`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
`SOUTHERN DIVISION
`
`VIRGIN RECORDS AMERICA, INC.,
`et al.,
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`v.
`
`BERTHA LACEY,
`
`Defendant.
`
` )
` )
` )
` )
` )
` ) CIVIL ACTION 06-0639-WS-M
` )
` )
` )
` )
`
`ORDER
`
`This case is before the Court on plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Default Judgment (doc. 9).
`
`I.
`
`Background.
`
`On October 10, 2006, plaintiffs Virgin Records America, Inc., Motown Record Company,
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`L.P., UMG Recordings, Inc.,1 Sony BMG Music Entertainment, and BMG Music filed a Complaint for
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`Copyright Infringement (doc. 1) against defendant, Bertha Lacey. In particular, plaintiffs maintained
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`that Lacey had utilized an online media distribution system to download or distribute copyrighted music
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`recordings belonging to plaintiffs, and/or to make such recordings available for distribution to others,
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`thereby infringing on plaintiffs’ copyrights and exclusive rights under copyright. On that basis, the
`
`Complaint requested the following relief: (1) statutory damages pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(c); (2)
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`attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505; and (3) injunctive relief pursuant to 17 U.S.C.
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`§§ 502 and 503, prohibiting Lacey from further infringing conduct and requiring her to destroy all
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`copies of sound recordings made in violation of plaintiffs’ exclusive rights.
`
`1
`The Complaint lists UMG Recordings, Inc. as a plaintiff twice. The Court assumes that
`this redundancy was inadvertent, inasmuch as each UMG Recordings plaintiff is described in the
`Complaint as “a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, with
`its principal place of business in the State of California.” (Complaint, ¶¶ 6, 9.)
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`
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`Case 1:06-cv-00639-WS-M Document 11 Filed 01/23/07 Page 2 of 11
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`On November 14, 2006, plaintiffs filed a Return of Service (doc. 5) reflecting that defendant
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`had been served with process by a private process server on October 26, 2006. According to the
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`server’s declaration, copies of the summons and complaint were left at Lacey’s dwelling house or usual
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`place of abode (6005 Howells Ferry Road, Mobile, AL 36618) and were given to Lacey’s son, Brad
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`Lacey.
`
`Notwithstanding service of process in accordance with Rule 4(e), Fed.R.Civ.P., nearly three
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`months ago, Lacey has never filed an answer or otherwise appeared in this action. Upon motion by
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`plaintiffs, a Clerk’s Entry of Default (doc. 8) was entered against Lacey on December 13, 2006 for
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`failure to plead or otherwise defend. The Clerk of Court mailed a copy of that Entry of Default to
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`defendant at the same address at which process was served. Once again, Lacey failed to respond. No
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`further activity occurring in this matter in the subsequent 30 days, plaintiffs now seek entry of default
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`judgment.
`
`II.
`
`Analysis.
`
`A.
`
`Propriety of Default Judgment.
`
`In this Circuit, “there is a strong policy of determining cases on their merits and we therefore
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`view defaults with disfavor.” In re Worldwide Web Systems, Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir.
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`2003); see also Varnes v. Local 91, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n of U.S. and Canada, 674 F.2d
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`1365, 1369 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Since this case involves a default judgment there must be strict
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`compliance with the legal prerequisites establishing the court's power to render the judgment.”).
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`Nonetheless, it is well established that a “district court has the authority to enter default judgment for
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`failure ... to comply with its orders or rules of procedure.” Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1174
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`(11th Cir. 1985).
`
`Where, as here, a defendant has failed to appear or otherwise acknowledge the pendency of a
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`lawsuit against her for some three months after being served, entry of default judgment may be
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`appropriate. Indeed, Rule 55 itself provides for entry of default and default judgment where a
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`defendant “has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules.” Rule 55(a),
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`Fed.R.Civ.P. In a variety of contexts, courts have entered default judgments against defendants who
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`-2-
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`Case 1:06-cv-00639-WS-M Document 11 Filed 01/23/07 Page 3 of 11
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`have failed to defend the claims against them following proper service of process. See, e.g., In re
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`Knight, 833 F.2d 1515, 1516 (11th Cir. 1987) (“Where a party offers no good reason for the late
`
`filing of its answer, entry of default judgment against that party is appropriate.”); Matter of Dierschke,
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`975 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1992) (“when the court finds an intentional failure of responsive pleadings
`
`there need be no other finding” to justify default judgment); Kidd v. Andrews, 340 F. Supp.2d 333,
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`338 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) (entering default judgment against defendant who failed to answer or move
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`against complaint for nearly three months); Viveros v. Nationwide Janitorial Ass'n, Inc., 200 F.R.D.
