Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2022 Filed 12/22/23 Page 1 of 19
`
`
`
`GARY M. RESTAINO
`United States Attorney
`District of Arizona
`
`KEVIN M. RAPP (Ariz. Bar No. 014249, kevin.rapp@usdoj.gov)
`MARGARET PERLMETER (Ariz. Bar No. 024805, margaret.perlmeter@usdoj.gov)
`PETER S. KOZINETS (Ariz. Bar No. 019856, peter.kozinets@usdoj.gov)
`ANDREW C. STONE (Ariz. Bar No. 026543, andrew.stone@usdoj.gov)
`Assistant U.S. Attorneys
`40 N. Central Avenue, Suite 1800
`Phoenix, Arizona 85004-4408
`Telephone (602) 514-7500
`
`DAN G. BOYLE (N.Y. Bar No. 5216825, daniel.boyle2@usdoj.gov)
`Special Assistant U.S. Attorney
`312 N. Spring Street, Suite 1400
`Los Angeles, CA 90012
`Telephone (213) 894-2426
`
`NICOLE M. ARGENTIERI
`Acting Assistant Attorney General
`Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice
`
`AUSTIN M. BERRY (Texas Bar No. 24062615, austin.berry2@usdoj.gov)
`U.S. Department of Justice
`Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section
`1301 New York Avenue, NW, 11th Floor
`Washington, D.C. 20005
`Telephone (202) 412-4136
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
`
`
`
`
`
`United States of America,
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`v.
`
`
`Michael Lacey, et al.,
`
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`
`CR-18-422-PHX-DJH
`
`UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE TO
`DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A
`NEW TRIAL (Doc. 2009)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`
`Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2022 Filed 12/22/23 Page 2 of 19
`
`
`
`In “exceptional cases” where “the evidence preponderates heavily against the
`verdict,” courts may grant a new trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). United States v. Rush,
`749 F.2d 1369, 1371 (9th Cir. 1984). The evidence comes nowhere close to meeting this
`standard—and Defendants’ Motion should be denied.
`I.
`The Rule 29 Grounds Do Not Support Defendants’ Rule 33 Motion
`In two conclusory sentences, Defendants “incorporate by reference” and assert that
`the bases of their Rule 29 motions support granting a new trial under Rule 33. Mot. at 1.
`This argument fails for the same reasons Defendants’ Rule 29 arguments fail. The jury
`heard 21 government witnesses and received over 400 government exhibits during the 34-
`day trial. Docs. 1993, 1994. The witnesses included Backpage insiders Carl Ferrer, Dan
`Hyer, and Jess Adams; John Shehan from NCMEC; Brad Myles from the Polaris Project;
`Isaac Luria from the Auburn Theological Seminary; Mickey Hansen from American
`Express; Lin Howard from Arizona Bank and Trust; numerous police officers (Det.
`Murray, Lt. Griffin, Det. Fritze) and victims (B.L., A.B., J.S., N.F., A.C., A.B., A.S.W.
`(sister of a victim), J.T., M.L.); and former IRS-Criminal Investigation Special Agent
`Quoc Thai. Doc. 1994. The evidence showed that Defendants deliberately built Backpage
`into a massive prostitution advertising website, generated hundreds of millions of dollars
`from selling ads for illegal prostitution, and then laundered the proceeds through a complex
`web of domestic and foreign accounts. See generally United States’ Responses to the Rule
`29 Motions filed by Lacey, Spear, and Brunst. This evidence does not warrant the
`extraordinary remedy of a new trial under Rule 33. Rush, 749 F.2d at 1371.
`II.
`Defendants’ Discovery Arguments Do Not Support Dismissal or a New Trial
`
`The United States incorporates by reference its response (Doc. 1990) to Defendants’
`supplement regarding Ferrer’s emails with U.S. Postal Inspector Lyndon Versoza
`concerning the forfeiture phase of the trial. Doc. 1972.
`
`Defendants next assert that the United States “refused . . . to produce nearly all the
`factual information developed during” a separate investigation of Backpage conducted by
`the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Washington (WDWA) in 2012-13.
`
`- 1 -
`
`

