Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1530 Filed 03/14/23 Page 1 of 13
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`GARY M. RESTAINO
`United States Attorney
`District of Arizona
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`KEVIN M. RAPP (Ariz. Bar No. 014249, kevin.rapp@usdoj.gov)
`MARGARET PERLMETER (Ariz. Bar No. 024805, margaret.perlmeter@usdoj.gov)
`PETER S. KOZINETS (Ariz. Bar No. 019856, peter.kozinets@usdoj.gov)
`ANDREW C. STONE (Ariz. Bar No. 026543, andrew.stone@usdoj.gov)
`Assistant U.S. Attorneys
`40 N. Central Avenue, Suite 1800
`Phoenix, Arizona 85004-4408
`Telephone (602) 514-7500
`
`DAN G. BOYLE (N.Y. Bar No. 5216825, daniel.boyle2@usdoj.gov)
`Special Assistant U.S. Attorney
`312 N. Spring Street, Suite 1400
`Los Angeles, CA 90012
`Telephone (213) 894-2426
`
`KENNETH POLITE
`Assistant Attorney General
`Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice
`
`AUSTIN M. BERRY (Texas Bar No. 24062615, austin.berry2@usdoj.gov)
`U.S. Department of Justice
`Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section
`1301 New York Avenue, NW, 11th Floor
`Washington, D.C. 20005
`Telephone (202) 412-4136
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
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`United States of America,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`James Larkin (2), Scott Spear (3),
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`Defendants.
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`
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`CR-18-422-PHX-DJH-2, 3
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`UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE TO
`DEFENDANTS LARKIN AND
`SPEAR’S MOTION TO
`CONTINUE TRIAL
`[Doc. 1526]
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`Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1530 Filed 03/14/23 Page 2 of 13
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`Preliminary Statement
`The time has come to try this case. The grand jury indicted Defendants in March
`2018—five years ago. (Doc. 1.) The Court set trial for January 2020, and then continued
`that date four times—at Defendants’ request. (Docs. 862, 990, 1058, 1113.) In October
`2022, Defendant James Larkin discharged two lawyers who had spent years preparing for
`trial—and who actually took the case to trial in September 2021. (Doc. 1488.) After the
`Court set a new firm trial of June 20, 2023 (Doc. 1494), Larkin hired three new lawyers.
`(Doc. 1509.) This Court then held a status conference at which it addressed new counsel
`and expressed “I want to make sure and get on the record your acknowledgment of a
`number of things.” (Ex. A at 4.) The Court reminded new counsel of its obligation to
`“meet[] with prior counsel to obtain all of the discovery and files.” (Ex. A at 4.) Given
`the age of the case, the Court made new counsel “firmly aware . . . I do not intend to
`entertain any Motion to Continue absent extraordinary circumstances, and those
`circumstances may be related to a client’s health issue or something to that effect, but I
`want to make sure that you and your co-counsel are completely aware of your obligations
`to this Court.” (Ex. A at 5.)
`Despite that clear warning, Larkin and Defendant Scott Spear (who also has a new
`lawyer, though he retained his attorney who represented him in the first trial) have filed a
`motion to continue that fails to show any “extraordinary circumstances.” Upending the
`trial schedule and postponing trial to the cusp of the 2023-24 winter holidays will
`inconvenience and prejudice the United States, victims, witnesses, the Court, and the
`public. Several continuances have already been granted, and further delay is not
`warranted.
`Moreover, Larkin’s and Spear’s lawyers are not starting anew. Larkin’s new
`counsel is stepping into the shoes of a legal team that extensively worked this case up for
`trial. Spear’s new attorney is co-counsel with Bruce Feder—who has worked on this case
`from the start. And Larkin’s and Spear’s new lawyers have long had access to the public
`court filings in this case—including two speaking indictments (Docs. 1 and 230); many
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`Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1530 Filed 03/14/23 Page 3 of 13
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`motions—including seven motions to dismiss (see Docs. 559, 793, 840, 844, 946, 1168,
`1444); and transcripts from the first trial, which include the United States’ opening
`statement and the testimony of four government witnesses. (Docs. 1341-1347.)
