Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 182 Filed 08/20/18 Page 1 of 30
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`IRELL & MANELLA LLP
`Jonathan S. Kagan (SBN 166039)
`jkagan@irell.com
`Joshua Glucoft (SBN 301249)
`jglucoft@irell.com
`Casey Curran (SBN 305210)
`ccurran@irell.com
`Sharon Song (SBN 313535)
`ssong@irell.com
`1800 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 900
`Los Angeles, California 90067-4276
`Telephone: (310) 277-1010
`Facsimile: (310) 203-7199
`
`Rebecca Carson (SBN 254105)
`rcarson@irell.com
`Kevin Wang (SBN 318024)
`kwang@irell.com
`840 Newport Center Drive, Suite 400
`Newport Beach, California 92660-6324
`Telephone: (949) 760-0991
`Facsimile: (949) 760-5200
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`JUNIPER NETWORKS, INC.
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
`FINJAN, INC., a Delaware Corporation,,
`)
`Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA
`
`)
`
`DEFENDANT JUNIPER NETWORKS,
`Plaintiff,
`)
`INC.’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF FINJAN,
`
`)
`INC.’S OPENING CLAIM
`v.
`
`)
`CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`)
`JUNIPER NETWORKS, INC., a Delaware
`)
`Corporation,
`)
`Hon. William Alsup
`
`)
`)
`)
`
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`10563691
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`JUNIPER’S REPLY TO FINJAN’S OPENING
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`(Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA)
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`A Registered Limited Liability
`Law Partnership Including
`Professional Corporations
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`IRELL & MANELLA LLP
`A Registered Limited Liability
`Law Partnership Including
`Professional Corporations
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`
`
`I.
`II.
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`III.
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`IV.
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`V.
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`VI.
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`10563691
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`D.
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`B.
`C.
`
`Page
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1
`THE ’633 PATENT ............................................................................................................ 1
`determining, by the computer, whether the downloadable
`A.
`information includes executable code”/ “if the downloadable-
`information is determined to include executable code / (Claims 1
`and 8) ....................................................................................................................... 2
`“mobile protection code” (Claims 1, 8, 14 and 19) ................................................. 4
`“information-destination/downloadable-information destination”
`(Claims 1, 8, 14 and 19) .......................................................................................... 5
`“A computer program product, comprising a computer usable
`medium having a computer readable program code therein, the
`computer readable program code adapted to be executed for
`computer security, the method comprising:” (Claim 14) ........................................ 8
`1.
`The Court has no authority to “correct” the claim language. ...................... 8
`(a)
`Claim 14 is indefinite under IPXL. .................................................. 9
`THE ’844 PATENT .......................................................................................................... 10
`A.
`“inspector” (Claims 1, 15 and 41) ......................................................................... 10
`B.
`“before a web server makes the Downloadable available to web
`clients” (Claims 1, 15, and 41) .............................................................................. 14
`THE ’926 PATENT .......................................................................................................... 16
`“a transmitter coupled with said receiver, for transmitting the
`A.
`incoming Downloadable and a representation of the retrieved
`Downloadable security profile data to a destination computer, via a
`transport protocol transmission” ........................................................................... 17
`THE ’154 PATENT .......................................................................................................... 19
`A.
`“A content processor. . .” (Claim 1) ...................................................................... 20
`B.
`“invoking a second function with the input” (Claim 1) ........................................ 22
`C.
