NOT FOR PUBLICATION
`
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`
`FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`FILED
`
`
`JUN 21 2021
`
`MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
`U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
`
` Plaintiff-counter-
`
`defendant-Appellant,
`
`ALEXANDER C. BAKER,
`
`
`
`
` v.
`
`
`CLARA VESELIZA BAKER, AKA Clair
`Marlo,
`
`
`
`
` Defendant-counter-claimant-
` Appellee.
`
`
`
`
`No. 18-55922
`
`
`D.C. No.
`2:16-cv-08931-VAP-JPR
`
`
`
`MEMORANDUM*
`
`
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Central District of California
`Virginia A. Phillips, District Judge
`
`Argued and Submitted March 1, 2021
`Pasadena, California
`
`Before: SILER,** HURWITZ, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.
`
`
`
`*
` This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
`
`
`except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
`
`** The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the
`
`
`U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Alexander Baker (Alexander) appeals a judgment entered in favor of Clara
`
`Veseliza Baker’s (Clara) First Amended Counterclaim (FACC) and an award of
`
`attorney’s fees to Clara as the “prevailing party” in this suit.
`
`Alexander’s operative complaint raised several federal claims, including
`
`alleged violations of RICO statutes and copyright infringement. However, all of
`
`Alexander’s federal claims were disposed of through summary judgment in Clara’s
`
`favor in 2018.1 The FACC sought a declaration that “the reported and/or registered
`
`writer splits” for the copywritten songs that were the subject of Alexander’s
`
`infringement allegations are “true and correct.” The district court granted the
`
`requested declaration after dismissing Alexander’s federal claims. The issues for
`
`
`1 Alexander challenges the district court’s conclusion, in its order granting
`summary judgment on his claim for copyright infringement, that he had granted an
`implied license to Clara and FirstCom Music. However, except with respect to one
`specified group of songs, the district court also dismissed this infringement claim
`on the alternative ground that Alexander had failed to register his copyrights prior
`to bringing his copyright infringement claim, and Alexander does not contest that
`alternative ground on appeal. As to that remaining group of songs, the district
`court held that Alexander had already obtained a judgment against Clara with
`respect to those songs and could not sue her again, and Alexander does not
`challenge that ruling either. Because these unchallenged alternative rulings fully
`support the summary judgment to Clara on the copyright infringement claim, there
`is no basis to set aside that order. The implied license ruling was essential only
`with respect to the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to the copyright
`infringement claim against FirstCom Music and only with respect to that group of
`songs. However, after the summary judgment ruling, Alexander stipulated to the
`dismissal of all claims against FirstCom Music, which is therefore not a party to
`this appeal. Alexander therefore has forfeited any challenge to the summary
`judgment as to FirstCom Music, including on the grounds of an implied license to
`FirstCom Music.
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`

`

`decision are whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the FACC
`
`and, if it did not, whether the award of fees to Clara as the “prevailing party” in this
`
`litigation should therefore be revisited.2
`
`“The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law that is reviewed
`
`de novo.” FMC Medical Plan v. Owens, 122 F.3d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1997). An
`
`award of attorney’s fees is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Stetson v. Grissom, 821
`
`F. 3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2016). We vacate the district court’s declaratory judgment
`
`on the FACC on jurisdictional grounds, and remand for the limited purpose of
`
`reducing the fee award by the amount attributable to Clara’s success on the FACC,
`
`as opposed to her success on Alexander’s operative complaint.
`
`1. “[J]ust because a case involves a copyright does not mean that federal
`
`subject matter jurisdiction exists.” Scholastic Ent., Inc. v. Fox Ent. Grp., Inc., 336
`
`F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Vestron, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 839
`
`F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988)). Rather, the issue is whether “(1) the complaint
`
`asks for a remedy expressly granted by the Copyright Act; (2) the complaint requires
`
`an interpretation of the Copyright Act; or (3) federal principles should control the
`
`claims.” Id. at 986. A claim seeking a mere “naked declaration of ownership or
`
`
`2 Because, within 30 days of the entry of the district court’s order awarding
`attorney’s fees, Alexander filed a document in this court confirming that he
`challenges that order on this appeal, we have jurisdiction over that challenge. See
`Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248-49 (1992) (informal brief in court of appeals
`may provide sufficient notice to serve as a notice of appeal).
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`

