`
`No. 22-162
`
`IN THE
`United States Court of Appeals
`FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`
`IN RE: APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`On Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to the United States District Court
`for the Western District of Texas, No. 6:21-cv-01101-ADA
`
`
`
`AIRE TECHNOLOGY LIMITED RESPONSE TO APPLE’S
`PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
`
`
`
`Brett Cooper
` Counsel of Record
`Jonathan Yim
`BC LAW GROUP, P.C.
`200 Madison Avenue, 24th Floor
`New York, NY 10016
`Telephone: (516) 359-9668
`bcooper@b-clg.com
`
`Counsel for Respondent Aire Technology Limited
`
`
`
`Case: 22-162 Document: 9 Page: 2 Filed: 09/09/2022
`
`FORM 9. Certificate of Interest
`
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`
`CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST
`
`
`Form 9 (p. 1)
`July 2020
`
`
`Case Number
`Short Case Caption
`Filing Party/Entity
`
`
`
`
`
`Instructions: Complete each section of the form. In answering items 2 and 3, be
`specific as to which represented entities the answers apply; lack of specificity may
`result in non-compliance. Please enter only one item per box; attach
`additional pages as needed and check the relevant box. Counsel must
`immediately file an amended Certificate of Interest if information changes. Fed.
`Cir. R. 47.4(b).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`I certify the following information and any attached sheets are accurate and
`complete to the best of my knowledge.
`
`
`Date: _________________
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Signature:
`
`Name:
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`22-162
`
`In re Apple Inc.
`
`Aire Technology Limited
`
`Brett Cooper
`
`/s/ Brett Cooper
`
`09/09/2022
`
`
`
`Case: 22-162 Document: 9 Page: 3 Filed: 09/09/2022
`
`FORM 9. Certificate of Interest
`
`1. Represented
`Entities.
`Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(1).
`Provide the full names of
`all entities represented
`by undersigned counsel in
`this case.
`
`Form 9 (p. 2)
`July 2020
`
`2. Real Party in
`Interest.
`Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(2).
`Provide the full names of
`all real parties in interest
`for the entities. Do not
`list the real parties if
`they are the same as the
`entities.
`
`3. Parent Corporations
`and Stockholders.
`Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(3).
`Provide the full names of
`all parent corporations
`for the entities and all
`publicly held companies
`that own 10% or more
`stock in the entities.
`
`☐ None/Not Applicable ☐ None/Not Applicable
`
`Additional pages attached
`
`4
`
`4
`
`Aire Technology Limited
`
`
`
`Case: 22-162 Document: 9 Page: 4 Filed: 09/09/2022
`
`FORM 9. Certificate of Interest
`
`Form 9 (p. 3)
`July 2020
`
`4. Legal Representatives. List all law firms, partners, and associates that (a)
`appeared for the entities in the originating court or agency or (b) are expected to
`appear in this court for the entities. Do not include those who have already
`entered an appearance in this court. Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(4).
`None/Not Applicable
`Additional pages attached
`
`5. Related Cases. Provide the case titles and numbers of any case known to be
`pending in this court or any other court or agency that will directly affect or be
`directly affected by this court’s decision in the pending appeal. Do not include the
`originating case number(s) for this case. Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(5). See also Fed. Cir.
`R. 47.5(b).
`None/Not Applicable
`
`Additional pages attached
`
`6. Organizational Victims and Bankruptcy Cases. Provide any information
`required under Fed. R. App. P. 26.1(b) (organizational victims in criminal cases)
`and 26.1(c) (bankruptcy case debtors and trustees). Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(6).
`None/Not Applicable
`Additional pages attached
`
`Seth Hasenour
`
`Drew Hollander
`
`4
`
`4
`
`
`
`Case: 22-162 Document: 9 Page: 5 Filed: 09/09/2022
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION …………………………………………………………………1
`
`REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ……………………………………3
`
`
`I.