`“safe” (Claim 1) .................................................................................................... 23
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 25
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`IRELL & MANELLA LLP
`A Registered Limited Liability
`Law Partnership Including
`Professional Corporations
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Abbott Labs. v. Novopharm Ltd.,
`323 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ..................................................................................................23
`
`Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Finjan, Inc.,
`IPR2018-00391, Paper 6 ........................................................................................................3, 13
`
`CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc.,
`654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ....................................................................................................9
`
`Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc.,
`582 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ..................................................................................................23
`
`Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,
`2014 WL 4802426 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2014) .........................................................................1, 3
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc.,
`2014 WL 5361976 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2014) ....................................................................8, 9, 13
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc.,
`879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ..................................................................................................16
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc.,
`Case No. 5:13-cv-03999-BLF, Dkt. No. 118 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2014) ...................................16
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`2018 WL 3537142 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2018) ........................................................................8, 16
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. ESET, LLC,
`2017 WL 5501338 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2017) ...............................................................13, 14, 16
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. ESET, LLC,
`Case No. 3:17-cv-00183-CAB, Dkt. No. 205 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2017) ..................................14
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Proofpoint, Inc.,
`2015 WL 7770208 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2015) ...............................................................................7
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Sophos, Inc.,
`244 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2017) .....................................................................................18
`
`Gutterglove, Inc. v. American Die & Rollforming, Inc.,
`2017 WL 4124229 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2017) ...........................................................................20
`
`IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`430 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ..........................................................................................8, 9, 10
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`JUNIPER’S REPLY TO FINJAN’S OPENING
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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 182 Filed 08/20/18 Page 4 of 30
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`Page(s)
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`MasterMine Software, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`874 F.3d 1307 (Fed Cir. 2017) ...................................................................................................10
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc.,
`357 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ..................................................................................................12
`
`Novo Indus., L.P. v. Micro Molds Corp.,
`350 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ....................................................................................................8
`
`O2 Micro International Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ..................................................................................................22
`
`Oatey Co. v. IPS Corp.,
`2006 WL 581240 (N.D. Ohio March 8, 2006) .............................................................................4
`
`Rembrandt Data Techs., LP v. AOL, LLC,
`641 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ..................................................................................................10
`
`Rembrandt Wireless Techs. LP v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd.,
`853 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ..................................................................................................23
`
`Saffran v. Johnson & Johnson,
`712 F.3d 549 (Fed Cir.2013) ......................................................................................................12
`
`Smith v. ORBCOOM, Inc.,
`2015 WL 5302815 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2015) ............................................................................9
`
`Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp.,
`503 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ..................................................................................................20
`
`WhatsApp Inc. v. Intercarrier Commc’ns, LLC,
`2014 WL 5306078 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2014) ............................................................................12
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 255 ..................................................................................................................................8
`
`Other Authorities
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`MPEP § 2173.05(e) ............................................................................................................................9
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`JUNIPER’S REPLY TO FINJAN’S OPENING
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`IRELL & MANELLA LLP
`A Registered Limited Liability
`Law Partnership Including
`Professional Corporations
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Plaintiff Finjan, Inc.’s (“Finjan’s”) patent campaign against the network security industry
`has taken a heavy toll on Finjan’s patent portfolio. Each of the patents currently asserted against
`Juniper Networks, Inc. (“Juniper”) has been the subject of multiple reexamination or inter partes
`review proceedings, during which Finjan made numerous concessions to save its patents. Now that
`Finjan is trying to establish an infringement case against Juniper, it attempts to retreat from
`statements it made to the USPTO and PTAB. This it cannot do; having conceded that its patents
`are limited to preserve their validity, Finjan cannot now recapture the claim scope it surrendered.
`In addition, Finjan’s claim that it is merely trying to use the “plain meaning” of many patent
`terms is false. In many cases, Finjan’s proposed “plain meaning” ignores the actual, plain language
`of the claims, the express goals of the patents, pertinent portions of the specification, and the relevant
`prosecution history (including post-grant proceedings). See Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC v. Sprint
`Nextel Corp., 2014 WL 4802426, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2014) (IPR proceedings are “an
`important part of the intrinsic record.”). Finjan also improperly cherry-picks favorable constructions
`from past district court orders, while ignoring those that support Juniper’s proposed constructions.