`

`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`
`Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2022 Filed 12/22/23 Page 3 of 19
`
`
`
`Mot. at 2. Defendants speculate about what that investigation “determined” and assert,
`without support, that unspecified materials from the investigation are “plainly exculpatory
`and impeaching.” Mot. at 3. Defendants have already litigated this issue—and lost.
`
`In 2019, in granting a motion to compel destruction of inadvertently disclosed
`documents, Judge Logan found that the WDWA investigation was “wholly separate” from
`this criminal case. Doc. 1454, 12/3/2021 Hr’g Tr. at 56:11-16 (quoting Doc. 449-1 at 4).
`And in 2021, this Court denied Defendants’ motion to compel regarding the WDWA
`investigation. Doc. 1444 at 14-15. In responding to Defendants’ motion (Doc. 1281), the
`United States explained that WDWA investigation materials are neither exculpatory nor
`material for many reasons. Doc. 1326 at 3, 9-13. These reasons include the avalanche of
`evidence that emerged after that investigation, including Backpage’s compelled disclosure
`of hundreds of thousands of internal documents in 2015-15, the U.S. Senate’s investigation
`and its resulting report BACKPAGE.COM’S KNOWING FACILITATION OF ONLINE SEX
`TRAFFICKING in 2017, and the guilty pleas of Backpage’s CEO, Carl Ferrer, Dan Hyer, and
`the Backpage operating entities in 2018. Doc. 1326 at 9-13. As shown by the plea
`agreements and a raft of additional evidence, Backpage promoted prostitution by, among
`other things, aggregating prostitution ads from competing websites, forming relationships
`with bulk prostitution advertisers or “super posters,” and developing a reciprocal link and
`cross-marketing business relationship with The Erotic Review—a prostitution review site
`that left no doubt about Defendants’ intent to promote prostitution. See Doc. 1326 at 9-13.
`The Court found no reason to reconsider previous orders that addressed the Brady and
`Giglio issues raised by Defendants (Docs. 339, 449, and 1028), refused to dismiss the case,
`and declined to find that the United States had intentionally concealed or refused to
`produced exculpatory materials. Doc. 1444 at 15.
`
`Defendants offer nothing new, other than to assert that “the entirety of the
`government’s case” now requires a different result. Mot. at 5. But the United States put on
`the same case at trial that it had laid out in its Superseding Indictment and the briefing that
`the Court considered when issuing its prior Orders. See, e.g., Doc. 230 passim; Doc. 649,
`
`- 2 -
`
`

