`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
`NORTHERN DIVISION
`
`CAPITOL RECORDS, et al.,
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`v.
`
`RITA CARMICHAEL,
`
`Defendant.
`
` )
` )
` )
` )
` ) CIVIL ACTION 06-0251-WS-C
` )
` )
` )
` )
`
`ORDER
`
`This matter comes before the Court on plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Default Judgment
`(doc. 14).
`I.
`Background.
`On April 21, 2006, plaintiffs Capitol Records, Inc., Motown Record Company, L.P.,
`Sony BMG Music Entertainment, Arista Records LLC, and BMG Music filed a Complaint for
`Copyright Infringement (doc. 1) against defendant, Rita Carmichael. In particular, plaintiffs
`maintained that Carmichael had utilized an online media distribution system to download or
`distribute copyrighted music recordings belonging to plaintiffs, and/or to make such recordings
`available for distribution to others, thereby infringing on plaintiffs’ copyrights and exclusive
`rights under copyright. On that basis, the Complaint requested the following relief: (1) statutory
`damages pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(c); (2) attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §
`505; and (3) injunctive relief pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §§ 502 and 503, prohibiting Carmichael from
`further infringing conduct and requiring her to destroy all copies of sound recordings made in
`violation of plaintiffs’ exclusive rights.
`On October 20, 2006, after being granted an extension of time in which to perfect service
`of process, plaintiffs filed a Return of Service (doc. 7) reflecting that defendant had been
`properly served with process by a private process server on October 11, 2006. According to the
`server’s declaration, copies of the summons and complaint were left at Carmichael’s dwelling
`house or usual place of abode (571 Piney Woods Road, Camden, Alabama 36726) and were
`given to Carmichael’s mother, who indicated that both she and Carmichael live at that address.
`
`
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`Case 2:06-cv-00251-WS-C Document 15 Filed 06/25/07 Page 2 of 11
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`Notwithstanding service of process in accordance with Rule 4(e), Fed.R.Civ.P., more
`than eight months ago, Carmichael has never filed an answer or otherwise appeared in this
`action. Upon motion by plaintiffs, a Clerk’s Entry of Default (doc. 10) was entered against
`Carmichael on January 5, 2007 for failure to plead or otherwise defend; however, it does not
`appear that either plaintiffs or the Clerk of Court placed Carmichael on notice of these default
`proceedings at that time.
`As of June 6, 2007, there had been no additional substantive activity in this file. For that
`reason, the undersigned (to whom this action had been transferred in the interim) entered a Show
`Cause Order (doc. 13) directing plaintiffs to show cause why this action should not be dismissed
`for failure to prosecute, given the prolonged spell of inactivity. On June 11, 2007, plaintiffs filed
`their Motion for Entry of Default Judgment (doc. 14), with a Certificate of Service confirming
`that they had served a copy of said Motion on defendant at the same address at which service of
`process was perfected on her. Carmichael has failed to respond or to acknowledge the Motion in
`any way. Accordingly, the Court will now take that Motion under submission.
`II.
`Analysis.
`A.
`Propriety of Default Judgment.
`In this Circuit, “there is a strong policy of determining cases on their merits and we
`therefore view defaults with disfavor.” In re Worldwide Web Systems, Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1295
`(11th Cir. 2003); see also Varnes v. Local 91, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n of U.S. and Canada,
`674 F.2d 1365, 1369 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Since this case involves a default judgment there must be
`strict compliance with the legal prerequisites establishing the court's power to render the
`judgment.”). Nonetheless, it is well established that a “district court has the authority to enter
`default judgment for failure ... to comply with its orders or rules of procedure.” Wahl v. McIver,
`773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 1985).
