Case 8:19-cv-02192-GW-AS Document 52 Filed 09/03/20 Page 1 of 27 Page ID #:553
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`
`
`
`
`William E. Thomson, Jr. (SBN 47195)
`BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C.
`601 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 2080
`Los Angeles, California 90017-5780
`Tel: (213) 622-3003
`wthomson@brookskushman.com
`
`Marc Lorelli (Admitted pro hac vice)
`mlorelli@brookskushman.com
`John P. Rondini (Admitted pro hac vice)
`jrondini@brookskushman.com
`Mark A. Cantor (Admitted pro hac vice)
`mcantor@brookskushman.com
`John S. LeRoy (Admitted pro hac vice)
`jleroy@brookskushman.com
`BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C.
`1000 Town Center, 22nd Floor
`Southfield, MI 48075
`Tel: (248) 358-4400
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`Ancora Technologies, Inc.
`
`
`
`
`
`ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES,
`INC.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`
`Case No. 8:19-cv-02192-GW-ASx
`(LEAD CASE)
`
`Consolidated Case No.:
`Case No. 2:20-cv-01252-GW-ASx
`
`[Hon. George H. Wu]
`
`
`ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC.’S
`OPENING MARKMAN BRIEF
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`v.
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`TCT MOBILE (US) INC.,
`HUIZHOU TCL MOBILE
`COMMUNICATION CO.,
`LTD., and SHENZHEN TCL
`CREATIVE CLOUD
`TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.,
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`
`
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`Defendants.
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`ANCORA’S OPENING MARKMAN BRIEF
`Case No. 8:19-cv-02192-GW-ASx
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`Case 8:19-cv-02192-GW-AS Document 52 Filed 09/03/20 Page 2 of 27 Page ID #:554
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
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`II.
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`THE ’941 PATENT ......................................................................................... 2
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`III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION LAW .................................................................. 4
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`IV. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES ......................................................... 6
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`A.
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`“volatile memory” ................................................................................. 7
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`B.
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`“Selecting a program residing in the volatile memory” ........................ 8
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`C.
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`“Set up a verification structure” .......................................................... 11
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`D.
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`“license record” ................................................................................... 13
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`E.
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`“memory of the BIOS” ........................................................................ 16
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`F.
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`“first non-volatile memory area of the computer” (Claims 7 and
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`13) ........................................................................................................ 20
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`G.
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`“wherein establishing a license-record includes the steps of: . . . ”
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`(Claim 6) .............................................................................................. 21
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`V.
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`CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 22
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`Case 8:19-cv-02192-GW-AS Document 52 Filed 09/03/20 Page 3 of 27 Page ID #:555
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`
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Cases
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`Ancora Techs., Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
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`2012 WL 6738761 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2012) ............................... 1, 3, 7, 13-16
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`Ancora Techs., Inc. v. Apple, Inc.,
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`744 F.3d 732 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ........................................................ 1, 3, 7, 17-18
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`Ancora Techs., Inc. v. HTC Am., Inc.,
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`908 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ..................................................... 1, 2, 3, 13, 14
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`Ancora Techs., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Samsung Elecs., ECF No. 69,
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`Civil No. 1-20-cv-00034-ADA (W.D. Tex. June 2, 2020)
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`(Attached as Ex. 3) ............................................................................................ 1
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`Ancora Techs., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Samsung Elecs., ECF No. 93,
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`Civil No. 1-20-cv-00034-ADA (W.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2020)
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`(Attached as Ex. 4.) ..................................................................................... 1, 13
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`CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,
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`288 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ........................................................................ 4
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`Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb Weston, Inc.,
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`358 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ........................................................................ 9
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`Facebook, Inc. v. Pragmatus AV, LLC,
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`582 F. App’x 864 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .................................................................. 17
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`Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp.,
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`626 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ........................................................................ 4
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`Harris Corp. v. IXYS Corp.,
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`114 F.3d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ....................................................................... 12
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`Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. LifeScan, Inc.,
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`381 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ........................................................................ 5
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`HTC Corp. v. Ancora Techs. Inc.,
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`2017 WL 6032605 (Patent Tr. & App. Bd. Dec. 1, 2017) .............................. 14
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`Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro,
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`152 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ....................................................................... 11
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`K–2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A.,
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`191 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ........................................................................ 9
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`ANCORA’S OPENING MARKMAN BRIEF
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`Case 8:19-cv-02192-GW-AS Document 52 Filed 09/03/20 Page 4 of 27 Page ID #:556
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`
