Case5:14-cv-04561-EJD Document44 Filed05/28/15 Page1 of 18
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`SAN JOSE DIVISION
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`AMAZON.COM, INC.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`STRAIGHT PATH IP GROUP INC,
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`Defendant.
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`Case No. 5:14-cv-04561-EJD
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`ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S
`MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING
`MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE
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`Re: Dkt. No. 14
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`Presently before the Court is Defendant Straight Path IP Group, Inc.’s (“Straight Path” or
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`“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff
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`Amazon.com, Inc.’s (“Amazon” or “Plaintiff”) Complaint for Declaratory Judgment pursuant to
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Docket Item No. 14. Alternatively, Defendant requests
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`a transfer to the Eastern District of Virginia, which it believes is the proper venue for this action.
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`See id.
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`Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to
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`Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Transfer
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`Venue.
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`I. BACKGROUND
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`Amazon’s Complaint for declaratory judgment arises from patent infringement actions
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`filed in 2013 in the Eastern District of Virginia by Straight Path. See Dkt. No. 36 at 2. Amazon
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`Case No.: 5:14-cv-04561-EJD
`ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING MOTION TO
`TRANSFER VENUE
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`Case5:14-cv-04561-EJD Document44 Filed05/28/15 Page2 of 18
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`alleges that an actual controversy exists between Amazon and Straight Path regarding whether
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`Amazon’s technology infringes U.S. Patent Nos. 6,009,469 (the “’469 patent”), 6,108,704 (the
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`“’704 patent”), and 6,131,121 (the “’121 patent”) (collectively, the “patents-in-suit”). See Dkt.
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`No. 36 at 2. Straight Path has filed numerous suits, in various jurisdictions, against consumer
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`electronic companies based on their sale of Internet-enabled devices (e.g., SmartTVs, Blu-ray
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`players, tablets, or smartphones) with preinstalled video-streaming applications. See id. Among
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`its many targets are Amazon’s technology partners, including LG Electronics, Inc. and its related
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`entities (“LGE”) and VIZIO, Inc. (“VIZIO”), both of whom Straight Path sued in the Eastern
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`District of Virginia. See id. at 3. However, these actions have been stayed pending (1) the
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`outcome of a currently-pending appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit relating to
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`the patentability of the patents-in-suit, and (2) three requests for inter partes review challenging
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`the patentability of the patents-in-suit. See id. at 4. The parties to the Eastern District of Virginia
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`actions agreed that a stay pending resolution of the inter partes reviews and Straight Path’s appeal
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`would likely narrow the issues and conserve judicial resources. See id.
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`On October 17, Straight Path served its Preliminary Infringement Contentions in the
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`EDVA Actions targeting Amazon Instant Video, among other video-streaming services. See Dkt.
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`No. 23-4 at 5. Amazon Instant Video is an on-demand Internet video service that provides
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`millions of users direct access to over 140,000 movies and television episodes through over 500
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`devices, including SmartTVs, Blu-ray players, game consoles, and smartphones. See Dkt No. 24-
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`8 (Declaration of Saina S. Shamilov in Opposition to Straight Path’s Motion to Dismiss
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`(“Shamilov Decl.”), Ex. A.). These devices are manufactured and sold by myriad electronics
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`companies, including LGE and VIZIO. See id. Ex. B.
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`Amazon designed, developed, and now provides the Amazon Instant Video service
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`through a cloud network it controls and operates. See Dkt. No. 23-4 at 2. That network hosts the
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`video content that the Amazon Instant Video application accesses. See id. at 3. The application is
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`provided by Amazon and is either pre-installed on consumer electronics devices such as LGE and
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`VIZIO’s devices, or made available by Amazon for users to download onto their compatible
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`Case No.: 5:14-cv-04561-EJD
`ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING MOTION TO
`TRANSFER VENUE
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`Northern District of California
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`United States District Court
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`

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`Case5:14-cv-04561-EJD Document44 Filed05/28/15 Page3 of 18
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`devices. See id.
