`(Slip Opinion)
`
`
`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2019
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
`
`
`
`
`
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
` RITZEN GROUP, INC. v. JACKSON MASONRY, LLC
`
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
` No. 18–938. Argued November 13, 2019—Decided January 14, 2020
`
`An appeal of right lies from “final judgments, orders, and decrees” en-
`
`
`tered by bankruptcy courts “in cases and proceedings.” 28 U. S. C.
`§158(a). Bankruptcy court orders are considered final and immedi-
`ately appealable if they “dispose of discrete disputes within the larger
`
`
`[bankruptcy] case.” Bullard v. Blue Hills, 575 U. S. 496, 501.
`
`
`Ritzen Group, Inc. (Ritzen) sued Jackson Masonry, LLC (Jackson)
`
`in Tennessee state court for breach of a land-sale contract. Jackson
`
`filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The
`state-court litigation was put on hold by operation of 11 U. S. C.
`
`
`§362(a), which provides that filing a bankruptcy petition automatically
`
`
`“operates as a stay” of creditors’ debt-collection efforts outside the um-
`brella of the bankruptcy case. The Bankruptcy Court denied Ritzen’s
`motion for relief from the automatic stay filed pursuant to §362(d).
`
`Ritzen did not appeal that disposition. Instead, its next step was to
`
`file a proof of claim against the bankruptcy estate. The Bankruptcy
`
`Court subsequently disallowed Ritzen’s claim and confirmed Jackson’s
`plan of reorganization. Ritzen then filed a notice of appeal in the Dis-
`trict Court, challenging the Bankruptcy Court’s order denying relief
`
`
`from the automatic stay. The District Court rejected Ritzen’s appeal
`as untimely under 28 U. S. C. §158(c)(2) and Federal Rule of Bank-
`ruptcy Procedure 8002(a), which require appeals from a bankruptcy
`
`court order to be filed “within 14 days after entry of [that] order.” The
`Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the order denying Ritzen’s mo-
`
`tion to lift the stay was final under §158(a), and that the 14-day appeal
`
`clock therefore ran from entry of that order.
`
`Held: A bankruptcy court’s order unreservedly denying relief from the
`automatic stay constitutes a final, immediately appealable order un-
`
`der §158(a). Pp. 6–12.
`
`
`
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`
`
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`
`
`
`
`2
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`RITZEN GROUP, INC. v. JACKSON MASONRY, LLC
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`
` (a) This Court’s application of §158(a)’s finality requirement is
`
` guided by the opinion in Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U. S. 496.
`
` Addressing repayment plan confirmations under Chapter 13, the
`
` Court held in Bullard that a bankruptcy court’s order rejecting a pro-
`
`posed plan was not final because it did not conclusively resolve the
`relevant “proceeding.” Rather, the proceeding would continue until
`
` approval of a plan. Id., at 502. P. 6.
`(b) In applying Bullard’s analysis here, the key inquiry is “how to
`
`define the immediately appealable ‘proceeding’ in the context of [stay-
`
` relief motions].” 575 U. S., at 502. Adjudication of a creditor’s motion
`
` for relief from the stay is properly considered a discrete “proceeding.”
`
`A bankruptcy court’s order ruling on a stay-relief motion disposes of a
`procedural unit anterior to, and separate from, claim-resolution pro-
`
`ceedings. It occurs before and apart from proceedings on the merits of
`
`creditors’ claims. And its resolution forms no part of the adversary
`claims-adjudication process, proceedings typically governed by state
`
`substantive law. Relief from bankruptcy’s automatic stay thus pre-
`
`sents a discrete dispute qualifying as an independent “proceeding”
`within the meaning of §158(a). Bullard, 575 U. S., at 502–505. Pp. 6–
`8.
`
`
`(c) Ritzen incorrectly characterizes denial of stay relief as determin-
`ing nothing more than the forum for claim adjudication and thus a
`
`preliminary step in the claims-adjudication process. Resolution of a
`stay-relief motion can have large practical consequences, however, in-
`
`cluding whether a creditor can isolate its claim from those of other
`creditors and go it alone outside bankruptcy or the manner in which
`adversary claims will be adjudicated. Moreover, bankruptcy’s auto-
`
`matic stay stops even nonjudicial efforts to obtain or control the
`debtor’s assets, matters that often do not concern the forum for, and
`
`
`cannot be considered part of, any subsequent claim adjudication.
