Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 209 Filed 10/12/18 Page 1 of 10
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`IRELL & MANELLA LLP
`Jonathan S. Kagan (SBN 166039)
`jkagan@irell.com
`Joshua P. Glucoft (SBN 301249)
`jglucoft@irell.com
`Casey Curran (SBN 305210)
`ccurran@irell.com
`Sharon Song (SBN 313535)
`ssong@irell.com
`1800 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 900
`Los Angeles, California 90067-4276
`Telephone: (310) 277-1010
`Facsimile: (310) 203-7199
`
`Rebecca L. Carson (SBN 254105)
`rcarson@irell.com
`Kevin Wang (SBN 318024)
`kwang@irell.com
`840 Newport Center Drive, Suite 400
`Newport Beach, California 92660-6324
`Telephone: (949) 760-0991
`Facsimile: (949) 760-5200
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`JUNIPER NETWORKS, INC.
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
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`FINJAN, INC.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`vs.
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`JUNIPER NETWORKS, INC.,
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`Defendant.
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`Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA
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`DEFENDANT JUNIPER NETWORKS,
`INC.’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
`MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND ITS
`ANSWER TO FINJAN, INC.’S SECOND
`AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR PATENT
`INFRINGEMENT AND COUNTER-
`CLAIMS
`
`Date: November 1, 2018
`Time: 8:00 a.m.
`Judge: William Alsup
`Courtroom: 12 - 19th Floor
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`IRELL & MANELLA LLP
`A Registered Limited Liability
`Law Partnership Including
`Professional Corporations
`
`10592919
`
`
`
`
`JUNIPER’S REPLY ISO
`MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
`(Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA)
`
`

`

`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 209 Filed 10/12/18 Page 2 of 10
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`Juniper’s proposed amended responsive pleading overcomes all deficiencies identified by
`the Court’s August 31, 2018 order or otherwise raised by Finjan.1 Juniper has added factual
`allegations that detail each element of its counterclaims and/or defenses for inequitable conduct,
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`prosecution laches and ensnarement. See Dkt. No. 197. Finjan does not oppose Juniper’s
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`amendment to the ensnarement affirmative defense. See Dkt. No. 202 at 1 n.1.
`I.
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`JUNIPER SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGES INEQUITABLE CONDUCT (FOURTH
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`AND FIFTH COUNTERCLAIMS, FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE)
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`The factual allegations Juniper added to its inequitable conduct counterclaims and
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`affirmative defense overcome all issues previously identified by Finjan. See Dkt. No. 202.
`A.
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`Juniper Alleges Facts Demonstrating That Mr. Touboul’s Statement Of Sole
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`Inventorship To The USPTO Was False
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`Juniper now alleges facts demonstrating that Mr. Touboul’s claim of sole inventorship
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`relating to the ’494 Patent is false. Specifically, Juniper alleges that Mr. Touboul testified in his
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`declaration that he was the “sole” inventor of claims 1, 3-6, 9, 10, 12-15, and 18 of the
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`’494 Patent, and that these claims were conceived solely by Mr. Touboul no later than November
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`18, 1996. Dkt. No. 197-5 (Ex. 4) at ¶ 233. Juniper then quotes sworn testimony from Mr. David
`R. Kroll, one of the inventors listed on the face of the ’494 Patent,2 that he “helped come up with
`the idea behind claim 10 [of the ’494 Patent]” after he started his employment at Finjan in 1999.
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`See id. at ¶ 236; Mot. at 3-4. Mr. Kroll’s sworn testimony thus expressly contradicts Mr.
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`Touboul’s testimony to the USPTO, and it provides strong, clear factual support for Juniper’s
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`allegation that Mr. Touboul made an affirmative misrepresentation to the USPTO about claim 10.
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`Finjan’s primary response to Juniper’s allegations is that “Juniper cites to no statement
`from Mr. Touboul that contradict [sic] his declaration to the PTO or show [sic] that it was false.”
`Dkt. No. 202 at 4:9-10. But Juniper does not need to allege a statement from Mr. Touboul that
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`
`1 All emphasis is added unless indicated otherwise.
`2 Mr. Kroll is not a mere “layperson,” as Finjan argues (see Dkt. No. 202 at 3:17). Rather,
`he is one of the inventors of the ’494 Patent who would be able to testify, from his personal
`knowledge the extent to which he contributed to the invention of claim 10.
`
`IRELL & MANELLA LLP
`A Registered Limited Liability
`Law Partnership Including
`Professional Corporations
`
`10592919
`
`
`- 1 -
`
`JUNIPER’S REPLY ISO
`MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
`(Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA)
`
`

