`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
`SOUTHERN DIVISION
`
`ATLANTIC RECORDING
`CORPORATION, et al.,
`
`
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`v.
`
`JOANNA CARTER,
`
`Defendant.
`
` )
` )
` )
` )
` )
` ) CIVIL ACTION 07-0001-WS-C
` )
` )
` )
` )
`
`ORDER
`
`This matter comes before the Court on plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Default Judgment
`(doc. 11).
`I.
`Background.
`On January 3, 2007, plaintiffs Atlantic Recording Corporation, Warner Bros. Records
`Inc., Virgin Records America, Inc., Motown Record Company, L.P., UMG Recordings, Inc.,
`Sony BMG Music Entertainment, and Arista Records LLC filed a Complaint for Copyright
`Infringement (doc. 1) against defendant, Joanna Carter. In particular, plaintiffs maintained that
`Carter had utilized an online media distribution system to download or distribute copyrighted
`music recordings belonging to plaintiffs, and/or to make such recordings available for
`distribution to others, thereby infringing on plaintiffs’ copyrights and exclusive rights under
`copyright. On that basis, the Complaint requested the following relief: (1) statutory damages
`pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(c); (2) attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505; and (3)
`injunctive relief pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §§ 502 and 503, prohibiting Carter from further infringing
`conduct and requiring her to destroy all copies of sound recordings made in violation of
`plaintiffs’ exclusive rights.
`On March 8, 2007, plaintiffs filed a Return of Service (doc. 7) reflecting that defendant
`had been properly served with process by a private process server on February 16, 2007.
`According to the server’s declaration, copies of the summons and complaint were served
`
`
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`Case 1:07-cv-00001-WS-C Document 12 Filed 04/11/07 Page 2 of 11
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`personally upon Carter at the following address: 6020 Galena Drive, Mobile, Alabama.
`Notwithstanding service of process in accordance with Rule 4(e), Fed.R.Civ.P., almost
`two months ago, Carter has never filed an answer or otherwise appeared in this action. Upon
`motion by plaintiffs, a Clerk’s Entry of Default (doc. 10) was entered against Carter on March
`20, 2007 for failure to plead or otherwise defend. The Clerk of Court mailed a copy of that Entry
`of Default to defendant at both the address listed on the Summons and the address at which
`Carter had been personally served with process. Once again, Carter failed to respond. No
`further activity occurring in this matter in the subsequent three weeks, plaintiffs now seek entry
`of default judgment.
`II.
`Analysis.
`A.
`Propriety of Default Judgment.
`In this Circuit, “there is a strong policy of determining cases on their merits and we
`therefore view defaults with disfavor.” In re Worldwide Web Systems, Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1295
`(11th Cir. 2003); see also Varnes v. Local 91, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n of U.S. and Canada,
`674 F.2d 1365, 1369 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Since this case involves a default judgment there must be
`strict compliance with the legal prerequisites establishing the court's power to render the
`judgment.”). Nonetheless, it is well established that a “district court has the authority to enter
`default judgment for failure ... to comply with its orders or rules of procedure.” Wahl v. McIver,
`773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 1985).
`Where, as here, a defendant has failed to appear or otherwise acknowledge the pendency
`of a lawsuit against her for nearly two months after being served, entry of default judgment may
`be appropriate. Indeed, Rule 55 itself provides for entry of default and default judgment where a
`defendant “has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules.” Rule 55(a),
`Fed.R.Civ.P. In a variety of contexts, courts have entered default judgments against defendants
`who have failed to defend the claims against them following proper service of process. See, e.g.,
`In re Knight, 833 F.2d 1515, 1516 (11th Cir. 1987) (“Where a party offers no good reason for the
`late filing of its answer, entry of default judgment against that party is appropriate.”); Matter of
`Dierschke, 975 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1992) (“when the court finds an intentional failure of
`responsive pleadings there need be no other finding” to justify default judgment); Kidd v.
`Andrews, 340 F. Supp.2d 333, 338 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) (entering default judgment against
`
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`
`
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`Case 1:07-cv-00001-WS-C Document 12 Filed 04/11/07 Page 3 of 11
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`defendant who failed to answer or move against complaint for nearly three months); Viveros v.