`Notwithstanding their ready access to a roadmap of the government’s case, Larkin
`and Spear assert that a continuance until the end of 2023 is needed because this case
`involves “millions of documents, hundreds of witnesses, and novel questions of law.”
`(Mot. at 2.) But their motion does not explain how these bare-bones assertions justify
`more delay. The production of large amounts of electronically stored information cannot
`support such relief where, as here, the United States produced that evidence in industry-
`standard, electronically-searchable format, provided indices to allow the defense to focus
`their review, highlighted key documents that support the government’s case, and assisted
`with technical questions. (See Doc. 273 at 4; Doc. 294 at 2-6; Doc. 880 at 1-2, 6.)1
`Moreover, the parties have not disclosed “hundreds” of trial witnesses, and many issues
`have been thoroughly litigated. The motion to continue should be denied.
`In response to the Court’s March 9, 2023 order directing the United States to
`address whether Defendants’ Lacey and Larkin should be severed (Doc. 1527), the Court
`has rejected a motion to sever, and all six Defendants should be tried in a single trial in
`this conspiracy case, as discussed below.
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`1 As the United States explained in 2020:
`[I]t has clearly been evident since the outset of this case (as is the case in
`high-volume discovery cases) that review of the millions of pages of
`discovery produced does not require counsel to manually review each page.
`In fact, immediately after indictment, the prosecution team met and
`conferred with Defendants to discuss how the ESI in this case would be
`produced. (See Doc. 273-2 at 5.) During this process, everybody agreed that
`it would be acceptable for the government to produce ESI in an industry-
`standard format—word-searchable load files that could be reviewed using
`Relativity, a commonly-used discovery platform. (See Doc. 273-2 at 5-6.)
`During the April 20, 2018 status conference, the government specifically
`discussed the plan to disclose the ESI in a Relativity-accessible format. (See
`Doc. 137, Tr. 4/30/18 at 5-6.) Defendants agreed to this approach. (See
`Doc. 137, Tr. 4/30/18 at 1-14.)
`(Doc. 880 at 6.)
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`Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1530 Filed 03/14/23 Page 4 of 13
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`I.
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`Argument
`The United States Opposes Severance.
`The United States opposes any severance. The parties have not discussed severing
`Defendants Lacey and Larkin for trial, but the United States doesn’t believe that judicial
`economy would be served by holding multiple trials. The Supreme Court has made clear
`that judicial economy is better served when defendants who are indicted together are tried
`in a single case. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993) (“There is a preference
`in the federal system for joint trials of defendants who are indicted together.”). See also
`United States v. Marcello, 731 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Joint participation in a
`criminal activity generally means joint indictment and a joint trial.”); United States v.
`Doe, 655 F.2d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1980) (“Co-defendants jointly charged are, prima facie,
`to be jointly tried.”). Indeed, “[j]oint trials ‘play a vital role in the criminal justice
`system[,]’ . . . promote efficiency and ‘serve the interests of justice by avoiding the
`scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts.’” Id. (citing Robinson v. Marsh, 481 U.S.
`200, 209-10 (1987)). This is especially true when defendants are charged with
`conspiracy. United States v. Jenkins, 633 F.3d 788, 807 (9th Cir. 2011) (“because
`appellants were charged with conspiracy, a joint trial was particularly appropriate.”).
`Here, neither the circumstances nor judicial economy dictate that multiple trials
`should occur. First, Defendant Vaught previously filed a Motion to Sever. (Doc. 784.)
`After the United States opposed the motion (Doc. 808) and Vaught replied (Doc. 831),
`the Court denied severance (Doc. 878). The Court ruled that Vaught’s “indicted conduct
`is logically interrelated to her codefendants’ actions such that severance is inappropriate.”
`(Doc. 878 at 3 (citing United States v. Freeman, 6 F.3d 586, 598 (9th Cir. 1993).) The
`Court also reasoned that each Defendant is “being tried for their interrelated involvement
`at Backpage” and this “foundational factual similarity does not warrant severance,
`especially considering a liberal policy favoring initial joinder.” (Doc. 878 at 4.) That
`logic holds true today.