`
`The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Granting
`Apple’s Motion to Supplement ………………………………………….4
`
`II. Apple Can Seek Alternate Relief that It Has Yet to Request ……………8
`
`III. Under No Circumstances Is a Stay Warranted ……………………...….10
`
`
`CONCLUSION ………………………………………………………………..…11
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`
`
`Case: 22-162 Document: 9 Page: 6 Filed: 09/09/2022
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Cases
`Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. Of Columbia,
`542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) ...................................................................................... 3
`CPC Pat. Techs. Pty Ltd. v. Apple Inc.,
`No. 6:21-cv-00165, Dkt. No. 82 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2022) .................................. 6
`
`GUI Global Prods., Ltd. v. Apple Inc.,
`No. 4:20-cv-02652, Dkt. No. 40 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2020). ................................ 6
`GUI Glob. Prod., Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`No. 4:20-CV-2624, 2021 WL 3705005 (S.D. Tex. May 28, 2021) ..................... 6
`In re Apple Inc., 979 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ........................................... 5
`In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .................................. 3
`In re Google Inc., No. 2015-138, 2015 WL 5294800 (Fed. Cir. July 16, 2015) ...... 8
`In re Hewlett Packard Enter. Co.,
`No. 2022-154, 2022 WL 3209326, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 9, 2022) ....................... 7
`In re HTC Corp., 889 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ......................................... 3
`In re Superior Crewboats, Inc., 374 F.3d 330, 334 (5th Cir. 2004) ....................... 11
`In re Vistaprint Ltd., 628 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .................................... 3
`In re Volkswagen of Am. Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 319 (5th Cir. 2008) ........................... 8
`
`In re Volkswagen of Am. Inc., 566 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ...................... 3
`Scramoge Tech. Ltd. v. Apple Inc.,
` No. 6:21-cv-00579 WL 1667561 (W.D. Tex. May 25, 2022) ....................... 5,6,7
`Scramoge Tech. Ltd. v. Apple Inc.,
` No. 3:22-cv-03041, Dkt. No. 113 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2022) ............................... 7
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`
`
`Case: 22-162 Document: 9 Page: 7 Filed: 09/09/2022
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`The petition concerns no garden-variety transfer situation; rather, this is an
`
`unusual request stemming wholly from Apple’s failure to submit all of its supporting
`
`evidence when filing its transfer motion. Apple added seven employee declarations
`
`to bolster its transfer motion just as venue discovery was closing, more than two
`
`months after filing its transfer motion. The District Court could have simply rejected
`
`this new evidence as untimely, and Apple would have had no room to complain.
`
`Instead, the District Court gave Apple everything it wanted: relying on Apple’s
`
`representation that it would not oppose a continuance, it accepted the seven late
`
`declarations and ordered the parties to submit a new schedule to resolve the transfer
`
`motion. Notably, the District Court’s order specifically defers the Markman hearing
`
`until after resolution of the transfer motion.
`
`This was a proper exercise of the District Court’s discretion to accept untimely
`
`evidence and manage its docket, and follows all applicable precedent from this Court
`
`and the Fifth Circuit. What is improper is Apple’s attempt to delay this case on
`
`account of its own negligence. Aire seeks prompt resolution of Apple’s transfer
`
`motion and opposed Apple’s request to supplement with the seven declarations
`
`precisely because it would invite delay. Aire’s investigation has already revealed
`
`strong witness and evidentiary contacts with the Western District of Texas, and Aire
`
`
`
`1
`
`
`
`Case: 22-162 Document: 9 Page: 8 Filed: 09/09/2022
`
`is prepared to stand on its existing transfer briefing.1 Aire therefore consents to
`
`resolving Apple’s transfer motion at any time, provided that no stay interfere with
`
`discovery, Markman proceedings, or the preparation of this case for trial.
`
`This is not an extraordinary situation that requires the extraordinary remedy
`
`of mandamus. This is an ordinary docket management issue that Apple precipitated,
`
`not Aire or the District Court. Apple prevailed on its motion to supplement with its
`
`new declarations, but Apple never made a request to Aire or the District Court to
`
`adjust the relief it was granted—had it done so, Aire would not have opposed a
`
`prompt transfer ruling. This availability of alternate relief precludes mandamus.