`Where, as here, a defendant has failed to appear or otherwise acknowledge the pendency
`of a lawsuit against her for more than eight months after being served, entry of default judgment
`may be appropriate. Indeed, Rule 55 itself provides for entry of default and default judgment
`where a defendant “has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules.” Rule
`55(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. In a variety of contexts, courts have entered default judgments against
`defendants who have failed to defend the claims against them following proper service of
`
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`
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`process. See, e.g., In re Knight, 833 F.2d 1515, 1516 (11th Cir. 1987) (“Where a party offers no
`good reason for the late filing of its answer, entry of default judgment against that party is
`appropriate.”); Matter of Dierschke, 975 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1992) (“when the court finds an
`intentional failure of responsive pleadings there need be no other finding” to justify default
`judgment); Kidd v. Andrews, 340 F. Supp.2d 333, 338 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) (entering default
`judgment against defendant who failed to answer or move against complaint for nearly three
`months); Viveros v. Nationwide Janitorial Ass'n, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 681, 684 (N.D. Ga. 2000)
`(entering default judgment against counterclaim defendant who had failed to answer or otherwise
`respond to counterclaim within time provided by Rule 12(a)(2)). In short, then, “[w]hile modern
`courts do not favor default judgments, they are certainly appropriate when the adversary process
`has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.” Flynn v. Angelucci Bros. & Sons,
`Inc., 448 F. Supp.2d 193, 195 (D.D.C. 2006) (citation omitted).1
`
`To be sure, courts have generally required some notice to be given to a defendant
`1
`between the time of service of process and entry of default judgment. See, e.g., International
`Brands USA, Inc. v. Old St. Andrews Ltd., 349 F. Supp.2d 256, 261 (D. Conn. 2004) (“Where a
`party fails to respond, after notice the court is ordinarily justified in entering a judgment against
`the defaulting party.”) (emphasis added and citations omitted); F.T.C. v. 1263523 Ontario, Inc.,
`205 F. Supp.2d 205, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (entering default judgment where defendants had
`failed to respond in any way to summons, complaint and motion for default judgment); New York
`State Teamsters Conference Pension and Retirement Fund v. Fratto Curbing Co., 875 F. Supp.
`129, 131 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (defendant that had failed to file answer to complaint or otherwise
`defend was properly notified of motion for default judgment). For unknown reasons, plaintiffs
`elected not to give Carmichael notice of their efforts to secure a default against her, as their
`Motion for Entry of Default (doc. 9) was unaccompanied by a Certificate of Service or other
`indicia that plaintiffs had placed Carmichael on notice of these default proceedings. Nothing in
`the text of Rule 55 excuses the service requirement for requests for entry of default (as
`distinguished from motions for default judgment), and Rule 5(a) on its face requires such
`service. Nonetheless, any harm arising from this omission is negated by the fact that the
`plaintiffs mailed a copy of their Motion for Entry of Default Judgment to Carmichael at the
`address where service was perfected. As such, Carmichael is on notice that plaintiffs have
`moved forward with default proceedings, yet she has elected not to defend herself. Given her
`failure to appear in this case, despite actual notice that this lawsuit was pending, that her
`responsive pleading was due by a date certain, that a default had been entered against her, and
`that defendants are actively seeking entry of default judgment against her, she cannot be heard to
`complain that she has received insufficient notice at this time antecedent to entry of default
`judgment. See generally Rule 55(b)(2) (defaulted defendant is entitled to notice of request for
`default judgment only if defendant has appeared in the action).
`
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`
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`The law is clear, however, that Carmichael’s failure to appear and the Clerk’s subsequent
`entry of default against her do not automatically entitle plaintiffs to a default judgment. Indeed,
`a default is not “an absolute confession by the defendant of his liability and of the plaintiff’s
`right to recover,” but is instead merely “an admission of the facts cited in the Complaint, which
`by themselves may or may not be sufficient to establish a defendant’s liability.” Pitts ex rel.
`Pitts v. Seneca Sports, Inc., 321 F. Supp.2d 1353, 1357 (S.D. Ga. 2004); see also Descent v.
