`
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`Case 2:18-cr-00422-SMB Document 793 Filed 10/24/19 Page 1 of 23
`
`
`
`WO
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
`
`United States of America,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`v.
`
`Michael Lacey, et al.,
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`No. CR-18-00422-001-PHX-SMB
`
`ORDER
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`The issue before the Court is Defendants Michael Lacey, James Larkin, Scott Spear,
`
`and John Brunst’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment. (Doc. 561, “Mot.”). Codefendants
`
`Andrew Padilla and Joye Vaught joined the Motion. (Docs. 615, 617). The Government
`
`filed a Response. (Doc. 649, “Resp.”). Lacey, Larkin, and Spear filed a reply. (Doc. 697).
`
`Brunst separately filed a reply. (Doc. 700). Various groups also motioned for leave to file
`
`amici curiae briefs, which the Court granted.1
`
`I.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`On July 25, 2018, a federal grand jury returned a 100-count superseding indictment
`
`against Defendants alleging they engaged in criminal acts while operating the website
`
`Backpage.com (“Backpage”). The charges include conspiracy, violations of the Travel
`
`
`1 The DKT Liberty Project, Cato Institute, and Reason Foundation submitted a brief in
`support of the motion to dismiss the indictment. (Doc. 624). The ACLU of Arizona
`submitted an Amicus Curiae Brief Regarding First Amendment Considerations. (Doc.
`625). Equality Now, Legal Momentum, Sanctuary for Families, United Abolitionists, Inc.,
`and National Coalition against Domestic Violence submitted a brief in support of the
`Government. (Doc. 641).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`Case 2:18-cr-00422-SMB Document 793 Filed 10/24/19 Page 2 of 23
`
`
`
`Act, and money laundering. (Doc. 230, the “SI”). This is one of multiple cases involving
`
`Backpage. In another case before this Court, Backpage itself (the corporate entity) and
`
`related entities have pleaded guilty to Money Laundering Conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).
`
`(CR-18-465-PHX-SMB, Docs. 8, 10, 20). In still another, the CEO of Backpage, Carl
`
`Ferrer has pleaded guilty to Conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371. (CR-18-464-PHX-SMB, Docs.
`
`7, 12, 20). Both of those cases are awaiting sentencing and forfeiture proceedings.
`
`The first count in the SI is conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371, to commit a violation of the
`
`Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3)(A), against all defendants. (SI ¶¶ 195–99). Counts 2–
`
`51 are violations of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3)(A), against all defendants. (SI
`
`¶¶ 200–01). Count 52 is conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h),
`
`against Lacey, Larkin, Spear, Brunst, and Hyer. (SI ¶¶ 202–03). Counts 53–62 are charges
`
`for concealment money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), against Lacey, Larkin,
`
`Spear, Brunst, and Hyer. (SI ¶¶ 204–05). Counts 63–68 are charges of international money
`
`laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A), against Lacey, Larkin, Spear, Brunst, and Hyer.
`
`(SI ¶¶ 206–07). Counts 69–99 are charges of transactional money laundering, 18 U.S.C. §
`
`1957(a).2 (SI ¶¶ 208–09). Finally, Count 100 is a charge of international concealment
`
`money laundering, 19 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), against Lacey. (SI ¶¶ 210–11). One
`
`defendant in this case, Dan Hyer, has pleaded guilty to Count 1 and awaits sentencing.
`
`(Docs. 270, 284, 520).
`
`1. The Alleged Facts
`
`
`
`At this stage of the proceedings, the Court must “accept the truth of the allegations
`
`in the indictment in analyzing whether a cognizable offense has been charged.” United
`
`States v. Boren, 278 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 2002). The Court does “not consider evidence
`
`not appearing on the face of the indictment.” United States v. Jensen, 93 F.3d 667, 669 (9th
`
`Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Marra, 481 F.2d 1196, 1199 (6th Cir. 1973)). Further,
`
`
`2 The defendants for each count of transactional money laundering are designated by a table
`in the SI that includes the transaction at issue and which defendant or defendants are
`charged in connection to that transaction. Lacey, Larkin, Brunst, and Spear all appear as
`defendants in the table.