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`Devices such as SmartTVs and Blu-ray players often come pre-loaded with various
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`software applications, including Amazon Instant Video. See id. To launch the Amazon Instant
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`Video application on one of these devices, the user first scrolls through the applications available
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`on the device and then selects the icon corresponding to Amazon Instant Video. See id. At that
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`point, the user is required to register the device with Amazon. See id. This process is illustrated
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`as follows:
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`See Shamilov Decl., Ex. D. Once registered, the user has access to and can view thousands of
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`movies and television shows hosted by Amazon and made available through Amazon Instant
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`Video:
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`Case No.: 5:14-cv-04561-EJD
`ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING MOTION TO
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`Case5:14-cv-04561-EJD Document44 Filed05/28/15 Page4 of 18
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`See id. Amazon controls the Amazon Instant Video service from application launch, to content
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`selection, to streaming of video, to the user’s viewing experience. See Dkt. No. 23-4 at 4. The
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`process is generally the same, regardless of what device is used to access the Amazon Instant
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`Video service. See id.
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`i.
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`Indemnification Provisions in Amazon’s Agreements with LGE and VIZIO
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`In its Complaint, Amazon alleges that: (1) Straight Path accuses LGE and VIZIO of
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`infringing the ’469, ’704 and ’121 patents through their incorporation of Amazon Instant Video;
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`(2) Straight Path has sought discovery from Amazon to support these infringement claims; (3)
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`pursuant to their respective written agreements with Amazon, LGE and VIZIO have requested that
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`Amazon indemnify them against Straight Path’s claims; (4) Straight Path has initiated suits against
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`other Amazon customers, including Samsung, and could assert substantially similar infringement
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`claims based on Amazon Instant Video; and (5) Amazon has a substantial interest in clearing any
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`uncertainty regarding potential infringement of the Amazon Instant Video service by defeating
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`Straight Path’s claims. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 8-24.
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`Case No.: 5:14-cv-04561-EJD
`ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING MOTION TO
`TRANSFER VENUE
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`Case5:14-cv-04561-EJD Document44 Filed05/28/15 Page5 of 18
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`II. LEGAL STANDARD
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`A.
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` Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
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`Under Rule 12(b)(1), a party may file a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
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`jurisdiction. A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be either facial or factual. Wolfe v. Strankman, 392
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`F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004). A facial 12(b)(1) motion involves an inquiry confined to the
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`allegations in the complaint, whereas a factual 12(b)(1) motion permits the court to look beyond
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`the complaint to extrinsic evidence. Id. When a defendant makes a facial challenge, all material
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`allegations in the complaint are assumed true, and the court must determine whether lack of
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`federal jurisdiction appears from the face of the complaint itself. Id.
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`Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, adjudicating only cases which the
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`Constitution and Congress authorize. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375,
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`377 (1994). “A party invoking the federal court’s jurisdiction has the burden of proving the actual
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`existence of subject matter jurisdiction.” Thompson v. McCombe, 99 F.3d 352, 353 (9th Cir.
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`1996). If a court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
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`action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
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`B. Motion to Transfer
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`Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1404(a), “a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
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`district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all
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`parties have consented” if such a transfer is convenient to the parties and witnesses. The purpose
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`of § 1404(a) is to “prevent the waste of time, energy, and money and to protect litigants,
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`witnesses, and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.” Van Dusen v.
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`Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964).
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`To determine whether transfer is appropriate, the court first examines whether the action
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`could have been brought in the district to which transfer is sought. See Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co.,
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`758 F.2d 409, 414 (9th Cir. 1985) (“In determining whether an action might have been brought in
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`a district, the court looks to whether the action initially could have been commenced in that
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`district.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). If the proposed district is a viable one,
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`Case No.: 5:14-cv-04561-EJD
`ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING MOTION TO
`TRANSFER VENUE
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`the court then goes through an “individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and
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`fairness.” Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 622.
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`In addition to the convenience considerations enumerated by § 1404(a), the Ninth Circuit
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`has identified other fairness factors that should be weighed by the court when considering a
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`transfer: “(1) the location where the relevant agreements were negotiated and executed, (2) the
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`state that is most familiar with the governing law, (3) the plaintiff’s choice of forum, (4) the
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`respective parties’ contacts with the forum, (5) the contacts relating to the plaintiff’s cause of
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`action in the chosen forum, (6) the differences in the costs of litigation in the two forums, (7) the
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`availability of compulsory process to compel attendance of unwilling non-party witnesses, and (8)
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`the ease of access to sources of proof.” Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498-99
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`(9th Cir. 2000).