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`681, 684 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (entering default judgment against counterclaim defendant who had failed to
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`answer or otherwise respond to counterclaim within time provided by Rule 12(a)(2)). In short, then,
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`“[w]hile modern courts do not favor default judgments, they are certainly appropriate when the
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`adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.” Flynn v. Angelucci
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`Bros. & Sons, Inc., 448 F. Supp.2d 193, 195 (D.D.C. 2006) (citation omitted).2
`
`2
`To be sure, courts have generally required some notice to be given to a defendant
`between the time of service of process and entry of default judgment. See, e.g., International Brands
`USA, Inc. v. Old St. Andrews Ltd., 349 F. Supp.2d 256, 261 (D. Conn. 2004) (“Where a party fails
`to respond, after notice the court is ordinarily justified in entering a judgment against the defaulting
`party.”) (emphasis added and citations omitted); F.T.C. v. 1263523 Ontario, Inc., 205 F. Supp.2d
`205, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (entering default judgment where defendants had failed to respond in any
`way to summons, complaint and motion for default judgment); New York State Teamsters
`Conference Pension and Retirement Fund v. Fratto Curbing Co., 875 F. Supp. 129, 131
`(N.D.N.Y. 1995) (defendant that had failed to file answer to complaint or otherwise defend was
`properly notified of motion for default judgment). For unknown reasons, plaintiffs elected not to give
`Lacey notice of their efforts to secure a default against her, as their Motion for Entry of Default (doc. 7)
`was unaccompanied by a Certificate of Service or other indicia that plaintiffs had placed Lacey on
`notice that they were seeking entry of default. Nothing in the text of Rule 55 excuses the service
`requirement for requests for entry of default (as distinguished from motions for default judgment).
`Nonetheless, any harm arising from plaintiffs’ omission is negated by the fact that the Clerk of Court
`mailed a copy of the Clerk’s Entry of Default (doc. 8) to Lacey at the address where service was
`perfected. As such, Lacey is on notice that plaintiffs have moved forward with default proceedings, yet
`she has elected not to defend herself. Given Lacey’s failure to appear in this case, despite actual notice
`that this lawsuit was pending, that her responsive pleading was due by a date certain, and that a default
`had been entered against her, she is entitled to no further notice at this time. See Rule 55(b)(2)
`(defaulted defendant is entitled to notice of request for default judgment only if defendant has appeared
`in the action).
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`-3-
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`Case 1:06-cv-00639-WS-M Document 11 Filed 01/23/07 Page 4 of 11
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`The law is clear, however, that Lacey’s failure to appear and the Clerk’s subsequent entry of
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`default against her do not automatically entitle plaintiffs to a default judgment. Indeed, a default is not
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`“an absolute confession by the defendant of his liability and of the plaintiff’s right to recover,” but is
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`instead merely “an admission of the facts cited in the Complaint, which by themselves may or may not
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`be sufficient to establish a defendant’s liability.” Pitts ex rel. Pitts v. Seneca Sports, Inc., 321 F.
`
`Supp.2d 1353, 1357 (S.D. Ga. 2004); see also Descent v. Kolitsidas, 396 F. Supp.2d 1315, 1316
`
`(M.D. Fla. 2005) (“the defendants’ default notwithstanding, the plaintiff is entitled to a default judgment
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`only if the complaint states a claim for relief”); GMAC Commercial Mortg. Corp. v. Maitland Hotel
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`Associates, Ltd., 218 F. Supp.2d 1355, 1359 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (default judgment is appropriate only
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`if court finds sufficient basis in pleadings for judgment to be entered, and that complaint states a claim).
