
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`not until late June 2022, after the Court issued its claim construction order, that Apple first indicated that
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`there may be a dispute about the meaning of “a power button for pressing to turn on/off the terminal.” In
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`its response to an interrogatory regarding its non-infringement positions, Apple contended that
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`6 The Court made this statement at the technology tutorial, which was off the record.
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`PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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`CASE NO: 3:18-CV-02245-JD
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`Case 3:18-cv-02245-JD Document 223 Filed 12/19/22 Page 13 of 22
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`5 (Supplemental Objections and Responses to Interrogatory No. 14) at 3-4, 8-9. Apple’s technical
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`expert, Dr. Cockburn, echoed this argument in his expert report, contending that
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` Ex. 6 (Cockburn Rebuttal Report) at ¶¶ 85, 184. And in his
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`deposition, Dr. Cockburn testified that
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` Ex. 41 (Cockburn Dep. Tr.) at 45:7-12. Dr. Cockburn confirmed that he believes
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` Id. at 54:15-18
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`Despite Apple’s failure to seek construction of the phrase “a power button for pressing to turn
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`on/off the terminal,” Apple’s argument raises a claim construction issue for the Court to resolve. Apple
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`intends to argue to the jury that the Accused Products’ power button is not “a power button for pressing
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`to turn on/off the terminal” because
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`Whether the claims require that the pressing of the power button be able to turn the device on and off (or
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`instead require only that the power button turn the device on or off) is an issue of claim scope and
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`should therefore be decided by the Court before trial. O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1360; CytoLogics, 424 F.3d
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`at 1172.
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`2)
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`The Court should hold that “a power button for pressing to turn on/off the
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`terminal” requires only that the power button turn on or off the terminal.
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`The Court should construe “a power button for pressing to turn on/off the terminal” as “a power
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`button for pressing to turn on or off the terminal.” In other words, the Court should construe “on/off” as
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`“on or off.” Such a construction is consistent with the claims, the specification, and case law.
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`First, the doctrine of claim differentiation requires construing “on/off” as “on or off.” While,
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`“[i]n the most specific sense, ‘claim differentiation’ refers to the presumption that an independent claim
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`PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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`8
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`CASE NO: 3:18-CV-02245-JD
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`Case 3:18-cv-02245-JD Document 223 Filed 12/19/22 Page 14 of 22
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`should not be construed as requiring a limitation added by a dependent claim,” the Federal Circuit “has
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`characterized claim differentiation more generally, i.e., as the ‘presumption that each claim in a patent
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`has a different scope.’” Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2006) (quoting Versa Corp. v. Ag-Bag Int’l Ltd., 392 F.3d 1325, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Thus,
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`“claim differentiation takes on relevance in the context of a claim construction that would render
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`additional, or different, language in another independent claim superfluous.” Id. at 1381. Claim 1 of the
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`’373 patent and ’419 patent, both of which are independent claims, require “a power button configured
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`to turn on and off the terminal by pressing.” Ex. 2 (’373 patent) at claim 1 (emphasis added); see also
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`Ex. 3 (’419 patent) at claim 1. In contrast, the asserted claims require “a power button for pressing to
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`turn on/off the terminal.” Ex. 2 (’373 patent) at claim 11; Ex. 3 (’419 patent) at claim 10. Claim 1 of the
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`’373 and ’419 patents thus describe the “power button” differently than the asserted claims. Construing
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`“on/off” to mean “on and off” would ignore this difference in claim language and render the term “on
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`and off” in claim 1 of the asserted patents superfluous.
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`Second, the specification does not warrant restricting the meaning of “on/off” to “on and off.”
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`“[U]nless compelled to do otherwise, a court will give a claim term the full range of its ordinary
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`meaning as understood by an artisan of ordinary skill.” Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336,
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`1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001). A court will only give a claim term a meaning other than its plain and ordinary
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`meaning “1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the
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`patentee disavows the full scope of the claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.”
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`Hill-Rom Servs. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Thorner v. Sony
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`Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Although the specification can be a
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`22
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`useful guide to how the inventor used a disputed term, “limitations discussed in the specification may
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`not be read into the claims.” 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 1321 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2013); see also Kara Tech. Inc. v. Stamps.com Inc., 582 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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`The specification does not define “on/off” to mean “on and off,” nor does the specification
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`26
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`indicate that a slash should be interpreted as “and” instead of “or.” Indeed, when describing an
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`“ON/OFF button,” the specification only describes using the button to turn off the device, omitting any
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`PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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`9
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`CASE NO: 3:18-CV-02245-JD
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`Case 3:18-cv-02245-JD Document 223 Filed 12/19/22 Page 15 of 22
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`discussion of how the button could be used to turn on the device. Ex. 2 (’373 pat