`
`Miscellaneous Docket No. 22-164
`
`
`
`IN THE
`United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
`
`Petitioner.
`
`IN RE APPLE INC.,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the
`United States District Court for the
`Western District of Texas
`No. 6:21-cv-01071-ADA, Hon. Alan D Albright
`
`
`
`APPLE INC.’S EMERGENCY MOTION FOR A STAY OF
`PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT PENDING
`RESOLUTION OF APPLE’S MANDAMUS PETITION
`
`
`
`Melanie L. Bostwick
`Jonas Q. Wang
`ORRICK, HERRINGTON &
` SUTCLIFFE LLP
`1152 15th Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`(202) 339-8400
`
`
`
`Steven D. Moore
`KILPATRICK TOWNSEND &
` STOCKTON LLP
`Two Embarcadero Center
`Suite 1900
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`
`Mansi Shah
`KILPATRICK TOWNSEND &
` STOCKTON LLP
`1302 El Camino Real, Suite 175
`Menlo Park, CA 94025
`
`Alton L. Absher III
`KILPATRICK TOWNSEND &
` STOCKTON LLP
`1001 West Fourth Street
`Winston-Salem, NC 27101
`
`
`Counsel for Petitioner
`
`
`
`
`
`Case: 22-164 Document: 6 Page: 2 Filed: 09/12/2022
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................... ii
`LIST OF EXHIBITS ................................................................................. iv
`RULE 27(A)(2) STATEMENT ................................................................... v
`INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 1
`BACKGROUND ........................................................................................ 4
`Apple promptly moves to transfer this case pursuant to
`§ 1404(a), leading to venue discovery ..................................... 4
`The district court sua sponte orders the parties to complete
`fact discovery and “re-brief” Apple’s transfer motion
`before it will consider whether to transfer venue .................. 9
`Apple files a petition for writ of mandamus and moves in the
`district court to stay proceedings pending this Court’s
`decision on the mandamus petition ...................................... 11
`LEGAL STANDARD ............................................................................... 11
`ARGUMENT ........................................................................................... 12
`I.
`Apple’s Petition Makes A Compelling Case For
`Mandamus. ............................................................................ 13
`II. Absent A Stay, Apple Would Be Irreparably Harmed
`By Participating In Substantive Proceedings In Texas. ...... 16
`III. A Brief Stay Would Not Harm Scramoge. ............................ 18
`IV. The Public Interest Favors A Stay. ...................................... 19
`CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 20
`CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST
`EXHIBITS
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
`
`i
`
`
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`Case: 22-164 Document: 6 Page: 3 Filed: 09/12/2022
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller,
`510 U.S. 443 (1994) ............................................................................. 20
`In re Apple Inc.,
`979 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ....................................................... 1, 14
`Cont’l Grain Co. v. The Barge FBL-585,
`364 U.S. 19 (1960) ............................................................................... 14
`E-Watch, Inc. v. Lorex Can., Inc.,
`No. H-12-3314, 2013 WL 5425298 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2013) ........... 18
`In re EMC Corp.,
`501 F. App’x 973 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ....................................................... 14
`In re Google Inc.,
`No. 2015-138, 2015 WL 5294800 (Fed. Cir. July 16, 2015) ... 14, 16, 18
`Hilton v. Braunskill,
`481 U.S. 770 (1987) ................................................................. 12, 16, 18
`In re Horseshoe Ent.,
`337 F.3d 429 (5th Cir. 2003) ......................................................... 14, 16
`In re Lloyd’s Register N. Am., Inc.,
`780 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 2015) ............................................................... 17
`In re Morgan Stanley,
`417 F. App’x 947 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ....................................................... 19
`In re Nintendo Co.,
`544 F. App’x 934 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ....................................................... 14
`Nken v. Holder,
`556 U.S. 418 (2009) ........................................................... 12, 16, 18, 19
`
`ii
`
`
`
`Case: 22-164 Document: 6 Page: 4 Filed: 09/12/2022
`
`In re SK hynix Inc.,
`835 F. App’x 600 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ....................................... 2, 14, 17, 18
`Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc.,
`897 F.2d 511 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ....................................................... 12, 13
`In re TracFone Wireless, Inc.,
`848 F. App’x 899 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ................................. 2, 14, 16, 17, 18
`VirtualAgility Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc.,
`759 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ........................................................... 19
`In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc.,
`545 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008) ............................................................... 17
`Weingarten Realty Inv’rs v. Miller,
`661 F.3d 904 (5th Cir. 2011) ............................................................... 20
`In re WMS Gaming Inc.,
`564 F. App’x 579 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ....................................................... 19
`Statutes
`28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) .............................................................................. 5, 14
`Rules and Regulations
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) .............................................................................. 5
`Other Authorities
`Discovery and Scheduling Order, Aire Tech. Ltd. v. Apple,
`Inc., No. 6:21-cv-01101-ADA, Dkt. 54 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 22,
`2022) .................................................................................................... 11
`Discovery and Scheduling Order, XR Commc’ns v. Apple Inc.,
`No. 6:21-cv-00620-ADA, Dkt. 72-1 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 9,
`2022) .................................................................................................... 10
`Discovery and Scheduling Order, XR Commc’ns v. Asustek
`Comput. Inc., No. 6:21-cv-00622-ADA, Dkt. 55 (W.D. Tex.