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`Linear Tech. Corp. v. ITC,
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`566 F.3d 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ....................................................................... 17
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`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) ............ 5, 6
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`Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp.,
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`401 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ....................................................................... 11
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`Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.,
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`395 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ....................................................................... 22
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`Nokia Sols. & Networks US LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co.,
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`2017 WL 2226413 (E.D. Tex. May 19, 2017) .................................................. 9
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`Omega Eng’g, Inc, v. Raytek Corp.,
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`334 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ....................................................................... 17
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`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
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`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) ..................................................... 4, 5
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`Prowess, Inc. v. RaySearch Labs., AB,
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`953 F. Supp. 2d 638 (D. Md. 2013) ................................................................... 9
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`Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc.,
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`438 F.3d 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ....................................................................... 19
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`Seachange Int’l, Inc. v. C-COR Inc.,
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`413 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ....................................................................... 19
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`Southwall Technologies, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Company,
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`54 F.3d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ........................................................................... 6
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`Thorner v. Sony Computer Enter. Am. LLC,
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`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ......................................................................... 4
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`U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc.,
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`103 F.3d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ......................................................................... 4
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`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,
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`90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ....................................................................... 4, 6
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`Statutes
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`U.S.C. § 101 ................................................................................................................ 1
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`Case 8:19-cv-02192-GW-AS Document 52 Filed 09/03/20 Page 5 of 27 Page ID #:557
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`This case concerns a single patent: U.S. Patent No. 6,411,941. (“the ’941
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`Patent,” Ex. 1.) The ’941 Patent has a lengthy history. It was invented in the late
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`1990s by Ancora’s president, Mr. Miki Mullor and a colleague and was described by
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`the Patent and Trademark Office during prosecution as proceeding against the
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`conventional wisdom in the art to do something “the closest prior art, singly or
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`collectively,” never contemplated: “using an agent to set up a verification structure
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`in the erasable, non-volatile memory of the BIOS.” Ex. 2, Examiner’s Reasons for
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`Allowance at ANCC 408.
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`Moreover, since it issued, the patent has been examined repeatedly. Its claims
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`have been construed by multiple courts, including the Federal Circuit. Ancora
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`Techs., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 2012 WL 6738761 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2012) (“Apple I”);
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`Ancora Techs., Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 744 F.3d 732 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Apple II”). Many
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`other claim terms were construed by Judge Albright in the Western District of Texas
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`in 2020. Ancora Techs., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Samsung Elecs., ECF No. 69, Civil No. 1-
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`20-cv-00034-ADA (W.D. Tex. June 2, 2020) (Attached as Ex. 3); Ancora Techs.,
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`Inc. v. LG Elecs., Samsung Elecs., ECF No. 93, Civil No. 1-20-cv-00034-ADA
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`(W.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2020) (Attached as Ex. 4.) (“Samsung/LG”.) And the validity
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`of the ’941 Patent has been confirmed repeatedly, including most recently by the
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`Federal Circuit in Ancora Techs., Inc. v. HTC Am., Inc., 908 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir.
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`2018), which held that the asserted claims satisfied 35 U.S.C. § 101 as a matter of
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`law. (“HTC”.)
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`Case 8:19-cv-02192-GW-AS Document 52 Filed 09/03/20 Page 6 of 27 Page ID #:558
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`In asserting infringement in this matter, Ancora has relied on the entirety of
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`these courts’ guidance. In fact, with limited exceptions, Ancora simply asks this
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`Court to adopt constructions already reached by prior courts. In contrast, Defendants
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`seek to avoid infringement by offering a raft of constructions—constructions that
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`conflict not just with the claims and specification, but the prior holdings and
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`constructions already provided by prior courts.
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`II.
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`THE ’941 PATENT
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`The ’941 Patent relates to a specific technique for “identifying and restricting
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`of an unauthorized software program’s operation.” ’941 Patent at 1:6-8.
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`Specifically, before the ’941 Patent, there were two basic (and sub-optimal)
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`methods of verifying and restricting the operation of a program. One involved
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`“software-based methods” that “require[d] writing a license signature on the
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`computer’s hard drive.” HTC, 908 F.3d at 1344. A key “flaw in those methods,”
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`however, “is that such a signature can be changed by hackers without damaging
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`other aspects of computer functionality.” Id. (citing ’941 Patent at 1:19-26.)