`Kolitsidas, 396 F. Supp.2d 1315, 1316 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (“the defendants’ default
`notwithstanding, the plaintiff is entitled to a default judgment only if the complaint states a claim
`for relief”); GMAC Commercial Mortg. Corp. v. Maitland Hotel Associates, Ltd., 218 F. Supp.2d
`1355, 1359 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (default judgment is appropriate only if court finds sufficient basis
`in pleadings for judgment to be entered, and that complaint states a claim). Stated differently, “a
`default judgment cannot stand on a complaint that fails to state a claim.” Chudasama v. Mazda
`Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1370 n.41 (11th Cir. 1997).
`Review of the Complaint confirms that it does indeed assert detailed facts, including a
`recitation of 8 specific copyrighted recordings that Carmichael has used and continues to use an
`online media distribution system to download and/or distribute without plaintiffs’ permission.
`(Complaint, ¶¶ 12-15 & Exh. A.)2 The Complaint further states that plaintiffs are the copyright
`owners or licensees of exclusive rights for those specific recordings. These facts, which are
`deemed admitted by virtue of Carmichael’s default, are sufficiently detailed and specific to give
`rise to a cognizable claim for direct copyright infringement in violation of the copyright laws of
`the United States, as codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. See generally In re Aimster Copyright
`Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that those who make and transmit
`digital copies of copyrighted music are direct infringers of those copyrights); A&M Records, Inc.
`
`Those recordings include Pink Floyd “Run Like Hell,” Rick James “Super Freak,”
`2
`Mariah Carey “Vision of Love,” Michael Jackson “Remember the Time,” Kenny G “Songbird,”
`Kenny G “The Moment,” Yanni “One Man’s Dream,” and Tyrese “For Always.” (Complaint, at
`Exh. A.) The Complaint lists each of these recordings by reference to copyright owner (which in
`each instance is one of the named plaintiffs herein), artist name, song title, album title, and SR#.
`Additionally, the Complaint includes as Exhibit B a list of literally hundreds of additional
`copyrighted recordings (amidst other items not germane to these proceedings) that Carmichael
`downloaded and/or distributed via this same online media distribution system.
`
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`
`
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`v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001) (prima facie case of direct infringement is
`shown where plaintiffs establish ownership of allegedly infringed material and demonstrate that
`alleged infringers are violating at least one exclusive right granted to copyright holders).
`Accordingly, the Court finds that the Complaint states a claim for relief.
`The legal effect of Carmichael’s default is that she has now admitted the facts recited in
`the Complaint, which are sufficient to establish her liability to plaintiffs on a theory of copyright
`infringement.3 Moreover, because she has made no attempt to defend this action in the more
`than eight months since being served with process, despite notice that plaintiffs were moving
`forward with default proceedings against her, Carmichael’s course of conduct amounts to a
`deliberate and intentional failure to respond, which is just the sort of dilatory litigation tactic for
`which the default judgment mechanism was created. For these reasons, plaintiffs’ Motion is
`granted as to entry of default judgment. Default judgment will be entered against Carmichael,
`in accordance with Rule 55(b)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. The Court will next consider the question of
`remedies.
`Remedies.
`B.
`Plaintiffs seek three forms of relief, to-wit: minimum statutory damages, costs, and a
`permanent injunction. In considering these requests, the Court bears in mind that,
`notwithstanding the default against Carmichael, “judgment may be granted only for such relief
`as may lawfully be granted upon the well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint.” Pitts, 321 F.
`Supp.2d at 1358 (citation omitted).4 Each form of relief sought will be considered in turn.
`
`The effect of a default is to render all well-pleaded factual allegations of the
`3
`complaint (except those relating to damages) admitted. See Nishimatsu Const. Co. v. Houston
`Nat. Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975) (“defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiff's
`well-pleaded allegations of fact”); McMillian/McMillian, Inc. v. Monticello Ins. Co., 116 F.3d
`319, 321 (8th Cir. 1997) (explaining that “when a default judgment has been entered, facts
`alleged in the complaint ... may not be contested by the defaulted party”).
`
`While well-pleaded facts in the complaint are deemed admitted, plaintiffs’
`4
`allegations relating to the amount of damages are not admitted by virtue of default; rather, the
`court must determine both the amount and character of damages. Miller v. Paradise of Port
`Richey, Inc., 75 F. Supp.2d 1342, 1346 (M.D. Fla. 1999); see also Anheuser Busch, Inc. v.
