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`Case 2:21-cv-00441-SMB Document 75 Filed 03/09/22 Page 1 of 7
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
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`Jaime Dion,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`Bradley Eugene Wright, et al.,
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`Defendants.
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`No. CV-21-00441-PHX-SMB
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`ORDER
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`Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Jaime Dion’s Motion for Summary Judgment
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`(“Motion”). (Doc. 57.) Plaintiff also filed a Statement of Facts in Support of her Motion.
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`(Doc. 58.) Defendants Pinnacle West Capital Corporation Supplemental Excess Benefit
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`Retirement Plan, Pinnacle West Administrative Committee, and Pinnacle West Capital
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`Corporation (collectively the “Pinnacle West Defendants”) filed a Response in which they
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`took no position on Plaintiff’s Motion. (Doc. 62.) Defendant Bradley Wright filed a
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`Response to Plaintiff’s Motion, (Doc. 66), and filed a Controverting Statement of Facts in
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`support of the Response, (Doc. 67). Plaintiff replied. (Doc. 71.) The Court heard oral
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`argument on the Motion on February 25, 2022. The Court has considered the briefing,
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`evidence, and relevant law and will now dismiss the case.
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`I. BACKGROUND
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`Mr. Wright and Ms. Dion were married in 2001 and divorced in 2021. (Doc. 58 ¶
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`1.) Maricopa County Superior Court issued a final divorce decree for the couple on July
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`16, 2021. In re the Matter of Jaime Dion Wright and Bradley Eugene Wright, Case No.
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`Case 2:21-cv-00441-SMB Document 75 Filed 03/09/22 Page 2 of 7
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`FC 2018-006203 (the “Dissolution Decree”). (Id.) Mr. Wright was employed by SunCor
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`Development Company (“SunCor”), a former subsidiary of Pinnacle West Capital
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`Corporation, from 1999 to 2010. (Id. ¶ 2.) During his time working for SunCor, Mr.
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`Wright became vested in a “Pinnacle West Capital Corporation Supplemental Excess
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`Benefit Retirement Plan” (the “Plan”). (Id. ¶ 3.) The Plan allowed a married participant
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`to make an election to receive five-year certain payments in place of a lifetime annuity, but
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`only with the signed consent of the participant’s spouse. (Id. ¶ 4.)
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`At a certain point, to modify the benefit under the Plan, Mr. Wright submitted two
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`documents to the Plan that purported to bear Ms. Dion’s signature. (Id. ¶ 5.) The forms
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`were (1) the “Spouse’s Consent to Designation of Other Beneficiary,” and (2) the
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`“Spouse’s Consent to Payment Form.” (Id. ¶ 6.) The effect of these documents were (1)
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`to change the payout from a lifetime annuity starting when Mr. Wright turned 65 to a five-
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`year payout starting when Mr. Wright turned 55, and (2) to waive Ms. Dion’s rights to her
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`survivor benefits. (Id. ¶ 7.) The documents would have no effect without Ms. Dion’s
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`signature. (Id. ¶ 4.) Ms. Dion contends that she never signed the contested documents.
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`(Doc. 57 at 7.) Her handwriting expert concluded that the disputed signatures on the
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`documents are inconsistent with Ms. Dion’s signatures. (Doc. 58 ¶¶ 15, 16.)
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`In the Dissolution Decree issued by Maricopa County Superior Court on July 16,
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`2021, after weighing the evidence, the court found that “based on evidence presented, that
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`[Ms. Dion] did not sign the Waiver.” (Doc. 57-2 at 16.) The court went on to state:
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`The Court qualifies this finding as limited to being “as between Husband and
`Wife,” because Pinnacle West/Suncor is not a party to this divorce
`proceeding, the finding might not be binding on Pinnacle West/Suncor, and
`the finding, therefore, might not resolve the current pending federal court
`litigation concerning the form of the SEBRP benefit.
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`Because the federal court case has not been resolved, it would not be
`appropriate for this Court to enter any orders concerning the form of benefit
`it must divide. This Court therefore defers to the federal court, will not enter
`any such order concerning the form of benefit at this time, and reserves
`jurisdiction to do so after the federal court rules.
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`Case 2:21-cv-00441-SMB Document 75 Filed 03/09/22 Page 3 of 7
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`(Id.) The Pinnacle West Defendants stated—both in their Response to Ms. Dion’s Motion
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`and at oral argument—that the company intends to comply with any judgment to divide
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`the Plan assets, whether a qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”) from Maricopa
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`County Superior Court or an order from this Court. (See Doc. 62 at 2.)