`Ritzen errs in arguing that the order should nonetheless rank as non-
`final where, as here, the bankruptcy court’s decision turns on a sub-
`
`stantive issue that may be raised later in the litigation. Section 158(a)
`asks whether the order in question terminates a procedural unit sepa-
`
`rate from the remaining case, not whether the bankruptcy court has
`preclusively resolved a substantive issue. Finally, rather than disrupt-
`
`ing the efficiency of the bankruptcy process, immediate appeal may
`
`
`permit creditors to establish their rights expeditiously outside the
`
`bankruptcy process, affecting the relief sought and awarded later in
`
`the bankruptcy case. Pp. 8–11.
`906 F. 3d 494, affirmed.
`GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`
`
`
` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
`
`
`
` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
`
` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
`
`
` corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
`
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
`_________________
`
` No. 18–938
`_________________
` RITZEN GROUP, INC., PETITIONER v.
`
`
` JACKSON MASONRY, LLC
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
`[January 14, 2020]
`
` JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
`
`Under the Bankruptcy Code, filing a petition for bank-
`ruptcy automatically “operates as a stay” of creditors’ debt-
`collection efforts outside the umbrella of the bankruptcy
`
`
`
`case. 11 U. S. C. §362(a). The question this case presents
`concerns the finality of, and therefore the time allowed for
`
`appeal from, a bankruptcy court’s order denying a creditor’s
`request for relief from the automatic stay. In civil litigation
`generally, a court’s decision ordinarily becomes “final,” for
`
`purposes of appeal, only upon completion of the entire case,
`
`i.e., when the decision “terminate[s the] action” or “ends the
`
`litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to
`do but execute the judgment.” Gelboim v. Bank of America
`
`
`Corp., 574 U. S. 405, 409 (2015) (internal quotation marks
`omitted). The regime in bankruptcy is different. A bank-
`ruptcy case embraces “an aggregation of individual contro-
`versies.” 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶5.08[1][b], p. 5–43 (16th
`ed. 2019). Orders in bankruptcy cases qualify as “final”
`
`when they definitively dispose of discrete disputes within
`the overarching bankruptcy case. Bullard v. Blue Hills
`Bank, 575 U. S. 496, 501 (2015).
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`RITZEN GROUP, INC. v. JACKSON MASONRY, LLC
`
`Opinion of the Court
`The precise issue the Court today decides: Does a credi-
`
`tor’s motion for relief from the automatic stay initiate a dis-
`tinct proceeding terminating in a final, appealable order
`when the bankruptcy court rules dispositively on the mo-
`
`tion? In agreement with the courts below, our answer is
`
`“yes.” We hold that the adjudication of a motion for relief
`from the automatic stay forms a discrete procedural unit
`within the embracive bankruptcy case. That unit yields a
`
`final, appealable order when the bankruptcy court unre-
`servedly grants or denies relief.
`
`I
`In civil litigation generally, 28 U. S. C. §1291 governs ap-
`
`peals from “final decisions.” Under that provision, a party
`may appeal to a court of appeals as of right from “final de-
`cisions of the district courts.” Ibid. A “final decision” within
`
`
`the meaning of §1291 is normally limited to an order that
`
`resolves the entire case. Accordingly, the appellant must
`
`raise all claims of error in a single appeal. See In re Saco
`
`Local Development Corp., 711 F. 2d 441, 443 (CA1 1983)
`
`(Breyer, J.) (“Traditionally, every civil action in a federal
`
`court has been viewed as a ‘single judicial unit,’ from which
`
`only one appeal would lie.”). This understanding of the
`term “final decision” precludes “piecemeal, prejudgment ap-
`peals” that would “undermin[e] efficient judicial admin-
`istration and encroac[h] upon the prerogatives of district
`
`court judges.” Bullard, 575 U. S., at 501 (quoting Mohawk
`
`Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U. S. 100, 106 (2009); in-
`ternal quotation marks omitted).
`
`The ordinary understanding of “final decision” is not at-
`tuned to the distinctive character of bankruptcy litigation.
`A bankruptcy case encompasses numerous “individual con-
`troversies, many of which would exist as stand-alone law-
`suits but for the bankrupt status of the debtor.” Bullard,
`575 U. S., at 501 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
` Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`thus common for bankruptcy courts to resolve discrete con-
`troversies definitively while the umbrella bankruptcy case re-
`mains pending. Delaying appeals from discrete, controversy-
`resolving decisions in bankruptcy cases would long
`
`postpone appellate review of fully adjudicated disputes.
`
`Moreover, controversies adjudicated during the life of a
`
`bankruptcy case may be linked, one dependent on the out-
`come of another. Delaying appeal until the termination of
`the entire bankruptcy case, therefore, could have this unto-
`ward consequence: Reversal of a decision made early on
`
`could require the bankruptcy court to unravel later adjudi-
`cations rendered in reliance on an earlier decision.