`
`- 2 -
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`Case 2:18-cr-00422-SMB Document 793 Filed 10/24/19 Page 3 of 23
`
`
`
`Defendants “may not properly challenge an indictment, sufficient on its face, on the ground
`
`that the allegations are not supported by adequate evidence.” Id. (quoting United States v.
`
`Mann, 517 F.2d 259, 267 (5th Cir. 1975)). The proper forum for challenging whether there
`
`is adequate evidence is at trial. See id. (“By basing its decision on evidence that should
`
`only have been presented at trial, the district court in effect granted summary judgment for
`
`the defendants. This it may not do.”); see also United States v. Critzer, 951 F.2d 306, 307
`
`(11th Cir. 1992) (“Nor do the [criminal] rules provide for a pre-trial determination of
`
`sufficiency of the evidence.”). Accordingly, the below summary of relevant facts is
`
`assumed as true for the purpose of this motion.
`
`The SI contains a lengthy summary of the alleged facts. Lacey, Larkin, and a third
`
`individual known as “C.F” created Backpage in 2004. (SI ¶ 2). Spear and Brunst had
`
`executive positions at Backpage or related entities and held ownership interests. (SI ¶¶ 3–
`
`4). Padilla and Vaught were employees of Backpage, with Padilla serving as operations
`
`manager and Vaught as assistant operations manager. (SI ¶¶ 6–7). Lacey, Larkin, Spear,
`
`and Brunst “purportedly” sold their interests in Backpage in 2015, but retained “significant
`
`control” afterward. (SI ¶¶ 2, 29). They sold their interests in Backpage to Dutch entities
`
`controlled by C.F., who “borrowed” most of the purchase price from Lacey, Larkin, Spear,
`
`and Brunst. (SI ¶ 30). Even after the sale, Lacey, Larkin, Spear, and Brunst retained
`
`significant control over Backpage, including its finances, and required C.F. to provide them
`
`with an annual accounting of his personal assets. (SI ¶ 31).
`
`Lacey and Larkin are the founders of the Phoenix New Times newspaper and owned
`
`several other newspapers, including the Village Voice. (SI ¶ 18). They created Backpage
`
`as an online classified ad site that competed with the likes of craigslist.com (“Craigslist”).
`
`(SI ¶¶ 20–21). When Craigslist shut down its “adult” section in 2010, Backpage began
`
`implementing strategies to capture Craigslist’s share of the market. (SI ¶ 24). Larkin noted
`
`in one internal document that Craigslist folding could mean “a deluge of adult content ads
`
`for backpage.com.” (Id.). Financially, Backpage was very successful. In its own words,
`
`it was experiencing “explosive growth” by “capitalizing on displaced Craigslist ad
`
`- 3 -
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`Case 2:18-cr-00422-SMB Document 793 Filed 10/24/19 Page 4 of 23
`
`
`
`volume.” (SI ¶ 25). Backpage profits grew annually: $26 million in 2010, over $52 million
`
`in 2011, over $78 million in 2012, over $112 million in 2013, and over $134 million in
`
`2014. (SI ¶¶ 25, 28).
`
`The SI alleges that all defendants “were aware that the overwhelming majority of
`
`the website’s ‘adult’ and ‘escort’ ads were actually ads for prostitution.” (SI ¶ 34). The SI
`
`points to three strategies Backpage used to attract more prostitution ads. (Id.). It refers to
`
`them as content aggregation, reciprocal link and affiliate programs, and moderating ads to
`
`“sanitiz[e]” them. (SI ¶ 34).
`
`
`
`The SI describes Defendants’ aggregation efforts in paragraphs 35–44. It alleges
`
`Spear encouraged Hyer and C.F. to create a plan to move prostitution ads onto Backpage.