`

`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 209 Filed 10/12/18 Page 3 of 10
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`contradicts his earlier declaration; Juniper may allege any set of facts that show that Mr.
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`Touboul’s declaration was false. Here, Juniper carries that burden by presenting sworn testimony
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`from another inventor on claim 10 that expressly contradicts Mr. Touboul’s claim of exclusive
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`inventorship. Mot. at 5. Juniper even supplements this testimony from Mr. Kroll with evidence
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`that Mr. Kroll was one of the original and first inventors of the subject matter disclosed in U.S.
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`Patent No. 7,058,822, from which the ’494 Patent claims priority.
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`Mr. Kroll’s contribution to claim 10 is significant because it helps establish the date on
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`which this claim was conceived. Mr. Kroll started his employment at Finjan in 1999, so
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`(assuming he helped come up with the idea for claim 10, as he testified) the conception date for
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`this claim could not be November 1996 as Finjan has claimed. Moreover, if Mr. Kroll’s testimony
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`under oath that he “helped come up with the idea behind claim 10” is true, then Mr. Touboul’s
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`statement that he was the sole inventor was false.
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`Finjan’s argument that Mr. Kroll was not asked any questions about Mr. Touboul’s
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`contribution to the ’494 Patent is inapposite. Juniper is not attempting to prove that Mr. Touboul
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`is not an inventor on the patent—only that he is not the exclusive inventor of claim 10, as he
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`represented to the USPTO.
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`At the pleadings stage, where “the court accepts the facts alleged in the complaint as true,”
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`Juniper sufficiently alleges that Mr. Touboul made a misrepresentation to the USPTO in his
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`declaration. See Vistan Corp. v. Fadei USA, Inc., No. C-10-4862 JCS, 2011 WL 1544796, at *7
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`(N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2011). As this misrepresentation consists of “the filing of an unmistakably
`false affidavit,” it is an “affirmative act[] of egregious misconduct” that is per se material.
`Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1376, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also
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`Outside the Box Innovations v. Travel Caddy, Inc., 695 F.3d 1285, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[A]
`false affidavit or declaration is per se material.”). Moreover, Mr. Touboul’s false statements
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`resulted in the USPTO withdrawing its rejection because Ji would no longer be prior art if the
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`priority date of the ’494 Patent is 1996 (when Mr. Kroll was not yet working at Finjan) as opposed
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`to 1999. Thus, his false statements are also “but-for” material.
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`IRELL & MANELLA LLP
`A Registered Limited Liability
`Law Partnership Including
`Professional Corporations
`
`10592919
`
`
`- 2 -
`
`JUNIPER’S REPLY ISO
`MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
`(Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA)
`
`