`Aug. 25, 2022) ..................................................................................... 11
`
`iii
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`
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`Case: 22-164 Document: 6 Page: 5 Filed: 09/12/2022
`
`LIST OF EXHIBITS
`Exhibit 1: Petition for Writ of Mandamus, In re Apple Inc., No. 22-
`164, Dkt. 2-1 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 8, 2022)
`Exhibit 2: Discovery and Scheduling Order, Scramoge v. Apple Inc.,
`No. 6:21-cv-01071-ADA, Dkt. 56 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2022)
`Exhibit 3: Apple’s Opposed Motion to Stay Proceeding[s] Pending
`Mandamus Review, Scramoge v. Apple Inc., No. 6:21-cv-
`01071-ADA, Dkt. 58 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2022)
`Exhibit 4: Discovery and Scheduling Order, XR Commc’ns LLC v.
`Apple, Inc., No. 6:21-cv-00620-ADA, Dkt. 72-1 (W.D. Tex.
`Sept. 9, 2022)
`
`
`
`
`
`iv
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`Case: 22-164 Document: 6 Page: 6 Filed: 09/12/2022
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`RULE 27(A)(2) STATEMENT
`Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8 and Federal
`
`Circuit Rule 8, Apple states that it notified Scramoge of its intent to file
`
`this motion for a stay. Scramoge opposes the motion.
`
`
`
`v
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`
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`Case: 22-164 Document: 6 Page: 7 Filed: 09/12/2022
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`INTRODUCTION
`On September 8, 2022, Petitioner Apple Inc. filed a petition for
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`writ of mandamus asking this Court to: (1) vacate the district court’s
`
`order requiring the parties to complete fact discovery and other merits
`
`steps before the district court will rule on Apple’s fully briefed motion to
`
`transfer this case to the Northern District of California; (2) direct the
`
`district court to rule on Apple’s pending transfer motion; and (3) stay all
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`other district-court proceedings until the district court decides the
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`transfer motion. The same day, after receiving Scramoge’s indication
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`that it would oppose a stay, Apple also moved in the district court for a
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`temporary stay pending this Court’s review of the mandamus petition.
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`The district court has not acted on Apple’s request for a temporary
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`stay. Apple therefore respectfully requests that this Court stay the
`
`district-court proceedings until mandamus proceedings are resolved.
`
`Because the district court is moving “ahead on the merits in significant
`
`respects,” In re Apple Inc., 979 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020), it is no
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`longer practicable for Apple to await the district court’s ruling on its
`
`request for a temporary stay.
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`1
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`Case: 22-164 Document: 6 Page: 8 Filed: 09/12/2022
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`The governing four-factor standard overwhelmingly favors a stay
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`in this case. First, Apple respectfully submits that its petition makes a
`
`strong showing that mandamus relief is appropriate. The district court
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`clearly abused its discretion by ordering the parties to complete fact
`
`discovery and otherwise advance this case on the merits for an
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`additional eight months before it will resolve Apple’s promptly filed
`
`transfer motion. This Court has held that such delays in ruling on
`
`transfer motions merit mandamus relief because transfer motions must
`
`take priority on a district court’s docket. E.g., In re TracFone Wireless,
`
`Inc., 848 F. App’x 899, 901 (Fed. Cir. 2021); In re SK hynix Inc., 835 F.
`
`App’x 600, 600-01 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Indeed, that delay is particularly
`
`problematic here, since another case involving the same parties and
`
`similar accused features will continue proceeding in the Northern
`
`District of California while this case proceeds in parallel, at least for the
`
`time being, in Texas.
