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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 326 Filed 12/13/18 Page 1 of 10
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`IRELL & MANELLA LLP
`Jonathan S. Kagan (SBN 166039)
`jkagan@irell.com
`Alan Heinrich (SBN 212782)
`aheinrich@irell.com
`Joshua Glucoft (SBN 301249)
`jglucoft@irell.com
`Casey Curran (SBN 305210)
`ccuran@irell.com
`Sharon Song (SBN 313535)
`ssong@irell.com
`1800 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 900
`Los Angeles, California 90067-4276
`Telephone: (310) 277-1010
`Facsimile: (310) 203-7199
`
`Rebecca Carson (SBN 254105)
`rcarson@irell.com
`Kevin Wang (SBN 318024)
`kwang@irell.com
`840 Newport Center Drive, Suite 400
`Newport Beach, California 92660-6324
`Telephone: (949) 760-0991
`Facsimile: (949) 760-5200
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`JUNIPER NETWORKS, INC.
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
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`FINJAN, INC., a Delaware Corporation,
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`Plaintiff,
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`
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`vs.
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`JUNIPER NETWORKS, INC., a Delaware
`Corporation,
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`Defendant.
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`10622413
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`Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA
`
`JUNIPER NETWORKS, INC.’S
`OPPOSITION TO FINJAN, INC.’S
`MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A
`MATTER OF LAW (DKT. NO. 322)
`
`Judge: Hon. William Alsup
`
`JUNIPER’S OPPOSITION TO FINJAN’S MOTION
`FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
`(Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA)
`
`
`
`

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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 326 Filed 12/13/18 Page 2 of 10
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`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
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`Juniper respectfully requests that the Court deny Finjan’s unfounded motion for
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`judgment as a matter of law. Dkt. No. 322. Juniper has substantial evidence that could support
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`a reasonable jury finding in its favor on all issues. See also Dkt. No. 323 (Juniper’s motion for
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`judgment as a matter of law demonstrating that Finjan failed to carry even its initial burden of
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`proof on the issues discussed below).
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`A court may not enter judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) unless “a party has been
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`fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury
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`to find for a party on that issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). Moreover, a court “must draw all
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`reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility
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`determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530
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`U.S. 133, 150 (2000). Indeed, “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and
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`the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a
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`judge.” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). “Judgment as a
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`matter of law is appropriate when
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`the
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`evidence
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`presented
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`at
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`trial
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`permits
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`only
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`one reasonable conclusion.” Torres v. City of Los Angeles, 548 F.3d 1197, 1206 (9th Cir.
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`2008). In other words, a “motion for a judgment as a matter of law is properly granted only if
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`no reasonable juror could find in the non-moving party's favor.” Id.
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`A.
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`Invalidity
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`As the Court’s Final Pretrial Order states, the parties stipulated that the Court will decide the
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`issue of Section 101 invalidity. Dkt. No. 301 ¶ 4. Thus, the issue of Section 101 invalidity is not a
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`proper subject of a motion for JMOL under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1), which is directed to issues tried
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`to the jury. FRCP 50(a)(1) (“If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the
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`court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for
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`the party on that issue….” (emphasis added)). Instead, such findings are governed by Fed. R. Civ.
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`P. 52. A Rule 50(a) motion is particularly inappropriate at this juncture before Juniper has even
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`rested its case in chief. To the extent the Court is interested in proper briefing under FRCP 52 after
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`10622413
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`- 1 -
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`JUNIPER’S OPPOSITION TO FINJAN’S MOTION
`FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
`(Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA)
`
`
`
`

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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 326 Filed 12/13/18 Page 3 of 10
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`trial to contextualize the evidence reviewed by the Court, Juniper is happy to provide such briefing
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`after the close of evidence.
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`In any event, as the Court observed, “[e]veryone knows, who’s done any coding, that if you
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`go through a lot of trouble to derive a number and there’s even a small chance you’re ever going to
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`need it again, you ought to save it rather than require the computer to go through that stuff again.”
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`Trial Tr. Vol. 4 at 633:17-23. Considering the elements of Claim 10 both individually and as an
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`ordered combination, Claim 10 of the ’494 Patent is a “simple thing,” id., that Juniper has shown
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`lacks an inventive concept through the testimony of its technical expert, Dr. Aviel Rubin. Id. at,
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`e.g., 717-732; id. at 722:13-15 (“[Q.] Were scanners well known in the art as of 1996? A. Yes.