`
`Moreover, mandamus is inappropriate because Apple has only itself to blame for its
`
`decision to initially source all Apple transfer evidence to just one person, whose
`
`declaration revealed serious vulnerabilities in Apple’s arguments. Apple’s later
`
`realization of this strategic blunder and belated attempt to fix it is not the type of
`
`mandamus case that warrants this Court’s attention.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1 Apple’s assertion that “this case lacks any connection to the Western District
`of Texas” ignores Aire’s showing of relevant witnesses and evidence in the district.
`Pet. at 6. Although Apple acknowledges that Aire accuses Apple of “infringing its
`patents by virtue of their Apple Pay contactless payment features,” Apple failed to
`identify its many Apple Pay employees in Austin, Texas. Pet. at 5. Aire’s
`investigation revealed more than two dozen Apple Pay employees in Austin with
`relevant knowledge. Appx216-219.
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`Case: 22-162 Document: 9 Page: 9 Filed: 09/09/2022
`
`REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
`
`Apple bears a heavy burden to prevail on its petition. A writ of mandamus is
`
`“a drastic and extraordinary remedy reserved for really extraordinary causes.”
`
`Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. Of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (internal
`
`quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court holds that “[t]he writ of
`
`mandamus is available in extraordinary situations to correct a clear abuse of
`
`discretion or usurpation of judicial power.” In re Volkswagen of Am. Inc., 566 F.3d
`
`1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
`
`A writ of mandamus may issue only if the petitioner satisfies three
`
`requirements: (1) the petitioner must have no other adequate means to attain the
`
`relief desired; (2) the petitioner must show that the “right to issuance of the writ” is
`
`“clear and indisputable”; and (3) the petitioner must show that the writ is
`
`“appropriate under the circumstances.” In re HTC Corp., 889 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2018). The petition should be denied “[i]f the facts and circumstances are
`
`rationally capable of providing reasons for what the district court has done.” In re
`
`Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); In re
`
`Vistaprint Ltd., 628 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that mandamus is
`
`inappropriate where there is “plausible support of record” for the district court’s
`
`decision).
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`Case: 22-162 Document: 9 Page: 10 Filed: 09/09/2022
`
`Apple fails to meet these stringent requirements. This is an unusual case that
`
`does not hew closely to precedent—seldom does the prevailing party in district court
`
`enlist the help of this Court to undo what it has won. In this situation without clear
`
`analogy, it cannot be said that the District Court committed an abuse of discretion,
`
`much less a clear abuse as required by the mandamus standard. The petition should
`
`additionally be denied because Aire consents to the determination of the transfer
`
`motion now. Finally, although Apple requests a stay pending resolution of the
`
`transfer motion, the petition fails to explain why a stay would be warranted. The
`
`petition should be denied.
`
`I.
`
`The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Granting
`Apple’s Motion to Supplement
`
`Apple fails to show how the District Court committed an abuse of discretion
`
`when it ruled in Apple’s favor and granted leave to submit untimely transfer
`
`evidence. Specifically, Apple now complains about the delay that Apple injected
`
`into the transfer briefing process at the very end of venue discovery. This Court
`
`should not allow Apple to pass that blame onto the District Court, which has
`
`established procedures to dispose of transfer motions in a timely, orderly fashion.
`
`Apple is solely responsible for the delay, and it was not an abuse of discretion for
`
`the District Court to attempt to accommodate Apple’s delay.
`
`The District Court has a standing order that specifically prioritizes transfer
`
`decisions before Markman proceedings, so as to avoid the very timing issues
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`Case: 22-162 Document: 9 Page: 11 Filed: 09/09/2022
`
`previously addressed by this Court. Appx162-163; see In re Apple Inc., 979 F.3d
`
`1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (holding that deciding a transfer motion “should take
`
`‘top priority,’ in advance of “a Markman hearing and claim construction order[,
`
`which] are two of the most important and time-intensive substantive tasks a district
`
`court undertakes in a patent case”). The standing order also limits venue discovery
`
`to no later than ten weeks after the filing of a transfer motion, after which the non-
`
`movant is required to file a transfer response within two weeks. Appx162.
