Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 432 Filed 04/11/19 Page 1 of 31
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`
`PAUL J. ANDRE (State Bar No. 196585)
`pandre@kramerlevin.com
`LISA KOBIALKA (State Bar No. 191404)
`lkobialka@kramerlevin.com
`JAMES HANNAH (State Bar No. 237978)
`jhannah@kramerlevin.com
`KRISTOPHER KASTENS (State Bar No. 254797)
`kkastens@kramerlevin.com
`KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS
` & FRANKEL LLP
`990 Marsh Road
`Menlo Park, CA 94025
`Telephone: (650) 752-1700
`Facsimile: (650) 752-1800
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`FINJAN, INC.
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
`
`
`FINJAN, INC., a Delaware Corporation,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`
`JUNIPER NETWORKS, INC., a Delaware
`Corporation,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`Case No.: 3:17-cv-05659-WHA
`
`PLAINTIFF FINJAN, INC.’S OPPOSITION
`TO DEFENDANT JUNIPER NETWORKS,
`INC.’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
`
`May 2, 2019
`Date:
`8:00 a.m.
`Time:
`Hon. William Alsup
`Judge:
`Courtroom: 12, 19th Floor
`
`
`
`
`
`
`REDACTED VERSION OF DOCUMENT SOUGHT TO BE SEALED
`
`PLAINTIFF FINJAN’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT
`JUNIPER NETWORK’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
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`CASE NO. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA
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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 432 Filed 04/11/19 Page 2 of 31
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`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
`
`INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................1
`
`ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................................1
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`SANCTIONS ARE NOT APPROPRIATE ..................................................................................1
`
`CLAIM 10 OF THE ‘494 PATENT PROPERLY WENT TO TRIAL ........................................2
`
`A.
`
`Finjan Presented Good Faith Evidence of Notice .............................................................3
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`Finjan Presented Substantial Evidence of Actual Notice, Which
`Juniper Failed to Rebut. ........................................................................................3
`
`Finjan Presented Substantial Evidence of Constructive Notice,
`Which Juniper Failed to Rebut. ............................................................................8
`
`Juniper Has No Basis to Seek Sanctions on the Issue of Notice ........................10
`
`B.
`
`Finjan Presented Well-Supported Damages Claims .......................................................11
`
`III.
`
`FINJAN HAD A GOOD FAITH BASIS FOR ASSERTING INFRINGEMENT
`OF CLAIM 1 OF THE ‘780 PATENT .......................................................................................17
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`Finjan’s Claim Construction Positions Are Consistent with its Prosecution
`and Prior Litigation of the ‘780 Patent. ..........................................................................17
`
`The ‘780 Patent is Valid and Directed to Patentable Subject Matter under
`35 U.S.C. § 101. ..............................................................................................................20
`
`Finjan Properly Presented Multiple Claims Regarding How Juniper
`Infringes in its Infringement Contentions. ......................................................................21
`
`IV.
