Case 3:17-md-02773-JSC Document 899 Filed 09/02/22 Page 1 of 70
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`Kalpana Srinivasan (237460)
`SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P.
`1900 Avenue of the Stars, 14th Floor
`Los Angeles, CA 90067
`Telephone: (310) 789-3100
`Facsimile: (310) 789-3150
`Email: ksrinivasan@susmangodfrey.com
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`Joseph W. Cotchett (36324)
`COTCHETT, PITRE & McCARTHY, LLP
`840 Malcolm Road, Suite 200
`Burlingame, CA 94010
`Telephone: (650) 697-6000
`Facsimile: (650) 697-0577
`Email: jcotchett@cpmlegal.com
`
`Plaintiffs’ Interim Co-Lead Counsel
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`SAN JOSE DIVISION
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`IN RE: QUALCOMM ANTITRUST
`LITIGATION
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`This Document Relates To:
`ALL ACTIONS
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`Case No. 17-md-2773-JSC
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`PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED
`CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION
`COMPLAINT
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`DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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`REDACTED PER COURT ORDER
`(ECF NO. 898)
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`Case 3:17-md-02773-JSC Document 899 Filed 09/02/22 Page 2 of 70
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`NATURE OF ACTION ...................................................................................................... 1
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`THE PARTIES .................................................................................................................... 7
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`Plaintiffs .................................................................................................................. 7
`A.
`Defendant ................................................................................................................ 8
`B.
`JURISDICTION AND VENUE ......................................................................................... 8
`
`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS.............................................................................................. 9
`
`A.
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`B.
`
`C.
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`Qualcomm Leverages the Standards-Setting Process to Attain a Strategic
`Dominant Position atop the Modem Chipset Industry. ........................................... 9
`Qualcomm Lures Customers into Acquiescence Through Its Knowingly
`Deceptive and Disingenuous FRAND Commitments. ......................................... 11
`Qualcomm Has Monopoly Power in the CDMA and Premium LTE Chip
`Markets. ................................................................................................................. 14
`Qualcomm Reinforces Its Stranglehold on the Industry Through Its No-
`License-No-Chips Tying Arrangement. ................................................................ 14
`Qualcomm Refuses to Deal with Its Rivals in Violation of FRAND. .................. 25
`Qualcomm’s Exclusivity Agreements with Apple Exacerbate the
`Anticompetitive Effects of Qualcomm’s Conduct. ............................................... 32
`Qualcomm Has Monopoly and Market Power in Relevant Markets. ................... 42
`Qualcomm’s Anticompetitive Conduct Harms Consumers. ................................. 49
`Qualcomm Fraudulently Concealed its Anticompetitive Conduct and
`Plaintiffs Could Not Reasonably Have Discovered It Earlier. .............................. 52
`CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS ................................................................................. 55
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`D.
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`E.
`F.
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`G.
`H.
`I.
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`I.
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`II.
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`III.
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`IV.
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`V.
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`FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
`Violations of the Cartwright Act
`(Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16700 et seq.) .......................................................................... 58
`
`SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
`Violations of the Unfair Competition Law
`(Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.) .......................................................................... 62
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`VI.
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`VII.
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`JURY DEMAND .............................................................................................................. 66
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`PRAYER FOR RELIEF .................................................................................................... 66
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`Plaintiffs Sarah Key, Andrew Westley, Terese Russell, and Carra Abernathy (“Plaintiffs”),
`on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated (the “Class,” as defined below), bring this
`Second Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint (“Complaint”) against Defendant
`Qualcomm Incorporated (“Qualcomm”) for violations of the California Cartwright Act and
`California Unfair Competition Law, and allege based on personal knowledge with respect to facts
`pertaining to them, and upon information and belief as to other matters, as follows:
`I. NATURE OF ACTION
`For over a decade, Qualcomm has exploited its position as the dominant global
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`provider of modem chips for cellular devices to extract billions of dollars in supracompetitive
`payments from other industry participants. The costs of those unfair and unlawful market-distorting
`payments were then passed on to consumers in the form of inflated prices for cellular devices
`throughout the world, including in California.
` Qualcomm has unlawfully leveraged its market power in the markets for certain
`2.