`

`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 209 Filed 10/12/18 Page 4 of 10
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`Juniper Alleges Facts Showing That Ms. Bey’s Certification To The USPTO
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`B.
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`That Her Claim Of Priority Was “Unintentionally” Delayed Was False
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`Juniper has also added factual allegations supporting its claim that Ms. Bey’s statement to
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`the USPTO that Finjan had “unintentionally” delayed its claim of priority is false. Finjan’s only
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`response to Juniper’s allegations is that the claim of priority was permitted by the USPTO’s
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`procedures. In making this argument, Finjan attempts to distract this Court from the crux of
`Juniper’s allegations—that Finjan has intentionally delayed making its claim of priority as part of
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`an effort to impermissibly extend the length of its patents. Finjan’s strategy is difficult to discern
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`when you look at individual prosecution cases in isolation—after all, it is certainly possible that in
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`any particular case there is unintentional delay in filing certain papers. When Finjan’s overall
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`patent prosecution strategy is examined, however, it becomes clear that Finjan intentionally
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`avoided making claims of priority to try to extend the life of its patents, and, if and only if the
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`USPTO rejected the claims over the prior art, Finjan would then submit a claim of priority to get
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`around the prior art, claiming that its earlier failure to do so was “unintentional.”
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`It is well established that “[c]ourts must consider the complaint in its entirety . . . when
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`ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss[.]” Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1205, n.6 (9th Cir.
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`2010) (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)). Here,
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`Juniper provides detailed allegations concerning Finjan’s pattern of repeated misrepresentations to
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`the USPTO regarding purportedly “unintentionally” delayed claims of priority, comprised of at
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`least five different instances in which Finjan made material misrepresentations to the USPTO. See
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`Dkt. No. 197-5 ¶¶ 252-258. These allegations, detailed in the Fifth Counterclaim and incorporated
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`by reference in the Fourth Counterclaim, explain how Finjan’s “unusually abundant history” of
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`petitioning for allegedly “unintentionally” delayed claims of priority illustrates Finjan’s scheme to
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`abuse the patent prosecution system by: (1) trying to get a later priority date for a patent; and (2) if
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`and only if the USPTO rejected this effort, claiming that Finjan made an innocent mistake about
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`the proper priority date, and seeking to “correct” its “unintentionally” delayed priority. See Mot.
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`at 6-7. This Court has already held that these allegations are sufficient to support Juniper’s Fifth
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`IRELL & MANELLA LLP
`A Registered Limited Liability
`Law Partnership Including
`Professional Corporations
`
`10592919
`
`
`- 3 -
`
`JUNIPER’S REPLY ISO
`MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
`(Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA)
`
`

`

`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 209 Filed 10/12/18 Page 5 of 10
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`Counterclaim—which alleges the same scheme to maximize the value of the ’154 patent. See Dkt.
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`No. 190 at 8; Dkt. No. 197-5 at ¶¶ 246-257.
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`Finjan concedes, as it must, that alleging inequitable conduct does not always require “but-
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`for materiality” if the allegations sufficiently plead the filing of an “unmistakably false affidavit”
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`that constitutes “affirmative egregious misconduct.” Dkt. No. 202 at 3:4-11. This Court has
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`already held that the facts alleged by Juniper “are sufficient to support a reasonable inference that
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`Attorney Bey falsely represented [in her petitions to the USPTO] that the delay in claiming
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`priority was ‘unintentional’ under the heightened pleading standard.” Dkt. No. 190 at 8-9. Thus,
`these petitions constitute unmistakably false affidavits that constitute affirmative egregious
`misconduct and are per se material. See Outside the Box Innovations, 695 F.3d at 1294;
`Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1392; Dkt. No. 190 at 12 (“The alleged delay tactics [exercised by
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`Attorney Bey], if accepted as true, would be an abuse of the prosecution system, which this order
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`finds would amount to ‘egregious misconduct.’”).
`C.
`For inequitable conduct, “knowledge and intent may be alleged more generally” as long as
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`Juniper Sufficiently Alleges Facts Justifying An Inference Of Specific Intent
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`“the pleadings allege sufficient underlying facts from which a court may reasonably infer that a
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`party acted with the requisite state of mind.” Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d
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`1312, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Oracle Corp. v. DrugLogic, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 2d 885, 896-
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`97 (N.D. Cal. 2011). “Because direct evidence of deceptive intent is rare, a district court may
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`infer intent from indirect and circumstantial evidence.” Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290.
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`The Federal Circuit has acknowledged that “[a]n inference of intent may arise where
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`material false statements are proffered in a declaration or other sworn statement submitted to the
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`PTO.” eSpeed, Inc. v. BrokerTec USA, L.L.C., 480 F.3d 1129, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Moreover,
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`the inference that material false statements contained in an affidavit submitted to the PTO “were
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`made with deceptive intent ‘arises not simply from the materiality of the affidavits, but from the
`affirmative acts of submitting them, their misleading character, and the inability of the examiner
`to investigate the facts.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). Additionally, where there is “a pattern
`of false and misleading statements during prosecution of related patents,” the Federal Circuit has
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`IRELL & MANELLA LLP
`A Registered Limited Liability
`Law Partnership Including
`Professional Corporations
`
`10592919
`
`
`- 4 -
`
`JUNIPER’S REPLY ISO
`MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
`(Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA)
`
`