`
`FINJAN HAS ACTED REASONABLY AND MADE NO FALSE
`STATEMENTS...........................................................................................................................22
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Finjan Preserved Its § 282 Objection to Juniper’s Failure to Serve a § 282
`Disclosure. ......................................................................................................................22
`
`Finjan Reasonably Claimed Work Product Protection over Mr. Garland’s
`Impressions of the Call with Mr. Coonan. ......................................................................24
`
`CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................................25
`
`
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`i
`PLAINTIFF FINJAN’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT
`JUNIPER NETWORK’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
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`CASE NO. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA
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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 432 Filed 04/11/19 Page 3 of 31
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`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`24/7 Customer, Inc. v. LivePerson, Inc.,
`No. 15-cv-02897-JST, 2017 WL 2311272 (N.D. Cal. May 25, 2017) ............................................ 20
`
`Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co.,
`24 F.3d 178 (Fed. Cir. 1994).............................................................................................................. 4
`
`Arctic Cat, Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational Prods. Inc.,
`876 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2017).................................................................................................... 9, 10
`
`Estate of Blas ex. rel. Chargualaf v. Winkler,
`792 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1986) ............................................................................................................. 2
`
`Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers Prods. Co.,
`717 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013)........................................................................................................ 11
`
`Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc.,
`773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014)........................................................................................................ 12
`
`Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls, Div. of Dover Res., Inc. v. Mega systems, LLC,
`350 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003)........................................................................................................ 23
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. BitDefender, Inc.,
`No. 4:17-cv-04790-HSG, 2019 WL 634985 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2019).................................... 17, 18
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc.,
`879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018)........................................................................................................ 15
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc.,
`No. 13-cv-03999-BLF, 2014 WL 5361976 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2014) ............................................ 17
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc.,
`No. 13-cv-03999-BLF, 2015 WL 3630000 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2015) ....................................... 17, 18
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Cisco, Inc.,
`No. 5:17-cv-00072-BLF, 2018 WL 3537142 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2018)......................................... 17
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. ESET, LLC,
`No. 17-cv-00183-CAB-(BGS), 2017 WL 5501338 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2017) .............................. 17
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp.,
`626 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2010)........................................................................................................ 11
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Sophos, Inc.,
`244 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2017) ........................................................................................... 17
`ii
`PLAINTIFF FINJAN’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT
`JUNIPER NETWORK’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
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`CASE NO. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA
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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 432 Filed 04/11/19 Page 4 of 31
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`
`Fink v. Gomez,
`239 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2001) ............................................................................................................. 2
`
`Funai Elec. Co. v. Daewoo Elecs. Corp.,
`616 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010).......................................................................................................... 4
`
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity Co.,
`200 F. Supp. 3d 565 (W.D. Penn. 2016) .......................................................................................... 20
`
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp.,
`100 F. Supp. 3d 371 (D. Del. 2015) ................................................................................................. 21
`
`Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.,
`39 Cal. 4th 95 (2006) ......................................................................................................................... 7
`
`In re Keegan Management Co., Sec. Litig.,
`78 F.3d 431 (9th Cir.1996) ................................................................................................................ 2
`
`LaFarge Corp. v. No. 1 Contracting Corp.,
`No. 3:CV-06-2315, 2008 WL 2120518 (M.D. Pa. May 19, 2008) .................................................. 22
`
`Lans v. Digital Equip. Corp.,
`252 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2001).......................................................................................................... 3
`
`Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc.,
`86 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1996)........................................................................................................ 3, 8
`
`Minks v. Polaris Indus., Inc.,
`546 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2008).......................................................................................................... 4
`
`Monsanto Co. v. Ralph,
`382 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004)........................................................................................................ 11
`
`Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Finjan, Inc.,
`Case IPR2016-00165, Paper No. 7 (P.T.A.B. April 21, 2016) ........................................................ 17
`
`Prism Techs. LLC v. Sprint Spectrum L.P.,
`849 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017)........................................................................................................ 11
`
`Rembrandt Wireless Techs., LP v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`853 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017)...................................................................................................... 3, 8
`
`SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc.,
`127 F.3d 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1997)...................................................................................................... 3, 4
`
`Symantec Corp. v. Zscaler, Inc.