`
`The plan was to “identify prostitutes advertising other websites,” contact the prostitutes,
`
`and create free trial ads for them if they were not already using Backpage. First tested in
`
`Dallas, Texas, this strategy became known as the “Dallas aggregation” plan soon spread to
`
`other locations. Spear, Hyer, Larkin, C.F., and Brunst are alleged to have been aware of
`
`this strategy through emails, email attachments, other documents, and meetings where the
`
`plan was on the agenda.
`
`
`
`The SI describes the “reciprocal link and affiliate programs” strategy in paragraphs
`
`45–67.
`
` It alleges Defendants sought
`
`to create a business relationship with
`
`TheEroticReview.com (“TER”), a “prostitution website” where “johns” could rate escorts.
`
`Backpage paid TER for banner ads, and Hyer and C.F. saw TER as essential to business
`
`growth. Google Analytics reports provided to Defendants also showed TER was the
`
`number one source of outside referrals to Backpage. The “affiliate programs” alleged in
`
`the SI involve partnerships with “organizations and individuals who were known to be
`
`involved in the prostitution industry.” One such individual went by the name “Dollar Bill.”
`
`Dollar Bill was described as a “super affiliate,” and Backpage once deleted over 4,000 ads
`
`that he posted. Padilla helped him restore those ads. Emails show that Dollar Bill was
`
`aware of Backpage’s moderation practices and C.F. coached him how to avoid deletion by
`
`Backpage moderators.
`
`- 4 -
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`Case 2:18-cr-00422-SMB Document 793 Filed 10/24/19 Page 5 of 23
`
`
`
`
`
`The SI describes Backpage’s moderation practices in paragraphs 68–70, 72–73, 75,
`
`77–96, 98–104, 108, 110, 112, 116–26, 128–30, 132–34, 136, 139, 143, 145, and 148. C.F.
`
`explained the strategy: “We do not intend to be a craig[slist] here, just get out the most
`
`egregious stuff.” Padilla emailed Hyer and C.F. that posters who repeatedly violated
`
`Backpage’s posting rule would have their ads deleted and banned, though the bans were
`
`only temporary and aimed at the “worst apples.” Another Padilla email cc’d Vaught and
`
`threatened to fire any Backpage employee who acknowledged in writing that a customer
`
`was a prostitute. Attachments to an October 16, 2010 email from Padilla to a large group
`
`of Backpage employees, including Hyer and Vaught, explained how to moderate ads. The
`
`instructions allowed nude and partially-nude photographs, some of which depicted graphic
`
`sex acts. The other attachment identified fifty terms that should be “stripped” from ads
`
`before publication. In another email, C.F. told Padilla to “lighten up on the images
`
`moderation. Spear tells me it’s the text that is the problem.” In January 2011, Lacey and
`
`Larkin met with representatives from the National Center for Missing and Exploited
`
`Children (“NCMEC”) where Lacey told them “adult prostitution is none of your business.”
`
`
`
`According to the SI, these moderation efforts were made not to stop the underlying
`
`illegal activity, but to create a “veneer of deniability” and evade detection. (SI ¶ 13).
`
`Defendants stripped coded terms they allegedly knew indicated prostitution or underage
`
`prostitution—such as “GFE/Girlfriend Experience,” “Lolita,” and “New in Town”—from
`
`ads but still posted them with their underlying message unchanged. The moderation
`
`practices also allowed identification numbers from TER to be used and permitted pictures
`
`with “nude rear shots” and “transparent wet panties.” A PowerPoint presentation created
`
`by some defendants acknowledged the non-adult sections of Backpage existed to show
`
`“plausible deniability” and make the website more palatable to “law enforcement.”
`
`
`
`A large portion of the SI is dedicated to showing Defendants knew their efforts to
`
`market to prostitution advertisers were successful. Spear received emails summarizing
`
`these moderation practices. (SI ¶¶ 70, 73, 81). Larkin, Spear, Brunst, Hyer, and C.F.