`Juniper’s constructions, on the other hand, are consistent with—and in some instances
`identical—to the constructions applied by the USPTO and PTAB. Perhaps most importantly,
`Juniper’s constructions accurately define what is actually taught in the patents as the purpose of the
`inventions, as expressed in the specifications and prosecution histories—which is precisely what the
`Federal Circuit has held claim constructions are supposed to do.
`II.
`THE ’633 PATENT
`The ’633 Patent is directed to a system that (1) determines whether an incoming file contains
`executable code, and if so, (2) sends code to the client computer that will protect that computer by
`running the file in a “sandbox” on the end user’s device. This approach facilitates load balancing
`by conducting the resource-intensive dynamic analysis at the client computers instead of at the
`gateway. Ex. 1 (’633 Patent) at 1:48-50, 2:14-16. Exemplary Claim 1 recites a computer processor-
`based method, comprising:
`receiving, by a computer, downloadable-information;
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`determining, by the computer, whether the downloadable-information includes
`executable code; and
`based upon the determination, transmitting from the computer mobile protection
`code to at least one information-destination of the downloadable-information, if the
`downloadable-information is determined to include executable code.
`Finjan’s proposed constructions for the ’633 Patent improperly expand the scope of the
`claims to include sending code other than sandboxing code to effectively anywhere, regardless of
`whether or not the file is even executable, thereby negating the purported benefits of the claims.
`Juniper’s constructions, on the other hand, are tied to the claim language and intrinsic record.
`A.
`determining, by the computer, whether the downloadable information
`includes executable code”/ “if the downloadable-information is determined to
`include executable code / (Claims 1 and 8)
`Juniper’s Proposed Construction
`Finjan’s Proposed Construction
`Distinguishing between two alternative
`Detecting content that is likely to be of an
`possibilities: executable code is included in
`executable type that can carry executable
`the downloadable-information and
`content
`executable code is not included in the
`downloadable-information
`
`Juniper’s proposed construction for the “determining” step is taken directly from the intrinsic
`record and is consistent with the positions Finjan took before the USPTO and PTAB to preserve the
`validity of its patent. During an ex parte reexamination, Finjan distinguished the Ji prior art by
`arguing that Ji “does not make the binary executable code vs. no-executable code determination as
`required.” Ex. 5 at 62. In Ji, the system determined whether a file had an applet tag, which would
`indicate the existence of executable code. Ex. 5 at 112. Finjan explained that this was not sufficient
`because it was critical to the claimed invention to actually determine whether a file has executable
`content (not simply whether it is a file type that likely includes (or does not include) executable
`code):
`
`
`
`One important aspect of the claimed invention is determining whether the
`downloadable-information it receives includes executable code . . . the patent
`identifies the growing problem where code may misidentify itself or may be
`obfuscated in a way to hide executable code within downloadable-information. . . .
`By determining whether the downloadable-information it receives includes
`executable code, the claimed invention protects against executable code that is not
`clearly identified or otherwise obfuscated. . . . The claims . . . require an active
`determination as to whether (or not) any [] downloadable information contains
`executable code.
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`Ex. 5 at 21, 23. On appeal, the PTAB accepted Finjan’s arguments distinguishing Ji and held: “In
`order to disclose determining whether the downloadable-information includes executable code, [the
`prior art] must disclose distinguishing between two alternative possibilities: executable code is
`included in the downloadable-information, and executable code is not included in the
`downloadable-information.” Ex. 5 at 112. Subsequently, in IPR2018-00391, Finjan itself
`advocated for the PTAB’s prior construction, and the PTAB adopted it in its Institution Decision.
`Ex. 6 (Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Finjan, Inc., IPR2018-00391, Paper 6 (Finjan’s POPR)) at 9 (criticizing
`Petitioner for “fail[ing] to apply” the same construction proposed by Juniper); Ex. 7 (Paper 7
`(Institution Decision)) at 9-10 (PTAB adopting Juniper’s proposed construction).