`

`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 209 Filed 10/12/18 Page 6 of 10
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`held that an “intent to deceive the PTO [is] the single most reasonable inference.” Intellect
`Wireless, Inc. v. HTC Corp., 732 F.3d 1339, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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`In Intellect Wireless, the inventor of the patents-in-suit made misrepresentations to the
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`USPTO during prosecution. The misrepresentations included a false declaration containing “false
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`statements regarding actual reduction to practice . . . in order to overcome prior art,” and a
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`misleading press release. 732 F.3d at 1344. The Federal Circuit held that “[s]ubmission of a
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`[false] affidavit . . . in order to overcome a prior art reference raises a strong inference of intent to
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`deceive.” Id. at 1345. And the court further held that “a pattern of deceit [] makes the inference
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`stronger” and affirmed the district court’s holding that “specific intent to deceive the PTO was the
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`most reasonable inference” from the inventor’s pattern of false and misleading statements during
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`prosecution. Id. at 1344-45.
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`Here, Juniper alleges that Mr. Touboul and Ms. Bey each submitted false affidavits to the
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`USPTO during prosecution of related patents. Just like the sole inventor in Intellect Wireless,
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`Mr. Touboul misrepresented to the PTO that he was the sole inventor of claim 10 of the ’494
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`Patent “in order to overcome prior art.” Mr. Touboul’s false statements were material because
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`they resulted in the USPTO withdrawing its rejection over Ji. And Ms. Bey’s multiple false
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`affidavits claiming “unintentionally” delayed claims of priority demonstrate a “pattern of
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`deceit.” Finjan’s “pattern of false and misleading statements” alleged by Juniper demonstrate that
`the specific intent to deceive the PTO is the single most reasonable inference.
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`Moreover, Juniper alleges that Ms. Bey’s motivation for submitting false affidavits was to
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`extend the life of the patents. See Dkt. No. 197-5 at ¶ 256 (allegation that “[s]ince patents expire
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`sooner if their priority is extended farther back in time, on information and belief, Ms. Bey, acting
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`on behalf of Finjan, intentionally delayed properly claiming priority in these patents so that they
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`might benefit from a deferred expiration date”). “[F]inancial incentive[] to lie to the PTO”
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`together with sufficient allegations of misrepresentations have been found to further “support an
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`inference of specific intent.” Capella Photonics, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 77 F. Supp. 3d 850, 863–
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`64 (N.D. Cal. 2014). Thus, these additional allegations bolster the inference regarding Mr.
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`Touboul’s and Ms. Bey’s intent to deceive the USPTO.
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`IRELL & MANELLA LLP
`A Registered Limited Liability
`Law Partnership Including
`Professional Corporations
`
`10592919
`
`
`- 5 -
`
`JUNIPER’S REPLY ISO
`MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
`(Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA)
`
`