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`Stated differently, “a default judgment cannot stand on a complaint that fails to state a claim.”
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`Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1370 n.41 (11th Cir. 1997).
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`Review of the Complaint confirms that it does indeed assert detailed facts against Lacey,
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`including a recitation of eight specific copyrighted recordings that Lacey has used and continues to use
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`an online media distribution system to download and/or distribute without plaintiffs’ permission.
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`(Complaint, ¶¶ , Exh. A.)3 The Complaint further states that plaintiffs are the copyright owners for
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`those specific recordings. These facts, which are deemed admitted by virtue of Lacey’s default, are
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`sufficiently detailed and specific to give rise to a cognizable claim for direct copyright infringement in
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`violation of the copyright laws of the United States, as codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. See
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`generally In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that
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`those who make and transmit digital copies of copyrighted music are direct infringers of those
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`copyrights); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001) (prima facie
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`case of direct infringement is shown where plaintiffs establish ownership of allegedly infringed material
`
`3
`Those recordings include Janet Jackson “This Time,” Rick James “Fire and Desire,”
`Dru Hill “5 Steps,” Jennifer Lopez “If You Had My Love,” Michael Jackson “Heal the World,”
`Michael Jackson “You Rock My World,” Tyrese “Lately,” and Dru Hill “Beauty.” (Complaint, at Exh.
`A.) The Complaint lists each of these recordings by reference to copyright owner (which in each
`instance is one of the named plaintiffs herein), album title, and SR#.
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`-4-
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`
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`Case 1:06-cv-00639-WS-M Document 11 Filed 01/23/07 Page 5 of 11
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`and demonstrate that alleged infringers are violating at least one exclusive right granted to copyright
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`holders). Accordingly, the Court finds that the Complaint states a claim for relief.
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`The legal effect of Lacey’s default is that she has now admitted the facts recited in the
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`Complaint, which are sufficient to establish her liability to plaintiffs on a theory of copyright
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`infringement.4 Moreover, because she has made no attempt to defend this action in the three months
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`since being served with process, despite notice that plaintiffs were moving forward with default
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`proceedings against her, Lacey’s course of conduct amounts to a deliberate and intentional failure to
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`respond, which is just the sort of dilatory litigation tactic for which the default judgment mechanism was
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`created. For these reasons, plaintiffs’ Motion is granted as to entry of default judgment. Default
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`judgment will be entered against Lacey, in accordance with Rule 55(b)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. The Court
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`will next consider which remedies which will be awarded to plaintiffs.
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`B.
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`Remedies.
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`Plaintiffs seek three forms of relief, to-wit: minimum statutory damages, costs, and a permanent
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`injunction. In considering these requests, the Court bears in mind that, notwithstanding the default
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`against Lacey, “judgment may be granted only for such relief as may lawfully be granted upon the well-
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`pleaded facts alleged in the complaint.” Pitts, 321 F. Supp.2d at 1358 (citation omitted).5 Each form
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`4
`The effect of a default is to render all well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint
`(except those relating to damages) admitted. See Nishimatsu Const. Co. v. Houston Nat. Bank, 515
`F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975) (“defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiff's well-pleaded
`allegations of fact”); McMillian/McMillian, Inc. v. Monticello Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 319, 321 (8th Cir.
`1997) (explaining that “when a default judgment has been entered, facts alleged in the complaint ... may
`not be contested by the defaulted party”).
`
`5
`While well-pleaded facts in the complaint are deemed admitted, plaintiffs’ allegations
`relating to the amount of damages are not admitted by virtue of default; rather, the court must determine
`both the amount and character of damages. Miller v. Paradise of Port Richey, Inc., 75 F. Supp.2d
`1342, 1346 (M.D. Fla. 1999); see also Anheuser Busch, Inc. v. Philpot, 317 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th
`Cir. 2003) (federal law requires judicial determination of damages absent factual basis in record);
`Credit Lyonnais Securities (USA), Inc. v. Alcantara, 183 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 1999) (even
`where default judgment is warranted based on failure to defend, allegations in complaint with respect to
`damages are not deemed true, and district court must conduct inquiry in order to ascertain damages
`with reasonable certainty); Patray v. Northwest Pub., Inc., 931 F. Supp. 865, 869-70 (S.D. Ga.