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`“No single factor is dispositive, and a district court has broad discretion to adjudicate
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`motions for transfer on a case-by-case basis.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, No.
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`08-1339, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84978, at *8, 2008 WL 4543043 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 10, 2008) (citing
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`Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988); Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., Inc.,
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`864 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1988)). A transfer may not be appropriate under § 1404(a) if it
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`“would merely shift rather than eliminate the inconvenience.” Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth
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`Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986). The party moving for transfer of a case bears the
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`burden of demonstrating transfer is appropriate. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.
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`Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 279 (9th Cir. 1979)), opinion modified, 828 F.2d 1445 (9th Cir. 1987).
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`III. DISCUSSION
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`A.
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`Subject Matter Jurisdiction
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`Straight Path argues that Amazon’s declaratory judgment Complaint should be dismissed
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`pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Dkt. No. 14 at 1.
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`Specifically, Straight Path argues that there is no actual controversy between Amazon and Straight
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`Path because it has not accused Amazon of infringing the patent-in-suit, nor has Straight Path sent
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`Amazon a cease-and-desist letter or otherwise communicated any intent to sue Amazon. See Dkt.
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`Case No.: 5:14-cv-04561-EJD
`ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING MOTION TO
`TRANSFER VENUE
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`Case5:14-cv-04561-EJD Document44 Filed05/28/15 Page7 of 18
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`No. 36 at 4. Straight Path also argues that it has not directed any affirmative acts toward Amazon,
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`and no subject matter jurisdiction exists over Amazon claims. See id. The Court disagrees for the
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`following reasons.
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`Subject matter jurisdiction in declaratory judgment actions asks “whether the facts alleged,
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`under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having
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`adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory
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`judgment.” MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007). A case or
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`controversy must be “based on a real and immediate injury or threat of future injury that is caused
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`by the defendants - an objective standard that cannot be met by a purely subjective or speculative
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`fear of future harm.” Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
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`2008). Thus, in the patent context, “jurisdiction generally will not arise merely on the basis that a
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`party learns of the existence of a patent owned by another or even perceives such a patent to pose
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`a risk of infringement, without some affirmative act by the patentee.” Id. When the conduct of
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`the patentee can be “reasonably inferred as demonstrating intent to enforce a patent” against the
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`declaratory judgment plaintiff, subject matter jurisdiction will arise, even when that intent is
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`demonstrated implicitly. Hewlett–Packard Co. v. Acceleron LLC, 587 F.3d 1358, 1363–64 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2009). The burden is on the party asserting declaratory judgment jurisdiction to establish that
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`an Article III case or controversy existed at the time that the claim for declaratory relief was filed
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`and that it has continued since. Danisco U.S. Inc. v. Novozymes A/S, 744 F.3d 1325, 1329 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2014). “It is well-established that, in patent cases, the existence of a case or controversy must
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`be evaluated on a claim-by-claim basis.” Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 665
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`F.3d 1269, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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`Here, Amazon alleges that an actual controversy exists between Amazon and Straight Path
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`regarding whether Amazon’s technology – including the Amazon Instant Video service and
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`application – infringes the patents-in-suit. See Dkt. No. 36 at 2. Amazon argues that by suing
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`Amazon’s customers and expressly asserting infringement claims against Amazon’s technology,
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`Case No.: 5:14-cv-04561-EJD
`ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING MOTION TO
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`Straight Path has engaged in an affirmative act directed at Amazon.1 Specifically, Amazon argues
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`that Straight Path’s infringement contentions, which implicate Amazon’s technology and identify
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`its end-user customers as direct infringers, create a controversy as to Amazon’s potential liability
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`for infringement, thus meeting the case or controversy requirement for declaratory judgment
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`jurisdiction.2 Moreover, Amazon argues that these allegations, at the very least, “impliedly assert
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`indirect infringement” by Amazon. See Microsoft Corp. v. DataTern, Inc., 755 F.3d 899, 903-904
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`(Fed. Cir. 2014).