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`Second, forcing the parties to try this case twice would cause further delay and
`force victim-witnesses to testify multiple times. Severance would create two 12-week
`trials, which fails to promote judicial economy and is counter to applicable rules. Zafiro,
`506 U.S. at 540 (“Rules 8(b) and 14 are designed to promote economy and efficiency and
`to avoid multiplicity of trials. . .”). Causing the victim-witnesses to testify multiple times
`does them a disservice. The Court should not entertain any severance.
`Defendant Larkin and Spear’s Motion to Continue Should Be Denied.
`II.
`District courts have “a great deal of latitude in scheduling trials.” Morris v. Slappy,
`461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983). This is so because of the inherent logistical difficulty in
`scheduling trials: “Not the least of [trial courts’] problems is that of assembling the
`witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same place at the same time, and this burden
`counsels against continuances except for compelling reasons.” Id. at 11. Therefore, “only
`an unreasoning and arbitrary ‘insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable
`request for delay’ violates the right to the assistance of counsel.” Id. at 11-12 (citation
`omitted).
`When a defendant claims that their Sixth Amendment right to counsel is
`implicated, courts must balance several factors to determine whether denying a requested
`continuance is “fair and reasonable.” United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 938 (9th Cir.
`1986). These factors include: “[1] whether the continuance would inconvenience
`witnesses, the court, counsel, or the parties; [2] whether other continuances have been
`granted; [3] whether legitimate reasons exist for the delay; [4] whether the delay is the
`defendant’s fault; and [5] whether a denial would prejudice the defendant.” United States
`v. Thompson, 587 F.3d 1165, 1174 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Studley, 783 F.2d at 938).2
`These factors weigh against granting the continuance that movants seek.
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`2 Defendants cite the four-factor test of United States v. Flynt, 756 F.2d 1352, 1359 (9th
`Cir. 1985), which largely overlaps with the above test. (Mot. at 2.)
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`Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1530 Filed 03/14/23 Page 6 of 13
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`1.
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`Further delay will inconvenience and prejudice the United States, the
`victims, the witnesses, the Court, and the public.
`“[D]elay is fatal to the vindication of the criminal law.” Cobbledick v. United
`States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940). This is because “[a]s time passes, the prosecution’s
`ability to meet its burden of proof may greatly diminish: evidence and witnesses may
`disappear, and testimony becomes more easily impeachable as the events recounted
`become more remote.” Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 264 (1984). See also
`United States v. Bert, 814 F.3d 70, 83 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[T]here is a risk [of] loss of
`important evidence” if a trial is unduly delayed. ‘Certainly, the public is the loser when a
`criminal trial is not prosecuted expeditiously, as suggested by the aphorism, ‘justice
`delayed is justice denied.’”).
`This case has been pending for five years and the June 20, 2023 trial date has been
`set for several months. (Docs. 1, 1494.) The government has expended significant
`resources with the expectation that trial will begin on June 20, 2023. Although the
`Government intends to call fewer witnesses than anticipated in the September 2021 trial,
`many witnesses will be travelling from out of state and have cleared their calendars to be
`present for trial. Subjecting the attorneys, agents, and witnesses to still further trial delay
`is not a mere “inconvenience”—it causes real prejudice.
`In addition, the victims have a right conferred by statute to “proceedings free from
`unreasonable delay.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(7) (“Crime Victims’ Rights Act” or “CVRA”);
`see also18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). The superseding indictment contains 17 select victim
`summaries. (Doc. 230, ¶¶ 160-176.) Four victims were murdered or killed as a result of
`being trafficked on Backpage, and their surviving family members or lawful
`representatives stand in their shoes for purposes of the CVRA. 18 U.S.C. §
`3771(e)(2)(B). (Doc. 230, ¶¶ 165, 173, 174, 175.) The victims are seeking to put this case
`behind them to heal and focus on their future, and they deserve trial without more delay.