`Philpot, 317 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2003) (federal law requires judicial determination of
`damages absent factual basis in record); Credit Lyonnais Securities (USA), Inc. v. Alcantara, 183
`
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`
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`Statutory Damages.
`1.
`A copyright owner whose copyright has been infringed may recover, at his election,
`either actual damages or statutory damages for the infringing activity. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) - (c).
`Where the copyright owner elects the latter option, a court may award, “instead of actual
`damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action,
`with respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable individually ... in a sum of not
`less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just.” § 504(c)(1). Plaintiffs have
`elected statutory damages, in lieu of actual damages and profits, and seek entry of only the
`statutory minimum amount of $750 per work for each of the 8 works that the Complaint charged
`Carmichael with unlawfully downloading and/or distributing, for a total of $6,000 in statutory
`damages.
`As mentioned above, the entry of default judgment against Carmichael in no way
`obviates the need for determinations of the amount and character of damages. Rule 55(b)(2)
`specifically provides that if “it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of
`damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any
`other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary
`and proper.” That said, there is no requirement that a hearing be conducted in all default
`judgment proceedings to fix the appropriate level of damages. See S.E.C. v. Smyth, 420 F.3d
`1225, 1232 n.13 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that evidentiary hearing is not per se requirement
`for entry of default judgment, and may be omitted if all essential evidence is already of record).5
`
`F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 1999) (even where default judgment is warranted based on failure to
`defend, allegations in complaint with respect to damages are not deemed true, and district court
`must conduct inquiry in order to ascertain damages with reasonable certainty); Patray v.
`Northwest Pub., Inc., 931 F. Supp. 865, 869-70 (S.D. Ga. 1996) (explaining that it is proper
`exercise of judicial power for court upon default to take evidence, fix amount which prevailing
`party should recover, and then give judgment). “The trial judge, sitting without a jury, has
`considerable latitude in determining the amount of the damages.” Patray, 931 F. Supp. at 870.
`
`See also Ford Motor Co. v. Cross, 441 F. Supp.2d 837, 848 (E.D. Mich. 2006)
`5
`(Rule 55 “does not require a presentation of evidence as a prerequisite to the entry of a default
`judgment, although it empowers the court to conduct such hearings as it deems necessary and
`proper to enable it to enter judgment or carry it into effect”); Board of Trustees of the
`Boilermaker Vacation Trust v. Skelly, Inc., 389 F. Supp.2d 1222, 1225 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (“A
`
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`Where the amount of damages sought is a sum certain, or where an adequate record has been
`made via affidavits and documentary evidence to show statutory damages, no evidentiary
`hearing is required. See, e.g., Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1364 n. 27 (judicial determination of
`damages is unnecessary where claim is for sum certain or for sum which can by computation be
`made certain); United Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1979) (award of
`statutory damages was improper “without a hearing or a demonstration by detailed affidavits
`establishing the necessary facts”); Ortiz-Gonzalez v. Fonovisa, 277 F.3d 59, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2002)
`(district court did not abuse discretion, based on record before it, in declining to hold hearing
`before awarding statutory damages); Taylor v. City of Ballwin, Mo., 859 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th
`Cir. 1988) (evidentiary hearing not necessary where facts in the record enable the court to fix the
`amount which the plaintiff is lawfully entitled to recover); Adkins v. Teseo, 180 F. Supp.2d 15,
`17 (D.D.C. 2001) (although court must make independent determination of the sum to be
`awarded, court need not hold a hearing, but may rely on detailed affidavits or documentary
`evidence); United States v. Cabrera-Diaz, 106 F. Supp.2d 234, 243 (D.P.R. 2000) (similar).