`

`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 209 Filed 10/12/18 Page 7 of 10
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`The case law Finjan cites on this issue is inapposite. For example, in Exergen, the Court
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`found that the defendant had not identified any specific individuals who withheld information or
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`made false statements. 575 F.3d at 1329. As such, the Court concluded that the allegations did
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`“not plausibly suggest any ‘deliberate decision to withhold a known material reference’ or to make
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`a knowingly false misrepresentation—a necessary predicate for inferring deceptive intent.” Id. at
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`1331. By contrast, Juniper has identified specific individuals who made knowingly false
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`statements that were either material or amount to egregious misconduct. See Dkt. No. 197-5 at
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`¶¶ 239, 258. Thus, Juniper—unlike the defendant in Exergen—has pled these necessary
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`predicates for inferring deceptive intent.
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`Zep Solar Inc. v. Westinghouse Solar, Inc., 2012 WL 1293872 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2012) is
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`also distinguishable. In that case, the defendant did “not even purport to identify an allegedly
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`fraudulent document that Zep submitted to the PTO,” nor did it “identify any particular
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`misrepresentation or omission to the PTO, let alone allege any facts regarding the ‘who, what,
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`when, where, and how’ of any such material misrepresentation or omission.” Id. at *3. Similarly,
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`in BlackBerry Limited v. Typo Products LLC, 2014 WL 1867009 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2014), the
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`court found that the defendant had not met the pleading requirement for specific intent because
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`“[a]ll that Typo has alleged is that a material reference which was widely available was not
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`disclosed to the PTO” and thus there were no facts from which to draw an inference of intent to
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`deceive. Id. at *3. Here, Juniper has included detailed allegations about Mr. Touboul’s and Ms.
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`Bey’s affirmative misrepresentations to the USPTO, and has identified them with particularity.
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`Moreover, it has made specific allegations regarding Mr. Touboul’s and Ms. Bey’s motivation for
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`making these false statements. Dkt. No. 197-5 at ¶¶ 235, 237, 256.
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`Moreover, as detailed in Juniper’s moving papers, the Bitdefender court has already found
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`Mr. Touboul’s false statements to the USPTO concerning his purported “sole” inventorship of the
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`’494 Patent, submitted in response to the Examiner’s rejection of the ’494 Patent in view of the Ji
`reference, “sufficient to support an inference that Touboul acted with intent to deceive the PTO.”
`Mot. at 6. While Finjan argues that Bitdefender’s pleadings involved different issues, this theory
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`fails upon an examination of the portion of the order from the Bitdefender court (J. Gilliam) cited
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`IRELL & MANELLA LLP
`A Registered Limited Liability
`Law Partnership Including
`Professional Corporations
`
`10592919
`
`
`- 6 -
`
`JUNIPER’S REPLY ISO
`MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
`(Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA)
`
`

`

`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 209 Filed 10/12/18 Page 8 of 10
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`in Juniper’s motion (id.): the Bitdefender court expressly found that Mr. Touboul’s false
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`statements to “overcome the PTO’s rejection of the ’494 Patent in view of [the Ji reference]” made
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`“when the ’494 Patent was at risk . . . to save it, claiming sole inventorship” sufficiently supported
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`an inference that Mr. Touboul had the specific intent to deceive the USPTO. These are the precise
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`allegations Juniper makes here.
`II.
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`JUNIPER SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGES PROSECUTION LACHES (THIRD
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`COUNTERCLAIM AND ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE)
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`Finjan’s opposition to Juniper’s proposed amendments to its prosecution laches allegations
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`simply repeats the arguments it made against Juniper’s inequitable conduct allegations; Finjan
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`again attempts to distract this Court from the core of Juniper’s allegations, which focus on
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`Finjan’s pattern of repeated misrepresentations
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`to
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`the USPTO regarding purportedly
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`“unintentionally” delayed claims of priority. Instead, Finjan emphasizes how its dilatory behavior
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`in individual cases and its use of terminal disclaimers in the ’926, ’633 and ’494 Patents were each
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`individually permitted by the USPTO’s procedures. See Dkt. No. 202 at 6. As discussed above,
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`Finjan’s scheme involving strategies of unexplained and unreasonable delay and misrepresentation
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`to the USPTO is difficult to discern if one focuses only on individual cases, but it becomes
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`obvious when the totality of Finjan’s behavior across all the patents asserted in this case is
`examined. See Dkt. No. 197-5 at ¶¶ 217-221.3 Indeed, this Court has already found that the
`“totality of Juniper’s allegations presents a troubling scheme” involving “delay tactics [by Finjan],
`if accepted as true, [that] would be an abuse of the prosecution system,” and that “would amount
`to ‘egregious misconduct.’” Dkt. No. 190 at 11-12.
`Finjan’s citation to Nomadix, Inc. v. Hosp. Core Servs. LLC, 2015 WL 3948804 (C.D. Cal.
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`June 29, 2015), is unpersuasive. In that case, defendant’s theory of prosecution laches was merely
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`that “Plaintiff had submitted multiple, prolix, and unreasonably complex patent applications” that
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`caused unreasonable and unexplained delay because it took longer for the Patent Office to issue
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`3 For prosecution laches, Juniper has incorporated by reference its allegations detailing
`Finjan’s dilatory scheme, comprised of at least four different instances in which Finjan made
`material misrepresentations to the USPTO.
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`IRELL & MANELLA LLP
`A Registered Limited Liability
`Law Partnership Including
`Professional Corporations
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`10592919
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`- 7 -
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`JUNIPER’S REPLY ISO
`MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
`(Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA)
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`