`modem chipsets, also called baseband processors, by tying sales of those chipsets to the taking of
`licenses to Qualcomm’s full Standard Essential Patent portfolio—even though many of the patents
`in that portfolio do not read on the devices manufactured by Qualcomm’s chipset customers.
`Through this unlawful tie, Qualcomm is able to extract higher royalties on its patent portfolio
`licenses and coerce licensees to agree to terms that prevent them from challenging the licenses as
`non-FRAND, challenging the validity of the patents, or challenging Qualcomm’s practice of
`forcing them to pay royalties for expired patents. Qualcomm has reinforced this tie by coercing
`licensees into exclusive dealing arrangements with steep penalties for non-compliance.
`This class action lawsuit is brought on behalf of the tens of millions of California
`3.
`consumers who, because of Qualcomm’s unlawful scheme, were unknowingly forced to pay
`artificially inflated prices for their smartphones, tablets, and other cellular devices. Qualcomm’s
`conduct was and is in violation of California antitrust and consumer protection laws.
`Plaintiffs’ claims in this case arise under the California Cartwright Act and Unfair
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`Competition Law (“UCL”), both of which provide more liberal standards for liability than are
`available under the federal Sherman Act.
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`The Cartwright Act was not modeled on the Sherman Act and “is broader in range
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`and deeper in reach than the Sherman Act.” In re Cipro Cases I & II, 61 Cal. 4th 116, 160-61
`(2015). Thus, a company’s conduct may violate the Cartwright Act even if it does not violate the
`Sherman Act.
`The reach of the UCL is even broader. Aimed at protecting consumers, the UCL
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`broadly prohibits any “unfair” business act or practice, and thus is not limited by the strictures of
`the federal or state antitrust law. Accordingly, a business act or practice may violate the UCL even
`if it does not violate federal or state antitrust law, or indeed any other law.
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`On behalf of themselves and a class of California consumers, Plaintiffs seek an order
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`declaring that Qualcomm’s conduct was and is unlawful, enjoining Qualcomm from continuing to
`engage in this and any similarly unlawful conduct, and awarding money damages, restitution, and
`all other relief to which Plaintiffs and putative class members are entitled for the class period of
`February 11, 2011, through September 27, 2018.
`Every smartphone, tablet, and other cellular device contains a piece of equipment
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`called a modem chipset (or baseband processor), which enables the device to connect and
`communicate with wireless networks (such as those run by wireless network carriers like Verizon
`and Sprint in the United States), and to transmit and receive voice and other data over those
`networks. This core function of all cellular devices would be impossible without a modem chipset.
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`For decades, wireless network carriers in the United States and around the world
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`have participated in a cooperative system in which they agree to negotiate, adopt, and ultimately
`implement cellular communication technology standards for the benefit of all industry participants
`and society as a whole. It is because of this system that wireless networks around the world enjoy
`a high degree of interoperability, which allows the average consumer to choose freely between a
`great variety of cellular devices made by various device manufactures, knowing that whatever
`device they choose should be able to easily connect and function with wireless networks run by
`hundreds of domestic and foreign carriers.
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`The international cellular communication technology standards are established by
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`bodies known as standard setting organizations (“SSOs”), whose members include leading
`telecommunications technology companies, device suppliers and manufactures, and other industry
`participants, including government agencies. SSOs serve as a forum for their members to share and
`vet technological innovations, and ultimately to decide which technologies will be incorporated
`into standards for
`the next generation of a
`technological system, such as cellular
`telecommunications systems (thereby picking market winners and losers).
`11. When an SSO incorporates a new technology into a new standard, industry
`participants’ ability to access that technology becomes essential to the functioning of the domestic
`and international telecommunications infrastructures. The patents protecting such technologies are
`known as standard essential patents (“SEPs”). All SEP holders stand to benefit enormously when
`their patent-protected technology is incorporated into a standard, since industry participants selling
`devices or technologies that comply with the relevant standard will have to pay the SEP holder
`licensing and royalty fees on an ongoing basis. If not appropriately checked, SEP holders could
`unfairly exploit their monopoly on standard essential technologies by withholding access to them,
`extracting excessive licensing and royalty fees when access is granted, and engaging in other
`conduct that stifles competition, deters future technological innovation, limits consumer choice,
`and otherwise serves to entrench and extend their dominance over the relevant market.