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`Hardware-based methods also existed, but “require[d] inserting a dongle into a
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`computer port to authenticate the software authorization.” Id. (citing ’941 Patent at
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`1:27-32.) As a result, those “methods are costly, inconvenient, and not suitable for
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`software sold and downloaded over the internet.” Id.
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`Case 8:19-cv-02192-GW-AS Document 52 Filed 09/03/20 Page 7 of 27 Page ID #:559
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`The ’941 Patent improved over these prior art techniques by “using the
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`memory space associated with the computer’s basic input/output system (BIOS),1
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`rather than other memory space, to store appropriately encrypted license information
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`to be used in the verification process.” Apple II, 744 F.3d at 733 (citing ’941 Patent
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`at 1:46-2:5, 4:45-48, and 5:19-24). Such BIOS memory space was and “is typically
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`used for storing programs that assist in the start-up of a computer.” HTC, 908 F.3d at
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`1345. Prior to the ’941 invention, however, it was not contemplated that operating
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`system (“OS”) level programs could interact with the BIOS at all—much less “us[e]
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`an agent to setup a verification structure in the erasable non-volatile memory area of
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`the BIOS.” Ex. 2, Reasons for Allowance at ANCC 408; HTC, 908 F.3d at 1348-49
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`(stating that “[t]he claimed method here specifically identifies how that functionality
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`improvement is effectuated in an assertedly unexpected way: a structure containing a
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`license record is stored in a particular, modifiable, non-volatile portion of the
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`computer’s BIOS, and the structure in that memory location is used for
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`verification”).
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`As the Federal Circuit explained, using the BIOS in this unexpected manner
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`“improves computer security, . . . because successfully hacking BIOS memory (i.e.,
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`altering it without rendering the computer inoperable) is much harder than hacking
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`the memory used by the prior art to store license-verification information.” HTC,
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`908 F.3d at 1345.
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`1 The BIOS “is the set of essential startup operations that run when a computer
`is turned on, which tests hardware, starts the operating system, and supports the
`transfer of data among hardware devices.” Apple I, 2012 WL 6738761, at *7.
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`Case 8:19-cv-02192-GW-AS Document 52 Filed 09/03/20 Page 8 of 27 Page ID #:560
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`III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION LAW
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`“It is a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of the patent define the
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`invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” Phillips v. AWH
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`Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal quotation marks
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`omitted). Claim terms should generally be “given their ordinary and customary
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`meaning” to those skilled in the art as informed by the specification. ld. at 1312-14.
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`However, it is not necessary to construe every claim. E.g. Finjan, Inc. v. Secure
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`Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that the district
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`court did not err by rejecting defendants’ construction and instructing the jury to
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`give the claim term its “ordinary meaning”); U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc.,
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`103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (claim construction “is not an obligatory
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`exercise in redundancy”).
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`There are only two exceptions to the general rule that words are generally
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`given their ordinary and customary meaning: “1) when a patentee sets out a
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`definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the
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`full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.” Thorner
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`v. Sony Computer Enter. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing
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`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). “To act
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`as its own lexicographer, a patentee must ‘clearly set forth a definition of the
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`disputed claim term’ other than its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. (quoting CCS
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`Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). “The
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`standard for disavowal of claim scope is similarly exacting.” Id. at 1366. “Absent a
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`clear disavowal or contrary definition in the specification or the prosecution history,
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`Case 8:19-cv-02192-GW-AS Document 52 Filed 09/03/20 Page 9 of 27 Page ID #:561
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`the patentee is entitled to the full scope of its claim language.” Home Diagnostics,
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`Inc. v. LifeScan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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`Although a patentee may use the specification to assign unique definitions to
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`claim terms, when it does so expressly and clearly as set forth above, limitations
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`from the written description should not be imported into the claims. Phillips, 415
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`F.3d at 1315-16, 1320, 1323 ([A]lthough the specification often describes very
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`specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining
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`the claims to those embodiments.”); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52
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`F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (“The written
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`description part of the specification does not delimit the right to exclude. That is the
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`function and purpose of the claims.”) Nevertheless, a claim is read “in the context of
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`the entire patent, including the specification.” Id. at 1313. In particular, the
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`description of an embodiment in the specification does not, without more, limit the
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`claims to that single embodiment. Id. at 1323 (“we have expressly rejected the
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`contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the
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`patent must be construed as being limited to that embodiment”). A patent’s
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`prosecution history may also be considered. Id. at 1317 (“Like the specification, the
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`prosecution history provides evidence of how the PTO and the inventor understood
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`the patent.”).