`
`Second, Apple will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay. If no
`
`stay is entered, the parties will continue proceeding through fact
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`discovery and other substantive aspects of this case. But if Apple is
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`right that mandamus is warranted, the district court will have
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`2
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`Case: 22-164 Document: 6 Page: 9 Filed: 09/12/2022
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`improperly proceeded to address the merits of the case—such as
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`hearing discovery disputes—in an inconvenient venue. This Court has
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`deemed that to be the kind of harm that warrants a stay.
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`Third, Scramoge would not suffer any prejudice from a stay. This
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`Court resolves mandamus proceedings quickly, so any delay would be
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`brief. And Scramoge is a non-practicing entity, so it can be made whole
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`for any delay with money damages if it eventually prevails here.
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`Moreover, there is no reason why a brief stay would delay the eventual
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`trial, which is not set to begin for more than a year.
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`Finally, the public interest favors a stay. Awaiting this Court’s
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`mandamus decision before proceeding would protect the strong local
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`interest held by the Northern District of California in this case. It
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`would also ensure that judicial resources are not wasted on a case that
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`likely will not go to trial in the Western District of Texas.
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`In sum, the governing factors all point in one direction: This
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`Court should stay the district-court proceedings so that no substantive
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`review takes place in the Western District of Texas until this Court
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`determines whether the district court must resolve Apple’s transfer
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`motion before the case moves forward on the merits.
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`3
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`Case: 22-164 Document: 6 Page: 10 Filed: 09/12/2022
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`BACKGROUND
`
`Apple promptly moves to transfer this case pursuant to § 1404(a),
`leading to venue discovery
`As explained more fully in Apple’s mandamus petition, Scramoge
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`is an Irish patent-holding company headquartered in Dublin. Pet. 5.
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`Scramoge has no ties to the Western District of Texas. Id.
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`Nonetheless, in June and October 2021, Scramoge filed two patent
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`lawsuits against Apple in the Waco Division of the Western District of
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`Texas. Id. In the first, Scramoge Technology Ltd. v. Apple Inc., No.
`
`6:21-cv-00579-ADA (W.D. Tex. June 7, 2021) (Scramoge I), Scramoge
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`accused various models of Apple’s iPhone and AirPods products of
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`infringing its patents covering aspects of wireless charging technology.
`
`Pet. 5. Because there was no meaningful connection to the Western
`
`District of Texas, Apple filed a motion to transfer on November 12,
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`2021. Pet. 5-6. The district court granted Apple’s motion on May 17,
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`2022, and transferred the case to the Northern District of California.
`
`Pet. 6.
`
`In the second suit—the case giving rise to Apple’s present
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`mandamus petition—Scramoge Technology Ltd. v. Apple Inc., No. 6:21-
`
`cv-01071-ADA (W.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2021) (Scramoge II), Scramoge
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`4
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`Case: 22-164 Document: 6 Page: 11 Filed: 09/12/2022
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`accused various models of Apple’s MagSafe Chargers and Apple Watch
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`products of infringing its patents by virtue of their wireless inductive
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`charging features. Pet. 6. As with Scramoge I, nothing about this
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`litigation has any meaningful connection to Texas, much less the Waco
`
`Division of the Western District of Texas. Pet. 6. Because this case has
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`no connection to Texas and because party and non-party witnesses,
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`documentation, and localized interests are concentrated in Northern
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`California, Apple promptly moved in May 2022 to transfer the case to
`
`the Northern District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Pet. 7.
`
`To support its transfer motion, Apple relied on the declaration of
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`Mark Rollins, a finance manager at Apple, to establish certain facts,
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`such as the relevance, role, and locations of witnesses and their teams
`
`and various categories of documents. Pet. 8. Mr. Rollins provided this
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`information on behalf of Apple as a corporation—akin to a Rule 30(b)(6)
`
`deponent. See Appx75.
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`In its opposition to Apple’s transfer motion, Scramoge made little
`
`attempt to show any connection to, or convenience in, the Texas forum
`
`it chose. Instead, Scramoge principally attacked the credibility of Apple
`
`and its corporate declarant, Mr. Rollins. Scramoge’s attacks relied
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`5
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`Case: 22-164 Document: 6 Page: 12 Filed: 09/12/2022
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`heavily on an order the same district court entered in Scramoge I just
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`days after Apple filed its transfer motion in this case. In the Scramoge
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`I order, the district court granted Apple’s motion to transfer to the
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`Northern District of California. Pet. 8. In doing so, the district court
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`sua sponte ruled on the “credibility” of Mr. Rollins, who had provided a
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`similar declaration this case. Pet. 9; Appx228; Appx230-236.
