Case 2:09-cv-08325-PSG-CW Document 23 Filed 05/11/10 Page 1 of 5 Page ID #:118
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
`
`O
`
`#19
`
`Case No.
`Title
`
`CV 09-8325 PSG (CWx)
`Mark Frost et al. v. Robert Frederick et al.
`
`Date May 11, 2010
`
`Present:
`
`The Honorable Philip S. Gutierrez, United States District Judge
`
`Wendy K. Hernandez
`Deputy Clerk
`
`Not Present
`Court Reporter
`
`n/a
`Tape No.
`
`Attorneys Present for Plaintiff(s):
`
`Attorneys Present for Defendant(s):
`
`Proceedings:
`
`Not Present
`Not Present
`(In Chambers) Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Relief from Order
`of Dismissal
`
`Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for relief from order of dismissal pursuant to Fed.
`
`R. Civ. P. 59 and 60(b). The Court finds the matter appropriate for decision without oral
`argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. Having considered the papers submitted in support
`of and in opposition to the motion, the Court DENIES the motion.
`
`I.
`
`Background
`
`On November 13, 2009, Plaintiffs Mark Frost (“Frost”) and Good Comma, Ink.
`(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a declaratory relief action against Defendants Robert Frederick
`and MVP Entertainment, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”). The complaint alleged that
`Plaintiffs, as owners of the copyright in Frost’s novel The Match, entered into negotiations with
`Defendants regarding Defendants’ possible acquisition of the movie rights to The Match. The
`complaint alleged that the parties never reached an enforceable agreement, but that Defendants
`claimed that a series of e-mails between the parties did in fact give rise to an enforceable
`agreement. Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs sought a declaration from the Court that
`“Defendants hold no interest or ownership in any rights to The Match” and that “there is no
`contract between the parties with respect to The Match.” See Cmplt ¶¶ 19, 22.
`
`On January 4, 2010, the Court issued an order to show cause (“OSC”) why the Court
`should not dismiss the action pursuant to its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). On January
`26, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a response to the OSC. Plaintiffs argued that the Court should exercise
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`CV-90 (06/04)
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`CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
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`Page 1 of 5
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`Case 2:09-cv-08325-PSG-CW Document 23 Filed 05/11/10 Page 2 of 5 Page ID #:119
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
`
`O
`
`#19
`
`Case No.
`Title
`
`CV 09-8325 PSG (CWx)
`Mark Frost et al. v. Robert Frederick et al.
`
`Date May 11, 2010
`
`its discretion to entertain the action because the Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the parties’
`dispute. The Court had exclusive jurisdiction, according to Plaintiffs, because the alleged
`agreement between the parties involved the transfer of “the exclusive rights granted to copyright
`owners” and § 204 of the Copyright Act requires such a transfer to be in writing. See Plaintiffs’
`Response to OSC 2:18-22.
`
`On March 10, 2010, the Court, declining to exercise its jurisdiction to entertain the action,
`dismissed it without prejudice, noting that district courts “should avoid needless determination
`of state law issues.” See 3/10/10 Order 2 (quoting Government Emples. Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133
`F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 1998)). The Court indicated that it did not have “exclusive jurisdiction
`over a run-of-the-mill, state-law dispute regarding contract formation simply because the
`contract involves a transfer of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner.” See id.
`
`On March 22, 2010, Plaintiffs filed this motion for relief from the Court’s order of
`dismissal (“Order”) pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60(b) (“Motion”).
`
`II.
`
`Legal Standard
`
`“While Rule 59(e) permits a district court to reconsider and amend a previous order, the
`rule offers an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and
`conservation of judicial resources.” Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003)
`(citations and quotations omitted). In fact, “a motion for reconsideration should not be granted,
`absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered
`evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.” Id.
`(citations and quotations omitted). Moreover, “[a] Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to raise
`arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised
`earlier in the litigation.” Id.
`
`Similarly, “[o]n motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal
`representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” for any reason enumerated under
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The final reason enumerated under subsection
`(b) is a catch-all: “any . . . reason that justifies relief.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6); James v.
`United States, 215 F.R.D. 590, 593 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (describing 60(b)(6) as “a catch-all
`provision”). However, as with the relief available under Rule 59, relief under Rule 60(b) is
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`CV-90 (06/04)
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`Case 2:09-cv-08325-PSG-CW Document 23 Filed 05/11/10 Page 3 of 5 Page ID #:120
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
`
`O
`
`#19
`
`Case No.
`Title
`
`CV 09-8325 PSG (CWx)
`Mark Frost et al. v. Robert Frederick et al.
`
`Date May 11, 2010
`
`granted only in “extraordinary circumstances.” See United States v. Washington, 593 F.3d 790,
`799 (9th Cir. 2010).
`
`III.
`
`Discussion
`
`Plaintiffs contend that the Court’s Order of dismissal was based on two clear errors of law
`that warrant withdrawing the Order under Rules 59 and 60(b). First, Plaintiffs contend that the
`Court committed a clear error of law when it concluded that “the federal courts’ jurisdiction to
`entertain Plaintiffs’ action is not exclusive.” See Motion 2:23-25 (quoting 3/10/10 Order 2). As
`a general proposition, federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims “arising under” the
`Copyright Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). According to Plaintiffs, federal cases have uniformly
`interpreted this to mean “that a claim falls within the exclusive copyright jurisdiction of the
`federal courts ‘if the complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the Act, . . . or asserts a
`claim requiring construction of the Act . . . .’” See id. at 3:2-7 (quoting Effects Associates, Inc.