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`While the Court may consider other evidence extrinsic to the patent, the use of
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`extrinsic evidence (such as expert testimony and dictionaries) must be secondary and
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`subservient to the intrinsic evidence. As explained in Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318, the
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`Federal Circuit “view[s] extrinsic evidence in general as less reliable than the patent
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`and its prosecution history in determining how to read claim terms, for several
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`Case 8:19-cv-02192-GW-AS Document 52 Filed 09/03/20 Page 10 of 27 Page ID #:562
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`reasons.” For example, extrinsic evidence is not tied to the teachings of the patent
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`and “undue reliance on extrinsic evidence poses the risk that it will be used to
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`change the meaning of the claims.” Id. at 1319. Indeed, it is improper to rely on
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`extrinsic evidence where “the claims, specification and file history” adequately
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`define a claim term. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583. The intrinsic evidence defines the
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`public record from which the public is entitled to rely. Id. (citing Markman, 52 F.3d
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`at 978-79.) “Allowing the public record to be altered or changed by extrinsic
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`evidence introduced at trial, such as expert testimony, would make this right
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`meaningless.” Id. (citing Southwall Technologies, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Company, 54
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`F.3d 1570, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
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`IV. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES
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`In this matter, Ancora asserts that TCL infringes Claims 1-3, 6-14 and 16 of
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`the ’941 Patent. For these claims, TCL identifies 7 phrases for construction.
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`For the Court’s convenience, Ancora addresses the first 5 phrases in the order
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`in which they first appear in the asserted claim 1. Ancora includes the full claim
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`below that include the disputed phases, with underlining or emphasis for the
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`disputed phrases:
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`A method of restricting software operation within a
`1.
`license for use with a computer including an erasable, non-volatile
`memory area of a BIOS of the computer, and a volatile memory area
`the method comprising the steps of:
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`selecting a program residing in the volatile memory;
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`using an agent to set up a verification structure in the erasable,
`non-volatile memory of
`the BIOS,
`the verification structure
`accommodating data that includes at least one license record,
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`Case 8:19-cv-02192-GW-AS Document 52 Filed 09/03/20 Page 11 of 27 Page ID #:563
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`verifying the program using at least the verification structure
`from the erasable non-volatile memory of the BIOS, and
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`acting on the program according to the verification.
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`The remining phrases in dispute are from dependent claims 7 and 13.
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`A.
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`“volatile memory”
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`Claim Term/Phrase
`
`Ancora Construction
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`TCL Construction
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`Volatile memory
`(Claim 1)
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`
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`Memory whose data is not
`maintained or becomes
`inaccessible when the
`power is removed.
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`“memory whose data is
`not maintained when the
`power is removed”
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`The parties agree that volatile memory means memory whose data is not
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`maintained when the power is removed. They disagree only as to whether the term
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`also includes memory whose data “becomes inaccessible” after the power is
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`removed. As the Federal Circuit already has held, it does.
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`In Apple II, the Federal Circuit held that, “as a general matter, ‘[t]o one of
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`ordinary skill in the art, a volatile memory is memory whose data is not maintained
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`when the power is removed . . . .’” 744 F.3d at 737 (quoting Apple I, 2012 WL
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`6738761, at *4). The Federal Circuit then went on to identify an important exception
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`to that “general” understanding—explaining that the ’941 Patent’s disclosure “of a
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`hard disk as ‘volatile’ memory” showed that the ’941 Patent contemplated that
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`memory typically thought of as non-volatile also fell within the scope of the term
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`“volatile memory” to the extent such memory was being used in a volatile manner.
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`Id. at 737-38.
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`The Federal Circuit even identified an example of when non-volatile memory
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`could be understood to be operating in a volatile manner, explaining:
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`Case 8:19-cv-02192-GW-AS Document 52 Filed 09/03/20 Page 12 of 27 Page ID #:564
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`it is well known that a computer’s hard disk is routinely used as
`‘virtual’ memory to provide temporary storage when there is
`insufficient RAM to complete an operation, in which case (it is
`undisputed) the data become inaccessible through the usual means
`once power is removed (even if the data can still be found on the hard
`disk by more sophisticated means).