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`-5-
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`
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`Case 1:06-cv-00639-WS-M Document 11 Filed 01/23/07 Page 6 of 11
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`of relief sought will be considered in turn.
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`1.
`
`Statutory Damages.
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`A copyright owner whose copyright has been infringed may recover, at his election, either
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`actual damages or statutory damages for the infringing activity. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) - (c). Where the
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`copyright owner elects the latter option, a court may award, “instead of actual damages and profits, an
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`award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work,
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`for which any one infringer is liable individually ... in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000
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`as the court considers just.” § 504(c)(1). Plaintiffs have elected statutory damages, in lieu of actual
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`damages and profits, and seek entry of only the statutory minimum amount of $750 per work for each
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`of the eight works that the Complaint charged Lacey with unlawfully downloading and/or distributing,
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`for a total of $6,000 in statutory damages.
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`As mentioned above, the entry of default judgment against Lacey in no way obviates the need
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`for determinations of the amount and character of damages. Rule 55(b)(2) specifically provides that if
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`“it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of
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`any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such
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`hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper.” That said, there is no
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`requirement that a hearing be conducted in all default judgment proceedings to fix the appropriate level
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`of damages. See S.E.C. v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1232 n.13 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that
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`evidentiary hearing is not per se requirement for entry of default judgment, and may be omitted if all
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`essential evidence is already of record).6 Where the amount of damages sought is a sum certain, or
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`1996) (explaining that it is proper exercise of judicial power for court upon default to take evidence, fix
`amount which prevailing party should recover, and then give judgment). “The trial judge, sitting without
`a jury, has considerable latitude in determining the amount of the damages.” 931 F. Supp. at 870.
`
`6
`See also Ford Motor Co. v. Cross, 441 F. Supp.2d 837, 848 (E.D. Mich. 2006)
`(Rule 55 “does not require a presentation of evidence as a prerequisite to the entry of a default
`judgment, although it empowers the court to conduct such hearings as it deems necessary and proper to
`enable it to enter judgment or carry it into effect”); Board of Trustees of the Boilermaker Vacation
`Trust v. Skelly, Inc., 389 F. Supp.2d 1222, 1225 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (“A formal hearing is not required
`for a court to render a default judgment.”).
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`-6-
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`Case 1:06-cv-00639-WS-M Document 11 Filed 01/23/07 Page 7 of 11
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`where an adequate record has been made via affidavits and documentary evidence to show statutory
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`damages, no evidentiary hearing is required. See, e.g., Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1364 n. 27 (judicial
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`determination of damages is unnecessary where claim is for sum certain or for sum which can by
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`computation be made certain); United Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1979)
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`(award of statutory damages was improper “without a hearing or a demonstration by detailed affidavits
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`establishing the necessary facts”); Ortiz-Gonzalez v. Fonovisa, 277 F.3d 59, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2002)
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`(district court did not abuse discretion, based on record before it, in declining to hold hearing before
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`awarding statutory damages); Taylor v. City of Ballwin, Mo., 859 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1988)
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`(evidentiary hearing not necessary where facts in the record enable the court to fix the amount which the
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`plaintiff is lawfully entitled to recover); Adkins v. Teseo, 180 F. Supp.2d 15, 17 (D.D.C. 2001)
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`(although court must make independent determination of the sum to be awarded, court need not hold a
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`hearing, but may rely on detailed affidavits or documentary evidence); United States v. Cabrera-Diaz,
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`106 F. Supp.2d 234, 243 (D.P.R. 2000) (similar).
