Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 323 Filed 12/13/18 Page 1 of 12
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`IRELL & MANELLA LLP
`Jonathan S. Kagan (SBN 166039)
`jkagan@irell.com
`Alan Heinrich (SBN 212782)
`aheinrich@irell.com
`Joshua Glucoft (SBN 301249)
`jglucoft@irell.com
`Casey Curran (SBN 305210)
`ccuran@irell.com
`Sharon Song (SBN 313535)
`ssong@irell.com
`1800 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 900
`Los Angeles, California 90067-4276
`Telephone: (310) 277-1010
`Facsimile: (310) 203-7199
`
`Rebecca Carson (SBN 254105)
`rcarson@irell.com
`Kevin Wang (SBN 318024)
`kwang@irell.com
`840 Newport Center Drive, Suite 400
`Newport Beach, California 92660-6324
`Telephone: (949) 760-0991
`Facsimile: (949) 760-5200
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`Attorneys for Defendant
`JUNIPER NETWORKS, INC.
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
`FINJAN, INC., a Delaware Corporation,
`)
`Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA
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`DEFENDANT JUNIPER NETWORKS,
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`INC.’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND
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`MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A
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`MATTER OF LAW
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`
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`Judge: Hon. William Alsup
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`Plaintiff,
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`vs.
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`JUNIPER NETWORKS, INC., a Delaware
`Corporation,
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`Defendant.
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`10621761
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`JUNIPER’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
`FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
`(Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA)
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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 323 Filed 12/13/18 Page 2 of 12
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`NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
`PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on December 13, 2018 at the close of Plaintiff Finjan, Inc.’s
`(“Finjan”) case-in-chief, in Courtroom 12 before the Honorable William Alsup, 450 Golden Gate
`Avenue, San Francisco, California, Defendant Juniper Networks, Inc. (“Juniper”) moved for
`judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Juniper
`submits this memorandum in further support of the motion.1
`This Motion is made on the basis that Finjan failed to provide a legally sufficient evidentiary
`basis for a reasonable jury to find in favor of Finjan on notice, damages, and infringement.
`Specifically, the Court should grant judgment as a matter of law in favor of Juniper on the following
`grounds: (1) Finjan failed to provide Juniper with actual notice of Finjan’s infringement claim prior
`to filing suit, which eliminates Finjan’s ability to recover pre-suit damages under 35 U.S.C. § 287;
`(2) Finjan has not met its burden to establish damages; and (3) no reasonable jury could find that
`Juniper’s Sky ATP alone and SRX devices used in combination with Sky ATP infringe claim 10 of
`the 494 patent.
`This Motion is based on the testimony and evidence admitted at trial, the oral motion for
`judgment as a matter of law deemed made during trial, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities
`that follows, all pleadings, exhibits, and records in this action, and such other papers, evidence,
`and/or argument as may be submitted to the Court in connection with this Motion or that the Court
`may take notice or otherwise consider.
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`Dated: December 13, 2018
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`IRELL & MANELLA LLP
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`By: /s/ Alan Heinrich
`Alan Heinrich
`Attorneys for Defendant
`JUNIPER NETWORKS, INC.
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`1 The current motion is brought with respect to deficiencies in Finjan’ case-in-chief, and
`Juniper does not waive other matters on which Juniper may be entitled to JMOL.
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`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
`Juniper moves for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) in its favor pursuant to Rule 50(a)
`of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons explained below, no reasonable jury could
`find in Finjan’s favor on notice, damages, or infringement.
`ARGUMENT
`Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate if “a party has been fully heard on an issue and
`there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that
`issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). In making this determination, “the court should review all of the
`evidence in the record, not merely the evidence favorable to the non-moving party.” Reeves v.
`Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). Rule 50 “allows the trial court to
`remove . . . issues from the jury’s consideration when the facts are sufficiently clear that the law
`requires a particular result.” Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 448 (2000) (internal quotations
`omitted). “The question is not whether there is literally no evidence supporting the unsuccessful
`party, but whether there is evidence upon which a reasonable jury could properly have found its
`verdict.” Cordis Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
`A.