`
`The provision on appeals to U. S. district courts from de-
`
`cisions of bankruptcy courts is 28 U. S. C. §158(a). Under
`that provision, an appeal of right lies from “final judgments,
`orders, and decrees” entered by bankruptcy courts “in cases
`and proceedings.” Ibid. By providing for appeals from final
`
`decisions in bankruptcy “proceedings,” as distinguished
`from bankruptcy “cases,” Congress made “orders in bank-
`ruptcy cases . . . immediately appeal[able] if they finally dis-
`pose of discrete disputes within the larger [bankruptcy]
`case.” Bullard, 575 U. S., at 501 (quoting Howard Delivery
`
`Service, Inc. v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 547 U. S. 651, 657,
`
`n. 3 (2006)); see In re Saco Local Development Corp., 711
`F. 2d, at 444–447. In short, “the usual judicial unit for an-
`
`alyzing finality in ordinary civil litigation is the case, [but]
`in bankruptcy[,] it is [often] the proceeding.” Brief for
`
`United States as Amicus Curiae 10.
`
`Correct delineation of the dimensions of a bankruptcy
`“proceeding” is a matter of considerable importance. An er-
`roneous identification of an interlocutory order as a final
`decision may yield an appeal over which the appellate fo-
`rum lacks jurisdiction. Conversely, an erroneous identifi-
`
`cation of a final order as interlocutory may cause a party to
`
`miss the appellate deadline.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`RITZEN GROUP, INC. v. JACKSON MASONRY, LLC
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
` II
`The dispute at hand involves a contract in which Ritzen
`
`Group, Inc. (Ritzen) agreed to buy land in Nashville, Ten-
`nessee from Jackson Masonry, LLC (Jackson). The land
`sale was never effected. Blaming Jackson for the deal’s un-
`raveling, Ritzen sued for breach of contract in Tennessee
`
`state court. After over a year of litigation, just days before
`trial was to begin, Jackson filed for bankruptcy under
`
`Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. By operation of the
`Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision, 11 U. S. C.
`
`§362(a), the state-court litigation was put on hold.
`Ritzen filed a motion in the Federal Bankruptcy Court for
`
`
`relief from the automatic stay, seeking an order allowing
`
`
`the trial to proceed in state court. Ritzen argued that relief
`
`would promote judicial economy and that Jackson had filed
`for bankruptcy in bad faith. After a hearing, the Bank-
`ruptcy Court denied the motion. The Bankruptcy Code and
`
`Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure require parties to
`
`appeal from a final order “within 14 days after entry of the
`
`. . . order . . . being appealed.” 28 U. S. C. §158(c)(2); Fed.
`
`
`Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 8002(a). Ritzen did not appeal from the
`
`order refusing to lift the stay within the prescribed period.
`
`In pursuit of the breach-of-contract claim initially com-
`menced in state court, Ritzen filed a proof of claim against
`the bankruptcy estate. Following an adversary proceeding,
`
`the Bankruptcy Court found that Ritzen, not Jackson, was
`
`the party in breach of the land-sale contract because Ritzen
`failed to secure financing by the closing date. The court
`therefore disallowed Ritzen’s claim against the bankruptcy
`
`estate. Without objection from Ritzen, the court confirmed
`Jackson’s plan of reorganization. The plan permanently en-
`joined all creditors from the “commencement or continua-
`tion of any . . . proceeding against [d]ebtor . . . on account
`of [c]laims against [d]ebtor.” Debtor’s Plan of Reorganiza-
`tion in No. 3:16–bk–02065 (MD Tenn.), p. 15.
`Thereafter, Ritzen filed two separate notices of appeal in
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`
`
`Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020)
`
`Opinion of the Court
` the District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee.
`
`First, Ritzen challenged the Bankruptcy Court’s order
`denying relief from the automatic stay. Second, Ritzen
`
`challenged the court’s resolution of its breach-of-contract
`
`claim.
`The District Court rejected the first of Ritzen’s appeals as
`
`
`untimely, holding that under §158(c)(2) and Federal Rule of
`Bankruptcy Procedure 8002(a), time to appeal expired 14
`
`days after the Bankruptcy Court’s entry of the order deny-
`ing relief from the automatic stay. Turning to the appeal
`
`from the Bankruptcy Court’s rejection of Ritzen’s breach-of-
`contract claim, the District Court ruled against Ritzen on
`
`the merits.
`On further appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
`
`cuit affirmed the District Court’s dispositions. As to the
`timeliness of the first notice of appeal, the Court of Appeals
`rendered this determination: Adjudication of Ritzen’s mo-
`tion for relief from the automatic stay qualified as a discrete
`“proceeding,” commencing with the filing of the motion, fol-
`lowed by procedural steps, and culminating in a “[disposi-
`tive] decision based on the application of a legal standard.”