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`Apple has elsewhere demonstrated that the district court’s ruling
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`in Scramoge I identified no misstatements or other credibility
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`deficiencies in the testimony given by Mr. Rollins. See Pet. 9 (citing
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`Apple’s motion to seal portions of the Scramoge I transfer order,
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`Appx253-262, and to vacate portions of that order, Appx264-281).
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`Instead, the district court faulted Mr. Rollins for doing exactly what
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`corporate witnesses are obligated to do: gathering information from
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`individuals within Apple and relaying that information on behalf of the
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`company. Id.
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`Seeking to capitalize on the Scramoge I order, however, Scramoge
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`requested in its transfer opposition in this case that the district court
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`draw adverse inferences against Apple in light of Apple’s reliance on a
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`corporate declaration provided by Mr. Rollins. Id.; Appx92-100.
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`6
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`Case: 22-164 Document: 6 Page: 13 Filed: 09/12/2022
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`Scramoge also raised a number of new factual speculations regarding
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`the location of (i) potential third-party witnesses employed by Apple
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`suppliers Texas Instruments and STMicroelectronics and (ii) a handful
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`of Austin-based Apple employees that Scramoge asserted had relevant
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`knowledge. Pet. 9-10; Appx92; Appx95-100.
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`To rebut Scramoge’s misplaced reliance on the Scramoge I order
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`and to correct Scramoge’s newly raised factual assertions and
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`arguments, Apple acted promptly to investigate and obtain declarations
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`from Apple employees whom Scramoge put at issue in its opposition.
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`Pet. 10; Appx118-120; Appx124-126. Apple also provided declarations
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`from additional Apple employees whom Scramoge had first identified in
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`its transfer opposition, asserting that Apple had “inexplicably omit[ted]
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`mention of” them. Pet. 11; Appx98. But those employees, Apple
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`explained, “have no relevance to this case.” Pet. 11; Appx110-111. In
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`other words, each piece of Apple’s reply evidence directly responded to
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`an argument or factual assertion Scramoge put at issue in its
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`opposition. Because Scramoge introduced a number of arguments and
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`evidentiary issues in its opposition that it had not previously raised
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`7
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`Case: 22-164 Document: 6 Page: 14 Filed: 09/12/2022
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`during venue discovery, Apple could not have anticipated those issues
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`in its opening motion. See Pet. 11.
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`On August 17, 2022, Apple served these additional declarations on
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`Scramoge and filed them as exhibits to Apple’s reply brief in support of
`
`its transfer motion. Pet. 12; Appx113. Apple’s reply explained how the
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`declarations were directly responsive to arguments and assertions that
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`Scramoge had raised for the first time in its transfer opposition. Apple
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`further explained that, during the three months of venue discovery,
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`Scramoge had declined to take the deposition of Mr. Rollins or any
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`witness identified in his declaration. Pet. 12; Appx163.
`
`Scramoge responded to Apple’s transfer reply by insisting that
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`this “new” evidence was improper, and stating its intention to move to
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`strike under the view that it lacked an opportunity to respond to
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`Apple’s reply. Pet. 12; Appx134-135; Appx152. Apple demonstrated
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`how all of the evidence was proper rebuttal, but nonetheless offered
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`Scramoge the opportunity to file a sur-reply. Pet. 12; Appx164.
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`Instead of filing a sur-reply, Scramoge moved to strike what it
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`alleged to be improper evidence in Apple’s transfer reply brief. Pet. 13;
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`Appx130. But Scramoge did not identify a single piece of evidence
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`8
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`Case: 22-164 Document: 6 Page: 15 Filed: 09/12/2022
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`Apple provided in its reply that did not directly respond to an argument
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`Scramoge introduced for the first time in its opposition. Pet. 13;
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`Appx163; Appx108-109. And notably absent from Scramoge’s motion to
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`strike was any request for additional venue discovery, let alone any
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`delay in resolving transfer. See Pet. 13; Appx127-138.