`To limit the obvious potential for abuse by SEP holders, SSOs have established a
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`series of basic rules and practices. As relevant here, SSOs generally require that industry
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`participants disclose all patents they hold on technologies under consideration for incorporation
`into a standard and that patent holders agree, as an express condition of their patented technology
`being incorporated into a standard, to license that technology to other industry participants on fair,
`reasonable, and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) terms. FRAND terms strike a balance between
`compensating SEP holders for their patents and ensuring that new technologies can be adopted into
`standards without SEP holders—who are granted a monopoly—gaining unfair power and
`advantage over other industry participants, including their customers and competitors.
`As an early developer of cellular technology, Qualcomm holds patents on
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`technologies that were incorporated into virtually every relevant cellular standard adopted during
`the period relevant to this litigation, including the wireless telecommunications standards known
`as Code Division Multiple Access (“CDMA”) and Long-Term Evolution (“LTE”). Qualcomm has
`enormous market power in the markets for both CDMA and Premium LTE chipsets. A Premium
`LTE chipset is a chipset that is used in a “premium” smart-phone, which Qualcomm has defined as
`a smartphone with a retail average selling price of greater than $300 (prior to 2013)1 or greater than
`$400 (from 2013 forward).2
`Like all other SEP holders, Qualcomm has repeatedly made promises and
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`commitments to license its SEP technologies on FRAND terms, knowing full well that that SSOs
`and other industry participants would rely on those promises and commitments when deciding
`whether to incorporate Qualcomm’s patented technologies into the relevant standards.
`Despite those repeated promises and agreements, Qualcomm has systematically
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`disregarded its FRAND obligations as part of an unlawful scheme to leverage its market power in
`CDMA and Premium LTE chips. Instead of honoring its FRAND commitments, Qualcomm has
`long implemented its “No License, No Chips” policy, which ties sales of its CDMA and Premium
`LTE chips to a requirement that purchasers take a license on Qualcomm’s full SEP patent portfolio.
`The terms of that required license both require supra-FRAND compensation and prohibit the
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`1 Q2017MDL1_03031492 at 29 (May 24, 2011) (Qualcomm Strategic Plan 2011).
`2 Q2017MDL1_03031501 at 53 (June 10, 2013) (Qualcomm Strategic Plan 2014).
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`licensee from challenging either the validity of Qualcomm’s patents or the non-FRAND terms of
`the license itself.
`Beginning at least as early as 2008, Qualcomm has systematically violated its
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`FRAND obligations by refusing to grant a full license for, or imposing onerous restrictions on full
`licensing of, its SEPs to competing chipset makers; tying the sale of its CDMA and Premium LTE
`chips to the taking of a full license on Qualcomm’s entire patent portfolio—regardless of how many
`Qualcomm patents were practiced by the licensee’s devices; requiring device makers to pay
`Qualcomm unreasonably high royalties for every device shipped regardless of whether those
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`devices used Qualcomm chipsets; and reinforcing its stranglehold on the industry by entering into
`exclusive deals with Apple and other component part suppliers and device makers that foreclosed
`and stifled competition. While Qualcomm insists that its agreement with Apple during the relevant
`time period offered only “discounts” for exclusivity, in reality the agreement imposed penalties for
`non-exclusivity because the prices Qualcomm charged Apple were higher than what the price
`would have been absent Qualcomm’s coercive dealing.
`There are no legitimate business justifications for Qualcomm’s exclusionary and
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`anticompetitive conduct. To the extent Qualcomm has sought to achieve any legitimate business
`purposes through its conduct, it has not used the least restrictive means for doing so, any claimed
`pro-competitive benefit is outweighed by the anticompetitive harm, and any purported legitimate
`business justifications are mere pretexts. Qualcomm’s “No License, No Chips” policy, refusal to
`license its patents to competitors, and coercive agreements with OEMs—including its de facto
`exclusive dealing arrangements with Apple—are unlawful restraints of trade designed by
`Qualcomm to maintain its monopoly power and hide its illegal conduct.