`Damages
`Finjan’s damages case was an utter failure. In its case-in-chief, Finjan did not present any
`evidence on: (1) what the appropriate royalty base was for the accused products; (2) how that
`revenue base should be apportioned; and (3) what a reasonable royalty rate would be.
`1.
`No Legally Sufficient Evidence of a Royalty Base
`In its case-in-chief, Finjan’s only alleged evidence of a royalty base were Trial Exhibits 490
`and 494 and the related deposition testimony of Juniper’s Director of Finance, Ms. Gupta. These
`trial exhibits contain revenue information, but there is zero information in the record linking those
`revenues to any particular products, let alone the accused products. Finjan also designated portions
`of Ms. Gupta’s deposition testimony that merely consist of her reading the same revenue numbers
`into the record at Finjan’s counsel’s direction, without being asked to explain those numbers in any
`way. In Juniper’s counter-designations, Ms. Gupta makes clear that the revenue numbers Finjan’s
`counsel asked her to read are not limited to the accused products at issue in this case. Instead, they
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`include substantial revenues from SRX devices that were never configured with Sky ATP, contrary
`to the Court’s Daubert Order. Dkt. 283 at 4–5. It would be legal error to permit the jury to use
`Finjan’s manufactured revenue numbers—which are untethered to the actual accused products in
`this case—in its damages deliberations. Enplas Display Device Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Co.,
`— F 3d. —, 2018 WL 6033533, at *10 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (overturning jury’s damages award where
`expert testimony supporting it was “based, in part, on non-infringing sales of non-accused
`[products],” because “acts that do not constitute patent infringement cannot provide a proper basis
`for recovery of damages”); Monolithic Power Sys., Inc. v. O2 Micro Int’l, Ltd., 476 F. Supp. 2d
`1143, 1154–56 (granting motion to exclude expert opinion where not all of the products included in
`the expert’s sales base practiced the accused technology); Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., No.
`13–cv–03999–BLF, 2015 WL 4272870, at *9 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2015) (“[I]ncluding a product that
`does not practice the patent at issue and indisputably has an independent use would overcompensate
`[Finjan] for the alleged infringement . . . .”). Finjan has only itself to blame for the absence of any
`royalty base evidence at the close of its case in chief, as it refused and continues to refuse to accept
`the Court’s ruling that Finjan is “stuck with the $1.8 million base.” Id. at 5.
`2.
`No Legally Sufficient Evidence of Apportionment
`Even if Finjan could point to a proper royalty base for the accused products, that base would
`still have to be apportioned. “When the accused technology does not make up the whole of the
`accused product, apportionment is required.” Finjan v. Blue Coat Sys., 879 F.3d 1299, 1311-12
`(Fed. Cir. 2018) (vacating jury damages award due to lack of apportionment). Here, Finjan has no
`evidence of apportionment.
`Apportionment is clearly required in this case. For example, Finjan has accused SRX devices
`used in combination with Sky ATP and Sky ATP alone. But both include substantial non-infringing
`features and functionality. For example, SRX has Next Generation Firewall, AppSecure, Intrusion
`Prevention, Unified Threat Management, User Firewall, Adaptive Threat Intelligence, and Secure
`Routing. Ex. 345 at 3. SRX includes features such as antivirus, antispam, enhanced Web filtering,
`content filtering and “threat protection” for “advanced malware.” Id. at 2. These are just a small
`subset of SRX features and functionality that have nothing at all to do with Sky ATP. Id.
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`Sky ATP is a cloud-based anti-malware service that has a number of security analysis
`features that have nothing to do with Claim 10 and are not accused by Finjan. Finjan only accused
`certain portions of the “Malware Inspection Pipeline”—namely static and dynamic analysis—along
`with an “Identified Malware” but never addressed the other components of Sky ATP as shown
`below. Ex. 382 at 1.