`
`received an email notifying them that Chase Bank would no longer process transactions
`
`- 5 -
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`Case 2:18-cr-00422-SMB Document 793 Filed 10/24/19 Page 6 of 23
`
`
`
`for Backpage because of Backpage’s “involvement in human trafficking.” (SI ¶ 135). C.F.
`
`testified in a number of criminal trials of pimps who had used to Backpage to post
`
`prostitution ads. (SI ¶¶ 71, 76, 92). C.F., Padilla, and Vaught helped one Backpage
`
`customer, P.R., restore her prostitution ads after they were taken down. (SI ¶ 132). P.R.’s
`
`ads included the phrase “50 Red Roses special.” “Roses” is a commonly-used in
`
`prostitution to mean money. (SI ¶¶ 160–61). Lacey wrote a draft editorial claiming
`
`Backpage had provided “the oldest profession in the world . . . transparency, record keeping
`
`and safeguards” and acknowledging that Backpage used an automatic filter to remove
`
`certain phrases from ads that indicated prostitution but still published the ads after editing.
`
`(SI ¶ 107). Larkin forwarded the editorial to C.F. “cautioning against some of Lacey’s
`
`statements ‘being made public’ because ‘we need to stay away from the very idea of editing
`
`the posts.’” (SI ¶ 108).
`
`
`
`The SI includes “victim summaries” of women who were sold for sex on Backpage.
`
`(SI ¶¶ 160–176). Ads depicting Victims 5, 8, 10, 12, 11, 15, 17, 13, and 16 are among the
`
`alleged ads in the indictment. (SI ¶ 201, Counts 2, 4–5, 12–17, 19–24). One ad by Victim
`
`5 was rejected by Backpage because it listed her age as seventeen. It was accepted after it
`
`was “simply resubmitted with a new (false) age of 19.” (SI ¶ 164). Victim 8 was fifteen
`
`years old when her uncle and his friends posted ads on Backpage using terms indicative of
`
`prostitution like “roses,” and “150 for 1/2 hour, 200 for full hour.” (SI ¶ 167). Victim 10
`
`was seventeen years old when her pimp posted Backpage ads containing the phrase “NEW
`
`IN TOWN” and pictures of her provocatively posed. (SI ¶ 169). Backpage occasionally
`
`removed certain explicit photos from Victim 11’s ads but published the remaining text and
`
`other provocative photos. (SI ¶ 170). Victim 12’s advertisements contained phrases such
`
`as “New In Town” and “Sexy Dark Asian Bombshell with a Nice & Tight {Booty}.” (SI ¶
`
`171). Victim 13 was a juvenile when she and her trafficker posted Backpage ads, which
`
`falsely represented she was nineteen years old. At least once, a Backpage representative
`
`contacted her with instructions on how to fix an ad so it could be published. (SI ¶ 172).
`
`Victim 15 was sold for sex using phrases such as “Thick Glass of Chocolate Milk Looking
`
`- 6 -
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`Case 2:18-cr-00422-SMB Document 793 Filed 10/24/19 Page 7 of 23
`
`
`
`for a GoodTime!!!” and “sexy certified freak.” After her trafficker attempted to take her to
`
`Texas against her will, she jumped out of the vehicle and was killed after being hit by
`
`several vehicles on Interstate 10. (SI ¶ 174). Victim 16 was murdered by a customer after
`
`she posted Backpage ads containing the phrases “outcalls only,” “Juicy Caramel Lady on
`
`Duty,” and including provocative pictures. (SI ¶ 175). Victim 17 was sold for sex,
`
`averaged ten customers a day, and was forced to turn over all of her prostitution earnings
`
`to her pimp. An associate of her pimp took pictures of her and drafted Backpage ads with
`
`the phrases “IN/CALLS ONLY,” “I’m here to make your wildest fantasies come true,” and
`
`“Sorry, but NO BLACK MEN.” The ads included pictures of Victim 17’s buttocks and
`
`face. (SI ¶176).