`Nationwide Janitorial Ass'n, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 681, 684 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (entering default
`judgment against counterclaim defendant who had failed to answer or otherwise respond to
`counterclaim within time provided by Rule 12(a)(2)). In short, then, “[w]hile modern courts do
`not favor default judgments, they are certainly appropriate when the adversary process has been
`halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.” Flynn v. Angelucci Bros. & Sons, Inc., 448
`F. Supp.2d 193, 195 (D.D.C. 2006) (citation omitted).1
`The law is clear, however, that Carter’s failure to appear and the Clerk’s subsequent entry
`of default against her do not automatically entitle plaintiffs to a default judgment. Indeed, a
`default is not “an absolute confession by the defendant of his liability and of the plaintiff’s right
`to recover,” but is instead merely “an admission of the facts cited in the Complaint, which by
`themselves may or may not be sufficient to establish a defendant’s liability.” Pitts ex rel. Pitts v.
`Seneca Sports, Inc., 321 F. Supp.2d 1353, 1357 (S.D. Ga. 2004); see also Descent v. Kolitsidas,
`
`To be sure, courts have generally required some notice to be given to a defendant
`1
`between the time of service of process and entry of default judgment. See, e.g., International
`Brands USA, Inc. v. Old St. Andrews Ltd., 349 F. Supp.2d 256, 261 (D. Conn. 2004) (“Where a
`party fails to respond, after notice the court is ordinarily justified in entering a judgment against
`the defaulting party.”) (emphasis added and citations omitted); F.T.C. v. 1263523 Ontario, Inc.,
`205 F. Supp.2d 205, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (entering default judgment where defendants had
`failed to respond in any way to summons, complaint and motion for default judgment); New York
`State Teamsters Conference Pension and Retirement Fund v. Fratto Curbing Co., 875 F. Supp.
`129, 131 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (defendant that had failed to file answer to complaint or otherwise
`defend was properly notified of motion for default judgment). For unknown reasons, plaintiffs
`elected not to give Carter notice of their efforts to secure a default against her, as their Motion
`for Entry of Default (doc. 8) was unaccompanied by a Certificate of Service or other indicia that
`plaintiffs had placed Carter on notice that they were seeking entry of default. Nothing in the text
`of Rule 55 excuses the service requirement for requests for entry of default (as distinguished
`from motions for default judgment). Nonetheless, any harm arising from plaintiffs’ omission is
`negated by the fact that the Clerk of Court mailed a copy of the Clerk’s Entry of Default (doc.
`10) to Carter at both the address where service was perfected and the address listed on the face of
`the summons. As such, Carter is on notice that plaintiffs have moved forward with default
`proceedings, yet she has elected not to defend herself. Given Carter’s failure to appear in this
`case, despite actual notice that this lawsuit was pending, that her responsive pleading was due by
`a date certain, and that a default had been entered against her, she is entitled to no further notice
`at this time antecedent to entry of default judgment. See Rule 55(b)(2) (defaulted defendant is
`entitled to notice of request for default judgment only if defendant has appeared in the action).
`
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`Case 1:07-cv-00001-WS-C Document 12 Filed 04/11/07 Page 4 of 11
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`396 F. Supp.2d 1315, 1316 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (“the defendants’ default notwithstanding, the
`plaintiff is entitled to a default judgment only if the complaint states a claim for relief”); GMAC
`Commercial Mortg. Corp. v. Maitland Hotel Associates, Ltd., 218 F. Supp.2d 1355, 1359 (M.D.
`Fla. 2002) (default judgment is appropriate only if court finds sufficient basis in pleadings for
`judgment to be entered, and that complaint states a claim). Stated differently, “a default
`judgment cannot stand on a complaint that fails to state a claim.” Chudasama v. Mazda Motor
`Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1370 n.41 (11th Cir. 1997).