`
`Venue issues in this case were on track to be promptly resolved until Apple
`
`decided to supplement its transfer motion with the seven new declarations, to back
`
`up the statements in the sole Apple employee declaration submitted in support
`
`thereof—the declaration of Mr. Rollins. Appx176. Apple’s justification for this was
`
`that, about one month after filing its transfer motion in this case, an order in
`
`Scramoge Technology Ltd. v. Apple Inc., No. 6:21-cv-00579 (W.D. Tex. May 25,
`
`2022), “criticized statements Mr. Rollins had made in other cases.” Pet. at 8. Apple
`
`represents to this Court that prior to the May 25, 2022 Scramoge order criticizing
`
`Mr. Rollins, “Apple had no reason to know that the district court would take issue
`
`with this manner of presenting corporate information in support of a transfer
`
`motion.” Pet. at 8-9.
`
`That representation is factually incorrect. Several court opinions had already
`
`criticized Mr. Rollins for his vague, unsupported declarations in advance of the May
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`
`Case: 22-162 Document: 9 Page: 12 Filed: 09/09/2022
`
`25, 2022 Scramoge order and Apple’s April 14, 2022 transfer motion in this case.
`
`See, e.g., Scramoge Tech. Ltd. v. Apple Inc., No. 6:21-CV-00579-ADA, 2022 WL
`
`1667561, at *4 n.3 (W.D. Tex. May 25, 2022) (“this Court noticed Mr. Rollins’s
`
`offenses across many cases and has long treated Mr. Rollins with skepticism,
`
`especially given Apple’s history of avoiding discovery obligations”); CPC Pat.
`
`Techs. Pty Ltd. v. Apple Inc., No. 6:21-cv-00165, Dkt. No. 82, at 7 (W.D. Tex. Feb.
`
`8, 2022) (finding “that no relevant physical evidence exists” given that “Mr. Rollins
`
`does not provide the basis of his understanding, explain the process he used to search
`
`for physical documents, or identify a relevant business practice of keeping physical
`
`documents for the accused products”); GUI Glob. Prod., Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`
`No. 4:20-CV-2624, 2021 WL 3705005, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 28, 2021) (holding
`
`that, “[b]ased on Rollins’ vague assertions as to the actual location of Defendant’s
`
`physical sources of proof, the Court is unable to determine that such evidence
`
`supports transfer to the Northern District of California,” and “Rollins’ declaration
`
`merely relies on assertions from third-party individuals who themselves have not
`
`submitted sworn testimony to this Court.”).2
`
`
`2 This opinion erroneously identified Mr. Rollins’s first name as “Michael.” Apple’s
`motion to transfer that case relies on the “Declaration of Mark Rollins.” GUI Global
`Prods., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., No. 4:20-cv-02652, Dkt. No. 40, at 4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 3,
`2020).
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`
`Case: 22-162 Document: 9 Page: 13 Filed: 09/09/2022
`
`Nor was the District Court incorrect in finding that “Mr. Rollins routinely
`
`offers information about topics a financial manager would typically not know.”
`
`Scramoge, 2022 WL 1667561, at *3 (“The Rollins Declaration purports to state the
`
`locations of technical and marketing data stored typically known only to respective
`
`custodians of those documents, such as engineers and marketing personnel.”). After
`
`Apple succeeded in transferring Scramoge to the Northern District of California,
`
`Apple moved to vacate the District Court’s findings as to Mr. Rollins on the basis
`
`that its “credibility determination is baseless and contravenes basic corporate
`
`representative practices.” Appx384. The motion was denied. Scramoge Tech. Ltd.
`
`v. Apple Inc., No. 3:22-cv-03041, Dkt. No. 113 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2022). Requiring
`
`that evidentiary assertions in transfer motions be supported by declarants with
`
`personal knowledge is a common requirement that should not have caught Apple by
`
`surprise. See In re Hewlett Packard Enter. Co., No. 2022-154, 2022 WL 3209326,
`
`at *2 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 9, 2022) (faulting the movant-petitioner for relying on a
`
`declaration stating that “technical documents were located ‘primarily with the
`
`persons that design, develop, and test it,’” instead of “declarations from any
`
`employee confirming possession of such technical documents”).