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`They were very well known”); id. at 729:13-22 (“[Q.] Was it known to couple scanners to receivers?
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`A. Yes. The only way that you can scan something that comes from the Internet is to have a receiver
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`to receive it unless you wrote it yourself . . . Q. And did the [prior art] references that we looked at,
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`did they include receivers? A. Yes.”); id. at 729:23-730:1 (“Q. All right. Let’s turn to the last
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`addition here in Claim 10, the database manager. Were database managers well known in the art?
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`A. Yes, very well known”). Dr. Rubin further explained that the ordered combination of the
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`elements of Claim 10 lack an inventive concept because “there’s really only one order that makes
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`any sense,” given that “[a]ny way that you try to put those steps in another order, it wouldn’t work.”
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`Id. at 732:14-25.
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`The evidence introduced at trial further confirms that everything Finjan touts as allegedly
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`inventive was well known, routine, and conventional. In particular, Finjan claimed that it pioneered
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`the concept of behavioral analysis. See Trial Tr. Vol. 1 at 161:1-4 (“You're going to hear that
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`industry companies, companies that follow the industry, industry reports, like IDG and Gartner's,
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`they credit Finjan with being the pioneers, the innovators, the inventors of behavior-based
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`technology.”). But Finjan fails to address prior art such as Stang from 1995 (Trial Ex. 1069 at 6)
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`(excerpted and highlighting added):
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`10622413
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`JUNIPER’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
`FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
`(Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA)
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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 326 Filed 12/13/18 Page 4 of 10
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`…
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`Nor does Finjan address prior art like Swimmer which the USPTO found taught all of the limitations
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`of Claim 1, the substantially similar method counterpart to the system of Claim 10, which in its very
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`title shows that it is directed to behavior-based technology:
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`Ex. 1070 at 2 (excerpted). See also, e.g., Trial Ex. 2197 (describing a static scanner that generates
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`a list of suspicious computer operations by examining hexadecimal search patterns); Trial Ex. 1552
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`(describing a scanner that generates a list of suspicious computer operations after determining
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`whether a decoded macro includes a virus); Trial Ex. 1241 (supporting the fact that database
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`managers were well known, well understood, routine and conventional at the time before the
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`invention).
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`Accordingly, when the Court ultimately determines the issue of Section 101 invalidity, it
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`should find that Claim 10 of the ’494 Patent is invalid.
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`B.
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`Damages
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`In patent cases, “the burden of proving damages falls on the patentee and the patentee must
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`show his damages by evidence.” Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., 875 F.3d 651, 660 (Fed. Cir.
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`2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 156 (2018) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In this
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`case, Finjan failed to present legally sufficient evidence of (1) a royalty base, (2) apportionment, or
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`even (3) a royalty rate. See Dkt. No. 323 at 1-5 (Juniper briefing demonstrating that Finjan has
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`failed to carry its burden). As such, Juniper had no damages case to rebut. Moreover, Juniper
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`presented the testimony of its damages expert Dr. Keith R. Ugone, who analyzed a substantial
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`amount of information to arrive at his opinion. See Trial Tr. Vol. 4 at 797-820, including at 801:21-
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`802:8 (Dr. Ugone providing an overview of everything he reviewed in forming his opinion). Dr.
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`Ugone’s testimony, which the Court already found was properly admissible notwithstanding
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`10622413
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`JUNIPER’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
`FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
`(Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA)
`
`
`
`

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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 326 Filed 12/13/18 Page 5 of 10
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`Finjan’s motion to exclude Dr. Ugone for failure to rely on “sufficient facts or data” under FRE
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`702(b) (see Dkt. No. 231 at 11), is more than sufficient to refute any negligible evidence offered by
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`Finjan. See Dkt. No. 283 at 10-11 (Court denying Finjan’s motion to exclude Dr. Ugone).
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`C.
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`Notice
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`When Juniper satisfied its burden of production by serving a notice on Finjan identifying
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`specific unmarked patented articles subject to 35 U.S.C. § 287(a), it became Finjan’s “burden to
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`prove the products identified do not practice the patented invention.” Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier
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`Recreational Prod. Inc., 876 F.3d 1350, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Finjan failed to meet that burden
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`and did not present evidence legally sufficient to show either constructive or actual notice as
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`required under § 287. See Dkt. No. 323 at 5-8.