`The supra-FRAND nature of Qualcomm’s SEP patent licenses is evident on their
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`face: the long-standing industry custom is to calculate SEP royalty payments based on the value of
`the device component containing the patented technology, but Qualcomm requires device makers
`to calculate its royalty payments based on the price of the entire finished device. This results in
`Qualcomm extracting unfair and unreasonable royalties from device makers. For example, Apple
`has long offered the same model of iPhone at several price points depending on the amount of
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`storage capacity included in the device, charging a higher price for phones that contain more
`storage. Even though Qualcomm’s technology had nothing to do with the additional storage that is
`the reason for the higher price, Qualcomm still compelled Apple to pay royalties based on the total
`price of the finished device. Similarly, when Apple was able to charge more for iPhone models that
`included new features, such as more advanced camera and touchscreen technologies that had
`nothing to do with Qualcomm-patented technology, Qualcomm again forced Apple to pay royalties
`based on the total price of the finished device.
`The additional, supracompetitive royalty revenue that Qualcomm extracted from
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`Apple, and that it extracted and continues to extract from other device makers, and thus ultimately
`from cellular device purchasers, does not reflect any beneficial contribution by Qualcomm to
`cellular devices or the cellular device market. Instead, it is simply a market-distorting rent that
`Qualcomm is able to extract from industry participants by abusing its dominant market position
`and SEP portfolio, and by disregarding its FRAND and other commitments.
`For example, Apple has alleged it was forced to pay more SEP royalties to
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`Qualcomm than all other SEP holders combined—even though other SEP holders have stronger
`intellectual property rights related to Apple’s products. Qualcomm’s abuse of its market dominance
`even goes so far as to compel device makers to accept its licensing terms and royalty rates with
`respect to devices that do not use Qualcomm modem chipsets. In this manner, Qualcomm has
`effectively levied a private “tax” on the entire cellular device industry, causing a ripple effect of
`universally inflated prices in cellular devices for consumers worldwide, including in California.
`The impact of Qualcomm’s No-License-No-Chips tie is self-reinforcing. Qualcomm
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`has used its market power to increase its own profits by taxing all rival sales, which had an
`exclusionary effect on rival chipset manufacturers. This exclusion further reinforced Qualcomm’s
`monopoly power, which enhanced and prolonged Qualcomm’s ability to continue imposing the
`No-License-No-Chips tie and keep its royalties elevated to supra-FRAND levels. Thus, the restraint
`both directly raises chipset prices and increases Qualcomm’s ability to engage in other types of
`anticompetitive behavior. As a consequence of Qualcomm’s unlawful tying of a license to its SEP
`portfolio to the purchase of its CDMA and Premium LTE chipsets, along with its refusal to license
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`rivals and its unlawful exclusive dealing arrangements, Qualcomm has extracted $6.5 billion in
`overcharges from its licensees.3
`Qualcomm’s conduct has harmed Plaintiffs and the putative class of California
`22.
`consumers they seek to represent by forcing them to pay inflated, supracompetitive prices for their
`cellular devices, in violation of the California Cartwright Act and the California Unfair Competition
`Law.
`II. THE PARTIES
`Plaintiffs
`A.
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`23.
`Plaintiff Sarah Key, who resides in California, purchased an Apple iPhone 6 for
`personal use and not for resale during the Class Period. Plaintiff is a member of the proposed Class
`who was injured in fact and has lost money or property as a result of Qualcomm’s unlawful and
`anticompetitive conduct.
`Plaintiff Andrew Westley, who resides in California, purchased a Samsung Galaxy
`24.
`Tab-E Tablet and an Android cellular phone for personal use and not for resale during the Class
`Period. Plaintiff is a member of the proposed Class who was injured in fact and has lost money or
`property as a result of Qualcomm’s unlawful and anticompetitive conduct.
`Plaintiff Terese Russell, who resides in California, purchased an Apple iPad Mini,
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`an Amazon Kindle Paperwhite, an Apple iPhone 6 Plus, and a Samsung smartphone for personal
`use and not for resale during the Class Period. Plaintiff is a member of the proposed Class who was
`injured in fact and has lost money or property as a result of Qualcomm’s unlawful and
`anticompetitive conduct.