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`But Sky ATP also includes a multitude of non-infringing features and functionality. For
`example, it provides security intelligence cloud feeds such as C&C (i.e., command and control),
`compromised hosts, GeoIP, whitelists, and blacklists. Ex. 78 at 18. Sky ATP further includes
`additional features that do not perform security analysis at all, such as its service portal (i.e., Web
`user interface) that acts as a graphics interface for displaying information to customers and also
`provides a configuration management tool. Id.
`Finjan was accordingly required to apportion out the value of these non-patented features
`from its proposed royalty base, but it failed to do so. Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884)
`(The patentee “must in every case give evidence tending to separate or apportion the defendant’s
`profits and the patentee’s damages between the patented feature and the unpatented features, and
`such evidence must be reliable and tangible, and not conjectural or speculative.”).
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`Even if the Court were inclined to overlook Finjan’s failure of proof on the royalty base in
`light of the royalty base evidence Juniper put on, Finjan would still have to apportion that base
`before applying a royalty rate to it. The total accused revenue base at issue here ($1.8 million) would
`have to be properly apportioned before any royalty rates (such as Finjan’s proposed 8% and 16%
`rates) could apply. See, e.g., Finjan, 879 F.3d at 1312. Finjan does not dispute that the accused
`products incorporate many components and that the accused technology does not make up the whole
`of the accused products. Finjan therefore has not provided evidence that would permit the jury to
`determine the apportionment of revenues.
`3.
`No Legally Sufficient Evidence of a Royalty Rate
`At trial, Finjan continued to rely on the same rates that the Court already rejected.
`Specifically, Finjan pointed to (i) an “$8 per user rate”; (ii) rates of “8 percent on hardware” and
`“16 percent on software;” and (iii) a “$0.32 cents per scan rate.” Each is legally improper.
`$8 Per User Rate: Earlier this year, the Federal Circuit rejected this exact rate and
`overturned a jury damages verdict in Finjan’s favor. Finjam, 879 F.3d at 1311. The Federal Circuit
`ruled that “the $8-per-user fee appears to have been plucked from thin air, and, as such, cannot be
`the basis for a reasonable royalty calculation.” Id. at 1312 (emphasis added); see id. at 1311 (“the
`$8-per-user royalty rate employed in Finjan’s analysis was unsupported by substantial evidence.”).
`Trial testimony from Finjan’s CEO, Mr. Philip Hartstein, confirms that no licensee has accepted a
`$8 per user rate. Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 315:25–316:5 (“Q. You don’t have any licensees who have
`actually paid Finjan a per-use rate, correct? A. It does not show up in the license agreements, no.
`Q. So you don’t have any licensees who have actually agreed to pay $8 per user for a license
`agreement; correct? A. I think that’s correct.”)
`8% on Hardware/16% on Software: Mr. Hartstein also testified that Finjan’s 8%/16%
`royalty rates are merely a starting point for negotiations. Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 332:11–15 (“Q. Now,
`during the negotiation, what happens? What can happen with those rates? A. Uhm, so I mentioned
`that each negotiation is unique. So every company is its own situation. We use 8 and 16 percent as
`the starting point; right?”). However, Finjan has introduced no evidence on the rate the reasonable
`parties in this case would actually reach. Consequently, Finjan has failed to provide evidence of a
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`royalty rate that the jury could reasonably adopt. See Finjan, 879 F.3d at 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
`(“[T]estimony that an 8-16% royalty rate would be the current starting point in licensing
`negotiations says little about what the parties would have proposed or agreed to in a hypothetical
`arm’s length negotiation [at the time of the hypothetical negotiation].” (emphasis added)).
`$0.32 Cents Per Scan Rate: Finjan’s proposed $0.32 per scan rate is devoid of any
`evidentiary support and thus similarly “plucked from thin air.” See Finjan, 879 F.3d at 1312. Not
`only is this $0.32 per scan figure unsupported, here, it would lead to absurd results. Assuming 10
`million scans per month, a $0.32 per scan royalty would result in damages of $44.8 million over the
`course of the damages period (10 million scans x 14 months in damages period x $0.32). There is
`no evidence in the record that Juniper would have agreed to such an economically preposterous rate,
`which vastly exceeds Finjan’s consistent starting point of 8% on hardware and 16% on software.