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`D.
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`Infringement
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`1.
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`A Reasonable Jury Could Find that “ResultsDB Database” Is Only An
`Interface, Not a “Database.”
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`A reasonable jury could find that “ResultsDB” is merely an interface to certain underlying
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`storage components—namely, MySQL, DynamoDB, and S3—and not a “database.” As shown by
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`the diagram drawn by Dr. Cole, “ResultsDB” is actually comprised of “ResultsDB API” (short for
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`Application Programming Interface) and an assortment of distinct underlying storage components
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`where the data is actually stored:
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`JUNIPER’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
`FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
`(Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA)
`
`
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`

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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 326 Filed 12/13/18 Page 6 of 10
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`Ex. 1179 at 10. See also, e.g., Trial Tr. Vol. 3 at 440:14-17 (Dr. Cole: “the Results Database API,
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`application programming interface, this is something that interfaces with another component like a
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`database, that the ResultsDB API is the database manager.”). In other words, even Dr. Cole appears
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`to acknowledge that no data is stored in anything called “ResultsDB Database.” In actuality, as Dr.
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`Rubin testified, “there is no such this as a ResultsDB Database. [Dr. Cole is merely] drawing a box
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`around three different storage solutions and calling that the ResultsDB Database.” Trail Tr. Vol. 4
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`at 764:21-23.
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`References to “ResultsDB” are no more than a reference to the interface by which other
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`components actually interact with those storage components. By way of analogy, “ResultsDB” can
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`be compared to the popular property rental website AirBnB, short for Air Bread and Breakfast.
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`AirBnB is a cloud-based site that connects travelers with places to stay, and travelers do not actually
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`stay “in” AirBnB—that would be impossible because AirBnB is just a web interface. Nonetheless,
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`travelers ubiquitously refer to such experiences as “staying in an AirBnB” when, it actuality, the
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`person is simply staying in Bob’s condo or Alice’s house. In the same way, “ResultsDB” is just an
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`interface to storage components, and while engineers may casually refer to storing data in
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`10622413
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`- 5 -
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`JUNIPER’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
`FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
`(Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA)
`
`
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`

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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 326 Filed 12/13/18 Page 7 of 10
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`“ResultsDB,” such statements are just references to the interface that the engineers use to
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`communicate with MySQL, DynamoDB, and S3.
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`Critically, Dr. Cole admitted that his infringement theory did not rely on the individual
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`storage components with which ResultsDB API interfaces:
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`Q. And, in fact, sir, you did not analyze whether MySQL independently would
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`infringe the database element of Claim 10; correct?
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`A. I believe that is correct. I focused on ResultsDB as the infringing database.
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`Q. And you also didn't analyze whether DynamoDB independently would infringe
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`the database element of Claim 10; correct?
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`A. I'm pausing because I believe in my report that I actually did talk about the
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`individual databases and that they do infringe. But here at trial what I presented
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`this morning was focused on ResultsDB.
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`Trial Tr. Vol. 3 at 500:20-501:6 (emphasis added).
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`2.
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`A Reasonable Jury Could Find that “ResultsDB Database” Is Not
`Organized According to a Database Schema as Required by the Agreed
`Construction.
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`A reasonable jury could find that what Finjan alleges to be “ResultsDB Database” is not
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`organized according to a database schema. Amazon’s own documentation makes it clear that
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`Amazon’s DynamoDB is a schema-less database:
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`Ex. 1264-4 (excerpted and highlighting added). Dr. Rubin further confirmed that DynamoDB is a
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`schema-less database and that S3 is also schema-less. See, e.g., Trial Tr. Vol 4 at 764:25-765:1
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`(“the JSONs, which are the results of the analysis, are stored in DynamoDB or S3, which are
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`schema-less”) (emphasis added).
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`It is immaterial whether some parts of “ResultsDB Database” have a JSON schema, as
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`Finjan introduced no evidence that a JSON schema is a database schema. To the contrary, as Dr.
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`Rubin testified,
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`10622413
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`JUNIPER’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
`FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
`(Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA)
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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 326 Filed 12/13/18 Page 8 of 10
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`You can have a JSON schema. The word “schema” just has to do with
`having rules for how you put things together. This is different from a
`database schema, which defines how you put data into a database. A
`JSON schema defines how you put text into a JSON object.