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`In DataTern, the Federal Circuit addressed similar issues to those considered in this case.
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`DataTern, Inc. (“DataTern”) had previously sued several of Microsoft Corporation’s
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`(“Microsoft”), SAP AG and SAP America, Inc.’s (collectively, “SAP”) customers, alleging
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`infringement of both of the patents-in-suit. See id. at 902. DataTern had sent these customers
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`claim charts alleging infringement based on the customers’ use of SAP’s and Microsoft’s software
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`products; the claim charts referred extensively to SAP and Microsoft functionality. Id. With
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`respect to SAP, the claim charts as to both patents cited “to SAP-provided [product] user guides
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`and documentation for each element of the representative claims.” Id. With respect to Microsoft,
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`for the first patent (the “‘502 patent”), the claim charts cited to “Microsoft-provided [product]
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`online documentation for each element of the representative claims.” Id. For the second patent
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`(the “‘402 patent”), however, the claim charts cited only to third-party documentation (that is,
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`documentation not provided by Microsoft) for several claim limitations. Id.
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`In assessing whether subject matter jurisdiction existed over SAP’s and Microsoft’s
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`declaratory judgment claims, the DataTern court found it “incorrect” to assume that a supplier has
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`an automatic “right to bring [a] declaratory judgment action solely because their customers have
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`1 See Dkt. No. 23-4 at 8; see also SanDisk v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1380-81
`(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“In the context of patent infringement, ‘declaratory judgment jurisdiction . . .
`[requires] some affirmative act by the patentee’ directed at the accused infringer.”).
`2 See Dkt. No. 23-4 at 8; see also Arris Grp., Inc. v. British Telecomms., 639 F.3d 1368, 1375
`(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“there is a controversy between the patentee and the supplier as to the supplier’s
`liability for induced or contributory infringement based on the alleged acts of direct infringement
`by its customers.”).
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`Case No.: 5:14-cv-04561-EJD
`ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING MOTION TO
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`been sued for direct infringement.” Id. at 904. It explained that there was no allegation in the case
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`that Microsoft or SAP were liable for direct infringement; as to indirect infringement, it required
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`Microsoft and SAP to point to “allegations by the patentee or other record evidence that establish
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`at least a reasonable potential that such a claim could be brought.” Id. at 904-05.
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`Ultimately, the Federal Circuit held that there was subject matter jurisdiction over SAP’s
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`claims as to both patents-in-suit. There the DataTern court noted that the claim charts “provided
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`to the SAP customers allege direct infringement of the [patents] based on SAP’s customers’ use of
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`[particular SAP software]” and cited to “SAP-provided user guides and documentation for each
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`claim element.” Id. at 905. Thus, since the charts “show that SAP provides its customers with the
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`necessary components to infringe [the patents-in-suit] as well as the instruction manuals for using
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`the components in an infringing manner” SAP had established that a substantial controversy
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`existed as to whether it induced infringement. Id. Subject matter jurisdiction also existed for
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`Microsoft’s claims regarding the ‘502 patent, as the “claim charts cite to Microsoft-provided
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`online documentation for each limitation of [that patent’s] representative claims.” Id. But with
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`respect to Microsoft’s claims regarding the ‘402 patent, the DataTern court held that subject
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`matter jurisdiction did not exist. The Federal Circuit explained that because the claim charts as to
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`this patent “cite exclusively to third-party ... documentation for several key claim limitations” they
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`did not “impliedly assert that Microsoft induced [the direct] infringement” at issue. Id. Likewise,
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`with respect to contributory infringement, the DataTern court found that the claim charts did not
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`impliedly assert that Microsoft’s product was not a staple article or commodity of commerce
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`suitable for substantial non-infringing use. Id. at 906.
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`With the holding of DataTern in mind, the Court addresses whether there is a justiciable
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`controversy with respect to the patents-in-suit. At the outset, the Court notes that there is no
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`allegation here that Straight Path ever communicated directly with Amazon in any way, nor that
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`Straight Path ever directly threatened Amazon with suit. If subject matter jurisdiction exists as to
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`some or all of these claims, it must emanate from implicit threats that Straight Path made to
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`Amazon by way of its communications to Amazon’s customers.