`See Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 314:3–6 (Philip Hartstein: “Q. You’re not aware of any instance where Finjan
`proposed a royalty that exceeded 16 percent of revenues for the accused products; correct? A. As a
`proposal? No, I don’t think so.”). Such an award “defies basic laws of economics” every bit as
`much as the excluded opinion of Finjan’s damages expert, Mr. Arst. See Dkt. 283 at 4. Finjan
`therefore has not presented evidence of a rate that the jury can use.
`4.
`No Evidence of Apportionment
`B.
`Notice
`During summary judgment briefing, Juniper expressly raised Finjan’s failure to comply with
`the marking and notice requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 287, and Juniper explained that this failure
`precluded Finjan from recovering any damages because the ’494 Patent expired before Finjan filed
`this action. In particular, Juniper argued Finjan incurred a notice obligation pursuant to § 287
`because it and its licensees sold products that embody the ’494 Patent but failed to mark those
`products. Because Finjan failed to mark all or substantially all of the products embodying the ‘494
`Patent, Finjan can collect damages only if it provided Juniper with actual notice of infringement
`pursuant to § 287. No reasonable jury could find that Finjan provided the notice required by law. It
`is undisputed that Finjan did not provide Juniper with written notice. At trial, Finjan relied solely
`on a call between its licensing executive, John Garland, and Juniper’s Director of Litigation, Scott
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`Garland. But Mr. Garland admitted at trial that he made no mention of Sky ATP on that call. Trial
`Tr. 586:22-587:1. Actual notice requires the “affirmative communication of a specific charge of
`infringement by a specific accused product or device.” Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings
`Co., 24 F.3d 178, 187 (Fed. Cir. 1994). No reasonable jury could find that Finjan provided that here.
`1.
`Constructive Notice
`“Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 287(a), a patentee who makes or sells a patented article must mark
`his articles or notify infringers of his patent in order to recover damages.” Arctic Cat Inc. v.
`Bombardier Recreational Prod. Inc., 876 F.3d 1350, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2017). An alleged infringer
`who disputes a “patentee’s compliance with § 287 bears an initial burden of production to articulate
`the products it believes are unmarked ‘patented articles’ subject to § 287.” Id. at 1368. Here, Juniper
`satisfied its burden of production by serving a notice on Finjan identifying specific unmarked
`patented articles subject to § 287. Trial Transcript (“Trial Tr.”) Vol. 2 at 289:8–23. Finjan now
`“bears the burden to prove the products identified do not practice the patented invention.” Arctic
`Cat, 876 F.3d at 1368.
`To satisfy § 287’s constructive notice provision, Finjan and its licensees needed to mark
`substantially all products embodying the ’494 Patent. See Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138
`F.3d 1437, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Cybiotronics, Ltd. v. Golden Source Elecs. Ltd., 130 F. Supp. 2d
`1152, 1162 (C.D. Cal. 2001). Further, Finjan must show that with respect to third-party licensees
`who sell products embodying the ’494 Patent, Finjan “made reasonable efforts to ensure compliance
`with the marking requirements.” Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1111–12 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
`First, Finjan failed to mark substantially all of its own product. Finjan’s CEO, Mr. Hartstein,
`pointed to marking on a web page and on a product advertisement, but this is insufficient as a matter
`of law. See Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 751, 830 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)
`(Distribution of marking “separately from the [patented] devices themselves . . . is insufficient under
`the statute, as a matter of law.”), aff’d, 96 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Acantha LLC v. Depuy
`Orthopaedics Inc., No. 15-C-1257, 2018 WL 1951231, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 25, 2018) (“Because
`Acantha has not established that the surgical technique guides were distributed or shipped with the
`licensed products, it cannot rely on the fact that these guides contain its patent number to show that
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`it complied with the requirements of § 287(a).”); Calmar, Inc. v. Emson Research, Inc., 850 F. Supp.