`

`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`
`Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2022 Filed 12/22/23 Page 4 of 19
`
`
`
`passim; Doc. 1326 at 5-9. Defendants also ignore that the United States in fact searched its
`files and disclosed factual materials relating to the WDWA investigation to Defendants,
`including grand jury testimony, interview memoranda, hand written notes of interviews,
`and additional reports and documents. See, e.g., Doc. 1281 at 5-6; Doc. 1326 at 3, 13. The
`notion that the United States “steadfastly refused” (Mot. at 2) to produce these materials is
`incorrect. Nor does Defendants’ suggestion that the United States used the investigation
`“as a sword”— based on one vague sentence from Ferrer’s 11 days of testimony—support
`the “exceptional” relief Defendants seek. Rush, 749 F.2d at 1371; cf. Mot. at 2-3 and n.3.
`III. The United States Did Not Elicit “False or Misleading Testimony” from Ferrer
`A.
`Ferrer Truthfully Testified that He Corresponded with P.R.
`Defendants’ assertion that Ferrer’s testimony conveyed the “false impression” that
`he emailed directly with P.R. is a non-starter. Mot. at 4-7. As Defendants concede, Ferrer
`testified that he corresponded with P.R. via email. Mot. at 5, quoting 9/14/23 P.M. Tr. at
`79:7-9 (“Q. [D]id you have e-mail exchanges with somebody by the name of [P.R.]? A.
`Yes.”). He had an independent recollection of those exchanges, which occurred from 2010
`to 2018. Id.; see also id. at 79:10-12 (“Q. [O]ver what time period approximately did those
`e-mail exchanges take place? A. Approximately 2010 to 2018. There’s a lot of e-mails.”).
`From his interactions with her, Ferrer concluded that P.R. “was engaged in
`prostitution.” 9/14/23 p.m. Tr. at 80:6. Like other prostitutes who advertised on Backpage,
`P.R. kept violating the site’s posting rules, but “we would let her back in,” “much like we
`had done with all of the other advertisers in Female Escort sections. They would get a pass.
`They wouldn’t be banned if they posted ads violating the rules. They would get to try
`again.” 9/15 a.m. Tr. at 7:14-21. And to reward her for past business, P.R. received “promo
`codes” for free or discounted ads. See Exs. 162, 164.
`This approach illustrated the moderation strategy that Backpage developed in
`response to outside criticism. Larkin and Spear directed Ferrer to “not throw the baby out
`with the bathwater,” 9/14/23 p.m. Tr. at 25:20-26:7, leading to “cosmetic changes” that
`didn’t impact revenue. 9/15/23 a.m. Tr. at 9:1-10:23. While the company adopted various
`
`- 3 -
`
`

`

`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`
`Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2022 Filed 12/22/23 Page 5 of 19
`
`
`
`moderation policies, users were continually given additional chances to post. They weren’t
`blocked; “[t]hey could just post again.” 9/12/23 p.m. Tr. at 60:7.
`Ferrer testified about several emails he exchanged with P.R. In Ex. 162, P.R.
`complained about the removal of an image from one of her ads, and Ferrer testified that
`she provided him that image as an email attachment. 9/14/23 p.m. Tr. at 84:24-85:11; Exs.
`162, 162a. Ferrer confirmed that Ex. 163 was an email exchange between himself and P.R.
`9/14/23 p.m. Tr. at 86:3-15. He testified that Ex. 164 was a marketing email that he “would
`write up and then have Scott Spear approve before I sent it out.” 9/14/23 p.m. Tr. at 89:19-
`90:5. Ex. 165 was another marketing email that Ferrer drafted, sent to Spear for approval,
`and “remember[ed] sending.” 9/14/23 p.m. Tr. at 94:12- 96:23. Ferrer testified that Ex. 168
`was an email that he received from P.R. 9/14/23 p.m. Tr. at 99:23-100:4.
`Defendants note that Ferrer testified on cross-examination that the address
`appearing on these emails, Carl@backpage.com, was a marketing email address that others
`at Backpage could access and respond from. Mot. at 6; 10/10/23 a.m. Tr. at 104:3-23. But
`Ferrer never testified that the emails with P.R. that he discussed at trial (Exs. 162-165 and
`168) reflected communications with anyone other than himself. And even if his testimony
`indicates any conflict in the evidence (it does not), neither Rule 29 nor Rule 33 would
`justify the relief Defendants seek. United States v. Renzi, 2013 WL 12216505, at *4 (D.
`Ariz. Oct. 25, 2013) (“[T]hat witnesses gave inconsistent or conflicting testimony does not
`establish that such testimony was false.”) (citing United States v. Croft, 124 F.3d 1109,
`1119 (9th Cir. 1997)); United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (en
`banc) (under Rule 29, conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the verdicts).
`The notion that the government’s questioning suggested that the prosecutor knew
`Ferrer’s testimony was false is also incorrect. Mot. at 6. In several questions, the prosecutor
`queried Ferrer about what P.R. asked him, and what he wrote, said, or did. See, e.g., 9/14/23
`P.M. Tr. at 81:10 (“can you read what she’s asking you here?”); id. at 81:20 (“What does
`she say to you here…?”); id. at 82:9-11 (“So what are you doing in response to [P.R.’s]
`issues? What are you trying to do to assist her in any respect?”); id. at 85:5-6 (“Does she
`
`- 4 -
`
`