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`Here, Amazon argues that Straight Path’s infringement contentions against LGE and
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`VIZIO accuse Amazon Instant Video, which LGE and VIZIO pre-install on their consumer
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`electronics devices. See Dkt. No. 23-4 at 5. Specifically, Amazon argues that in the infringement
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`contentions against LGE, Straight Path accuses the Amazon Instant Video application and
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`Amazon servers with which it interacts: “[T]he Amazon application on the Accused Products
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`communicates with the Amazon server for the purpose of streaming media.” See id. Amazon
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`asserts that in the infringement contentions against VIZIO, Straight Path includes similar
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`allegations identifying Amazon software and Amazon’s end-users as direct infringers of the
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`patents-in-suit. See id. at 6. Therefore, Amazon alleges that Straight Path cites to an Amazon web
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`page and network traces between Amazon Instant Video application and an Amazon server as
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`purportedly satisfying all elements of the asserted claims. See id. at 5. Amazon argues that this
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`targeting of LGE and VIZIO by Straight Path in their infringement suits is similar to those found
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`to support subject matter jurisdiction in DataTern.
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`Straight Path contends that under DataTern, the Virginia Action cannot impliedly assert
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`induced infringement because they do not use Amazon-provided information to support the
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`alleged infringement of each key claim element. See Dkt. No. 28-16 at 1. Straight Path argues
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`that under DataTern, the Virginia Action is not an affirmative act against Amazon because several
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`of the claim elements in the Virginia Action are supported only with non-Amazon provided
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`material. See id at 3. Therefore, Straight Path asserts they are not affirmative acts capable of
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`supporting declaratory judgment jurisdiction.
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`However, Amazon cites to Straight Path’s infringement chart targeting LGE and VIZIO
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`products running Amazon Instant Video3 and argues that Straight Path identifies Amazon software
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`and servers as “satisfying all elements of the asserted claims.” See Dkt. No. 23-4 at 5. For
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`example, in the infringement contentions against LGE, Straight Path accuses the Amazon Instant
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`Video application and Amazon servers with which it interacts: “[T]he Amazon Application on the
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`3 See Dkt No. 24-8 (Declaration of Saina S. Shamilov in Opposition to Straight Path’s Motion to
`Dismiss (“Shamilov Decl.”), Ex. H).
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`Accused Products communicates with the Amazon Server for the purpose of streaming media”4
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`and identifies Amazon’s end-user customers as alleged direct infringers of the patents-in-suit:
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`“Where the Accused Products indirectly meet this limitation, the direct infringer is the device’s
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`end user utilizing the Amazon Instant Video Application on an Accused Product.”5 Further,
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`Straight Path cites to an Amazon web page and network traces (see below) between Amazon
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`Instant Video application and an Amazon servers as allegedly meeting this limitation. See Dkt.
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`No. 23-4 at 5.
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`Here, Straight Path alleges that “[t]he Vizio Product executes the Amazon Application and
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`forwards to the Amazon Server a network protocol address currently assigned to the first process
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`upon connection to the server; for example, the TCP SYN packet as observed in the network trace
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`test performed on the device includes the network protocol address currently assigned to the first
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`process” and that “the Amazon Application on the Vizio Product transmits to an Amazon Server a
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`query as to whether a second process is connected to the computer network to stream media.” See
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`Shamilov Decl., Ex. I at 6-7.
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`Indeed, in its infringement contentions, Straight Path explicitly identifies Amazon Instant
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`Video on LGE (see below) as satisfying the elements of the asserted claims and Amazon’s end-
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`users as direct infringers of the patents-in-suit. See Shamilov Decl., Exs. H-K.
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`4 See Shamilov Decl., Ex. H at 2-3.
`5 See id. at 2.
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`Straight Path also cites to a screen shot taken from the Amazon website and alleges that “the
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`Amazon Application on the Accused Products communicates with the Amazon Server for the
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`purpose of streaming media. For example, the LG Product is able to interface with the Amazon
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`Servers in order to stream videos.” See Shamilov Decl., Ex. H at 2-3.