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`In opposing Scramoge’s motion to strike, Apple again
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`demonstrated that the evidence Scramoge sought to strike responded
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`directly to arguments raised by Scramoge in its response. Pet. 13;
`
`Appx166.
`
`The district court sua sponte orders the parties to complete fact
`discovery and “re-brief” Apple’s transfer motion before it will
`consider whether to transfer venue
`On August 26, 2022, the district court granted in part Scramoge’s
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`motion to strike. Appx1-3. The district court ruled that, “in lieu of
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`striking” Apple’s evidence and argument, it would “give Scramoge” “an
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`opportunity to investigate and respond to the new facts and arguments”
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`in Apple’s reply. Appx1; Appx3. In doing so, however, the district court
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`also postponed ruling on Apple’s transfer motion—which at that point
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`was fully briefed—until after the completion of fact discovery on the
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`merits. The district court stated that “[f]ull fact discovery will allow the
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`9
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`Case: 22-164 Document: 6 Page: 16 Filed: 09/12/2022
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`parties to provide the Court with the best evidence for ruling on a
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`motion to transfer.” Appx2. Although neither party had asked for a
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`revised schedule, the district court sua sponte issued a new discovery
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`and scheduling order, which requires the parties to “re-brief the motion
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`to transfer … after the parties conduct fact discovery and determine
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`which witnesses and evidence they intend to call at trial.” Appx2.
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`The order provides for 30 weeks of fact discovery, to be followed by
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`six weeks of additional briefing on the transfer motion. Appx6-7. In
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`other words, the district court ordered the parties to engage in more
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`than eight months of fact discovery and briefing before it will even
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`consider whether to transfer venue. During this time, the parties also
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`will be required to take other substantive steps in the litigation, all
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`according to the district court’s particular rules and limitations (even if
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`those rules differ from the ones in force in the ultimate transferee
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`forum).
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`The district court has entered nearly identical orders in at least
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`three other patent-infringement cases (two against Apple) with pending
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`motions to transfer venue. See, e.g., XR Commc’ns LLC v. Apple, Inc.,
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`No. 6:21-cv-00620-ADA, Dkt. 72-1 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2022) (Exhibit 4);
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`10
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`Case: 22-164 Document: 6 Page: 17 Filed: 09/12/2022
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`XR Commc’ns v. Asustek Comput. Inc., No. 6:21-cv-00622-ADA, Dkt. 55
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`(W.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2022), Appx388-390; Aire Tech Ltd. v. Apple, Inc.,
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`No. 6:21-cv-01101-ADA, Dkt. 54 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2022), Appx282-
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`288. Each order requires the parties to complete fact discovery and
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`additional briefing, again over the course of many months, before the
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`district court will consider whether to transfer venue.
`
`Apple files a petition for writ of mandamus and moves in the
`district court to stay proceedings pending this Court’s decision
`on the mandamus petition
`On September 8, 2022, Apple filed a petition for a writ of
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`mandamus directing the district court to vacate its scheduling order
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`and stay all other proceedings until it rules on Apple’s transfer motion.
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`Dkt. 2. The same day, Apple asked the district court to temporarily
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`stay proceedings pending this Court’s resolution of the mandamus
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`petition. Dist. Ct. Dkt. 58. The district court has not acted on that
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`motion.
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`LEGAL STANDARD
`Four factors govern stay requests: “(1) whether the stay applicant
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`has made a strong showing that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits;
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`(2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay;
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`11
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`Case: 22-164 Document: 6 Page: 18 Filed: 09/12/2022
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`(3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other
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`parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest
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`lies.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 425-26 (2009) (quoting Hilton v.
`
`Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)); see Standard Havens Prods., Inc.
`
`v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 897 F.2d 511, 512 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (explaining
`
`that these four factors “always guide our discretion to issue a stay
`
`pending appeal”). As this Court has explained, “likelihood of success in
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`the appeal is not a rigid concept.” Standard Havens, 897 F.2d at 512. A
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`“substantial case” on the merits suffices where “the other factors
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`militate in [the] movant’s favor.” Id. at 513 (quoting Hilton, 481 U.S. at
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`778) (emphasis omitted).
`
`ARGUMENT
`The governing standard overwhelmingly favors a stay. Apple’s
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`petition makes a compelling showing that mandamus is appropriate
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`because the district court’s order is contrary to precedent from this
`
`Court and the Fifth Circuit. Absent a stay, Apple will suffer irreparable
`
`harm as the case proceeds on the merits, including with the progression
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`of fact discovery and other substantive steps in the litigation.