`861, 868 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that “marking some literature associated with a patented article
`is insufficient to satisfy the marking requirements of the statute”).
`Second, Mr. Hartstein acknowledged that Finjan’s licensees sold products practicing the
`’494 patent, which Finjan itself touted in its Patent Office filings as evidence of secondary
`considerations of non-obviousness. Trial Tr. at 318:11-13 (“But Finjan believes that its licensees
`are actually using its patents in those products; correct? A. Yes, we believe that.”); Trial Ex. 1760
`at 54. However, Mr. Hartstein admitted that he was not aware of any efforts by Finjan to monitor
`whether its licensees are marking their products with Finjan’s patents. See Trial. Tr. at 265:10–14;
`319:8–11. In fact, Mr. Hartstein did not even believe that any of Finjan’s licenses had marking
`provisions. Id. at 319:5-11. U.S. Ethernet Innovations, LLC v. Acer, Inc., No. C 10-3724 CW, 2013
`WL 4456161, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2013) (“3Com failed even to include in the licensing
`agreement an obligation that IBM itself make efforts to mark any products that it reasonably
`believed practiced 3Com's patents.8 It instead authorized IBM to practice the patents-in-suit without
`any requirement that IBM even make a minimal effort to mark them.”). Thus no reasonable jury
`could find that Finjan satisfied § 287’s constructive notice provision.
`2.
`Actual Notice
`Finjan provided no evidence that it gave Juniper written notice of infringement. Without
`such evidence, Finjan cannot satisfy § 287’s actual notice requirements. See 2018 N.D. Cal. Model
`Patent Jury Instruction 5.9 requiring “actual written notice.”
`Even if oral notice were sufficient, no reasonable jury could find that Finjan provided Juniper
`with adequate actual notice. As an initial matter, the standard for actual notice is objective and it
`does not matter what the parties subjectively understood. Specifically, the Federal Circuit has
`explained that “[t]o serve as actual notice, a letter must be sufficiently specific to support an
`objective understanding that the recipient may be an infringer.” Funai Elec. Co., Ltd. V. Daewoo
`Electronics, 616 F.3d 1357, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Thus, Mr. Garland’s alleged subjective intent of
`identifying Sky ATP by referring to “advanced malware modules” is not sufficient to satisfy the
`actual notice requirements as a matter of law.
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`Moreover, to adequately communicate actual notice, the patentee must provide an
`identification of specific products. The Federal Circuit has held “[t]he letter must communicate a
`specific charge of infringement of specific patents by a specific product or group of products.” Funai
`Elec. Co., 616 F.3d. at 1373. Here, Mr. Garland only referenced Juniper’s SRX Series, and its
`included Unified Threat Management, web-filtering, and anti-virus modules. Ex. 256 at JNPR-
`FNJN_29011_00960577-78 (stating that Finjan is focused on the SRX series and that “it looks like
`some of the modules that are supported in those products and the Next Generation firewall, which
`is your UTM, your antivirus, and your web filtering are three modules that we think about using
`three new patents.”). Mr. Garland admitted that he did not mention Sky ATP or SRX specifically
`used in combination with Sky ATP as accused products. Trial Tr. 586:22-587:1; See Trial Exs. 256,
`257; Trial Tr. Vol. 3 at 588:13–16 (John Garland: “Q. Right. And you now know that you’re
`mistaken and that you did not mention Sky ATP; is that right? A. I only know I’m mistaken because
`the call - - yeah, the call is recorded and taped and transcribed.”).