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`Id. at 738 (internal citations omitted).
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`Thus, unlike Defendants’ construction, Plaintiff’s construction adheres to the
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`entirety of the Federal Circuit’s guidance and recognizes that “volatile memory”
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`includes both (1) memory whose data is not maintained when the power is removed
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`and (2) memory whose data becomes inaccessible when the power is removed such
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`that it is recoverable only through “sophisticated means.” Id.; see Ex. 5, Jestice Decl.
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`at ¶¶ 10-12. Indeed, when the Western District of Texas addressed this term after the
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`Federal Circuit’s decision, the court made clear that “where the hard disk is used as
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`virtual RAM, the data is not accessible by normal means after the power is
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`removed.” Ex. 3, Final Claim Constructions at 2. Accordingly, Ancora’s
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`construction should be adopted.
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`B.
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`“Selecting a program residing in the volatile memory”
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`Claim Term/Phrase
`
`Ancora Construction
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`TCL Construction
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`Selecting a program
`residing in the volatile
`memory
`(Claim 1)
`
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`Plain and ordinary
`meaning
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`“accessing a program to be
`verified in the volatile
`memory”
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`Defendants next ask the Court to re-write the phrase “selecting a program
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`residing in the volatile memory” by changing the word “selecting” to “accessing”
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`and deleting the word “residing” and implying that this memory is the location of the
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`Case 8:19-cv-02192-GW-AS Document 52 Filed 09/03/20 Page 13 of 27 Page ID #:565
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`verification. No support exists for this re-write. K–2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d
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`1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Courts do not rewrite claims; instead, we give effect
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`to the terms chosen by the patentee.”).
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`First, the words “selecting” and “residing” are simple English words that, as a
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`general matter, do not require construction. See Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb Weston, Inc.,
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`358 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[O]rdinary, simple English words whose
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`meaning is clear and unquestionable . . . mean exactly what they say.”); Nokia Sols.
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`& Networks US LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co., 2017 WL 2226413, at *26 (E.D. Tex.
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`May 19, 2017) (construing the term “[select/selecting] a communication resource . .
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`.” to have its plain and ordinary meaning (alteration in original)); Prowess, Inc. v.
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`RaySearch Labs., AB, 953 F. Supp. 2d 638, 672 (D. Md. 2013) (same).
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`Second, the patent itself demonstrates that, at a minimum, “selecting” is not
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`synonymous with “accessing” or the running of a program.2 In describing
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`embodiments of the “selecting” step, the specification never refers to the “accessing”
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`of a program—a concept it references for other steps. Compare ’941 Patent at 2:66-
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`67, 6:7-17 (describing the “selecting”), with id. at 1:53-57, 1:59-62, 2:19-26, 2:27-
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`32, 2:36-39 (describing how the program can be “run” after it is verified); see also
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`id. at 3:57, 4:1 (referencing a “selected program”). Instead, the specification explains
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`that “[s]electing (17) a program” can include “the step of: establishing a licensed-
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`software-program in the volatile memory of the computer wherein the licensed-
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`2 Other parties have been unsuccessful in their attempts to change the
`language “selecting” to “running” so TCL presents the work “accessing” which
`introduces ambiguity so TCL make improper arguments to the jury regarding
`running of a program. Claim construction is used to clarify language, not add
`ambiguity.
`ANCORA’S OPENING MARKMAN BRIEF
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`Case 8:19-cv-02192-GW-AS Document 52 Filed 09/03/20 Page 14 of 27 Page ID #:566
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`software program includes contents used to form a license-record.” Id. at 6:7-10;
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`2
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`accord id. at Claim 6 (“A method according to claim 1 wherein selecting a program
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`includes the steps of establishing a licensed software-program in the volatile
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`memory of the computer . . . .”). Introduction of the term “accessing” adds
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`ambiguity and it certainly is not “running” of a program.
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`Further, the specification teaches that, in at least one embodiment, this
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`“establishing” (or “loading”) of the program in the volatile memory, as well as its
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`verification, occurs before the selected program can accessed for running. Id. at
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`2:10-26. As the ’941 Patent explains:
`[W]hen a program is loaded into the memory of the computer, a so-
`called license verifier application, that is a priori running in the
`computer, accesses the program under question, retrieves therefrom
`the license record, encrypts the record utilizing the specified unique
`key (as retrieved from the ROM section of the BIOS) and compares
`the so encrypted record to the encrypted records that reside in the
`E2PROM. In the case of match, the program is verified to run on the
`computer.