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`Scramoge, in contrast, will suffer no appreciable harm from a brief
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`12
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`Case: 22-164 Document: 6 Page: 19 Filed: 09/12/2022
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`delay. And finally, the public interest favors a stay, which would
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`protect local interests and judicial resources alike.
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`I.
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`Apple’s Petition Makes A Compelling Case For Mandamus.
`Apple respectfully suggests that it will likely prevail on the merits
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`of its mandamus petition, which asks this Court to address whether a
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`district court can, through a sua sponte scheduling order, decline to rule
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`on a transfer motion until after the parties complete full fact discovery
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`and otherwise move the litigation forward on the merits for nearly a
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`year. Pet. 3-4. That delay is particularly problematic here, since the
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`parties’ related litigation will continue proceeding in the Northern
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`District of California while this case proceeds in parallel, at least for the
`
`time being, in Texas. Pet. 4. Because the district court clearly abused
`
`its discretion by refusing to address Apple’s transfer motion until the
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`litigation has significantly progressed on the merits, Apple has, at the
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`very least, presented a “substantial case on the merits,” Standard
`
`Havens, 897 F.2d at 513 (emphasis omitted), warranting a brief stay
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`pending this Court’s resolution of Apple’s mandamus petition.
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`The district court’s scheduling order here is contrary to binding
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`precedent requiring courts to prioritize transfer motions. Because the
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`13
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`Case: 22-164 Document: 6 Page: 20 Filed: 09/12/2022
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`transfer statute is designed “to protect litigants, witnesses and the
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`public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense,” Cont’l Grain
`
`Co. v. The Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 27 (1960), this Court has
`
`stressed “the importance of addressing motions to transfer at the outset
`
`of litigation,” In re EMC Corp., 501 F. App’x 973, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2013);
`
`see also Apple, 979 F.3d at 1337-38; In re Nintendo Co., 544 F. App’x
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`934, 941 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
`
`The Fifth Circuit has likewise stated that transfer motions must
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`take “top priority” in litigation. In re Horseshoe Ent., 337 F.3d 429, 433
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`(5th Cir. 2003). When district courts fail to afford that priority to
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`transfer motions, this Court has used its mandamus authority to ensure
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`that those courts do not “frustrate 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)’s intent” by
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`forcing litigants “to expend resources litigating substantive matters in
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`an inconvenient venue while a motion to transfer lingers unnecessarily
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`on the docket.” In re Google Inc., No. 2015-138, 2015 WL 5294800, at *1
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`(Fed. Cir. July 16, 2015); see also SK hynix, 835 F. App’x at 600-
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`01; TracFone Wireless, 848 F. App’x at 901.
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` The district court’s scheduling order not only ensures that the
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`district court will oversee all of fact discovery, including resolving any
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`Case: 22-164 Document: 6 Page: 21 Filed: 09/12/2022
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`discovery disputes, but also requires the parties to complete multiple
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`other substantive steps in the Western District of Texas before the court
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`will consider whether this case should be transferred to the Northern
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`District of California. Claim construction briefing already has been
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`completed; the deadline to add parties will pass; the parties will serve
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`final infringement and invalidity contentions under the local patent
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`rules of the Texas forum; the deadline to amend pleadings will pass; the
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`parties will narrow the asserted claims and prior art (again, according
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`to the Texas court’s particular rules and limitations); the district court
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`will resolve any dispute over that narrowing; and the parties will
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`exchange preliminary exhibit and witness lists for trial. See Appx4-5.
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`All of this will take place before the parties are even permitted to
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`resume briefing on Apple’s transfer motion. In short, the district court’s
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`order guarantees that the parties will expend significant resources and
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`the case will substantially progress on the merits, all in a forum that
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`ultimately should not preside over the case.
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`The district court’s clear abuse of discretion compels mandamus
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`review by this Court. At a minimum, it presents a substantial case on
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`Case: 22-164 Document: 6 Page: 22 Filed: 09/12/2022
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`the merits warranting a brief stay while this Court considers Apple’s
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`petition.
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`II. Absent A Stay, Apple Would Be Irreparably Harmed By
`Participating In Substantive Proceedings In Texas.
`Apple will be “irreparably injured absent a stay.” Nken, 556 U.S.