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`Similarly, in its infringement contentions against VIZIO, Straight Path includes materially
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`identical allegations, again identifying Amazon software (see below) and servers as purportedly
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`satisfying the elements of the asserted claims and Amazon’s end-users as direct infringers of the
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`patents-in-suit. See Shamilov Decl., Exs. I-K.
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`Therefore, similar to DataTern, Straight Path relies on Amazon’s provided material for
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`each asserted claim element and not solely on third-party documentation for several key claim
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`limitations. See DataTern at 905. Although Straight Path asserted that it never approached
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`Amazon regarding licensing and never accused Amazon of infringement, Straight Path’s
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`infringement claims against LGE and VIZIO were based on LGE and VIZIO’s use of Amazon’s
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`products.
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`Accordingly, substantial controversy existed because Straight Path’s infringement claims
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`against LGE and VIZIO strongly support the conclusion that the Court has jurisdiction.
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`Moreover, Amazon’s obligation to indemnify LGE and VIZIO alone creates a standing for
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`jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court DENIES Straight Path’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject
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`matter jurisdiction.
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`B. Transfer
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`Straight Path argues that this Court should decline jurisdiction in favor of Straight Path’s
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`case addressing similar issues in the Eastern District of Virginia because of judicial efficiency and
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`economy. The Court agrees for the following reasons.
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`Under DataTern, the Federal Circuit has held that when “a case has already been filed
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`against … customers in the Eastern District of Texas … [Plainitff] cannot seek a declaration from
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`a New York court on behalf of customers they must indemnify where a suit against these very
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`customers on all the same issues was already underway in a Texas court.” See Futurewei Techs.,
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`Inc. v. Acacia Research Corp., 737 F.3d 704, 708 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Similarly, Amazon’s
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`Complaint arises from the patent infringement action in the Eastern District of Virginia, in which
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`Straight Path accused Amazon’s customers, LGE and VIZIO, of patent infringement on all the
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`same issues as in this case. See Dkt. No. 1. Therefore, by agreeing to indemnify any one of their
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`customers, Amazon could defend its customers and efficiently and effectively participate in the
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`Virginia Action. See DataTern at 904.
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`As to whether this action could have been brought in the Eastern District of Virginia,
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`Straight Path is based in Virginia and Straight Path has demonstrated that a similar case against
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`LGE and VIZIO is already pending in Virginia. See Dkt. No. 14 at 2. The Virginia court will
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`already have to commit significant resources to learning the relevant technology in this case.
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`Amazon’s case in this Court would require two federal district courts to duplicate work. Thus,
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`Straight Path has met its burden on this level of the analysis. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(1), (2),
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`(c)(2) (designating that a civil action may be brought in “a judicial district in which any defendant
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`resides” or “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to
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`the claim occurred,” and specifying that, for venue purposes, a corporation shall be deemed to
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`Case No.: 5:14-cv-04561-EJD
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`reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s
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`personal jurisdiction.”).
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`i. Convenience of the Parties
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`“The convenience of the parties is … an important factor in determining whether to allow a
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`transfer of venue.” Jarvis v. Marietta Corp., No. C 98–4951, 1999 WL 638231 MJJ, at *4 (N.D.
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`Cal. Aug. 12, 1999). In weighing this factor, “courts do not consider the convenience to parties
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`that have chosen to bring a case in a forum where they do not reside.” Brown v. Abercrombie &
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`Fitch Co., No. 13–CV–05205 YGR, 2014 WL 715082, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2014) (citing
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`Flint v. UGS Corp., No. C07–04640 MJJ, 2007 WL 4365481, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2007)).
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`Here, Straight Path argues that it would be more convenient to litigate this case in the
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`Eastern District of Virginia because Amazon’s complaint is grounded in an obligation to
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`indemnify customers already sued in Eastern District, where the underlying customer suit is
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`pending. See Dkt. No. 14 at 2. However, because Amazon is headquartered in Seattle,
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`Washington and not in the Northern District, this Court does not consider the convenience to it.
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`Therefore, t