`

`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`
`Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2022 Filed 12/22/23 Page 6 of 19
`
`
`
`provide you as an attachment the image that got removed? A. Yes, she does.”); id. at 86:13-
`15 (“So 163, is this also an e-mail exchange between you and [P.R.]? A. Yes, it is.”); id. at
`88:5 (“what are you saying here to [P.R.] [referencing Ex. 164]?”); id. at 90:22 (what is
`she saying here to you?”). While the prosecutor sometimes referenced the email address
`used in the emails, this record doesn’t show the prosecutor elicited false testimony about
`Ferrer’s correspondence with P.R. Cf. Mot. at 5-7.
`Defendants’ claim that the prosecutor improperly referenced P.R.’s emails in
`closing argument lacks merit. The excerpt Defendants cite accurately paraphrases P.R.
`statements. Compare Mot. at 7, citing 10/27/31 a.m. Tr. at 10:5-14, with Exs. 162, 164.
`B.
`Defendants’ “Materiality” Assertions Miss the Mark
`Alternatively, Defendants can’t show that the allegedly false suggestion that Ferrer
`corresponded with P.R. “could have affected the judgment of the jury.” Mot. at 7. Ferrer
`ran the website’s daily operations, including marketing and moderation. See 9/12/23 p.m.
`Tr. at 16:10-12; id. at 12:21-11, 14:24-9. Even if an employee other than Ferrer responded
`to P.R.’s complaints by repeatedly restoring her posting privileges and giving her
`discounts, the employee would have simply been implementing the policies and procedures
`that Larkin, Spear, and Ferrer had developed to give Backpage’s adult ads a veneer of
`legality without harming the bottom line. See Resp. to Spear’s Rule 29 Mot. at 3-6.
`
`More broadly, Defendants’ “materiality” argument reasserts their claim that if they
`didn’t know about or take any action regarding any particular charged ads, they can’t be
`found guilty. See Mot. at 5. That’s not the law of the case. Rather, Defendants’ policies and
`procedures, and their implementation of those policies and procedures, show they had the
`requisite mens rea and actus reus to be found guilty of conspiring to violate the Travel Act
`and of violating the Travel Act as charged in Counts 2-51.
`
`In Doc. 793, for example, the Court reviewed the allegations in the Superseding
`Indictment, which laid out the same evidence that the United States presented to the jury—
`including evidence showing the strategies that Defendants intentionally pursued to build
`and maintain their website as the internet’s leading source of prostitution ads. The Court
`
`- 5 -
`
`