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`at 426 (quoting Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776). Without a stay, the district
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`court will proceed to substantive review of this case imminently, with
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`claim-construction briefing completed, fact discovery underway, and
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`discovery disputes likely to ripen in the near future. Pet. 19-22; Appx4-
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`6; Appx284-288. But if Apple prevails on its mandamus petition, and
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`the district court is required to consider Apple’s transfer motion before
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`proceeding further on the merits, it will have erred by taking such
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`substantive steps in the interim.
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`As this Court has explained, allowing a transfer motion to go
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`unconsidered while a court “press[es] forward with discovery and claim
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`construction issues” can “forc[e] defendants” to spend time and
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`resources litigating the merits of a case “in an inconvenient venue.”
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`TracFone Wireless, 848 F. App’x at 900 (quoting Google, 2015 WL
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`5294800, at *1). That is why the Fifth Circuit requires district courts to
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`give transfer motions “top priority.” Horseshoe Ent., 337 F.3d at 433.
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`Case: 22-164 Document: 6 Page: 23 Filed: 09/12/2022
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`Allowing this case to march on toward trial in the Western District of
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`Texas risks creating major “inconvenience to witnesses, parties and
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`other[s],” which is “the very harm sought to be avoided by transferring
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`venue.” In re Lloyd’s Register N. Am., Inc., 780 F.3d 283, 289 (5th Cir.
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`2015) (quoting In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 319 (5th Cir.
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`2008) (en banc)). Indeed, witness convenience in the Northern District
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`of California is further underscored by the overlap of relevant witnesses
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`between this case and Scramoge I, which has been proceeding in the
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`California forum since it was transferred there in May. Appx210-211;
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`Appx77-78.
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`These harms could not be remedied after the fact. Once the
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`district court proceeds to substantive review of this case, the “prejudice
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`suffered cannot be put back into the bottle.” Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at
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`319. The threat of those harms confirms that a stay is warranted. See
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`TracFone Wireless, 848 F. App’x at 901 (granting mandamus and
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`ordering district court to stay all proceedings until ruling on transfer
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`motion); SK hynix, 835 F. App’x at 601 (partially granting mandamus
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`relief, including a stay of “all proceedings concerning … substantive
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`issues” until the resolution of a transfer motion, as the petitioner had
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`Case: 22-164 Document: 6 Page: 24 Filed: 09/12/2022
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`“no alternative means by which to obtain” such relief); Google, 2015 WL
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`5294800, at *2 (granting mandamus and ordering the district court to
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`decide the transfer motion within 30 days while staying all other
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`proceedings).
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`III. A Brief Stay Would Not Harm Scramoge.
`On the other hand, a stay pending resolution of Apple’s
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`mandamus petition would not “substantially injure” Scramoge. Nken,
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`556 U.S. at 426 (quoting Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776). Indeed, without a
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`stay, Scramoge (like Apple) would be required to expend time and
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`resources litigating in a forum that likely will not try this case. And
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`“delay alone does not constitute prejudice sufficient to deny a request
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`for [a] stay.” E-Watch, Inc. v. Lorex Can., Inc., No. H-12-3314, 2013 WL
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`5425298, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2013). In any event, any delay
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`caused by a stay will likely be brief. Apple filed its mandamus petition
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`quickly (less than two weeks after the district court’s scheduling order),
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`and this Court resolves mandamus petitions in an expedited manner.
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`See, e.g., TracFone Wireless, 848 F. App’x at 900; SK hynix, 835 F. App’x
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`at 600 (Fed. Cir. 2021). And the trial in this matter is not scheduled to
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`Case: 22-164 Document: 6 Page: 25 Filed: 09/12/2022
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`take place until late October 2023, so there is no apparent reason why a
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`short stay would delay that date. Appx288.
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`Moreover, any momentary disadvantage to Scramoge from
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`granting a short stay—unlike the harm to Apple from denying it—
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`would be fully redressable. Because Scramoge does not practice the
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`asserted patents, it can be compensated for any delay with money
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`damages should it prevail in this lawsuit. See In re Morgan Stanley,
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`417 F. App’x 947, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining that “the prospective
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`speed with which this case might be brought to trial” is not “of
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`particular significance” where plaintiff does not make or sell any
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`product); In re WMS Gaming Inc., 564 F. App’x 579, 581 (Fed. Cir.
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`2014) (same). As this Court has explained, a stay should not be denied
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`merely because it “delays realization of … damages” without
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`“diminish[ing]” the