`
`Apple was aware of the problems with relying so heavily on Mr. Rollins and
`
`should have sourced its transfer evidence in a more reliable and timely fashion.
`
`Because Apple cannot argue that it was caught off guard by the Scramoge ruling on
`
`
`
`7
`
`
`
`Case: 22-162 Document: 9 Page: 14 Filed: 09/09/2022
`
`Mr. Rollins, Apple attempts to rely on In re Google Inc., No. 2015-138, 2015 WL
`
`5294800 (Fed. Cir. July 16, 2015), in support of its argument that “a defendant’s
`
`motion to supplement the transfer record” cannot justify what the District Court did
`
`here. Pet. at 23. But Apple’s petition omits a key fact from the holding: Google did
`
`not want any further delay as a result of its supplementation request. Google, 2015
`
`WL 5294800, at *1 (“Google expressly asked the district court to deny the request
`
`if it meant further delay on the transfer motion”). This case thus cuts against Apple’s
`
`argument because Apple’s motion to supplement not only failed to make the same
`
`request as in Google, but it expressly assured the District Court that a resulting
`
`“continuance would not affect the overall trajectory of this case,” which the District
`
`Court relied on. Appx181; Appx2. Apple cannot have it both ways.3
`
`II. Apple Can Seek Alternate Relief that It Has Yet to Request
`
`In the typical transfer petition heard by this Court, the movant has failed to
`
`convince the non-movant and the district court that another venue is clearly more
`
`convenient. Faced with such combined opposition, there is no alternate relief for the
`
`movant, who must seek mandamus review from this Court to avoid “the harm—
`
`inconvenience to witnesses, parties and other—[that] will already have been done
`
`
`3 Because the District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting Apple’s
`motion and allowing both parties to supplement the transfer record, Aire need not
`address Apple’s second criticism of the District Court’s opinion that “speculation
`and incomplete[] discovery often plagues early transfer motions.” Pet. at 24.
`
`
`
`8
`
`
`
`Case: 22-162 Document: 9 Page: 15 Filed: 09/09/2022
`
`by the time the case is tried and appealed.” In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d
`
`304, 319 (5th Cir. 2008).
`
`This is not that typical transfer petition. Apple raced to file its petition without
`
`inquiring as to Aire’s position on the transfer briefing schedule. Had Apple done so,
`
`Aire would have agreed that the transfer motion should have been promptly decided
`
`in advance of the then-scheduled September 1, 2022 Markman hearing, as
`
`contemplated by the District Court’s standing order. Appx163. Apple knows this—
`
`Aire’s opposition to Apple’s supplemental transfer declarations was based in part on
`
`“the need for the Court to decide transfer issues in advance of the Markman hearing.”
`
`Appx198. Aire also argued “A Continuance Would Not Be Feasible” in view of the
`
`District Court’s standing order providing that the “Court will not conduct a Markman
`
`hearing until it has resolved the pending motion to transfer”; it was Aire’s adamant
`
`desire to avoid “yet another extension of the Markman hearing” because of
`
`unresolved transfer issues. Appx206.
`
`Aire’s non-opposition to the District Court’s prompt ruling on the transfer
`
`motion provides Apple an alternate path for relief. Apple similarly admits that it
`
`could “withdraw its requested supplement” to avoid further delay. Pet. at 24 n.4.
`
`This possibility of relief alone precludes the issuance of the writ of mandamus as
`
`sought by the petition.
`
`
`
`
`
`9
`
`
`
`Case: 22-162 Document: 9 Page: 16 Filed: 09/09/2022
`
`III. Under No Circumstances Is a Stay Warranted
`
`Apple seeks “a writ of mandamus directing the district court to [1] vacate its
`
`scheduling order, [2] promptly rule on Apple’s pending transfer motion, and [3] stay
`
`all district court proceedings on the merits until the transfer has been resolved.” Pet.