`
`
`
`The SI’s factual allegations regarding money laundering appear in paragraphs 177–
`
`194. They detail that most of Backpages’ earnings came from pimping and prostitution,
`
`and that banks, credit card companies, and other financial institutions refused to do
`
`business with Backpage because of its connection to prostitution. (SI ¶ 177–78, 182). C.F.,
`
`Larkin, Spear, and Brunst discussed creating shell companies to fool credit card companies.
`
`(SI ¶ 179). They utilized entities such as Posting Solutions LLC, Website Technologies
`
`LLC, and Cereus Properties LLC. (SI ¶¶ 184–85, 187–92). They also used
`
`cryptocurrencies. (SI ¶¶ 193–94).
`
`
`
`The SI identifies fifty specific ads by date and description in paragraph 201. Fifteen
`
`of the ads depict specific victims found in the victim summaries. Ten of the ads were
`
`posted by P.R, the prostitute who had extensive communications with C.F. (SI ¶ 201,
`
`Counts 3, 6–11, 18, 25–26). In the remaining twenty-five examples, Backpage published
`
`ads containing “GFE.” (SI ¶ 201, Counts 27–51).
`
`II.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
`
`The Fifth Amendment demands that “no person be held to answer for “a capital, or
`
`otherwise infamous crime” unless indicted by a Grand Jury. U.S. Const., amend. V. This
`
`indictment “must be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts
`
`constituting the offense charged.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1). It is considered sufficient if it
`
`- 7 -
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`Case 2:18-cr-00422-SMB Document 793 Filed 10/24/19 Page 8 of 23
`
`
`
`“contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge
`
`against which he must defend” and “enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar
`
`of future prosecutions for the same offense.” Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 116
`
`(1974). An indictment “should be read in its entirety, construed according to common
`
`sense, and interpreted to include facts which are necessarily implied.” United States v.
`
`Berger, 473 F.3d 1080, 1103 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. King, 200 F.3d 1207,
`
`1217 (9th Cir. 1999). Language of a statute may be used to describe the accused defense,
`
`but it must be accompanied with enough “facts and circumstances” to “inform the accused
`
`of the specific offence . . . with which he is charged.” Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117–18
`
`(quoting United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483, 487 (1888)). “On a motion to dismiss an
`
`indictment for failure to state an offense, the court must accept the truth of the allegations
`
`in the indictment in analyzing whether a cognizable offense has been charged.” Boren,
`
`278 F.3d at 914. An indictment cannot be challenged “on the ground that the allegations
`
`are not supported by adequate evidence.” Jensen, 93 F.3d at 669 (quoting United States v.
`
`Mann, 517 F.2d at 267).
`
`The First Amendment provides additional protections in prosecutions based on
`
`speech. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002). But these
`
`protections are not unlimited. “Congress is allowed to restrict certain types of speech,
`
`including obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal
`
`conduct.” United States of America v. Sinneneng-Smith, 910 F.3d 461, 480 (9th Cir. 2018)
`
`(citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010)). The government carries the
`
`burden to show that the speech is unprotected. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 255.
`
`III. DISCUSSION
`
`Defendants repeatedly argue that the government is pursuing a theory of vicarious
`
`liability for merely hosting third party content. That argument is not supported by the SI,
`
`which goes through a long and fact-specific description of the Defendants participation in
`
`a conspiracy to facilitate and promote prostitution. The SI sufficiently explains why
`
`defendants in this case are not just merely hosting third party content. Defendants also
`
`- 8 -
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`Case 2:18-cr-00422-SMB Document 793 Filed 10/24/19 Page 9 of 23
`
`
`
`argue that the SI is based entirely on the assumption that the advertisements are for illegal
`
`activity. Again, Defendants ignore the specific facts alleged in the SI. While the SI does
`
`contain some language that could support that accusation, it is replete with specific facts
`
`that support finding that the conspirators knew the ads were for prostitution.