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`Here the facts deemed admitted from the Complaint show that Lacey infringed upon exclusive
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`rights granted to plaintiffs as copyright owners with respect to eight distinct recorded works. Because
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`plaintiffs have elected statutory damages, and because § 504(c)(1) mandates that statutory damages for
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`each infringed-upon work be at least $750, the minimum statutory damages that this Court could award
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`would be $6,000, or $750 times 8 copyrighted works. Plaintiffs request only the bare minimum
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`statutory damages. As such, a hearing to fix damages would be a pointless endeavor. Irrespective of
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`the evidence presented, given the admitted facts as to liability, there is no scenario under which the
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`Court could award less than $6,000 in statutory damages here. Plaintiffs have waived their right to
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`request any more than that minimum amount, and § 504(c)(1) forbids a lesser award; therefore, the
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`Court finds that no constructive purpose would be served by conducting an evidentiary hearing prior to
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`awarding plaintiffs the minimum statutory damages of $6,000, or $750 for each of the eight copyrighted
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`works that Lacey has admitted infringing. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mattingley, --- F. Supp.2d --
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`--, 2006 WL 3360549, *4 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2006) (no evidentiary hearing necessary in copyright
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`case where defendant defaulted and plaintiffs sought only minimum statutory damages); Virgin Records
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`-7-
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`Case 1:06-cv-00639-WS-M Document 11 Filed 01/23/07 Page 8 of 11
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`America, Inc. v. Johnson, 441 F. Supp.2d 963, 965 (N.D. Ind. 2006) (“Because Plaintiffs seek only
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`the minimum statutory damages and these damages are clearly ascertainable from the complaint, no
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`evidentiary hearing is necessary.”).
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`2.
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`Injunctive Relief.
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`Plaintiffs also seek a permanent injunction to enjoin Lacey from infringing plaintiffs’ rights in
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`copyrighted recordings, including by using the Internet or online media distribution systems to
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`reproduce or distribute any of plaintiffs’ recordings, or to make any of plaintiffs’ recordings available for
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`distribution to the public, except pursuant to a license or with plaintiffs’ consent. Plaintiffs also seek an
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`injunction requiring Lacey to destroy all copies of plaintiffs’ recordings that she has downloaded or
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`transferred onto computer hard drives, servers or physical devices or media without plaintiffs’
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`authorization.
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`This type of relief is specifically authorized by copyright law. Indeed, the Copyright Act
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`provides that a court may “grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem
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`reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 502(a). The Act also
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`provides that as part of a final judgment, a court “may order the destruction or other reasonable
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`disposition of all copies or phonorecords found to have been made or used in violation of the copyright
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`owner’s exclusive rights.” 17 U.S.C. § 503(b).
`
`Although “the issuance of an injunction is in the discretion of the court, courts have traditionally
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`granted permanent injunctions if liability is established and a continuing threat to a copyright exists.”
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`Jobete Music Co. v. Johnson Communications, Inc., 285 F. Supp.2d 1077, 1092 (S.D. Ohio
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`2003); see also Sailor Music v. IML Corp., 867 F.Supp. 565, 569 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (observing that
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`permanent injunctions typically are granted in cases involving infringement of sound recording copyrights
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`“because of the strong probability that unlawful performances of other copyrighted material will occur”);
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`Arista Records, Inc. v. Beker Enterprises, Inc., 298 F. Supp.2d 1310, 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2003)
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`(“Injunctions are regularly issued pursuant to the mandate of Section 502, because the public interest is
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`the interest in upholding copyright protections”) (citation omitted). Moreover, “[c]ourts also regularly
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`issue injunctions as part of default judgments.” Arista, 298 F. Supp.2d at 1314 (granting permanent
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`-8-
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`Case 1:06-cv-00639-WS-M Document 11 Filed 01/23/07 Page 9 of 11
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`injunction in default judgment in a copyright infringement case).
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`Here, plaintiffs have established Lacey’s liability for infringing their copyrights as to eight
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`copyrighted recordings. They have shown that Lacey is continuing her infringing conduct on an ongoing
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`basis through her use of an online media distribution system to download and/or distribute such
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`copyrighted recordings without plaintiffs’ permission or consent. Despite service of process and notice
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`of the default proceedings, Lacey has made no effort to defend against these charges of copyright
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`infringement, suggesting that she does not take seriously the illegality of her infringing activity. Based on
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`all of the foregoing, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have shown a strong likelihood that, unless
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`enjoined, Lacey will pose a continuing threat to infringe their copyrighted recordings. As such, the
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`permanent injunction sought by plaintiffs is reasonably necessary to protect plaintiffs from further
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`infringement of their copyrights by Lacey. See generally Virgin Records America, 441 F. Supp.2d at
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`966 (entering permanent injunction in connection with default judgment in copyright case where the
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`infringing activity caused injury that cannot be fully compensated or measured in money, there was no
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`evidence that defendant had stopped or would stop infringing conduct absent an injunction, and
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`defendant had failed to respond to or acknowledge the complaint). Plaintiffs’ request for entry of
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`permanent injunction as part of the default judgment in this case is granted.