`The Court has set aside several months of its calendar for the June 2023 trial,
`which is anticipated to run about 12 weeks. (Ex. A at 4.) See United States v. Pemkova,
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`731 F. App’x 620, 623-24 (9th Cir. 2018) (inconvenience cuts against a continuance
`where granting the motion required rescheduling a nine-day trial involving witnesses
`from around the country, in a case that had been pending for nearly seven years; “[b]y
`contrast, our cases finding an abuse of discretion [for denying continuances] generally
`involve only short delays or the rescheduling of very brief proceedings”) (collecting
`cases). Given the anticipated length of trial, the number of witnesses involved (many who
`require travel), the long pendency of this case, and the prolonged period of the requested
`continuance, considerations of inconvenience tip sharply against granting movants’
`requested delay here. Moreover, granting this motion—which seeks a new trial date of
`December 18, 2023 (Mot. at 5)—could open the door to still further delays to
`accommodate winter holiday schedules or other circumstances.
`The need to hold firm to the June 2023 trial date is also supported by the public’s
`strong interest in prompt trials rooted in the Sixth Amendment. “It is axiomatic that the
`Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial belongs both to a criminal defendant and to the
`public. The ‘societal interest in providing a speedy trial . . . exists separate from, and at
`times in opposition to, the interests of the accused.’” United States v. Budovsky, 2016 WL
`386133, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016) (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519
`(1972)).
`Several continuances have been already granted.
`2.
`Defendants sought and obtained several continuances from the original trial date
`of January 2020, which was extended pursuant to at least four requests to September
`2021. (See Docs. 862, 990, 1058, 1113.) This cuts against another continuance.
`3.
`Insufficient reasons exist for prolonged delay.
`Movants’ new counsel are not starting from a blank slate. Larkin’s new lawyers
`are stepping into the shoes of another law firm3 that worked up the case for several years
`
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`3 For more than four years, Larkin was represented by Bienert Katzman Littrell Williams
`LLP (compare Doc. 138 (May 9, 2018 notice of appearance) with Doc. 1488 (Oct. 30,
`2022 motion to withdraw), which—according to its website—is a “top trial boutique”
`firm. https://bklwlaw.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2023).
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`and took the case to trial. They are not claiming any lack of cooperation or
`communication with prior counsel. (Cf. Doc. 1521.) And Spear remains represented by
`Bruce Feder, who has been working on this case since April 2018—even though Spear is
`now also represented by CJA counsel. (Doc. 27.) This Court “cannot overlook the benefit
`. . . derived from [former counsel’s] prior years of work.” United States v. Mikhel, 889
`F.3d 1003, 1035 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming district court’s denial of defendant’s motions
`to continue his capital murder trial to give new co-counsel more time to prepare, where
`trial was originally scheduled for 2002 but was continued several times to 2006, and new
`counsel benefitted from predecessor’s many years of work).
`Further, Defendants Larkin and Spear were placed on notice of the June 2023 trial
`date several months ago (Doc. 1494), giving them more than sufficient time to organize
`their resources and efforts in preparation for trial. See Budovsky, 2016 WL 386133, at
`*11 (“There is also an independent virtue in setting a firm trial date and enforcing it. . . .
`A firm trial date encourages all parties to assess the strengths and weaknesses of their
`case in a timely manner and permits the parties to organize their resources and efforts to
`prepare for trial when the defendant elects that course.”).
`While movants cite the production of “millions of documents” as a reason for
`delay (Mot. at 1), the scope of discovery is not news. (See Ex. A at 5 (The Court: “You’re
`going to find the discovery to be voluminous.”).) By January 2019, the United States had
`produced about 7.8 million documents in discovery. (Doc. 444.) As in many large
`document cases, “no attorney or team of attorneys could meaningfully review all of it
`even with years to prepare for trial.” Budovsky, 2016 WL 386133, at *12. Rather, the
`United States has done here what the government has done in similar cases—it provided
`an indictment that identified its theories and discussed some of the most important pieces
`of evidence; provided the defense with discovery indices and collections of “hot
`documents”: and promptly “responded to the defense’s requests for assistance in
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`navigating the universe of discovery in this case.” Id. See also, e.g., United States v.
`Gross, 424 F. Supp. 3d 800, 804, 807 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (denying motion for continuance
`where the government produced the vast majority of its discovery in searchable electronic
`format, and provided indices and collections of key documents supporting its case-in-
`chief). The scope of discovery alone is not a sufficient reason for further delay.4
`The motion also suggests that if “Counsel” (for Larkin) “spent only five minutes
`reviewing each [of the 19,000 documents that Larkin claims comprise the United States’
`“nearly 2,000” trial exhibits], for eight hours a day, it would take approximately 197 days
`to get through these trial exhibits.” (Mot. at 2-3.) Even assuming the accuracy of these
`calculations, Larkin is now represented by three attorneys; if all three of them reviewed
`the exhibits, they would require 66 days—a timeframe that does not render the current
`trial date unreasonable.