`
`Defendants argue the SI should be dismissed for three reasons. First, they argue the
`
`SI is deficient because it presumes the ads in the indictment are illegal, merely repeats
`
`others’ accusations, attacks protected publisher functions, and attacks legal business
`
`practices. Second, they argue SI fails to allege specific intent, which Defendants argue is
`
`the required mens rea. Third, they argue the Travel Act is unconstitutional as applied in
`
`the SI because the allegations are based on “generalized crimes” and conflict with the First
`
`Amendment. The Court is unpersuaded by these arguments and will deny Defendants’
`
`motion to dismiss the indictment.
`
`1. The SI is not deficient.
`
`a. The SI does not presume ads are illegal nor does it merely repeat others’
`
`accusations.
`
`Defendants first argue that the SI impermissibly presumes the alleged offending ads
`
`are unlawful. “The Government may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress
`
`unlawful speech.” Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 255. In their view, Backpage was “an avenue of
`
`expression of ideas and opinions” with First Amendment protections. (Mot. at 17) (quoting
`
`Backpage.com v. Dart, 807 F.3d 229, 230 (7th Cir. 2015)). That is, because Backpage
`
`contained at least some ads that were not for prostitution, the Government’s prosecution of
`
`these defendants necessarily attacks protected speech unless it shows the speech at issue
`
`was unlawful. See Dart, 807 F.3d at 234. The Government “bears the burden of proving
`
`the constitutionality of its actions” when it restricts speech. United States v. Playboy Entm’t
`
`Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816 (2000); see Bd. of Trustees v. State Univ. of N.J., 492 U.S.
`
`469, 480 (1989) (“[T]he State bears the burden of justifying its restrictions[.]”).
`
`Here, taking the allegations in the SI as true, as the Court must, the Government has
`
`met its burden of showing the fifty ads in the SI are for prostitution. Counts 3, 6–11, 18,
`
`- 9 -
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`Case 2:18-cr-00422-SMB Document 793 Filed 10/24/19 Page 10 of 23
`
`
`
`and 25–26 concern ads posted by P.R. The SI lays out P.R.’s history of working with C.F.
`
`in detail. (SI ¶ 132). C.F. knew P.R.’s posts advertised prostitution, repeatedly allowed
`
`P.R. to post those ads, and advised P.R. on how to meet Backpage’s publications standards.
`
`P.R.’s ads contained a phrase indicative of prostitution, “50 red roses special,” and
`
`Backpage moderators sometimes deleted her nude pictures. In emails to C.F., P.R.
`
`complained that other ads had more nudity than her own. Vaught and Padilla also received
`
`emails from P.R. They instructed another Backpage employee to “dig into” her difficulty
`
`posting such pictures. P.R. posted ads through November 2015. Construing the SI in its
`
`entirety according to common sense, the alleged facts sufficiently show that the ads posted
`
`by P.R. were for prostitution.
`
`The ads in Counts 27–51 contain the phrase “GFE.” The SI explains in multiple
`
`paragraphs that GFE, short for “girlfriend experience,” is a “coded term for prostitution.”
`
`At one point, GFE was temporarily banned from use in Backpage ads. Defendants Spear,
`
`Hyer, Padilla, C.F., and Vaught exchanged emails discussing its use as a “code word” or a
`
`“solid sex for money term[].” (SI ¶ 149). Dollar Bill once complained that Backpage
`
`refused one of his ads even though “IT NEVER SAID GFE” while other, more obvious
`
`prostitution ads had been published despite “saying GFE.” (SI ¶ 64). Backpage’s
`
`moderators were instructed to stop removing ads containing “GFE” in or around January
`
`2016, a decision Padilla and a moderator discussed and communicated to Vaught. (SI ¶
`
`148). Again, taking the allegations in the SI as true, which the Court must, the SI’s alleged
`
`facts sufficiently show the GFE ads were for prostitution.