`

`contractual rights” does not give rise to federal subject matter jurisdiction, “even
`
`though the claim might incidentally involve a copyright or the Copyright Act.”
`
`Topolos v. Caldewey, 698 F.2d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks
`
`and citation omitted).
`
`
`
`As the district court explained, the FACC sought to resolve a “dispute
`
`[between Alexander and Clara over] the attribution of the authorship of certain
`
`musical compositions created as works-for-hire.” No construction of the Copyright
`
`Act is required to settle this claim. And, although in some cases “federal jurisdiction
`
`may be appropriate if resolution requires application of the work-for-hire doctrine
`
`of the Copyright Act,” JustMed, Inc. v. Byce, 600 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2010),
`
`this rule only applies when copyright ownership is at issue, or the application of the
`
`work-for-hire doctrine is “central” to the case, see id. at 1124-25. Here, copyright
`
`ownership is undisputedly and wholly assigned to FirstCom Music through the
`
`work-for-hire contracts. The FACC merely seeks the right of attribution under such
`
`contracts and a declaration that certain writer splits are accurate.
`
`Given that the FACC thus raised only a state-law claim, we next consider
`
`whether the district court should have retained supplemental jurisdiction over that
`
`claim after all federal law claims had been dismissed prior to trial. “[I]n the usual
`
`case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors
`
`to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy,
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`

`

`convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise
`
`[supplemental federal] jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-
`
`Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). On this record, we conclude
`
`that the district court abused its discretion in retaining jurisdiction over the FACC
`
`while dismissing Alexander’s closely related fraud claim. The fraud claim asserted
`
`that “[e]ach and every song listed in Appendix B [to the Complaint] was solely
`
`authored by Alexander Baker, or else authored in a percentage greater than as stated
`
`on the official registration,” and that Clara’s false representations caused each song
`
`to be registered with “unequal writer splits.” The FACC’s requested relief was “a
`
`declaration that the reported and/or registered writer splits for every composition and
`
`sound recording listed in Appendix B to the Complaint are true and correct.”
`
`Because those two claims are substantially intertwined, the district court’s decision
`
`to send one of these claims to state court while retaining and trying the other in
`
`federal court was an abuse of discretion. Moreover, there are no special
`
`considerations here that warrant any departure from the general rule that all state law
`
`claims should have been dismissed without prejudice to refiling them in state court.
`
`Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s declaratory judgment on the FACC and
`
`remand with instructions to dismiss the FACC without prejudice to refiling that
`
`claim in state court.
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`
`

`

`2. The Copyright Act provides that “the court in its discretion may allow the
`
`recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the United States” including
`
`“a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.” 17 U.S.C.
`
`§ 505. Prevailing party status turns on whether there has been a “material alteration
`
`of the legal relationship of the parties.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.
`
`Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001) (quotation marks
`
`omitted). The district court held that Clara was the prevailing party on Alexander’s
`
`copyright claim, finding the copyright claim objectively unreasonable because
`
`Alexander failed to comply with pre-filing registration requirements. It also found
`
`that Alexander pursued his copyright action in bad faith, evidenced by his pre-
`
`lawsuit conduct and conduct during litigation. Therefore, the district court did not
`
`abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees in favor of Clara for Alexander’s
`
`copyright infringement action.
`
`However, the fee award included fees incurred by Clara in pursuing the
`
`FACC. Because we conclude that the district court’s declaratory judgment on the
`
`FACC must be vacated on jurisdictional grounds, the district court should on remand
`
`recalculate the award without taking into account fees incurred in pursuing the
`
`FACC.
`
`AFFIRMED in part; VACATED in part; and REMANDED.
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`
`