`The motion further asserts that this case involves “hundreds of witnesses” (Mot. at
`1)—yet the United States disclosed 76 trial witnesses (CR 1314), and the government is
`not aware of other disclosures that would put the number of witnesses into “the
`hundreds.” And the United States is endeavoring to streamline its trial presentation and
`call fewer witnesses at trial.
`The motion also summarily asserts that this case involves “novel questions of law”
`(Mot. at 1), yet the Court has already resolved scores of defense motions over the last five
`years—and has made clear that “it will not accept any new motions unless based on new
`law or facts.” (Doc. 1524 at 4.) This, too, is not a reason for more delay.
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`4 Defendant’s assertion that the court in United States v. Gross, 424 F. Supp. 3d 800
`(C.D. Cal. 2019), granted a four-month continuance due to “voluminous discovery”
`misapprehends that case. (See Mot. at 3.) The court denied the defendant’s motion to
`continue, but granted a shorter continuance based on an anticipated future production
`from the government and factors the defense disclosed in camera. While the continuance
`was for four months, the court took pains to point out that it did “not believe a
`continuance of this length is warranted, but as noted above, [its] current trial calendar
`does not permit a continuance to an earlier date.” Id. at 807 n.7.
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`The requested delay is attributable to Larkin’s change of counsel.
`4.
`A criminal defendant’s exercise of the right to hire counsel of choice cannot
`“unduly hinder the fair, efficient and orderly administration of justice.” United States v.
`Walters, 309 F.3d 589, 592 (9th Cir. 2002) (quotation and citation omitted). Cf. United
`States v. Brandon Che Lee, 465 F. App’x 627, 629 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming denial of
`motion to substitute counsel where, inter alia, “[f]our different attorneys had already
`represented Lee, and each time Lee substituted new counsel, the new attorney requested a
`continuance to review the extensive discovery”).
`Here, after the Court stated on the record that Larkin’s new counsel had filed a
`notice of appearance “after this Court ha[d] set a firm trial date” of June 20, 2022 that it
`carefully selected after “bearing in mind [the Court’s] calendar as well as the age of the
`case,” and after that the Court warned that it did “not intend to entertain any Motion to
`Continue absent extraordinary circumstances,” Larkin moved for a six-month
`continuance—because he had hired new counsel. The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly
`affirmed the denial of motions to continue filed after clear warnings that such motions
`would be viewed with disfavor. See, e.g., United States v. Walter-Eze, 869 F.3d 891, 908
`(9th Cir. 2017) (affirming denial of motion to continue trial to allow substitute counsel
`more time to prepare, where the district court had “expressly warned” defendant and her
`new counsel that it would allow substitution only “if they represented that they would be
`prepared to go to trial on the date it was set,” and the request came after four trial
`continuances involving over nine months of trial delay); United States v. Steiniger, 459 F.
`App’x 624, 626 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[W]hen the Steinigers first requested self-
`representation, the district court clearly warned them of the firm trial date. Accordingly,
`the district court’s denial of the continuance requests should not have surprised the
`Steinigers.”) (citations omitted).5
`
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`5 Because Spear’s new CJA attorney will be assisted by Spear’s longstanding lawyer in
`this case (Bruce Feder), this factor also weighs against Spear’s requested continuance.
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`The Motion does not establish prejudice to Defendants.
`5.
`While the motion includes several summary assertions of prejudice, it contains no
`specific factual discussion of any particular prejudice movants might face. (See Mot. at
`4.) For example, movants cite cases in which brief continuances were sought to obtain
`rebuttal experts, but they point to no specific experts that they believe they might need.
`See, e.g., United States v. Barrett, 703 F.2d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 1983) (Mot. at 3)
`(involving a failure to grant a brief continuance to obtain a rebuttal expert regarding an
`expert that the United States disclosed eight days before trial; while the Ninth Circuit
`held that the continuance should have been granted, it found the error harmless). The
`parties have already exchanged expert disclosures. (Docs. 422, 500, 538, 638.) New
`counsel do not specify what additional or different experts they believe are necessary.