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`Id. Indeed, this passage alone demonstrates that the patentee understood what
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`“running” and “accessing” a program meant and intended that “selecting a program”
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`confer a different meaning.
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`In short, TCL’s construction is inconsistent with the primary objective of at
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`least some of the patent’s preferred embodiments: to require that a program be
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`verified before it is accessed for running. ’941 Patent at 2:19-20 (describing the
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`verification process and stating that, “[i]n the case of match, the program is verified
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`to run on the computer”). Defendants’ construction adds ambiguity and would also
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`negate some of
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`the
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`invention’s embodiments—violating a cardinal claim
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`construction rule.
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`ANCORA’S OPENING MARKMAN BRIEF
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`Case 8:19-cv-02192-GW-AS Document 52 Filed 09/03/20 Page 15 of 27 Page ID #:567
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`Again, recently when faced with similar arguments regarding this claim
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`phrase, the Western District of Texas concluded that the construction for this phrase
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`should be the “plain and ordinary meaning” as proposed here by Ancora. Ex. 3,
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`Final Claim Constructions at 3.
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`C.
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`“Set up a verification structure”
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`Claim Term/Phrase
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`Ancora Construction
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`TCL Construction
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`Set up a verification
`structure
`(Claim 1)
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`Plain and ordinary
`meaning
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`“store information
`encrypted with a key
`unique to the computer”
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`Defendant’s construction is inconsistent with the specification and the claims,
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`which make clear that this step can comprise just “establishing or certifying the
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`existence of a pseudo-unique key in the first non-volatile memory area; and
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`establishing at least one license-record location in the first or the second nonvolatile
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`memory area.” ’941 Patent at 6:18-22; see also Claim 7. And it is black-letter law
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`that a construction that would “exclude[] a [disclosed] embodiment from the scope
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`of the claim is rarely, if ever, correct.” Broadcom, 732 F.3d at 1333 (citation and
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`quotation marks omitted) Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1320
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`(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A ‘claim construction that does not encompass a disclosed
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`embodiment is … rarely, if ever, correct.’”) (quoting Johns Hopkins Univ. v.
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`Cellpro, 152 F.3d 1342, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Here, the specification is express
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`that “[t]he license record may be held in either encrypted or explicit form.” ’941
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`Patent at 1:55, emphasis added. Yet, TCL seeks to exclude this example from the
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`scope of the claims with its proposed construction.
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`Case 8:19-cv-02192-GW-AS Document 52 Filed 09/03/20 Page 16 of 27 Page ID #:568
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`At a basic level it appears that TCL is conflating the “set up a verification
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`structure” step with the process for “establishing a license-record,” which dependent
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`Claim 8 teaches can comprise “forming a license record by encrypting of the
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`contents used to form a license record with other predetermined data contents, using
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`the key.” Id. at 5:40-52 (teaching that “encrypted license records” can be “form[ed] .
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`. . from the contents” of the program “using the key”).
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`TCL’s “using a unique key for each computer” limitation fails for the same
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`reason: the specification and the claims expressly contemplate embodiments that do
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`not use a “key” to set up a verification structure. See id. at 2:62-3:3 (“In its broadest
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`aspect, the invention provides for a method of restricting software operation within a
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`license limitation including; . . . setting up a verification structure in the non-volatile
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`memories, verifying the program using the structure, and acting on the program
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`according to the verification.”). Further, those embodiments that do use a key are not
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`limited to using a “unique key.” Rather, as dependent Claim 7 teaches, a “pseudo-
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`unique key” may be used as part of the process to “set up the verification structure.”
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`Finally, what Defendants intend by their “using . . . license record information
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`in the program” limitation is unclear, but it appears that the text is entirely redundant
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`of the already-present requirement that “the verification structure accommodat[e]
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`data that includes at least one license record.” Accordingly, it should be rejected. See
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`Harris Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 114 F.3d 1149, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (rejecting
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`“construction [that] would contribute nothing but meaningless verbiage”).
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`In short, “set up a verification structure” requires no construction; the claim
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`already states in clear language what is required. The Court should adopt its plain
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`and ordinary meaning.
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`ANCORA’S OPENING MARKMAN BRIEF
`Case No. 8:19-cv-02192-GW-ASx
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`Case 8:19-cv-02192-GW-AS Do