`
`at 4. As discussed above, given that Aire also desires a prompt ruling on the transfer
`
`motion, Apple’s first two requests are not ripe for mandamus adjudication. Aire,
`
`however, opposes Apple’s request for a stay.
`
`No stay is warranted here because promptly resolving the transfer motion will
`
`alleviate any concerns of delay. Nor would a stay be warranted under the District
`
`Court’s existing order deferring resolution of the transfer motion. Although the
`
`petition specifically requests a stay, it does not even attempt to substantively argue
`
`that a stay is appropriate, and it should be denied. Pet. at 4.4 Apple only briefly lists
`
`common “steps” in patent litigation that would have to be completed in either the
`
`putative transferor or transferee venue. Pet. at 20-21.
`
`None of the steps identified by Apple implicate the convenience for Apple or
`
`its witnesses; nor do the steps implicate any decisions on the merits of the case.
`
`Claim construction briefing was completed on July 28, 2022, and there are no claim
`
`construction-related steps that will occur before the district court rules on the transfer
`
`
`4 Apple has filed a separate motion with this Court seeking a stay pending resolution
`of its mandamus petition. Dkt. No. 6. Aire will further explain why a stay is not
`warranted according to the Court’s order on that motion. Dkt. No. 8.
`
`
`
`10
`
`
`
`Case: 22-162 Document: 9 Page: 17 Filed: 09/09/2022
`
`motion, given that the district court postponed the Markman hearing until after it
`
`rules on Apple’s transfer motion. Nor do any of the other steps identified by Apple
`
`implicate any decisions by the district court on the merits of the case. Rather, each
`
`of the steps involves typical deadlines in patent cases that would take place
`
`regardless of the venue. Moreover, these steps do not implicate Apple’s witnesses
`
`or inconvenience Apple with any travel.
`
`Finally, as noted above, Apple’s motion to supplement, which precipitated the
`
`delay Apple now complains of, assured the District Court that “fact discovery will
`
`commence on July 18 regardless of whether a continuance is or is not granted.”
`
`Appx181. Apple argued this to the District Court in the hopes of securing leave for
`
`its seven supplemental declarations. Now having achieved that goal, Apple is
`
`judicially estopped from arguing the contrary to put fact discovery on hold. See In
`
`re Superior Crewboats, Inc., 374 F.3d 330, 334 (5th Cir. 2004).
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`The Court should deny the petition.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`11
`
`
`
`Case: 22-162 Document: 9 Page: 18 Filed: 09/09/2022
`
`Dated: September 9, 2022
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/s/Brett Cooper
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Brett E. Cooper
`bcooper@b-clg.com
`Jonathan Yim
`jyim@b-clg.com
`BC LAW GROUP, P.C.
`200 Madison Avenue, 24th Floor
`New York, NY 10016
`Phone: (516) 359-9968
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff Aire
`Technology Limited
`
`
`
`
`
`12
`
`
`
`Case: 22-162 Document: 9 Page: 19 Filed: 09/09/2022
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I certify that today, September 9, 2022, I electronically filed the foregoing
`
`document with the Clerk of the Court for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
`
`Circuit using the appellate CM/ECF system.
`
`I certify that today, September 9, 2022, I caused a copy of the foregoing to
`
`be served upon the district court via UPS:
`
`Hon. Alan D Albright
`United States District Court for the Western District of Texas
`800 Franklin Avenue, Room 301,
`Waco, Texas 76701
`Telephone: (254) 750-1501
`
`/s/Brett Cooper
`Brett E. Cooper
`Counsel for Aire Technology Limited
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case: 22-162 Document: 9 Page: 20 Filed: 09/09/2022
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
`
`This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P.
`
`21(d)(1) because this brief contains 2,623 words, excluding the parts of the brief
`
`exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(f).
`
`This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5)
`
`and the type-style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because this brief has
`
`been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in Times
`
`New Roman 14-point font.
`
`
`
`
`
`/s/Brett Cooper
`Brett E. Cooper
`Counsel for Aire Technology Limited
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`