`Review of the Complaint confirms that it does indeed assert detailed facts against Carter,
`including a recitation of 12 specific copyrighted recordings that Carter has used and continues to
`use an online media distribution system to download and/or distribute without plaintiffs’
`permission. (Complaint, ¶¶ , Exh. A.)2 The Complaint further states that plaintiffs are the
`copyright owners for those specific recordings. These facts, which are deemed admitted by
`virtue of Carter’s default, are sufficiently detailed and specific to give rise to a cognizable claim
`for direct copyright infringement in violation of the copyright laws of the United States, as
`codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. See generally In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d
`643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that those who make and transmit digital copies of
`copyrighted music are direct infringers of those copyrights); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
`239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001) (prima facie case of direct infringement is shown where
`plaintiffs establish ownership of allegedly infringed material and demonstrate that alleged
`infringers are violating at least one exclusive right granted to copyright holders). Accordingly,
`the Court finds that the Complaint states a claim for relief.
`
`Those recordings include Phil Collins “In The Air Tonight,” Boney James & Rick
`2
`Braun “Shake It Up,” Jaheim “Could It Be,” After 7 “Baby I’m For Real (Natural High),” Lenny
`Kravitz “I Belong To You,” Boyz II Men “Motownphilly,” K-Ci & Jojo “How Could You,”
`Babyface “And Our Feelings,” Sade “Love Is Stronger Than Pride,” Wyclef Jean “Gone Till
`November,” Outkast “Jazzy Belle,” and Usher “Nice and Slow.” (Complaint, at Exh. A.) The
`Complaint lists each of these recordings by reference to copyright owner (which in each instance
`is one of the named plaintiffs herein), artist name, song title, album title, and SR#. Additionally,
`the Complaint includes as Exhibit B a list of literally hundreds of additional copyrighted
`recordings (amidst various other items not germane to these proceedings, including images and
`videos, some of which are labeled as pornographic) that Carter downloaded and/or distributed
`via this same online media distribution system.
`
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`
`
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`The legal effect of Carter’s default is that she has now admitted the facts recited in the
`Complaint, which are sufficient to establish her liability to plaintiffs on a theory of copyright
`infringement.3 Moreover, because she has made no attempt to defend this action in the nearly
`two months since being served with process, despite notice that plaintiffs were moving forward
`with default proceedings against her, Carter’s course of conduct amounts to a deliberate and
`intentional failure to respond, which is just the sort of dilatory litigation tactic for which the
`default judgment mechanism was created. For these reasons, plaintiffs’ Motion is granted as to
`entry of default judgment. Default judgment will be entered against Carter, in accordance with
`Rule 55(b)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. The Court will next consider which remedies will be awarded to
`plaintiffs.
`Remedies.
`B.
`Plaintiffs seek three forms of relief, to-wit: minimum statutory damages, costs, and a
`permanent injunction. In considering these requests, the Court bears in mind that,
`notwithstanding the default against Carter, “judgment may be granted only for such relief as may
`lawfully be granted upon the well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint.” Pitts, 321 F. Supp.2d
`at 1358 (citation omitted).4 Each form of relief sought will be considered in turn.
`
`The effect of a default is to render all well-pleaded factual allegations of the
`3
`complaint (except those relating to damages) admitted. See Nishimatsu Const. Co. v. Houston
`Nat. Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975) (“defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiff's
`well-pleaded allegations of fact”); McMillian/McMillian, Inc. v. Monticello Ins. Co., 116 F.3d
`319, 321 (8th Cir. 1997) (explaining that “when a default judgment has been entered, facts
`alleged in the complaint ... may not be contested by the defaulted party”).
`
`While well-pleaded facts in the complaint are deemed admitted, plaintiffs’
`4
`allegations relating to the amount of damages are not admitted by virtue of default; rather, the
`court must determine both the amount and character of damages. Miller v. Paradise of Port
`Richey, Inc., 75 F. Supp.2d 1342, 1346 (M.D. Fla. 1999); see also Anheuser Busch, Inc. v.
`Philpot, 317 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2003) (federal law requires judicial determination of
`damages absent factual basis in record); Credit Lyonnais Securities (USA), Inc. v. Alcantara, 183
`F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 1999) (even where default judgment is warranted based on failure to
`defend, allegations in complaint with respect to damages are not deemed true, and district court
`must conduct inquiry in order to ascertain damages with reasonable certainty); Patray v.