`

`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`
`Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2022 Filed 12/22/23 Page 7 of 19
`
`
`
`ruled that Defendants’ specific knowledge of each of the 50 ads charged in Counts 2-51 is
`unnecessary. Rather, the Court found that if the SI’s allegations are proven, then
`Defendants could be found guilty of promoting prostitution business enterprises—
`notwithstanding their individualized knowledge of any particular ads. Doc. 793 at 15-20.
`
`The Court analyzed several cases, including Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147
`(1959), Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 511 (1966), and United States v. Gibson
`Specialty Co., 507 F.2d 446, 449 (9th Cir. 1974), “conclude[d] none of these cases mandate
`the mens rea requirement described by Defendants,” and instead “agree[d] with the
`Government that intent to promote or facilitate prostitution is sufficient.” Doc. 793 at 15.
`See id. at 15 (“Defendants argue the First Amendment requires the Government to prove
`that each Defendant was aware of each ad that make up the fifty Travel Act counts and
`knew that each ad proposed illegal transactions. The Court is not persuaded that the First
`Amendment demands such a standard.”). The Court also ruled: “The alleged facts in the
`SI, taken as true, establish Defendants had the specific intent to promote prostitution in
`violation of the Travel Act. They conspired together to do so. The conspiracy was
`successful and resulted in the 50 ads for prostitution that now make up 50 counts of
`violating the Travel Act.” Doc. 793 at 20. The Court reaffirmed these findings in June
`2023, in Doc. 1587 at 12-13. See also Doc. 649, Resp. at 30-44.
`In Doc. 946, the Court similarly recognized that the SI’s “allegations certainly
`describe a course of conduct where Defendants facilitated ‘unlawful activity,’ including
`numerous pimps, prostitutes and traffickers in violation of the Travel Act.” Doc. 946 at 13.
`See id. at 14 (the SI “alleges a continuous course of criminal conduct”).
`And in Doc. 1643, the Court determined that evidence of the prostitution marketing
`strategies that Defendants used to grow Backpage was highly relevant to showing
`Defendants’ knowledge and intent regarding the ads at issue. Defendants had moved in
`Doc. 1591 to preclude “evidence of alleged strategies to increase purported ‘prostitution’
`ads on the site not specific to these fifty ads”—including evidence of (1) moderation, (2)
`Backpage’s reciprocal link partnership with the Erotic Review (TER), and (3) content
`
`- 6 -
`
`

`

`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`
`Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2022 Filed 12/22/23 Page 8 of 19
`
`
`
`aggregation. Doc. 1591 at 3. Denying the motion, the Court found:
`
`Given the nature of the SI’s allegations, these categories of evidence are
`relevant to show Defendants knowledge of the ads, how and why they were
`created and their intended purposes. Further, it is relevant to show whether
`Defendants “intended to promote a business of prostitution” by posting the
`ads. (See Doc. 1272 at 3). Finally, the Court already found that facts that pre-
`date the 2013 allegations were relevant as evidence demonstrating
`“furtherance of the charged conspiracy.” Therefore, evidence of ad
`moderation, Backpage’s “reciprocal” advertising/link program with the
`Erotic Review, and content “aggregation’ to secure future advertising
`revenues will not be precluded to the extent that (1) the SI provides notice to
`Defendants of these acts, and (2) the acts demonstrate Defendants’
`knowledge, intent and conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy’s objective[.]
`Doc. 1643 at 6.
`Defendants also ignore the Court’s Pinkerton instructions, which show that each
`Defendant need not have been personally aware of the specifics of each ad or personally
`involved in that ad’s publication, if it was reasonably foreseeable—under the policies
`Defendants implemented as part of the conspiracy charged in Count 1—that such violations
`would be committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Doc. 1998 at 27; Doc. 649, Resp. at
`14. The Court has long approved of Pinkerton’s applicability here. Doc. 793 at 19.
`The evidence shows how the website’s owners, including Lacey, Brunst, and Spear,
`each played vital roles in developing Backpage into the internet’s leading source of
`prostitution ads, and then worked to maintain the website’s preeminence in that “niche”
`market. See Doc. 2019 at 1-7; Doc. 2020 at 14-17; Doc. 2021 at 1-9; Ex. 23 at 3. Consistent
`with the Court’s Orders, that evidence shows the actions they took to perpetuate
`Backpage’s publication of these and other prostitution ads.
`IV. The United States Did Not Make Improper Opening and Closing Arguments
`A.
`Defendants’ “Object of the Conspiracy” Argument Lacks Merit
`The United States incorporates by reference its discussion of this argument in its
`Response to Brunst’s Rule 29 Motion, Doc. 2019 at 9-10.
`B.
`This Case Does Not Involve an “Impermissible Boundless Conspiracy”
`Citing a single passage from Doc. 946 at 13, Defendants assert the conspiracy in
`Count 1 is cabined by the 50 ads charged in the substantive Travel Act counts, Counts 2-
`
`- 7 -
`
`