`No. 17-cv-04426-JST, 2018 WL 1456678 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2018) ............................................ 20
`
`Uniboard Aktiebolag v. Acer Am. Corp.,
`118 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D.D.C. 2000) ................................................................................................. 4, 9
`iii
`PLAINTIFF FINJAN’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT
`JUNIPER NETWORK’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
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`CASE NO. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA
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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 432 Filed 04/11/19 Page 5 of 31
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`Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc.,
`717 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2013)........................................................................................................ 12
`
`Viola Sportswear, Inc. v. Mimun,
`574 F. Supp. 619 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) .................................................................................................. 22
`
`Federal Statutes
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1927 ............................................................................................................................ 1, 2, 25
`
`35 U.S.C. § 101 ................................................................................................................................ 20, 23
`
`35 U.S.C. § 271 ........................................................................................................................................ 3
`
`35 U.S.C. § 282 .......................................................................................................................... 22, 23, 24
`
`35 U.S.C. § 284 ........................................................................................................................................ 3
`
`35 U.S.C. § 287 .................................................................................................................................... 3, 9
`
`35 U.S.C. § 287(a) ............................................................................................................................... 3, 4
`
`State Statutes
`
`Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. ................................................................................................... 7
`
`Cal. Pen. Code § 632................................................................................................................................ 7
`
`Rules
`
`Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50 ........................................................................................................ 2
`
`Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60 ........................................................................................................ 1
`
`
`
`iv
`PLAINTIFF FINJAN’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT
`JUNIPER NETWORK’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
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`CASE NO. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA
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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 432 Filed 04/11/19 Page 6 of 31
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`
`INTRODUCTION
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`Juniper’s Motion for Sanctions (“Motion”) should be denied because Finjan had a reasonable
`
`basis grounded in fact and law for its positions during this litigation. Juniper offers no evidence to the
`
`contrary and cannot meet its heavy burden that is required for such a Motion. Instead, Juniper cobbles
`
`together a variety of complaints that simply evidence a hard-fought litigation between the parties.
`
`Additionally, Juniper’s Motion is also improper as it moves for sanctions on issues that this Court has
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`not even issued final rulings, such that its Motion should be disregarded.
`
`Finally, what Juniper points to as alleged “misconduct” is nothing compared to Juniper’s actual
`
`misconduct, as set forth in Finjan’s pending Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
`
`P. Rule 60(B) (Dkt. No. 411-4) (Finjan’s Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
`
`60(b) (“Finjan’s Rule 60 Motion”), with respect to Juniper’s concealment of key evidence of its
`
`infringement for Claim 10 of U.S. Patent No. 8,677,494 (“the ‘494 Patent”). Specifically, Juniper
`
`produced for the first time in February 2019, nearly a year after discovery requests seeking such
`
`information were served, evidence that Sky ATP uses a database
`
`
`
`
`
` Dkt. No. 411-4 at 3-4; Dkt. No. 412-7 (Finjan’s Request for Production (“RFP”) Nos.
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`87-89) at 6. Because whether Sky ATP had a database was the central infringement issue at the
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`December 2018 trial regarding Claim 10 of the ‘494 Patent, Juniper had no excuse for failing to
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`produce this information so it could be used at trial. Given that Finjan has not engaged in any “bad
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`faith” or litigation misconduct, Juniper’s Motion should be denied.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`I.
`
`SANCTIONS ARE NOT APPROPRIATE
`Juniper cannot meet its heavy burden, which is required to seek sanctions under the Court’s
`
`inherent powers and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (“Section 1927”). See Mot. at 2-3. Finjan has acted with a
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`good faith basis as to each of the issues Juniper identifies in its motion. Because Juniper has no
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`evidence that Finjan acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons, or otherwise
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`acted for an improper purpose, there are no grounds to seek sanctions under the Court’s inherent
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`1
`PLAINTIFF FINJAN’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT
`JUNIPER NETWORK’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 432 Filed 04/11/19 Page 7 of 31
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`powers. Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, Juniper cannot meet its burden of
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`demonstrating bad faith, which requires some willful and improper conduct. Id. at 994.
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`Likewise, for Section 1927, Juniper cannot meet its requisite burden of proving bad faith or
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`reckless conduct that is coupled with something more egregious, such as an improper purpose. Id. at
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`993. For example, there is no evidence that a frivolous argument was “knowingly or recklessly”
`
`raised or arguments made purely “for the purpose of harassing an opponent.” Estate of Blas ex. rel.