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`The Court notes that Ms. Dion filed this case on March 15, 2021, only four months
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`before Maricopa County Superior Court issued the Dissolution Decree. (Doc. 1.) Ms.
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`Dion’s counsel stated at oral argument that the federal case was necessary because the
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`Pinnacle West Defendants were not a party to the state court proceedings, and thus would
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`not be bound by a judgment.
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`II. DISCUSSION
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`The parties’ pleadings raise three issues: whether there are any material facts in
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`dispute that would preclude summary judgment; whether collateral estoppel applies; and
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`whether this Court should decline jurisdiction. Because this case is duplicative of the
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`parallel state court proceeding, the Court will first examine whether to exercise jurisdiction
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`over this declaratory judgment action. Ms. Dion argues that it would be an error for this
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`Court to decline jurisdiction. (Doc. 71 at 11.) Mr. Wright argues that this case is
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`unnecessary and that the issue should be handled by the state court. (Doc. 66 at 1, 9.)
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`“Congress has expressly provided ERISA beneficiaries with the choice between a
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`state or federal forum in their actions to recover benefits.” Transamerica Occidental Life
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`Ins. Co. v. DiGregorio, 811 F.2d 1249, 1253 (9th Cir. 1987). The Ninth Circuit has long
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`held that “a district judge has discretion to decline jurisdiction in favor of pending state
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`court litigation when a party seeks to use the Declaratory Judgment Act to deprive a
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`plaintiff of his choice of forum or to encourage a race to judgment. Id. The questions for
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`a district court presented with a suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act is “whether the
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`questions in controversy between the parties to the federal suit, and which are not
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`foreclosed under the applicable substantive law, can better be settled in the proceeding
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`pending in the state court.” Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 282 (1995) (quoting
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`Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942)). A district court should also
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`Case 2:21-cv-00441-SMB Document 75 Filed 03/09/22 Page 4 of 7
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`consider “whether the declaratory action will settle all aspects of the controversy” or
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`“whether the use of a declaratory action will result in entanglement between the federal
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`and state court systems.” Supermicro Computer, Inc. v. Digitechnic, S.A., 145 F. Supp. 2d
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`1147, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (quoting Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1225
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`n. 5 (9th Cir. 1998)). “Ordinarily, it would be uneconomical as well as vexatious for a
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`federal court to proceed in a declaratory judgment suit where another suit is pending in a
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`state court presenting the same issues, not governed by federal law, between the same
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`parties.” Chamberlain v. Allstate Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 1361, 1366 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting
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`Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495. “Thus, when a party requests declaratory relief in federal court
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`and a suit is pending in state court presenting the same state law issue, there exists a
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`presumption that the entire suit should be heard in state court.” Id. at 1366–67. The mere
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`pendency of a state court action, however, does not require a district court to refuse
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`declaratory relief in federal court. Id. at 1167. When faced with such a situation, the
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`Supreme Court has counseled district courts to:
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`[A]scertain whether the questions in controversy between the parties to the
`federal suit, and which are not foreclosed under the applicable substantive
`law, can better be settled in the proceeding pending in the state court. This
`may entail inquiry into the scope of the pending state court proceeding and
`the nature of defenses open there. The federal court may have to consider
`whether the claims of all parties in interest can satisfactorily be adjudicated
`in that proceeding, whether necessary parties have been joined, whether such
`parties are amenable to process in that proceeding, etc.
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`Id. (quoting Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495). “A district court, therefore, when deciding whether
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`to exercise its jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, must balance concerns of
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`judicial administration, comity, and fairness to litigants.” Id.
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`“[T]o guide their discretion in declaratory judgment cases, [c]ourts look at the
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`factors set forth in Brillhart.” Gerdes v. GEICO Indem. Co., No. CV-10-2165-PHX-GMS,
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`2011 WL 649046, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 11, 2011). Under those factors, a district court
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`should (1) “avoid needless determination of state law issues;” (2) “should discourage
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`litigants from filing declaratory actions as a means of forum shopping;” and (3) “should
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`Case 2:21-cv-00441-SMB Document 75 Filed 03/09/22 Page 5 of 7
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`avoid duplicative litigation.” Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225 (citing Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Robsac
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`Indus., 947 F.2d 1367, 1371–73 (9th Cir. 1991) (overruled on other grounds by Dizol).