`v. Cohen, 817 F.2d 72, 73 (9th Cir. 1987)) (emphasis omitted). Plaintiffs argue that their claim
`falls into the latter category because it turns on the question of whether the parties’ e-mail
`communications satisfied the “signed writing” requirement of § 204(a) of the Copyright Act.
`See id. at 3:8-23.
`
`In making this argument, Plaintiffs rely principally on Sullivan v. Naturalis, Inc., 5 F.3d
`1410 (11th Cir. 1993), which Plaintiffs claim addresses “the exact same question” as the one
`presented here. See Motion 3:24-25. In that case, the parties disagreed about whether there was
`federal subject matter jurisdiction over a dispute concerning the validity of an oral transfer of
`rights in copyrighted material. See Sullivan, 5 F.3d at 1413. The Eleventh Circuit concluded
`that there was jurisdiction. The court reasoned that it would be “necessary for the district court
`to decide what the parties intended with respect to the ownership and use of the . . . copyrighted
`material [and then] to interpret § 204(a) of the Copyright Act to assess the validity of their
`actions.” See id. According to the court, these determinations required construction of the
`Copyright Act, and for this reason the case was one “arising under” the Act. See id.
`
`Here, however, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ argument for three reasons. First, though
`Plaintiffs had clear notice of the Court’s jurisdictional concerns when they responded to the
`Court’s OSC, Plaintiffs made no mention of Sullivan v. Naturalis in their response. Especially
`as the case supposedly addresses “the exact same question” as the one presented here, Plaintiffs
`should have argued Sullivan at that time, not now. See Carroll, 342 F.3d at 945.
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`CV-90 (06/04)
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`Case 2:09-cv-08325-PSG-CW Document 23 Filed 05/11/10 Page 4 of 5 Page ID #:121
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
`
`O
`
`#19
`
`Case No.
`Title
`
`CV 09-8325 PSG (CWx)
`Mark Frost et al. v. Robert Frederick et al.
`
`Date May 11, 2010
`
`Second, the Court does not find Sullivan sufficiently on point to demonstrate the
`commission of clear error. In particular, it appears that Sullivan involved a dispute over whether
`the parties intended, by their agreement, merely to confer a “non-exclusive license” to use
`copyrighted material (as opposed to transferring ownership of the copyright) and, if so, whether
`such an agreement is excepted from § 204’s writing requirement. See Sullivan, 5 F.3d at 1413 n.
`5. Here, by contrast, there appears to be no dispute over whether the alleged agreement is
`subject to the writing requirement of § 204, merely over whether that requirement was satisfied.
`This is a significantly narrower question than the one in Sullivan, and less obviously requires
`“construction” of the Copyright Act.
`
`Finally, the Court notes that “almost every case involving contract interpretation,
`appropriate for state court determination, could be recharacterized as a case appropriate for a
`federal court simply by framing the issue to be whether the disputed contract qualified as a
`writing within the meaning of section 204(a).” Jasper v. Bovina Music, 314 F.3d 42, 47 (2d Cir.
`2002). As other courts have observed, the boundaries of the federal courts’ exclusive copyright
`jurisdiction “cannot be obliterated by such verbal gymnastics.” See id.
`
`The Court’s second clear error of law, Plaintiffs argue, was in dismissing this action
`“despite the fact that Defendants filed counterclaims for money damages over which this Court
`unquestionably has diversity jurisdiction.” See Motion 1:26-28. According to Plaintiffs, “[t]he
`law in the Ninth Circuit is clear that when there is an independent basis for jurisdiction over
`other claims in a declaratory action, including counterclaims, the district courts have no
`discretion to dismiss those claims and to dismiss the entire controversy.” See id. at 1:28-2:3.
`Defendants have represented to the Court, however, that “[t]o the extent (if any) that jurisdiction
`arguably arises from [Defendant] MVP Entertainment, Inc.’s counterclaims in this action, the
`defendant is ready and willing to dismiss them.” Opp. 3:27-28 n. 3. Accordingly, the Court
`rejects Plaintiffs’ second argument as moot.
`
`For these reasons, then, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to establish that this
`Court committed “a clear error of law” warranting reconsideration of the Court’s Order under
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), see Carroll, 342 F.3d at 945, or that there is “any . . . reason that justifies
`relief” from the Order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
`
`IV.
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`Conclusion
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`CV-90 (06/04)
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`Case 2:09-cv-08325-PSG-CW Document 23 Filed 05/11/10 Page 5 of 5 Page ID #:122
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
`
`O
`
`#19
`
`Case No.
`Title
`
`CV 09-8325 PSG (CWx)
`Mark Frost et al. v. Robert Frederick et al.
`
`Date May 11, 2010
`
`For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion for relief from the order
`of dismissal.
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`IT IS SO ORDERED.
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`CV-90 (06/04)
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`CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
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