`
`Chargualaf v. Winkler, 792 F.2d 858, 860 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal citation omitted); In re Keegan
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`Management Co., Sec. Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th Cir. 1996) (“For sanctions to apply, if a filing is
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`submitted recklessly, it must be frivolous, while if it is not frivolous, it must be intended to harass.”).
`
`In all cases, the only evidence Juniper has is of a hard-fought litigation. Because Juniper
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`cannot meet the stringent burden before it on this Motion, and especially in light of its own misdeeds
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`as outlined in Finjan’s Rule 60 Motion, Juniper attempts to manufacture issues by cobbling together
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`unrelated issues and mischaracterizing Finjan’s litigation positions, witness testimony, and even the
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`Court’s discussion of the very issues that Juniper raises, as described below. Indeed, Juniper’s tactics
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`in its Motion, including use of incomplete citations, point to Juniper as the party who has committed
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`misconduct. For these reasons, Juniper’s Motion should be denied.
`
`II.
`
`CLAIM 10 OF THE ‘494 PATENT PROPERLY WENT TO TRIAL
`Finjan had substantial evidence of both constructive and actual notice of the ‘494 Patent, and
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`Finjan properly presented these questions to the jury, thereby establishing that it had a good faith basis
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`for trial for Claim 10 of the ‘494 Patent. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1) (courts may grant judgment as a
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`matter of law to keep an issue from the jury only “[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue during a
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`jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis
`to find for the party on that issue”); Ex. 11, Trial Tr. at 843:24-844:9 (sending notice to the jury).
`Indeed, because there was substantial evidence that created material facts, this issue could not be
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`summarily decided at the summary judgment stage and was to be decided by the jury. Dkt. No. 189 at
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`20. Further, the jury ultimately did not reach this issue due to its decision regarding infringement,
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`1 Unless otherwise noted, all exhibits are attached to Declaration of Kristopher Kastens, filed herewith.
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`2
`PLAINTIFF FINJAN’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT
`JUNIPER NETWORK’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
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`CASE NO. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA
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`which was, at least partially based upon Juniper’s own concealment of dispositive evidence from Joe
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`Security regarding the presence of a database within the meaning of the claim. See generally Dkt. No.
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`411-4 (Finjan’s Motion for Relief from Judgment). That aside, Juniper seeks sanctions on an issue
`that (i) had no bearing on the outcome of the trial, (ii) for which it cannot prove any bad faith or
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`improper purpose, and (iii) for which it has already filed a Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter
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`of Law (“Renewed JMOL”) which the Court has held the issue in abeyance. See Dkt. No. 352
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`(Juniper’s Renewed JMOL); Dkt. No. 387 at 5. Thus, it is not an appropriate issue for sanctions.
`A.
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`Finjan Presented Good Faith Evidence of Notice.
`
`1.
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`Finjan Presented Substantial Evidence of Actual Notice, Which Juniper
`Failed to Rebut.
`Finjan provided ample evidence of compliance with the notice obligations of 35 U.S.C. §
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`287(a), including by presenting evidence of both actual and constructive notice even though proving
`actual notice obviates the need to prove constructive notice.2 See Rembrandt Wireless Techs., LP v.
`Samsung Elecs. Co., 853 F.3d 1370, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Marking under the statute is permissive,
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`not mandatory.”). Where actual notice is at issue, there is no need to address constructive notice. See
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`Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Thus, the statute defines that ‘[a
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`patentee] is entitled to damages from the time when it either began marking its product in compliance
`with section 287(a)[,constructive notice,] or when it actually notified [the accused infringer] of its
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`2 Juniper attempted to invent a new notice standard to suit its arguments of mootness. See Mot. at 3
`(“As a result, this claim was moot unless Finjan proved both (a) compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 287,
`which would entitle it to pre-suit damages; and (b) a cognizable damages theory.”) (emphasis added).