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`3.
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`Costs.
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`Plaintiffs present evidence that they have incurred costs in the amount of $420 in this case.
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`(Anderson Declaration, ¶ 7.) They request that the default judgment include recovery of that amount.
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`The Copyright Act provides that “the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or
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`against any party” who prevails. 17 U.S.C. § 505. Moreover, courts have routinely awarded costs to
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`the prevailing party in copyright cases. See, e.g., Arclightz & Films Pvt. Ltd. v. Video Palace Inc.,
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`303 F. Supp.2d 356, 365 (S.D. N.Y. 2003). This is equally true in the default judgment context. See
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`Capitol Records, 2006 WL 3360549, at *6 (awarding costs in copyright infringement action where
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`default judgment was entered against defendant); Virgin Records America, 441 F. Supp.2d at 965
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`(same). The Court finds that $420 is a reasonable expenditure of costs and that plaintiffs should
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`recover same as part of their award in this case.
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`-9-
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`Case 1:06-cv-00639-WS-M Document 11 Filed 01/23/07 Page 10 of 11
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`III.
`
`Conclusion.
`
`For all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Default Judgment (doc. 9) is
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`granted pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. A separate default judgment will be entered,
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`containing the following elements:
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`An award of statutory damages to plaintiffs in the amount of $6,000, pursuant to 17
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`U.S.C. § 504(c)(1);
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`Entry of a permanent injunction pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §§ 502 and 503. This injunction
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`will enjoin defendant from directly or indirectly infringing plaintiffs’ rights under federal
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`or state law in the following copyrighted sound recordings: Janet Jackson “This Time”
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`from album “Janet” (SR #174-392); Rick James “Fire and Desire” from album “Street
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`Songs” (SR #25-800); Dru Hill “5 Steps” from album “Dru Hill” (SR #227-760),
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`Jennifer Lopez “If You Had My Love” from album “On the 6” (SR # 267-571),
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`Michael Jackson “Heal the World” from album “Dangerous” (SR #178-165), Michael
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`Jackson “You Rock My World” from album “Invincible” (SR #304-780), Tyrese
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`“Lately” from album “Tyrese” (SR #237-788) and Dru Hill “Beauty” from album “Enter
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`the Dru” (SR #290-402); and in any other sound recording, whether now in existence
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`or later created, that is owned or controlled by plaintiffs (or any parent, subsidiary or
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`affiliate record label of plaintiffs) (“Plaintiffs’ Recordings”), including without limitation
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`by using the Internet or any online media distribution system to reproduce (i.e.,
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`download) any of Plaintiffs’ Recordings, to distribute (i.e., upload) any of Plaintiffs’
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`Recordings, or to make any of Plaintiffs’ Recordings available for distribution to the
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`public, except pursuant to a lawful license or with the express authority of plaintiffs.
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`Defendant also shall destroy all copies of Plaintiffs’ Recordings that she has
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`downloaded onto any computer hard drive or server without plaintiffs’ authorization,
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`and shall destroy all copies of such downloaded recordings transferred onto any
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`physical medium or device in her possession, custody or control.
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`3.
`
`An award of costs to plaintiffs in the amount of $420, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505.
`
`-10-
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`Case 1:06-cv-00639-WS-M Document 11 Filed 01/23/07 Page 11 of 11
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`The Clerk’s Office is directed to mail a copy of this Order, and the accompanying default
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`judgment, to defendant Bertha Lacey at the address where she received service of process, to-wit:
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`6005 Howells Ferry Road, Mobile, AL 36618
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`DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of January, 2007.
`
`s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
`
`-11-