`Northwest Pub., Inc., 931 F. Supp. 865, 869-70 (S.D. Ga. 1996) (explaining that it is proper
`exercise of judicial power for court upon default to take evidence, fix amount which prevailing
`party should recover, and then give judgment). “The trial judge, sitting without a jury, has
`
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`Case 1:07-cv-00001-WS-C Document 12 Filed 04/11/07 Page 6 of 11
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`Statutory Damages.
`1.
`A copyright owner whose copyright has been infringed may recover, at his election,
`either actual damages or statutory damages for the infringing activity. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) - (c).
`Where the copyright owner elects the latter option, a court may award, “instead of actual
`damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action,
`with respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable individually ... in a sum of not
`less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just.” § 504(c)(1). Plaintiffs have
`elected statutory damages, in lieu of actual damages and profits, and seek entry of only the
`statutory minimum amount of $750 per work for each of the 12 works that the Complaint
`charged Carter with unlawfully downloading and/or distributing, for a total of $9,000 in statutory
`damages.
`As mentioned above, the entry of default judgment against Carter in no way obviates the
`need for determinations of the amount and character of damages. Rule 55(b)(2) specifically
`provides that if “it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to
`establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter,
`the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper.”
`That said, there is no requirement that a hearing be conducted in all default judgment
`proceedings to fix the appropriate level of damages. See S.E.C. v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1232
`n.13 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that evidentiary hearing is not per se requirement for entry of
`default judgment, and may be omitted if all essential evidence is already of record).5 Where the
`amount of damages sought is a sum certain, or where an adequate record has been made via
`affidavits and documentary evidence to show statutory damages, no evidentiary hearing is
`required. See, e.g., Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1364 n. 27 (judicial determination of damages is
`
`considerable latitude in determining the amount of the damages.” Patray, 931 F. Supp. at 870.
`
`See also Ford Motor Co. v. Cross, 441 F. Supp.2d 837, 848 (E.D. Mich. 2006)
`5
`(Rule 55 “does not require a presentation of evidence as a prerequisite to the entry of a default
`judgment, although it empowers the court to conduct such hearings as it deems necessary and
`proper to enable it to enter judgment or carry it into effect”); Board of Trustees of the
`Boilermaker Vacation Trust v. Skelly, Inc., 389 F. Supp.2d 1222, 1225 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (“A
`formal hearing is not required for a court to render a default judgment.”).
`
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`unnecessary where claim is for sum certain or for sum which can by computation be made
`certain); United Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1979) (award of statutory
`damages was improper “without a hearing or a demonstration by detailed affidavits establishing
`the necessary facts”); Ortiz-Gonzalez v. Fonovisa, 277 F.3d 59, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2002) (district
`court did not abuse discretion, based on record before it, in declining to hold hearing before
`awarding statutory damages); Taylor v. City of Ballwin, Mo., 859 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1988)
`(evidentiary hearing not necessary where facts in the record enable the court to fix the amount
`which the plaintiff is lawfully entitled to recover); Adkins v. Teseo, 180 F. Supp.2d 15, 17
`(D.D.C. 2001) (although court must make independent determination of the sum to be awarded,
`court need not hold a hearing, but may rely on detailed affidavits or documentary evidence);
`United States v. Cabrera-Diaz, 106 F. Supp.2d 234, 243 (D.P.R. 2000) (similar).
`Here the facts deemed admitted from the Complaint show that Carter infringed upon
`exclusive rights granted to plaintiffs as copyright owners with respect to at least 12 distinct
`recorded works. Because plaintiffs have elected statutory damages, and because § 504(c)(1)
`mandates that statutory damages for each infringed-upon work be at least $750, the minimum
`statutory damages that this Court could award would be $9,000, or $750 times 12 copyrighted
`works. Plaintiffs request only the bare minimum statutory damages. As such, a hearing to fix
`damages would be a pointless endeavor. Irrespective of the evidence presented, given the
`admitted facts as to liability, there is no scenario under which the Court could award less than
`$9,000 in statutory damages here. Plaintiffs have waived their right to request any more than
`that minimum amount, and § 504(c)(1) forbids a lesser award; therefore, the Court finds that no
`constructive purpose would be served by conducting an evidentiary hearing prior to awarding
`plaintiffs the minimum statutory damages of $9,000, or $750 for each of the 12 copyrighted
`works that Carter, via her default, has admitted infringing. See Capitol Records, Inc. v.