`There is no indication of from where Juniper has imported part (b). See id. (citing Lans v. Digital
`Equip. Corp., 252 F.3d 1320, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (affirming denial of summary judgment of
`infringement for simple failure to comply with 35 U.S.C. § 287). By the plain language of the statute,
`compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) entitles a patentee to damages for proven infringement, and
`damages shall be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and in no event less than a reasonable
`royalty pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 284. Finjan presented substantial evidence to support notice under
`either 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) actual or constructive provisions. Although the amount of Finjan’s damages
`is a separate issue, Finjan also presented substantial evidence and case precedent to support its
`damages claim. That the Court excluded its theories is not grounds for sanctions, and moreover this
`issue has no bearing on any alleged mootness of the claim. This is not the first time Juniper has
`misrepresented the plain language of the law with respect to the issue of notice. It repeated a
`misstatement of law in its proposed jury instructions and again in its Renewed JMOL that actual notice
`must be given in writing, which is contrary to 35 U.S.C. § 271. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 352 at 8; see Dkt.
`No. 357, at 9-10 (citing SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1470 (Fed. Cir.
`1997)).
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`3
`PLAINTIFF FINJAN’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT
`JUNIPER NETWORK’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
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`infringement, whichever was earlier.’”)(citation omitted); see also Uniboard Aktiebolag v. Acer Am.
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`Corp., 118 F. Supp. 2d 19, 22 (D.D.C. 2000) (in finding constructive notice was not relevant to the
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`dispute, “the Court focuses its inquiry on if and when Uniboard provided the defendants actual notice
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`of the alleged infringement.”).
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`Actual notice does not require a formulaic recitation; rather the Federal Circuit has noted that
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`“[a]lthough there are numerous possible variations in form and content, the purpose of the actual
`notice requirement is met when the recipient is notified, with sufficient specificity, that the patent
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`holder believes that the recipient of the notice may be an infringer.” SRI Int'l, 127 F.3d at 1470
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`(emphasis added). A patentee can even identify a group of products or relevant technology. Funai
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`Elec. Co. v. Daewoo Elecs. Corp., 616 F.3d 1357, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010)(citing Amsted Indus. Inc. v.
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`Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 187 (Fed. Cir. 1994))(group of products sufficient); Minks v.
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`Polaris Indus., Inc., 546 F.3d 1364, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that a communication of the
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`patentee’s “belief that reverse speed limiters sensing engine speed and a DC input infringe” the patent
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`may have sufficed the notice requirement); SRI Int'l, 127 F.3d at 1470 (“the actual notice requirement
`of § 287(a) is satisfied when the recipient is informed of the identity of the patent and the activity that
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`is believed to be an infringement”) (emphasis added).
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`Here, Finjan provided Juniper with actual notice because it identified the ‘494 Patent and the
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`products that infringed the ‘494 Patent, which is all that is required. Amsted Indus., 24 F.3d at 187
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`(“Actual notice requires the affirmative communication of a specific charge of infringement by a
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`specific accused product or device.”). Mr. Garland, Finjan’s Director of Business Development (Ex.
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`1, Trial Tr. 547:21-22), reviewed a Juniper press release which had been recently issued in September
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`2015 announcing its new products, including its “Advanced Anti-Malware Cloud Service” and new
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`firewall technology, as part of his due diligence in continuing the licensing negotiations with Juniper.
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`Ex. 1, Trial Tr. 551:10-553:19 (explaining Mr. Garland’s review of Juniper’s press release); Ex. 2
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`(Trial Ex. 91); see also Ex. 1, Trial Tr. 555:8-13. Thereafter, Mr. Garland arranged a call with Mr.