`This is not prejudice.
`6.
`Facts specific to Spear’s request.
`Defendant Spear’s argument that a continuance is justified, in part, because the
`United States delayed in sending his second attorney discovery isn’t persuasive. As an
`initial matter, the United States is unclear why Spear’s original (and ongoing) co-counsel
`in this case, Mr. Feder, did not provide Mr. Kessler with access to all the discovery.
`Defendant Larkin’s previous counsel, who are no longer associated with this case, sent all
`discovery to his new attorneys. (Doc. 1521 at 1; Doc. 1526 at 4.) Mr. Feder is still
`counsel of record for Defendant Spear6, so sharing the discovery materials seems
`appropriate. In all events, the United States has worked with Mr. Kessler to provide him
`with discovery as detailed below.
`On Sunday, January 22, 2023, Mr. Kessler wrote to counsel requesting the United
`States re-produce all discovery to him. The next day, on January 23, 2023, the United
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` 6 Mr. Feder is now retained as Knapp counsel. See Knapp v. Hardy, 523 P.2d 1308 (Ariz.
`1974) (permitting indigent defendant to receive services from privately retained attorney
`who associates with appointed counsel).
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`Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1530 Filed 03/14/23 Page 12 of 13
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`States emailed Mr. Kessler’s office, which led to a phone call two days later to discuss
`the most efficient method for producing discovery. On that call, the United States
`provided a discovery overview, and requested a hard drive from Mr. Kessler so the
`United States could download all disclosures produced by the United States Attorney’s
`Office in this matter. Later that day, the United States emailed Mr. Kessler’s office a
`discovery index.
`The United States received the hard drive from Mr. Kessler’s office the week of
`January 30, 2023, and began downloading the discovery the next week. On February 15,
`2023, the United States sent an email informing Mr. Kessler’s office that the discovery
`download to the hard drive was still in process and additional time was needed. The
`United States also attached a filing that referenced “hot docs” that may be relevant to Mr.
`Kessler’s trial preparation. (See Doc. 696-2 at 3; Doc. 696-3 at 2; Doc. 696-4 at 3.) On
`February 22, 2023, the hard drive download was completed. On February 23, 2023, the
`United States sent the hard drive to Mr. Kessler’s office for delivery the next day. On
`February 27, 2023, Mr. Kessler’s office informed the United States that they were unable
`to open any files from the drive.7 The next day, on February 28, 2023, the United States
`began uploading the discovery to USAfx, a cloud-based file-sharing platform, and
`finished uploading all discovery materials produced by the United States Attorney’s
`Office on March 9, 2023. The United States worked diligently to transmit discovery to
`Mr. Kessler’s office. These facts do not necessitate a continuance.
`Conclusion
`For all these reasons, Defendants Larkin and Spear have not shown that a six-
`month continuance of trial from June to December 2023 is fair, reasonable or necessary.
`Their Motion to Continue Trial (Doc. 1526) should be denied, and this matter should
`proceed to a joint trial of all Defendants commencing on June 20, 2023.
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`7 Likely this means the hard drive was corrupted, which can sometimes occur during
`transit.
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`Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1530 Filed 03/14/23 Page 13 of 13
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`Respectfully submitted this 14th day of March, 2023.
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`GARY M. RESTAINO
`United States Attorney
`District of Arizona
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`KENNETH POLITE
`Assistant Attorney General
`Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice
` s/Kevin Rapp _____________________
`KEVIN M. RAPP
`MARGARET PERLMETER
`PETER KOZINETS
`ANDREW STONE
`DANIEL BOYLE
`Assistant U.S. Attorneys
`AUSTIN BERRY
`Trial Attorney
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`I hereby certify that on March 14, 2020, I electronically transmitted the attached
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`document to the Clerk’s Office using the CM/ECF System for filing and transmittal of a
`Notice of Electronic Filing to the CM/ECF registrants who have entered their appearance
`as counsel of record.
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`s/ Daniel Parke
`Daniel Parke
`U.S. Attorney’s Office
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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