`Here the facts deemed admitted from the Complaint show that Carmichael infringed upon
`exclusive rights granted to plaintiffs as copyright owners with respect to at least 8 distinct
`recorded works. Because plaintiffs have elected statutory damages, and because § 504(c)(1)
`mandates that statutory damages for each infringed-upon work be at least $750, the minimum
`statutory damages that this Court could award would be $6,000, or $750 times 8 copyrighted
`works. Plaintiffs request only the bare minimum statutory damages. As such, a hearing to fix
`damages would be a pointless endeavor. Irrespective of the evidence presented, given the
`admitted facts as to liability, there is no scenario under which the Court could award less than
`$6,000 in statutory damages here. Plaintiffs have waived their right to request any more than
`that minimum amount, and § 504(c)(1) forbids a lesser award; therefore, the Court finds that no
`constructive purpose would be served by conducting an evidentiary hearing prior to awarding
`plaintiffs the minimum statutory damages of $6,000, or $750 for each of the 8 copyrighted works
`that Carmichael, via her default, has admitted infringing. See Capitol Records, Inc. v.
`Mattingley, 461 F. Supp.2d 846, 851 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (no evidentiary hearing necessary in
`
`formal hearing is not required for a court to render a default judgment.”).
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`copyright case where defendant defaulted and plaintiffs sought only minimum statutory
`damages); Virgin Records America, Inc. v. Johnson, 441 F. Supp.2d 963, 965 (N.D. Ind. 2006)
`(“Because Plaintiffs seek only the minimum statutory damages and these damages are clearly
`ascertainable from the complaint, no evidentiary hearing is necessary.”).
`2.
`Injunctive Relief.
`Plaintiffs also seek a permanent injunction to enjoin Carmichael from infringing
`plaintiffs’ rights in any copyrighted recordings, including by using the Internet or online media
`distribution systems to reproduce or distribute any of plaintiffs’ recordings, or to make any of
`plaintiffs’ recordings available for distribution to the public, except pursuant to a license or with
`plaintiffs’ consent. Plaintiffs also seek an injunction requiring Carmichael to destroy all copies
`of plaintiffs’ recordings that she has downloaded or transferred onto computer hard drives,
`servers or physical devices or media without plaintiffs’ authorization.
`This type of relief is specifically authorized by copyright law. Indeed, the Copyright Act
`provides that a court may “grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem
`reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 502(a). The Act also
`provides that as part of a final judgment, a court “may order the destruction or other reasonable
`disposition of all copies or phonorecords found to have been made or used in violation of the
`copyright owner’s exclusive rights.” 17 U.S.C. § 503(b).
`Although “the issuance of an injunction is in the discretion of the court, courts have
`traditionally granted permanent injunctions if liability is established and a continuing threat to a
`copyright exists.” Jobete Music Co. v. Johnson Communications, Inc., 285 F. Supp.2d 1077,
`1092 (S.D. Ohio 2003); see also Sailor Music v. IML Corp., 867 F.Supp. 565, 569 (E.D. Mich.
`1994) (observing that permanent injunctions typically are granted in cases involving
`infringement of sound recording copyrights “because of the strong probability that unlawful
`performances of other copyrighted material will occur”); Arista Records, Inc. v. Beker
`Enterprises, Inc., 298 F. Supp.2d 1310, 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (“Injunctions are regularly issued
`pursuant to the mandate of Section 502, because the public interest is the interest in upholding
`copyright protections”) (citation omitted). Moreover, “[c]ourts also regularly issue injunctions
`as part of default judgments.” Arista, 298 F. Supp.2d at 1314 (granting permanent injunction in
`default judgment in a copyright infringement case).
`
`-8-
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`Here, plaintiffs have established Carmichael’s liability for infringing their copyrights as
`to 8 copyrighted recordings. They have shown that Carmichael is continuing her infringing
`conduct on an ongoing basis through her use of an online media distribution system to download
`and/or distribute such copyrighted recordings without plaintiffs’ permission or consent. Despite
`service of process and notice of the default proceedings, Carmichael has made no effort to
`defend against these charges of copyright infringement, suggesting that she does not take
`seriously the illegality of her infringing activity. Based on all of the foregoing, the Court
`concludes that plaintiffs have shown a strong likelihood that, unless enjoined, Carmichael will
`pose a continuing threat to infringe their copyrighted recordings. As such, the permanent
`injunction sought by plaintiffs is reasonably necessary to protect plaintiffs from further
`infringement of their copyrights by Carmichael. See generally Virgin Records America, 441 F.