`Plaintiff Carra Abernathy, who resides in California, purchased an Apple iPhone 7
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`Plus for personal use and not for resale during the Class Period. Plaintiff is a member of the
`proposed Class who was injured in fact and has lost money or property as a result of Qualcomm’s
`unlawful and anticompetitive conduct.
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`3 See Expert Report of Michael J. Lasinski at 109 (Fig. 70) (Oct. 26, 2018).
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`Defendant
`B.
`Defendant Qualcomm is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business
`27.
`at 5775 Morehouse Drive, San Diego, California 92121. Qualcomm develops, designs, licenses,
`and markets worldwide its digital communications products and services through two wholly
`owned subsidiaries: Qualcomm CDMA Technologies (“QCT”), which handles equipment sales,
`and Qualcomm Technology Licensing (“QTL”), which licenses patents and other intellectual
`property rights from Qualcomm’s intellectual property portfolio. QCT is operated by Qualcomm
`Technologies, Inc. (“QTI”), another wholly owned subsidiary of Qualcomm.
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`Qualcomm maintains offices and employees and regularly conducts business
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`throughout this District, including in San Francisco, Santa Clara, and Alameda counties.
`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
`III.
`This Court has jurisdiction over the subject of this action pursuant to the Class
`29.
`Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), because the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of $5
`million exclusive of interest and costs, and certain Class members are citizens of states different
`from Qualcomm. In addition, this Court may retain supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-
`law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
`This Court has personal jurisdiction over Qualcomm because it resides in and has
`30.
`its principal place of business in the State of California and substantial parts of the anti-competitive
`conduct at issue took place in, originated in, or were implemented in whole or in part within the
`State of California.
`Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because a substantial part of
`31.
`the events giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this District, and because Qualcomm
`transacts business and maintains facilities in this District and thus is subject to personal jurisdiction
`here.
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`IV.
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`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
`Qualcomm Leverages the Standards-Setting Process to Attain a Strategic
`A.
`Dominant Position atop the Modem Chipset Industry.
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`Cellular devices such as smartphones and tablets include a semiconductor device
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`known as a baseband processor or modem chip. These chips manage the cellular device’s radio
`control functions, including signal generation, modulation, encoding, and frequency shifting,
`enabling the device to communicate with a wireless network. A hypothetical phone without a
`modem chipset would be unable to make calls and would not have the ability to send or receive
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`data when outside the presence of a wifi access point.
`33. Modem chips must comply with the technological communications standard that a
`wireless network uses. Chips that comply with multiple wireless network standards are known as
`“multi-mode” chips. Multi-mode chips can communicate with networks that use multiple standards
`or multiple networks using different standards.
`Qualcomm, along with many other companies, contributed to the development of
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`technological standards that govern how consumer cellular devices connect to voice and data
`networks.
`Companies in the wireless industry form SSOs to develop such technical standards
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`to ensure interoperability and compatibility of products and wireless networks for consumer use.
`Patents that are essential to practicing a technical standard are called standard essential patents
`(“SEPs”).
`Qualcomm owns SEPs for technologies used to implement various cellular
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`communications standards, such as the CDMA, WCDMA/UMTS, and LTE standards.
`37. Modem chip makers, cellular device makers, and other companies that make or
`supply products or services that practice a given cellular communications standard must obtain a
`license to practice the applicable cellular SEPs, or else they will infringe those SEPs.
`There are several different SSOs related to wireless communications. The
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`International Telecommunications Union (“ITU”) is a worldwide telecommunications SSO
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`SECOND AMENDED CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`Case No. 17-md-2773-JSC
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`composed of governments and private companies. The Telecommunications Industry Association
`(“TIA”) is the primary SSO in the United States for the telecommunications industry and is
`composed of companies that manufacture or supply products or services in that industry. The
`European Telecommunications Standards Institute (“ETSI”) is an independent, non-profit
`organization based in France that focuses on producing global communication standards. These
`SSOs and others have developed several generations of cellular communications standards, known
`as 1G, 2G, 3G, and 4G.