`Mattingley, 461 F. Supp.2d 846, 851 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (no evidentiary hearing necessary in
`copyright case where defendant defaulted and plaintiffs sought only minimum statutory
`damages); Virgin Records America, Inc. v. Johnson, 441 F. Supp.2d 963, 965 (N.D. Ind. 2006)
`(“Because Plaintiffs seek only the minimum statutory damages and these damages are clearly
`ascertainable from the complaint, no evidentiary hearing is necessary.”).
`
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`Case 1:07-cv-00001-WS-C Document 12 Filed 04/11/07 Page 8 of 11
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`Injunctive Relief.
`2.
`Plaintiffs also seek a permanent injunction to enjoin Carter from infringing plaintiffs’
`rights in any copyrighted recordings, including by using the Internet or online media distribution
`systems to reproduce or distribute any of plaintiffs’ recordings, or to make any of plaintiffs’
`recordings available for distribution to the public, except pursuant to a license or with plaintiffs’
`consent. Plaintiffs also seek an injunction requiring Carter to destroy all copies of plaintiffs’
`recordings that she has downloaded or transferred onto computer hard drives, servers or physical
`devices or media without plaintiffs’ authorization.
`This type of relief is specifically authorized by copyright law. Indeed, the Copyright Act
`provides that a court may “grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem
`reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 502(a). The Act also
`provides that as part of a final judgment, a court “may order the destruction or other reasonable
`disposition of all copies or phonorecords found to have been made or used in violation of the
`copyright owner’s exclusive rights.” 17 U.S.C. § 503(b).
`Although “the issuance of an injunction is in the discretion of the court, courts have
`traditionally granted permanent injunctions if liability is established and a continuing threat to a
`copyright exists.” Jobete Music Co. v. Johnson Communications, Inc., 285 F. Supp.2d 1077,
`1092 (S.D. Ohio 2003); see also Sailor Music v. IML Corp., 867 F.Supp. 565, 569 (E.D. Mich.
`1994) (observing that permanent injunctions typically are granted in cases involving
`infringement of sound recording copyrights “because of the strong probability that unlawful
`performances of other copyrighted material will occur”); Arista Records, Inc. v. Beker
`Enterprises, Inc., 298 F. Supp.2d 1310, 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (“Injunctions are regularly issued
`pursuant to the mandate of Section 502, because the public interest is the interest in upholding
`copyright protections”) (citation omitted). Moreover, “[c]ourts also regularly issue injunctions
`as part of default judgments.” Arista, 298 F. Supp.2d at 1314 (granting permanent injunction in
`default judgment in a copyright infringement case).
`Here, plaintiffs have established Carter’s liability for infringing their copyrights as to 12
`copyrighted recordings. They have shown that Carter is continuing her infringing conduct on an
`ongoing basis through her use of an online media distribution system to download and/or
`distribute such copyrighted recordings without plaintiffs’ permission or consent. Despite service
`
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`Case 1:07-cv-00001-WS-C Document 12 Filed 04/11/07 Page 9 of 11
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`of process and notice of the default proceedings, Carter has made no effort to defend against
`these charges of copyright infringement, suggesting that she does not take seriously the illegality
`of her infringing activity. Based on all of the foregoing, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have
`shown a strong likelihood that, unless enjoined, Carter will pose a continuing threat to infringe
`their copyrighted recordings. As such, the permanent injunction sought by plaintiffs is
`reasonably necessary to protect plaintiffs from further infringement of their copyrights by Carter.
`See generally Virgin Records America, 441 F. Supp.2d at 966 (entering permanent injunction in
`connection with default judgment in copyright case where the infringing activity caused injury
`that cannot be fully compensated or measured in money, there was no evidence that defendant
`had stopped or would stop infringing conduct absent an injunction, and defendant had failed to
`respond to or acknowledge the complaint). Plaintiffs’ request for entry of permanent injunction
`as part of the default judgment in this case is granted.