`

`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`
`Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2022 Filed 12/22/23 Page 9 of 19
`
`
`
`51. See Mot. at 8-9. Not so. The United States could have charged Count 1 without charging
`any substantive Travel Act counts; Counts 2-51 merely reflect examples of the scores of
`such violations the resulted for Defendants’ operation of Backpage. As the Court has
`repeatedly recognized, Count 1 alleges a 14-year conspiracy spanning 2004 to 2018, and
`conduct before 2013 is clearly relevant to the charge. Doc. 1643 at 4 (“[T]he Court has
`already clarified that the Government may introduce proof of the entirety of the scope of
`the conspiracy.”); Doc. 1643 at 6 (“[T]he Court already found that facts that pre-date the
`2013 allegations were relevant as evidence demonstrating ‘furtherance of the charged
`conspiracy.’”); 10/26/23 a.m. Tr. at 24:25-25:1.
`At trial, the United States argued, and presented evidence showing, that Defendants
`were engaged in a conspiracy with others to make Backpage successful as a prostitution
`advertising website. This evidence showed a “chain,” not a “hub-and-spoke,” conspiracy.
`Cf. Mot. at 9. “A chain conspiracy refers to a situation in which there are numerous
`conspiring individuals, each of whom has a role in a ‘chain’ that serves the conspiracy’s
`object. . . . The success of each ‘link’ in the chain depends on the success of the others,
`even though each individual conspirator may play a role that is separated by great distance
`and time from the other individuals involved.” United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d
`540, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). In a wheel or hub-and-spoke conspiracy, in contrast, “one
`person typically acts as a central point while others act as ‘spokes’ by virtue of their
`agreement with the central actor. Id. at 554. Here, the Defendants, Ferrer, Hyer, and others
`performed different roles and relied on each to develop, and profit from, Backpage’s
`growth into the internet’s leading source of prostitution ads. This was a chain conspiracy,
`not a “rimless wheel conspiracy.” Mot. at 9.
`The pimps who paid and used Backpage’s services to promote and carry on their
`own criminal enterprises provided revenues that powered Backpage’s continued success,
`and can also be fairly considered part of the conspiracy. Cf. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 556
`(“Silk Road was nothing more than code unless and until third parties agreed to use it.
`When third parties engaged in unlawful narcotics transactions on the site, however,
`
`- 8 -
`
`

`

`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`
`Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2022 Filed 12/22/23 Page 10 of 19
`
`
`
`Ulbricht’s design and operation gave rise to potential conspiratorial conduct.”).
`In all events, “the form of the conspiracy is not as important as a determination that
`at least one other person joined in the alleged conspiratorial agreement with [the
`defendant].” Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 557. And the proof at trial established that Spear
`and Brunst conspired with Ferrer and others to promote, or facilitate the promotion of,
`prostitution enterprises in violation of the Travel Act. See generally Responses to Spear’s
`and Brunst’s Rule 29 Motions. For all these reasons, Defendants’ untimely request for
`reconsideration of the Court’s denial of their prior motion to dismiss Count 1 and their
`other requests for relief regarding that count should be denied.
`C.
`Trial References to “Promoting Prostitution” Do Not Warrant Relief
`Contrary to the law of the case—and common sense—Defendants assert that the
`United States should have been prohibited from telling the jury that Defendants used many
`business strategies to market and promote prostitution. Mot. at 9-11. Defendants litigated
`this issue before, and lost. For years, the United States has alleged that Defendants’ pursued
`several strategies to establish Backpage as the internet’s leading source of prostitution ads.
`See, e.g., Doc. 230, SI¶¶ 9-11, 34. The Court has long recognized that these and other facts
`alleged in the SI, taken as true, “establish defendants had the specific intent to promote
`prostitution in violation of the Travel Act. They conspired together to do so. The conspiracy
`was successful and resulted in the fifty ads for prostitution that now make up fifty counts
`of violating the Travel Act.” Doc. 793 at 20. See also Doc. 1643 at 6.
`The statements about which Defendants complain (Mot. at 9-11) fit well within the
`contours of the Court’s Orders. For example, Defendants complain about references in the
`prosecution’s opening statement to Defendants’ use of “three different strategies to market
`and promote prostitution” (Mot. at 10)—evidence the Court found relevant in its pretrial
`rulings (Doc. 1643 at 6). Defendants also complain about references to the Travel Act
`charges, which concern promoting, or facilitating the promotion of, prostitution business
`enterprises. Mot. at 10-11. Defendants are not entitled to a new trial simply because
`prosecutors did not repeat the Act’s text verbatim each time they referenced the charges.
`
`- 9 -
`
`