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`Here, the Court will decline to exercise jurisdiction because the state court is better
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`positioned to decide the entire dispute between the parties. Because a decision of whether
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`Ms. Dion signed the documents to amend the Plan is intertwined with the divorce
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`proceedings, a determination here would not settle all aspects of the controversy. See
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`Supermicro Computer, Inc., S.A., 145 F. Supp. 2d at 1150. The state court is obviously in
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`a better position to decide the entire dispute. In fact, it already has, (Doc. 57-2 at 16), and
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`it simply deferred judgment on the matter because of the pendency of this action. The state
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`court retained jurisdiction to enter an order on the form of benefits after this case is decided.
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`(Id.)
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`The Brillhart factors counsel this Court to decline to exercise jurisdiction. First,
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`this Court should not needlessly determine state law issues when the state court is in a
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`position to do so, and in fact, has already done so. Second, a ruling on this matter would
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`encourage litigants to file declaratory judgment actions during the pendency of state court
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`proceedings if they prefer a federal forum or do not favor a state court judge. Third, as
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`evidenced by the order of the state court judge, this litigation is duplicative. This Court
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`would be deciding the exact same issue that the state court already examined and ruled
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`upon.
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`Yet Ms. Dion argues that Mr. Wright’s request that the Court decline to exercise
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`jurisdiction is essentially a request to dismiss the suit. This, Ms. Dion argues, is
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`procedurally improper. (Doc. 71 at 11); see Carolina v. JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, No.
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`CV-19-05882-PHX-DWL, 2021 WL 5396066, at *9 (D. Ariz. Nov. 17, 2021) (finding that
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`plaintiff’s request for an adverse inference made for the first time in a response to a motion
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`for summary judgment procedurally improper under Rule 7(b)(1)). However, Mr. Wright
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`merely highlights a federal court’s preexisting duty to examine its own jurisdiction. See
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`U.S. v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995) (“The federal courts are under an independent
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`obligation to examine their own jurisdiction.”); see also Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d
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`Case 2:21-cv-00441-SMB Document 75 Filed 03/09/22 Page 6 of 7
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`861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Federal courts are always under an independent obligation to
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`examine their own jurisdiction.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, Ms.
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`Dion’s argument on this point does not stop this Court from considering whether to decline
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`jurisdiction.
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`Ms. Dion also argues that the Court cannot exercise its discretion to decline to
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`exercise jurisdiction unless the state court has jurisdiction over all the parties. (Doc. 71 at
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`12.) Because the Pinnacle West Defendants are not a party to the state court proceedings,
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`Ms. Dion argues that this action is necessary to bind them. (Id.) However, even though
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`the Pinnacle West Defendants are not parties to the state court action, they have avowed
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`both in their Response and at oral argument that they would follow and implement a QDRO
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`with respect to the assets in the Plan. (Doc. 62 at 2.) In fact, the Pinnacle West Defendants
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`stated that they routinely do so. The Pinnacle West Defendants also recognized that they
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`could have been joined in the state court proceedings and stated that they have been
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`included in state court proceedings in other cases. The Pinnacle West Defendants are
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`amendable to service in state court. Furthermore, Ms. Dion and Mr. Wright were both
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`parties in the state court divorce proceedings and had the opportunity to litigate the issue
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`now before this Court. Therefore, the fact that the Pinnacle West Defendants are not parties
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`to the state court action is of no consequence in this instance.1
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`Therefore, the Court will refuse to exercise jurisdiction of this matter and will defer
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`to the state court’s ruling on the matter.
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`///
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`///
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`///
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`///
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`1 Furthermore, if the Court were to proceed on the substance of the Motion, the case may
`result in a factual finding that is inconsistent with that of the state court. Specifically, the
`Court would find that there are disputed facts as to whether Ms. Dion signed the contested
`documents and issue preclusion does not apply. As a result, the matter could proceed to
`trial where a factual finding regarding the signatures could contradict the finding already
`made by the state court.
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`Case 2:21-cv-00441-SMB Document 75 Filed 03/09/22 Page 7 of 7
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`III. CONCLUSION
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`Accordingly,
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`IT IS ORDERED dismissing this case with prejudice.
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`IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
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`57.) is deemed moot.
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`IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall terminate this case.
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`Dated this 9th day of March, 2022.
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