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`Coonan, Juniper’s Senior Director of IP Litigation and Strategy (Ex. 3 (Coonan Trial Testimony) 7:9-
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`7:15), in November 2015 to discuss licensing, during which Mr. Garland identified the ‘494 Patent and
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`PLAINTIFF FINJAN’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT
`JUNIPER NETWORK’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 432 Filed 04/11/19 Page 10 of 31
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`Juniper’s SRX, advanced malware module, and Next Generation Firewall products. See, e.g., Ex. 1,
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`Trial Tr. at 554:2-555:5 (describing identification of products and patents on the call); id., 547:21-
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`548:2, 549:21-550:18, 604:9-11 (describing licensing practices and that purpose of call with Juniper
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`was to identify need for a patent license); id., 566:4-12 (Mr. Coonan never asked what was meant by
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`“advanced malware”); id., Ex. 3 (Coonan Trial Testimony) at 145:1-147:23, 167:7-12; id., Ex. 4 (Trial
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`Ex. 256) at 10:53-11:21 (transcript of phone call: “Mr. Garland: And there’s a newer one, one you
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`haven’t seen before. 8677494. Mr. Coonan: Okay. All right. And that’s significant, because it’s – is it
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`– is it a continuation? Mr. Garland: I don’t know. I don’t know. It’s [sic] reads on your advanced
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`malware modules.”); Ex. 4 at 25:48 (Mr. Coonan stating that “I thought it was in the context of a
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`litigation discussion, negotiation, and you rejected it, so we’re back to square one.”); see also (Trial
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`Ex. 257)(Coonan transcript recording).
`It is undisputed that Juniper has presented no evidence from the 2015 timeframe to
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`demonstrate that Mr. Garland’s identification of the “advanced malware module” in relation to the
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`SRX during the call was anything other than a specific reference to Sky ATP. Ex. 1, Trial Tr. at
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`554:2-555:10; id., Ex. 4 (Trial Ex. 256) at 10:53-11:21; see also (Trial Ex. 257). Conversely, there is
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`substantial evidence that this name was not Mr. Garland’s subjective understanding of Sky ATP, but
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`rather references Juniper’s own marketing material referring to Sky ATP as being for “advanced
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`malware.” Ex. 1, Trial Tr. 551:10-553:19; Ex. 2 (Trial Ex. 91); Ex. 1, Trial Tr. 555:8-13 (“advanced
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`malware” came from press release). Juniper’s characterization of a “telepathic notice” claim is a
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`distortion of Mr. Garland’s testimony, who testified that he referred to Sky ATP as the “advanced
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`malware module” because Juniper’s press release announcing the release of Sky ATP called Sky ATP
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`its “advanced anti-malware cloud service.” Compare Mot. at 8 with Ex. 1, Trial Tr. 589:9-10 (“Again,
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`I think advanced malware module in my mind is Sky ATP.”); id., Trial Tr. 589:11-17 (Mr. Garland
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`confirming that “[i]n preparation for that call, that was my understanding, advanced malware module
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`is Sky ATP”); id. Trial Tr. 555:8-13 (phrase “advanced malware” came from Mr. Garland’s review of
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`press release); Ex. 2 (Trial Ex. 91). Significantly, there was no confusion on Mr. Coonan’s part about
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`what was being discussed. Indeed, Mr. Coonan never asked what was meant by “advanced malware”
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`PLAINTIFF FINJAN’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT
`JUNIPER NETWORK’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 432 Filed 04/11/19 Page 11 of 31
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`or what recently released product Mr. Garland was referring to—nor should he, given (i) his position
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`at Juniper, (ii) that he is an engineer, and (iii) that Mr. Garland, also an engineer, sufficiently identified
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`Sky ATP by a descriptive name. See Ex. 1, Trial Tr. 566:4-12 (Mr. Coonan never asked what was
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`meant by “advanced malware”). Moreover, there is no dispute that Mr. Garland referred to “advanced
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`malware” as a recently released product, which is consistent with the September 2015 press release
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`that he reviewed prior to the call. Ex. 4 (Trial Ex. 256) at 10:53 to 11:21 (transcript of phone call:
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`; Ex. 2 (Trial Ex. 91).