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`Trial Tr. Vol 4 at 763:25-764:4. In other words, the JSON schema organizes the JSONs stored
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`within DynamoDB, but it does not organize DynamoDB itself. The authoritative definition of JSON
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`by the Internet Engineering Task Force further confirms that a JSON is nothing but a “text format”
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`similar to a Microsoft Word document (See Ex. 1248 at 3) and, as a result, so a JSON schema is just
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`a structure to text—not a structure for a database. A JSON schema is similar to following a standard
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`memo format in a Word document; the text in the Word document may be structured, but such
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`structure says nothing at all about whether that Word document is subsequently stored in a database
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`with a schema.
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`It is similarly immaterial whether some parts of “ResultsDB Database” has a key schema, as
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`Finjan presents no evidence that a key schema is a database schema, and Dr. Rubin testified that a
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`key schema is not a database schema:
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`Q. And just to be very clear, you mentioned it when the judge was asking you questions
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`about your little diagram with the keys, you mentioned it, you said there's a key schema --
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`A. Right.
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`Q. -- in the DynamoDB?
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`A. There is.
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`Q. All right.
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`A. It's a type of a JSON.
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`Q. But the DynamoDB has a schema, a key schema?
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`A. It does not have a database schema.
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`Trial Tr. Vol. 4 at 786:10-19. See also id. at, e.g., 745:15 (“In a schema-less database, you have
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`keys.”), 746:12-13 (“And so a schema-less database is this king of more free-form thing and it has
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`a key.”).
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`Additionally, a reasonable jury could conclude that “ResultsDB Database” is not organized
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`according to a “database schema” because “ResultsDB Database” fails to meet the requirement of a
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`10622413
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`JUNIPER’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
`FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
`(Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA)
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`

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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 326 Filed 12/13/18 Page 9 of 10
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`“database schema” set forth by Finjan and its own expert in IPR. As background, Finjan argued to
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`the PTAB that one of skill in the art would understand a “database schema” is “a description of a
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`database to a database management system (DBMS) in the language provided by the DBMS.” Trial
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`Ex. 1760 at 46. On one hand, the MySQL database is, as its name suggests and as Finjan’s expert
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`Dr. Cole admitted, described in Structured Query Language (SQL). Trial Tr. Vol. 3 at 516:10-13
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`(“Q. But for the MySQL database, you run queries using the standard query language; correct? A.
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`Yes. For the MySQL database that’s run by Amazon, they use MySQL for queries.”). On the other
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`hand, the ResultsDB API (i.e., what the Court found be the claimed “database manager”) is written
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`in Python, as indicated Dr. Cole also admitted. Trial Tr. Vol. 3 at 516:6-9 (“Q. The ResultsDB
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`manager that you identified as the infringing database management system is written in python;
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`correct? A. Yes, that is my understanding.”). Thus, if a “database schema” is understood to require
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`one language (“in the language”) as proposed by Finjan and its own expert during IPR, then a
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`reasonable jury could find that “ResultsDB Database” does not have a database schema because it
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`3.
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`No Reasonable Jury Could Find that “ResultsDB Database” Infringes
`Under the Doctrine of Equivalents.
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`Finjan failed to present any evidence at all that “ResultsDB Database” infringes under the
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`doctrine of equivalents. Dr. Cole presented no testimony that “ResultsDB Database” performed the
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`same function in the same way to achieve the same result as the claimed “database” or that
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`“ResultsDB Database” was substantially similar to the claimed database for any other reasons. As
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`a result, Juniper should be granted judgment as a matter of law that Juniper does not infringe under
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`the doctrine of equivalents.
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`CONCLUSION
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`Juniper respectfully requests that the Court deny Finjan’s motion for judgment as a matter
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`of law on notice, damages, infringement, and invalidity.
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`10622413
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`- 8 -
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`JUNIPER’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
`FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
`(Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA)
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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 326 Filed 12/13/18 Page 10 of 10
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`Dated: December 13, 2018
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`IRELL & MANELLA LLP
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`By: /s/ Alan Heinrich
`Alan Heinrich
`Attorneys for Defendant
`JUNIPER NETWORKS, INC.
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`JUNIPER’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
`FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
`(Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA)
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`
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