`3.
`Costs.
`Plaintiffs present evidence that they have incurred costs in the amount of $620 in this
`case. (Anderson Declaration, ¶ 7.) They request that the default judgment include recovery of
`that amount. The Copyright Act provides that “the court in its discretion may allow the recovery
`of full costs by or against any party” who prevails. 17 U.S.C. § 505. Moreover, courts have
`routinely awarded costs to the prevailing party in copyright cases. See, e.g., Arclightz & Films
`Pvt. Ltd. v. Video Palace Inc., 303 F. Supp.2d 356, 365 (S.D. N.Y. 2003). This is equally true in
`the default judgment context. See Capitol Records, 461 F. Supp.2d at 852-53 (awarding costs in
`copyright infringement action where default judgment was entered against defendant); Virgin
`Records America, 441 F. Supp.2d at 965 (same). The Court finds that $620 is a reasonable
`expenditure of costs and that plaintiffs should recover same as part of their award in this case.
`III.
`Conclusion.
`For all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Default Judgment (doc.
`11) is granted pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. A separate default judgment will be
`entered, containing the following elements:
`1.
`An award of statutory damages to plaintiffs in the amount of $9,000, pursuant to
`17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1);
`Entry of a permanent injunction pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §§ 502 and 503. This
`
`2.
`
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`Case 1:07-cv-00001-WS-C Document 12 Filed 04/11/07 Page 10 of 11
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`injunction will enjoin defendant from directly or indirectly infringing plaintiffs’
`rights under federal or state law in the following copyrighted sound recordings:
`Phil Collins “In The Air Tonight” from album “Face Value” (SR #24-682), Boney
`James & Rick Braun “Shake It Up” from album “Shake It Up” (SR #281-990),
`Jaheim “Could It Be” from album “Ghetto Love” (SR #295-088), After 7 “Baby
`I’m For Real (Natural High)” from album “Takin’ My Time” (SR #178-457),
`Lenny Kravitz “I Belong to You” from album “5” (SR #261-538), Boyz II Men
`“Motownphilly” from album “Cooleyhighharmony” (SR #212-333), K-Ci & Jojo
`“How Could You” from album “Love Always” (SR #238-754), Babyface “And
`Our Feelings” from album “For The Cool In You” (SR #184-540), Sade “Love Is
`Stronger Than Pride” from album “Stronger Than Pride” (SR #93-822), Wyclef
`Jean “Gone Till November” from album “Wyclef Jean Presents The Carnival
`Featuring Refugee Allstars” (SR #251-493), Outkast “Jazzy Belle” from album
`“Atliens” (SR #233-296), and Usher “Nice and Slow” from album “My Way”
`(SR #257-730); and in any other sound recording, whether now in existence or
`later created, that is owned or controlled by plaintiffs (or any parent, subsidiary or
`affiliate record label of plaintiffs) (“Plaintiffs’ Recordings”), including without
`limitation by using the Internet or any online media distribution system to
`reproduce (i.e., download) any of Plaintiffs’ Recordings, to distribute (i.e.,
`upload) any of Plaintiffs’ Recordings, or to make any of Plaintiffs’ Recordings
`available for distribution to the public, except pursuant to a lawful license or with
`the express authority of plaintiffs. Defendant also shall destroy all copies of
`Plaintiffs’ Recordings that she has downloaded onto any computer hard drive or
`server without plaintiffs’ authorization, and shall destroy all copies of such
`downloaded recordings transferred onto any physical medium or device in her
`possession, custody or control.
`An award of costs to plaintiffs in the amount of $620, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §
`505.
`The Clerk’s Office is directed to mail a copy of this Order, and the accompanying default
`judgment, to defendant Joanna Carter at the address where she received service of process, to-
`
`3.
`
`-10-
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`Case 1:07-cv-00001-WS-C Document 12 Filed 04/11/07 Page 11 of 11
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`wit: 6020 Galena Drive, Mobile, Alabama; as well as at the address listed on the face of the
`Summons, to-wit: 6951 Dickens Ferry Rd Apt. 36, Mobile, AL 36608-4464.
`
`DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of April, 2007.
`
`s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
`
`-11-