`Despite the lengthy intrinsic record supporting Juniper’s construction—including Finjan’s
`own statements and admissions—Finjan nevertheless argues that “Juniper’s language is not used
`anywhere in the specification or file history” and “completely rewrites the claim language.” As the
`excerpts above demonstrate conclusively, however, this is false: Finjan’s concessions in both the
`reexamination and IPR are indeed part of the file history that must be considered in claim
`construction. See Evolutionary, 2014 WL 4802426, at *4.
`Finjan also claims that the “determining” step needs no construction, but its brief makes
`crystal clear that it does: Finjan is improperly trying to expand the “plain and ordinary meaning” of
`the claim to read on systems that detect file type, instead of detecting whether the file actually
`includes executable code, as required by the claim. See Dkt. No. 176 at 9 (claiming that the “plain
`and ordinary meaning” of the term is “detect[s] content that is likely to be of an executable type that
`can carry executable content”, rather than whether or not the downloadable contains executable
`code). Determining a file’s type is not equivalent to determining whether a file “includes executable
`code.” For example, determining that a file is an HTML file does not mean that you have determined
`that it includes “executable code” because some HTML files have embedded executable content
`(e.g., JavaScript), while others do not. Under Finjan’s construction, merely determining that the file
`is HTML—regardless of whether it actually includes JavaScript or anything else executable—
`would suffice to meet the limitation because HTML is a “type that can carry executable content.”
`Expanding the claim term in this way—after Finjan twice argued it meant precisely the opposite—
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`JUNIPER’S REPLY TO FINJAN’S OPENING
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`would improperly rewrite the claim and is inconsistent with the “plain and ordinary meaning.”
`Finjan’s other arguments against Juniper’s construction also fail. Finjan claims that
`Juniper’s construction excludes one embodiment that describes “detecting indicators of file types
`that are likely to have executable code.” Dkt. No. 176 at 10. But Finjan mischaracterizes the
`specification, which merely explains that a file type detector can be a tool used to make the binary
`determination of whether a file contains executable code. See Ex. 1 (’633 Patent) at 15:17-30. And,
`in an even more explicit repudiation of Finjan’s proposed construction, the patent expressly states
`that the “file type detector” is only “potentially useful in certain instances, . . . and [is] not utilized
`in a present implementation.” Id. at 14:41-45. Indeed, to the extent Finjan’s citations can be
`interpreted to disclose an embodiment where a determination is made as to whether a file likely
`contains executable code, that is not an embodiment that Finjan chose to claim in the ’633 Patent,
`and is thus outside the scope of the patent. Oatey Co. v. IPS Corp., 2006 WL 581240, at *12 (N.D.
`Ohio March 8, 2006) (“acknowledgment of a possible alternative structure in the specification is
`not the same as claiming that alternative structure.”). If Finjan wanted to claim detecting content
`that is “likely to be of an executable type that can carry executable content,” it could have written
`its claims in that way, and it would not have argued contrary to the Patent Office.
`Finjan’s only other argument is that Juniper’s proposed construction does not make sense
`when inserted into the claims. This argument falls flat, however, as it is based on inserting the
`proposed construction into the wrong spot. Dkt. No. 176 at 11 (substituting Juniper’s construction
`for the term “if the downloadable-information is determined to include executable code” without
`regard to the prior “determining” step).
`B.
`“mobile protection code” (Claims 1, 8, 14 and 19)
`Juniper’s Proposed Construction
`Finjan’s Proposed Construction
`Code that itself, at runtime, monitors or
`Code that, at runtime, monitors or intercepts
`intercepts actually or potentially malicious
`actually or potentially malicious code operations
`code operations
`without modifying the executable code
`
`Juniper’s proposed construction for this term seeks to clarify that “mobile protection code”
`or “MPC” must comprise the code that actually does the monitoring or intercepting—i.e., the “code
`that itself, at runtime, monitors or intercepts actually or potentially malicious code operations.” This
`
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`clarification is necessary because, as Finjan acknowledges, “all code running on a computer interacts
`with many other software components (such as an operating system).” Dkt. No. 176 at 6. Juniper’s
`construction makes clear that those software components that interact with MPC but do not directly
`do any monitoring or intercepting—such as the operating system or configuration parameters—are
`not MPC within the meaning of the claim. Juniper’s proposal is consistent with the specification,
`which describes MPC as follows:
`Protection engine processing also enables MPC to effectively form a protection
`“sandbox” around Downloadable
`. . .