`Any notion that Mr. Garland’s single, offhand remark on a phone call that the ’494 Patent
`“reads on your advanced malware modules” provided actual notice of Sky ATP or SRX used in
`combination with Sky ATP fails as a matter of law. Sky ATP cannot objectively be viewed as an
`advanced malware module. Trial Ex. 345 at 2 (discussing SRX’s on-box “advanced malware” threat
`protection, which is unrelated to Sky ATP); Coonan Dep. Tr. at 167:13-24 (“Q. Have you heard of
`Sky ATP referred to as advanced malware? A. No. . . . Q. Have you ever heard of Sky ATP referred
`to as having advanced malware modules? A. Not – not a module, no, ‘cause it’s a cloud-based
`solution.”). Moreover, “advanced malware modules” does not identify a specific group of products.
`At best, “advanced malware modules” refers generally to the market for advanced anti-malware
`solutions. Identifying a broad market for products does not sufficiently provide actual notice as a
`matter of law. See Asyst Technologies, Inc. v. Empak, Inc., 2006 WL 3302476 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
`14, 2006) (finding insufficient actual notice as a matter of law despite the patent owner sending
`letters identifying “the market for SMIF pods” because “[n]either letter identified any particular
`product of [the defendants].” Id.
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`Thus, there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for Finjan
`on this issue, and judgment as a matter of law is appropriate.
`C.
`Infringement
`Finjan has failed to put forth a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to
`find infringement because Finjan has not demonstrated that Sky ATP satisfies the “database”
`element of claim 10. The parties agreed to the following construction of “database”: “a collection
`of interrelated data organized to a database schema to serve one or more applications.” However,
`Finjan has not demonstrated that its own abstract creation, the “ResultsDB Database,” is organized
`according to a database schema. Instead, the evidence showed that Juniper stores the results of its
`analysis engines, which correspond to the claimed “security profile,” in DynamoDB and S3, which
`are schema-less storage solutions. Trial Ex. 1264 at 2-3. Dr. Cole’s testimony does not relate to the
`database schema associated with DynamoDB or S3, rather it relates to the JSON schema of the
`objects stored in DynamoDB and S3; in other words, the databases are (as Amazon makes explicit)
`schema-less, regardless of whether some of the objects therein (the JSONs) have their own internal
`JSON schemas. Trial Tr. Vol. 3 at 504:22-25. Further, Dr. Cole’s testimony did not establish that
`the JSON schema was a database for the artificial “ResultsDB Database” of his own creation.
`Finjan has also failed to demonstrate that its made-up “ResultsDB Database” is organized
`according to a “database schema” as Finjan and its own expert defined the term on multiple
`occasions. Before the PTAB, Finjan argued through its expert that that one of skill in the art would
`understand that claim 10 requires the use of a “database schema,” which it defined as “a description
`of a database to a database management system (DBMS) in the language provided by the DBMS.”
`Trial Ex. 1760 at 46; see also IPR2015-01892, Paper 27 at 38-39 (same citation to same expert).
`On one hand, the MySQL database is, as its name suggests and as Dr. Cole admitted, described in
`Structured Query Language (SQL). On the other hand, the ResultsDB API (i.e., what the Court
`found be the claimed “database manager”) is written in Python, as indicated by the fact that the
`ResultsDB API code is found in argon\src\rdb\resultsdb.py (where “.py” is the Python file
`extension). Trial Tr. Vol. 3 at (Eric Cole: “Q. The ResultsDB manager that you identified as the
`infringing database management system is written in python; correct? A. Yes, that is my
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`understanding. Q. But for the MySQL database you run queries using the standard query language;
`correct? A. Yes, for the MySQL database that’s run by Amazon, they use MySQL for queries.”).
`Finally, Finjan failed to prove that the accused system, which is a cloud-based system, was
`made, used, sold or offered for sale in the United States during the damages period.
`CONCLUSION
`Juniper respectfully requests that the Court grant judgment as a matter of law on notice,
`damages, and infringement.
`
`Dated: December 13, 2018
`
`IRELL & MANELLA LLP
`
`By: /s/ Alan Heinrich
`Alan Heinrich
`Attorneys for Defendant
`JUNIPER NETWORKS, INC.
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