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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 209 Filed 10/12/18 Page 9 of 10
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`the patents. Id. at *10. By contrast, Juniper alleges that unreasonable and unexplained delay was
`caused by Finjan failing to file its patent applications until years after the filing of the parent
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`applications to which they claimed priority, as part of a scheme to try to extend the lives of their
`patents. For example, Juniper details how Finjan delayed almost seventeen years in prosecuting
`the ’494 Patent and twelve years in prosecuting the ’926 Patent. See Dkt. No. 197-5 at ¶¶ 206,
`209. Further, the only prejudice alleged by the defendant in Nomadix was of “general harm that
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`comes from an extended patent monopoly.” 2015 WL 3948804 at *11. Here, Juniper alleges the
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`specific prejudice it has suffered and Finjan’s assertion that Juniper fails to explain the prejudice it
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`suffered as a result of Finjan’s dilatory scheme is baseless. Juniper alleges it invested substantial
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`resources in developing its portfolio of security-related products (including those asserted in this
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`action) because Juniper could not account for the unissued patents in its product development
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`planning. See Dkt. No. 197-5 ¶¶ 217, 219. Even if, as Finjan notes, Finjan cannot extend its
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`patents’ terms beyond the 20-year mark, it would have an incentive to engage in unreasonable
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`delay in prosecution to entice more potential infringers into the market (alleged infringers who
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`would develop products without knowledge of the unissued patents), all of whom Finjan could
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`then sue once its delayed patents finally issued.
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`Moreover, Finjan’s assertion that the parent patent provides a “general outline” of
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`subsequent patent claims is ridiculous in the face of its extreme delays in prosecuting its patents.
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`In Nomadix, which Finjan relies on for this assertion, there was no delay in prosecuting the patents
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`after the parent application was approved. 2015 WL 3948804 at *11. Here, for example, in the
`almost seventeen years after the parent application of the ’494 Patent was filed, during which
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`Finjan chose not to prosecute the ’494 Patent, the computer security-related field would have
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`developed and evolved to the extent that no outdated parent patent would provide any useful
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`“general outline.”
`III. THERE IS NO PREJUDICE TO FINJAN
`Finjan will not be prejudiced by having to engage in discovery relating to Juniper’s
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`counterclaims and affirmative defenses because fact discovery does not close in this case until the
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`end of March 2019. Mot. at 9-10. Even if Finjan did not have “full and fair notice” of these
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`IRELL & MANELLA LLP
`A Registered Limited Liability
`Law Partnership Including
`Professional Corporations
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`10592919
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`- 8 -
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`JUNIPER’S REPLY ISO
`MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
`(Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA)
`
`

`

`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 209 Filed 10/12/18 Page 10 of 10
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`counterclaims based on Juniper’s original answer and counterclaims, it certainly has full and fair
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`notice now, and has more than six months to conduct relevant discovery. Finjan is also free to
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`request from the Court additional numbers of interrogatories if it believes that they are essential to
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`conducting needed discovery in this case.
`IV. CONCLUSION
`Juniper respectfully requests that the Court grant Juniper leave to amend certain of its
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`affirmative defenses and counterclaims to incorporate substantial new factual allegations.
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`Dated: October 12, 2018
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`
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`Respectfully submitted,
`IRELL & MANELLA LLP
`By: /s/ Rebecca L. Carson
`Rebecca L. Carson (SBN 254105)
`rcarson@irell.com
`840 Newport Center Drive, Suite 400
`Newport Beach, CA 92660-6324
`Tel: (949) 760-0991 | Fax: (949) 760-5200
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`JUNIPER NETWORKS, INC.
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`IRELL & MANELLA LLP
`A Registered Limited Liability
`Law Partnership Including
`Professional Corporations
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`10592919
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`- 9 -
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`JUNIPER’S REPLY ISO
`MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
`(Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA)
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`