`Supp.2d at 966 (entering permanent injunction in connection with default judgment in copyright
`case where the infringing activity caused injury that cannot be fully compensated or measured in
`money, there was no evidence that defendant had stopped or would stop infringing conduct
`absent an injunction, and defendant had failed to respond to or acknowledge the complaint).
`Plaintiffs’ request for entry of permanent injunction as part of the default judgment in this case is
`granted.
`
`Costs.
`3.
`Plaintiffs present evidence that they have incurred costs in the amount of $620 in this
`case. (Moore Declaration, ¶ 7.) They request that the default judgment include recovery of that
`amount. The Copyright Act provides that “the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of
`full costs by or against any party” who prevails. 17 U.S.C. § 505. Moreover, courts have
`routinely awarded costs to the prevailing party in copyright cases. See, e.g., Arclightz & Films
`Pvt. Ltd. v. Video Palace Inc., 303 F. Supp.2d 356, 365 (S.D. N.Y. 2003). This is equally true in
`the default judgment context. See Capitol Records, 461 F. Supp.2d at 852-53 (awarding costs in
`copyright infringement action where default judgment was entered against defendant); Virgin
`Records America, 441 F. Supp.2d at 965 (same). The Court finds that $620 is a reasonable
`expenditure of costs and that plaintiffs should recover same as part of their award in this case.
`III.
`Conclusion.
`For all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Default Judgment (doc.
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`2.
`
`14) is granted pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. A separate default judgment will be
`entered, containing the following elements:
`1.
`An award of statutory damages to plaintiffs in the amount of $6,000, pursuant to
`17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1);
`Entry of a permanent injunction pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §§ 502 and 503. This
`injunction will enjoin defendant from directly or indirectly infringing plaintiffs’
`rights under federal or state law in the following copyrighted sound recordings:
`Pink Floyd “Run Like Hell” from album “The Wall” (SR #14-787), Rick James
`“Super Freak” from album “Street Songs” (SR #25-800), Mariah Carey “Vision
`of Love” from album “Mariah Carey” (SR #118-408), Michael Jackson
`“Remember the Time” from album “Dangerous” (SR #178-165), Kenny G
`“Songbird” from album “Duotones” (SR #79-028), Kenny G “The Moment” from
`album “The Moment” (SR #236-228), Yanni “One Man’s Dream” from album
`“In My Time” (SR #152-673), and Tyrese “For Always” from album “2000
`Watts” (SR #293-345); and in any other sound recording, whether now in
`existence or later created, that is owned or controlled by plaintiffs (or any parent,
`subsidiary or affiliate record label of plaintiffs) (“Plaintiffs’ Recordings”),
`including without limitation by using the Internet or any online media distribution
`system to reproduce (i.e., download) any of Plaintiffs’ Recordings, to distribute
`(i.e., upload) any of Plaintiffs’ Recordings, or to make any of Plaintiffs’
`Recordings available for distribution to the public, except pursuant to a lawful
`license or with the express authority of plaintiffs. Defendant also shall destroy all
`copies of Plaintiffs’ Recordings that she has downloaded onto any computer hard
`drive or server without plaintiffs’ authorization, and shall destroy all copies of
`such downloaded recordings transferred onto any physical medium or device in
`her possession, custody or control.
`An award of costs to plaintiffs in the amount of $620, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §
`505.
`The Clerk’s Office is directed to mail a copy of this Order, and the accompanying default
`judgment, to defendant Rita Carmichael, at the address where she received service of process, to-
`
`3.
`
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`Case 2:06-cv-00251-WS-C Document 15 Filed 06/25/07 Page 11 of 11
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`wit: 571 Piney Woods Road, Camden, Alabama 36726.
`
`DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of June, 2007.
`
`s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
`
`-11-