`
`Counts 2, 4–5, 12–17, and 19–24 depict ads of Victims 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16,
`
`and 17. Victims 5, 8, 10 were “sold for sex, through the use of Backpage ads.” (SI ¶¶ 164,
`
`167, 169–72, 174–76). Each of these ads, construed according to common sense, and
`
`interpreted to include facts necessarily implied, and read in context of the entire SI, are ads
`
`for prostitution. The ad in Count 2 depicted Victim 5 and was titled “Get freaky Tuesday.
`
`. . Come spend ur day with us–19” and had accompanying text saying “Doin incalls and
`
`outcalls.” Victim 8 was depicted in the ad for Count 4, titled “Puerto Rican mami in
`
`- 10 -
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`Case 2:18-cr-00422-SMB Document 793 Filed 10/24/19 Page 11 of 23
`
`
`
`Walpole area INCALLS—19.” A similar ad depicting her makes up Count 5. The ads
`
`depicting Victims 10 and 12 (Counts 12–15) contained the phrase “New In Town,” a
`
`“coded phrase used by pimps who shuttle children to locations where they do not know
`
`anyone and cannot get help.” (SI ¶ 13). Victim 11 was featured in ads titled “Upscale
`
`Independent BRUNETTE BOMBSHELL 5-Star Fantasy—26” and “Alexis Foxx the
`
`HOTTEST in town!!!!!—26” (Counts 16–17). Victim 15 and 17’s ads, among other
`
`suggestive text, included a disclaimer that by contacting them, prospective customers
`
`agreed they were not affiliated with law enforcement (Counts 19–21). Victim 17 offered
`
`in/calls only (Counts 21–22). Victim 13’s ad included prices for particular services: “I do
`
`half hour sessions that vary in donation prices, 80 for head, 120 for hooking up without
`
`head and 150 for hooking up with head” (Count 23). Victim 16’s ad offered “Outcalls
`
`Now Freaky Curvy Caramel Lady OUTCALLS NOW—23.”
`
`Again, at this point of the proceeding, the Court must take the SI at its face. The
`
`Government may eventually fail to prove the facts alleged in the SI, but, at this stage of the
`
`proceeding, the Court cannot consider the adequacy of the evidence; that job is reserved
`
`for the fact finder. The Court is convinced the factual allegations in the SI are sufficient to
`
`show the ads were for prostitution.
`
`Additionally, Defendants argue the SI’s use of government officials’ and others’
`
`“accusations” against Backpage are improper. (Mot. at 18–19); see, e.g., (SI ¶ 74 (2010
`
`letter from state AGs); SI ¶ 109 (letter from Seattle mayor); SI ¶ 111 (letter from National
`
`Association of Attorneys General); SI ¶ 140 (amicus brief filed by NCMEC); SI ¶ 131
`
`(ASU publication)). Defendants cite two previous cases Backpage was involved in for the
`
`proposition that Courts have “rejected such ‘evidence’” in the past. (Mot. at 19); see
`
`Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805 (M.D. Tenn. 2013); Backpage.com,
`
`LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (W.D. Wash. 2012). Neither case stands for such
`
`a proposition;3 even if they did, the SI contains enough factual information outside of these
`
`
`3 In the portions of McKenna cited by Defendants, the district court analyzed a state statute
`under vagueness and overbreadth doctrines. 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1280–83. The Cooper court
`
`- 11 -
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`Case 2:18-cr-00422-SMB Document 793 Filed 10/24/19 Page 12 of 23
`
`
`
`“condemnations” to be sufficient.
`
`b. The SI does not attack protected editorial functions or protected business
`
`advertising practices.