`39. When the 2G series of standards was first introduced in the early 1990s, two main
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`standards were developed: (1) the Global System for Mobile Communications (“GSM”) and
`(2) Code Division Multiple Access (“CDMA”). Qualcomm’s SEPs constituted a significant portion
`of the overall set of SEPs for the 2G-CDMA standard. While AT&T and T-Mobile chose to design
`their networks around the GSM standard, Verizon and Sprint chose the 2G-CDMA standard.
`40. When the 3G series of standards were introduced in the late 1990s, there were two
`main standards: (1) the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (“UMTS”) and (2) third-
`generation CDMA (“3G-CDMA”). The UMTS standard also incorporated a CDMA-based
`technology known as wideband CDMA (“WCDMA”). GSM network operators (such as AT&T
`and T-Mobile) transitioned to the UMTS standard, while the 2G-CDMA operators (such as Verizon
`and Sprint) transitioned to the 3G-CDMA standard. Qualcomm had a smaller share of SEPs related
`to the UMTS and 3G-CDMA standards than its share of SEPs related to the 2G-CDMA standard.
`The 4G series of standards were first introduced in 2009. 4G standards allow for
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`substantially higher data-transmission speeds than 3G standards. Most major network operators
`have chosen the 4G standard known as Long-Term-Evolution (“LTE”). The LTE standard does not
`rely on CDMA-based technology. As a result, Qualcomm’s share of SEPs related to the LTE
`standard is much lower than its share of the standards based on CDMA technology. Qualcomm
`holds a share of SEPs for the LTE standard that is roughly equivalent to that of other industry
`competitors. One study of declared LTE SEPs found that Qualcomm had a 13% share of “highly
`novel” essential LTE patents, compared to 19% for Nokia, 12% for Ericsson, and 12% for
`Samsung.
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`10
`SECOND AMENDED CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`Case No. 17-md-2773-JSC
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`10657076v1/015494
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`B.
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`Qualcomm Lures Customers into Acquiescence Through Its Knowingly
`Deceptive and Disingenuous FRAND Commitments.
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`Qualcomm belongs to each of the leading SSOs involved in setting wireless
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`communication standards and has made commitments to such SSOs to license its SEPs on fair,
`reasonable, and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) terms. But Qualcomm has violated wholesale its
`FRAND commitments through a variety of schemes, including refusing to license its competitors
`directly, tying the provision of its chip supply to original equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”)
`acquiescing to its non-FRAND licensing terms and to applying royalty terms in a discriminatory
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`fashion, and bundling the licensing of its SEP patents with non-SEP patents.
`Absent appropriate safeguards, SEP holders can abuse the standard-setting process
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`via “patent hold-up,” which occurs “when the holder of a standard-essential patent (‘SEP’) demands
`excessive royalties after companies are locked into using a standard.” Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys.,
`Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of
`Commerce, Patent & Trademark Office, Policy Statement on Remedies for Standard-Essential
`Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments (Jan. 8, 2013).
`Such abuse is exacerbated when SEP holders like Qualcomm “over-declare” patents
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`as being essential to practicing a standard. SSOs generally have no involvement in assessing the
`validity and essentiality of patents declared as SEPs. See, e.g., Legal Considerations, ETSI Seminar
`2014. These abuses contribute to “royalty stacking,” where a single product-maker is required to
`pay “excessive royalties to many different holders of SEPs.” See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.,
`No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 211217, at *11 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013).
`To protect against such abuses—and to ensure the collaboration among competitors
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`embodied in the standard-setting process does not itself constitute an antitrust violation—SSOs
`require participants to publicly disclose any claimed SEPs and promise to license such patents to
`anyone who practices the standard on a royalty-free or FRAND basis. Absent such a promise, SSOs
`will usually design-around the claimed SEPs at issue. Qualcomm induced the relevant SSOs to
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`10657076v1/015494
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`11
`SECOND AMENDED CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`Case No. 17-md-2773-JSC
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`Case 3:17-md-02773-JSC Document 899 Filed 09/02/22 Page 14 of 70
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`incorporate Qualcomm technology into the relevant standards by promising to license its cellular
`SEPs on FRAND terms—promises that it knowingly r