`

`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`
`Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2022 Filed 12/22/23 Page 11 of 19
`
`
`
`Defendants’ related assertion that the evidence did not sufficiently tie Ferrer to
`Backpage’s prostitution advertising, including the charged 50 ads, also lacks merit. (Mot.
`at 11.) The jury heard extensive evidence about Ferrer’s involvement in Backpage’s
`prostitution advertising; he testified for nearly 11 days about his management of the site’s
`publication of millions of prostitution ads. Not only did he communicate directly with P.R.,
`the prostitute who posted several of the charged ads, but he managed and ran the day-to-
`day operations of the website throughout its 14-year lifespan.
`
`D.
`
`The Government Didn’t Repeatedly Tell the Jury It Could Convict
`Without Specific Intent
`The Court instructed the jury that it would inform the jury about the law as it applies
`here. See, e.g., Doc. 1998 at 2 (“It is also your duty to apply the law as I give it to you[.]”).
`Accordingly, the jury—which is presumed to follow the Court’s instructions—knew to
`look to the Court, and not the lawyers, about what the law required. United States v. Reyes,
`660 F.3d 454, 468 (9th Cir. 2011).1 The instructions required proof of specific intent and
`provided relevant definitions. Doc. 1998 at 30. The Court also directed the jury to consider
`“both direct and circumstantial evidence,” and left it to the jury “to decide how much
`weight to give any evidence.” Doc. 1998 at 8.
`Because direct evidence of wrongful intent is “rarely available,” “intent may be
`inferred from circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Kirst, 54 F.4th 610, 623 (9th Cir.
`2022) (cleaned up). A defendant’s specific intent to facilitate unlawful activity may be
`inferred from knowledge in any one of several circumstances, including “evidence of any
`unusual volume of business with prostitutes,” such as where “sales for illegal use amount
`to a high proportion of the seller’s total business.” People v. Lauria, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628, 632-
`33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
`
`
`1 Moreover, the Court instructed the jury that “statements” and “arguments” by the lawyers
`“are not evidence”: “[W]hat the lawyers have said in their opening statements, will say in
`their closing arguments, and have said at other times is intended to help you interpret the
`evidence, but it is not evidence. If the facts as you remember them differ from the way the
`lawyers state them, your memory of them controls.” Doc. 1998 at 7.
`
`- 10 -
`
`