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`Mr. Garland also specifically referenced Juniper’s Next Generation Firewall as relevant to the
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`‘494 Patent. Ex. 1, Trial Tr. at 554:2-555:3; Ex. 4, Trial Ex. 256 at 5:01–5:12. Juniper’s senior
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`management acknowledged that the SRX was not considered a Next Generation Firewall before it had
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`Sky ATP’s functionality, as the Sky ATP functionality was developed to fill the need for the SRX to
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`be able to detect previously-unknown malware to compete as a Next Generation Firewall in the
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`marketplace. Ex. 5 (Nagarajan Trial Testimony) at 36:02-37:08 (describing that Sky ATP was
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`developed to provide the SRX with threat prevention functionality, because next generation firewalls
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`need threat prevention); see also Ex. 6, Nagarajan Dep. Tr., 63:4-64:23. There is no dispute that
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`Finjan identified the SRX product on the call, that the SRX included Sky ATP free of charge, and that
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`Sky ATP only worked with SRX. Ex. 1, Trial Tr. 554:23-555:3; Ex. 4, Trial Ex. 256 at 5:01–5:12; Ex.
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`7 (Sky ATP included on SRX). Therefore, there was objective evidence that Mr. Garland identified
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`Sky ATP and SRX using the same terms that Juniper used, including “advanced malware module” and
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`“Next Generation Firewall.” There was also objective evidence that Juniper released Sky ATP just
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`before Mr. Garland’s call with Mr. Coonan, and that during the call Mr. Garland discussed Juniper’s
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`new products and obtaining a license to Finjan’s patents, including the ‘494 Patent.
`Juniper misleadingly proffers for the third time a cherry-picked SRX datasheet dated two
`years after the parties’ call to suggest that “advanced malware module” does not refer to “Sky ATP.”
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`Ex. 8, Trial Ex. 345. During trial, the Court ordered Juniper to cease showing this document to the
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`6
`PLAINTIFF FINJAN’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT
`JUNIPER NETWORK’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 432 Filed 04/11/19 Page 12 of 31
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`jury with respect to this issue. See Mot. at 8 (citing Trial Ex. 345); Ex. 1, Trial Tr. at 592:18-22, Ex. 8,
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`Trial Ex. 345 (“Ms. Kobialka: Objection, Your Honor. He's showing a document that came into
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`existence two years or three years after the call and he's tying it to the call. The Court: I think that's a
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`problem. So let's take that down off the screen.”); see also Ex. 1, Trial Tr. 591:4-24. Not only does
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`this 2017 document have no bearing on how Juniper referred to Sky ATP in 2015, but Juniper has no
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`evidence that the 2017 reference to “advance malware” in this datasheet for the SRX is anything other
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`than another reference to the SRX integrating with Sky ATP. See Ex. 8, Trial Ex. 345; see also Ex. 5,
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`(Nagarajan Trial Testimony) at 36:02-37:08 (Sky ATP provides SRX with its threat prevention
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`functionality). In any case, Juniper does not dispute that the testimony and evidence at trial was
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`accurate, namely that (i) Mr. Garland reviewed Juniper’s September 29, 2015 press release (Ex. 2,
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`Trial Ex. 91) just before Mr. Garland’s November 2015 call with Mr. Coonan, (ii) that Juniper just
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`announced for the first time the release of Sky ATP, which would be integrated with Sky ATP, and
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`called referred to Sky ATP as its “Advanced Anti-Malware” service, and (iii) and that Mr. Garland
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`informed Juniper that its new product offering of “advanced malware” infringed the ‘494 Patent.
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`Juniper’s other purported basis for sanctions—that Mr. Garland’s memory of a phone call from
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`3 years earlier was not as impeccable as a secretly recorded transcript—is not supported by any
`evidence of bad faith.3 Mr. Garland honestly admitted that he did not say the precise words “Sky
`ATP” on the call and explained that he was reminded that he referenced Sky ATP using “advanced
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`malware” which was consistent wit