`to monitor Downloadable,
`intercept
`determinable Downloadable operation (such as attempted accesses of Downloadable
`to destination resources). . . .
`
`Ex. 1 (’633 Patent) at 17:32-37. This description makes clear that the MPC sandbox is code that is
`actually monitoring and intercepting the operation of the Downloadable being analyzed; in other
`words, it is the MPC that actually monitors and intercepts; it does not merely interact with or
`configure some other code to perform the monitoring or intercepting. The ’633 Patent always
`describes MPC in this way. See, e.g., id. at 17:51-53 (describing intercepting function of MPC).
`Finjan’s only other argument against Juniper’s construction is that the “itself” language
`requires the MPC to operate in a vacuum without an underlying operating system. Dkt. No. 176 at
`6. This is false; Juniper’s construction does not require that the MPC operate in isolation; it merely
`identifies the particular code that is the MPC. The existence of other non-MPC code—and the
`interaction with that code but does not intercept —i.e., it does not require “code that, by itself []
`monitors or intercepts.” Rather, Juniper’s construction merely requires that the MPC directly
`monitors or intercepts the malicious operations, rather than encompassing any code module that
`interacts with or provides inputs to the code that performs the monitoring and interception.1
`C.
`“information-destination/downloadable-information destination” (Claims 1, 8,
`14 and 19)
`Juniper’s Proposed Construction
`user/client device
`
`1 While Juniper does not agree that it is appropriate to insert “without modifying the executable
`code” into the construction of MPC, Juniper is not affirmatively opposing it here to narrow the
`disputes between the parties. Juniper thus defers to the Court regarding the propriety of including
`that phrase within the construction of the term.
`
`Finjan’s Proposed Construction
`a device or process that is capable of receiving
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`and initiating or otherwise hosting a mobile code
`execution
`The Court should adopt Juniper’s construction because it is consistent with the patent’s
`definition of this term, as well as the intrinsic record, while Finjan’s proposed construction seeks to
`improperly broaden the scope of the claim and ignores the purported purpose of the invention.
`As noted above, the alleged novelty of the ’633 Patent is sending MPC to the user/client
`computer to reduce the resources required at the network gateway. Ex. 1 (’633 Patent) at 1:48-50;
`2:14-16 (“there remains a need for efficient, accurate and flexible protection”); 18:52-57. The
`patented invention can achieve this purpose only if resources are shifted from the gateway to user
`or client devices. Indeed, the ’633 Patent uses the terms “destination” and “user device”
`interchangeably. See, e.g., id. at 7:51-8 (suitable protected system can include “one or more user
`devices or ‘Downloadable-destinations’”); 7:58-62 (“[a] suitable information-destination or ‘user
`device’ can further include one or more devices or processes”); Figure 1b.
`During prosecution of the ’633 Patent, Finjan confirmed that the “information-destination”
`is the final, “destination computer”—i.e., the user or client device that actually runs the program.
`See Ex. 8 (6/22/05 Prelim. Resp.) at 1 (“The present invention provides a packaging of mobile
`protection code with a downloadable intended for a destination computer . . . The package is
`structured so that when it is received at its intended destination computer, the mobile protection
`code is executed prior to executing the downloadable.”); Ex. 9 (5/26/09 Resp.) at 14 (“The claimed
`invention provides a packaging of mobile protection code with a downloadable intended for a
`destination computer . . . The package is structured so that when it is received at its intended
`destination computer . . .”); Ex. 10 (2/19/14 Resp.) at 23-24 (“[T]he claimed invention exists on an
`server that recommunicates downloadable information by receiving downloadable information from
`content providers and evaluating them before sending them to their intended destination.”).