`

`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`
`Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2022 Filed 12/22/23 Page 12 of 19
`
`
`
`Furthermore, a website operator may be found to have the requisite intent when the
`defendant’s website was designed or tailored to further illegal activity. See, e.g., United
`States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“The Indictment does not
`allege that Ulbricht is criminally liable simply because he is alleged to have launched a
`website that was—unknown to and unplanned by him—used for illicit transactions. If that
`were ultimately the case, he would lack the mens rea for criminal liability. Rather, Ulbricht
`is alleged to have knowingly and intentionally constructed and operated an expansive black
`market for selling and purchasing narcotics and malicious software and for laundering
`money. This separates Ulbricht’s alleged conduct from the mass of others whose websites
`may—without their planning or expectation—be used for unlawful purposes.”); United
`States v. Omuro, N.D. Cal. No. 14-CR-336, Doc. 70 at 1-3 (court accepted guilty plea and
`convicted www.myRedBook.com founder Eric Omuro under the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C.
`§ 1952(a)(3)(A); his website hosted thousands of ads posted by prostitutes in the western
`United States); United States v. Hurant, E.D.N.Y. No. 16-CR-45, Doc. 117 at 1, 6 13-14
`(court accepted guilty plea and convicted www.Rentboy.com founder Jeffrey Hurant for
`violating the Travel Act; Hurant admitted he “was well aware…that the escort ads he
`posted…were thinly-veiled proposals of sexual services in exchange for money”; id. Doc.
`125 at 2 (like Backpage, Hurant’s employees often rejected ads with explicit offers of sex
`for money “but allow[ed] the ad to be resubmitted with different language. In many cases,
`Rentboy.com employees would just edit the advertisement’s language and approve it.”).
`The evidence here showed, among other things, that Backpage managers and
`employees helped customers craft their ads to reduce the risk of law enforcement detection
`without changing the underlying message (moderation); created ads for prostitutes and
`pimps and offered to publish them for a trial period for no or reduced fees (aggregation);
`entered into affiliation agreements with bulk prostitution advertisers like Dollar Bill (super
`posters); paid thousands of dollars to The Erotic Review, a Yelp-like website for buyers
`and sellers of commercial sex, in a cross-referral/cross-linkage business arrangement;
`purchased and published “feeds” of legitimate ads to falsely portray Backpage as a general
`
`- 11 -
`
`

`

`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`
`Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2022 Filed 12/22/23 Page 13 of 19
`
`
`
`classified advertising website for the sake of “plausible deniability”; tried to suppress
`negative news coverage; and laundered Backpage proceeds through domestic and overseas
`accounts. See, e.g., Doc. 2021 at 1-9. Simply put, the proof at trial gave the jury abundant
`evidence from which to infer Defendants’ intent.
`Against this backdrop, Defendants’ complaints about the prosecutor’s references to
`Defendants’ sources of knowledge that their website was promoting prostitution businesses
`falls flat. Mot. at 11-13. Defendants’ cherry-pick the prosecutor’s reference to Backpage’s
`receipt of thousands subpoenas in closing argument, but the United States’ opening and
`rebuttal closing arguments focused on far more evidence of knowledge and intent than that
`single data point. Compare Mot. at 11-12 with 10/26/23 p.m. Tr. at 52:17-88:7, 10/27/23
`a.m. Tr. at 6:4-35:1, and 11/1/23 a.m. Tr. at 37:21-70:12. Prosecutors have “wide latitude
`in closing arguments,” and “considerable leeway to strike hard blows based on the evidence
`and all reasonable inferences from the evidence.” United States v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524,
`538 (9th Cir. 2011). Oratorical flourish and argumentative characterizations are allowed.
`United States v. Chavez, 895 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Sayetsitty, 107
`F.3d 1405, 1409 (9th Cir. 1997). Taken in context, the reference to the “thousands of
`subpoenas” Backpage received was well within the bounds of acceptable argument, and
`hardly rises to the level of entitling Defendants to a new trial under Rule 33.
`Nor did the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument mischaracterize the law or the
`jury instructions about whether any Defendant knew about any specific charged ad. See
`Mot. at 12. As discussed supra at 5-7, the Court has repeatedly held that the United States
`may prove the charges against Defendants without necessarily showing a defendant’s
`personal, direct knowledge of individual ads.
`The prosecutor did not mischaracterize the 50 substantive Travel Acts as “just a
`sample.” Mot. at 12. The jury heard testimony from many witnesses showing prostitution
`advertising was rampant on Backp

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.