`
`Defendants argue the SI attacks Backpage’s protected editorial judgment and
`
`business advertising practices. The First Amendment protects “editorial control and
`
`judgment.” Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). The First
`
`Amendment also protects speech on the Internet. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
`
`Defendants, however, are unable to overcome the alleged facts in the SI.4
`
`The SI alleges Defendants participated in moderation not merely to edit, but to
`
`“conceal the true nature of the ads being posted on its website.” (SI ¶ 11). When a post
`
`advertised child prostitution, their “official policy” was to delete particular words in the ad
`
`that indicated the child’s age and publish the revised version. (SI ¶ 13). This “only created
`
`a veneer of deniability and helped Backpage’s customers (i.e., pimps trafficking children)
`
`evade detection.” (SI ¶¶ 13, 78). Backpage permitted users to include TER ID numbers,
`
`“just no live links.” (SI ¶ 85). In February 2011, Padilla responded to a request for
`
`Backpage’s list of banned adult terms. Padilla then provided an Excel spreadsheet that
`
`identified over “660 words or phrases that are indicative of prostitution, including an array
`
`of terms that are suggestive of child prostitution (e.g., ‘Lolita,’ ‘fresh,’ ‘high school,’
`
`‘tight,’ ‘young’). The spreadsheet explained that most such terms were simply to be
`
`‘filtered’ from the ads in which they appeared.” (SI ¶ 95). The SI also alleges the “non-
`
`adult sections” were simply intended to provide “plausible deniability” and to make the
`
`website “defensible” and more palatable to law enforcement. (SI ¶ 112). A Backpage
`
`
`discusses the September 2010 letter from state AGs, but held a state statute similar to the
`one in McKenna was likely unconstitutional under the overbreadth doctrine. 939 F. Supp.
`2d at 815–16, 831–32. Neither considered the sufficiency or use of the contested
`statements.
`4 Defendants also argue the SI’s allegations are not supported by underlying documents.
`Again, per Boren and Jensen, supra, the Court takes the allegations on their face and does
`not consider the adequacy of the evidence when reviewing whether an indictment is
`sufficient.
`
`- 12 -
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`Case 2:18-cr-00422-SMB Document 793 Filed 10/24/19 Page 13 of 23
`
`
`
`training document specifically instructed Backpage moderators not to remove photographs
`
`of a person who looks like a minor, unless the ad also contained a banned term. (SI ¶ 143).
`
`The training manual instructed moderators to allow phrases like “99% CUM BACK FOR
`
`MORE,” “car service,” and “lollipop special.” (SI ¶ 143). Backpage also taught customers
`
`how to word their ads to avoid moderator restrictions. (SI ¶ 59–67).
`
`The cases Defendants rely on do not persuade the Court that the above practices
`
`alleged in the SI were merely traditional, editorial functions. First, many of the cases were
`
`decided under the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), which grants immunity from
`
`civil liability to “interactive computer service” providers when information on its service
`
`originates from “another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c); see Barnes v.
`
`Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009) (“To summarize, we hold that section
`
`230(c)(1) bars Barnes’ claim, under Oregon law, for negligent provision of services that
`
`Yahoo undertook to provide”); Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 469–71 (3d Cir.
`
`2003); Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (“By its plain
`
`language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service
`
`providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service.”); Jones
`
`v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 2014); Batzel v. Smith,
`
`333 F.3d 1018, 1026–30 (9th Cir. 2003) superseded by statute on other ground as
`
`recognized in Breazeale v. Victim Serv., Inc., 878 F.3d 759 (9th Cir. 2017); Doe v.
`
`Backpage.com, LLC, 104 F. Supp. 3d 14

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.
After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.
Accept $ ChargeStill Working On It
This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.
Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.
A few More Minutes ... Still Working
It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.
Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.
We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.
You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.
Set your membership
status to view this document.
With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll
get a whole lot more, including:
- Up-to-date information for this case.
- Email alerts whenever there is an update.
- Full text search for other cases.
- Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

One Moment Please
The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.
Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!
If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document
We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.
If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.
Access Government Site