`Finjan argues, based on a mischaracterization of the specification, that Juniper’s construction
`excludes embodiments. Dkt. No. 176 at 8-9. Juniper agrees that Col. 7, lines 58-62 states that “[a]
`suitable information-destination or ‘user device’ can further include one or more devices or
`processes (such as email, browser or other clients) that are capable of receiving and initiating or
`
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`JUNIPER’S REPLY TO FINJAN’S OPENING
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`(Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA)
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`

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`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 182 Filed 08/20/18 Page 11 of 30
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`otherwise hosting mobile code execution.” But Juniper does not dispute that an “information-
`destination” can include both devices and processes. The point of Juniper’s construction is that the
`device or process must a part of the user/client computer, not some intermediate point in the network
`(such as a network gateway) that is located before the “destination.” In addition, Finjan’s contention
`that the patent discloses an embodiment where the “information-destination” is a “re-
`communicator” or “firewall/server” is incorrect. The portion of the specification upon which Finjan
`relies merely states that “suitable protected systems” can include a “firewall” or “recommunicator”;
`it does not describe such components as information destinations. Ex. 1 (’633 Patent) at 7:1-4 (“a
`suitable protected system . . . can include a protection-initiating host ‘server’ or ‘re-communicator,’
`one or more user devices or Downloadable-destinations”).2
`In contrast to Juniper’s proposed straightforward construction, Finjan seeks to expand the
`scope of the claim by proposing that the “destination” be defined to include not only the destination
`for the information, but any intermediate stop before the destination that is “capable of receiving or
`initiating or otherwise hosting a mobile code execution.” Under Finjan’s proposed construction,
`anywhere information could possibly go is the “destination” of that information. This is like saying
`that every rest stop along a highway is the destination of a traveler heading home because the traveler
`could stop at each of those locations. Passing by or through a location does not somehow convert
`that location into a destination. Rather, the destination is the location to which the information is
`being sent. Ex. 22 (Destination, Concise Oxford English Dictionary (11th ed. 2009)).
`Finally, while Finjan claims that its construction is supported by the Proofpoint court’s order
`(Dkt. No. 176), the parties in that case were focused on whether the “information-destination” must
`be “a location where [the MPC] has [to] be executed,” not whether that location could be an
`intermediate network gateway as opposed to the user/client device to which the information was
`destined. Finjan, Inc. v. Proofpoint, Inc., 2015 WL 7770208, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2015).
`Ironically, Finjan failed to inform the Court that Judge Freeman recently decided that “information-
`
`
`2 Finjan also cites Col. 7, lines 50-54, but that portion of the specification merely states that the
`system can include “a user device operating as a firewall/server”; it does not state that a
`firewall/server that is not a user device is an information-destination, and such a device would fall
`within Juniper’s construction in any event (because it is a user device).
`
`10563691
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`JUNIPER’S REPLY TO FINJAN’S OPENING
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`(Case No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA)
`
`

`

`Case 3:17-cv-05659-WHA Document 182 Filed 08/20/18 Page 12 of 30
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`destination” is indeed limited to a “user device that includes one or more devices or process that are
`capable of receiving and initiating or otherwise hosting a mobile code execution.” Finjan, Inc. v.
`Cisco Sys., Inc., 2018 WL 3537142, at *20 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2018).3
`D.
`“A computer program product, comprising a computer usable medium having
`a computer readable program code therein, the computer readable program
`code adapted to be executed for computer security, the method comprising:”
`(Claim 14)
`Juniper’s Proposed Construction
`indefinite under IPXL (mixed statutory
`classes)
`
`Finjan’s Proposed Construction
`correct “typographical error” by deleting “the
`method” from preamble:
`The Court