`In re Jackson Masonry, LLC, 906 F. 3d 494, 499–500
`(2018).1 The 14-day appeal clock, the Court of Appeals
`
`therefore concluded, ran from the order denying the motion
`
`to lift the stay, a disposition “(1) entered in a proceeding
`and (2) final[ly] terminating that proceeding.” Id., at 499
`(alterations omitted).
`We granted certiorari to resolve whether orders denying
`
`relief from bankruptcy’s automatic stay are final, therefore
`
`
`
`
`
`——————
`1The “procedural steps” included Ritzen’s provision of notice to Jack-
`son and the Bankruptcy Court’s conduct of a hearing at which the parties
`presented witness testimony and other evidence. App. to Pet. for Cert.
`48a. The question under the “applicable legal standard”: Did Ritzen es-
`
`tablish “cause” to permit the state-court litigation to proceed. See id., at
`52a–67a; 11 U. S. C. §362(d)(1).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`RITZEN GROUP, INC. v. JACKSON MASONRY, LLC
`
`Opinion of the Court
` immediately appealable under §158(a)(1). 587 U. S. ___
`(2019).
`
`
`
` III
`
`A
`This Court’s opinion in Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575
`
`
`U. S. 496, guides our application of §158(a)’s finality re-
`quirement. Addressing repayment plan confirmations un-
`der Chapter 13, we held in Bullard that a bankruptcy
`
`court’s order rejecting a proposed plan was not “final” under
`
`§158(a) because it did not conclusively resolve the relevant
`
`“proceeding.” Id., at 499, 502–503. The plan-confirmation
`
`process, the Bullard opinion explains, involves back and
`forth negotiations. See id., at 502. Plan proposal rejections
`
`
`may be followed by amended or new proposals. Only plan
`
`approval, we observed, “alters the status quo and fixes the
`rights and obligations of the parties.” Ibid. “Denial of con-
`firmation with leave to amend,” by contrast, leaves the
`
`“parties’ rights and obligations . . . unsettled,” and therefore
`
`cannot be typed “final.” Id., at 503. The appropriate proce-
`
`dural unit for determining finality, we concluded, is not a
`plan proposal, it is “the process of attempting to arrive at
`
`an approved plan.” Id., at 502.
`
`B
`We take up next the application of Bullard’s analysis to
`
`
`a bankruptcy court’s order denying relief from the auto-
`matic stay. As earlier stated, see supra, at 1, under the
`Bankruptcy Code, the filing of a bankruptcy petition auto-
`matically halts efforts to collect prepetition debts from the
`bankrupt debtor outside the bankruptcy forum. 11 U. S. C.
`§362(a). The stay serves to “maintai[n] the status quo and
`preven[t] dismemberment of the estate” during the pen-
`dency of the bankruptcy case. 1 Collier ¶1.05[1], p. 1–19; 3
`id., ¶362.03, p. 362–23. Among other things, the stay bars
`commencement or continuation of lawsuits to recover from
`
`
`
`
`
`7
`
`
`
`
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`Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`the debtor, enforcement of liens or judgments against the
`
`debtor, and exercise of control over the debtor’s property.
`§362(a).
`
` A creditor may seek relief from the stay by filing in the
`
`bankruptcy court a motion for an order “terminating, an-
` nulling, modifying, or conditioning” the stay, asserting in
`
`support of the motion either “cause” or the presence of spec-
`ified conditions. §362(d). A majority of circuits and the
`leading treatises regard orders denying such motions as fi-
`nal, immediately appealable decisions.2 We reach the same
`
`conclusion.
`Bullard instructs that we inquire “how to define the im-
`
`mediately appealable ‘proceeding’ in the context of [stay-
`relief motions].” 575 U. S., at 502. Jackson urges that, as the
`
`
`
`Court of Appeals held, adjudication of a stay-relief motion
`is a discrete “proceeding.” Ritzen urges that stay-relief ad-
`judication is properly considered a first step in the process
`of adjudicating a creditor’s claim against the estate.
`
`We agree with the Court of Appeals and Jackson that the
`appropriate “proceeding” is the stay-relief adjudication. A
`bankruptcy court’s order ruling on a stay-relief motion dis-
`
`poses of a procedural unit anterior to, and separate from,
`
`
`
`——————
`2See, e.g., Rajala v. Gardner, 709 F. 3d 1031, 1034 (CA10 2013); In re
`Excel Innovations, Inc., 502 F. 3d 1086, 1092 (CA9 2007); In re James
`
`Wilson Assocs., 965 F. 2d 160, 166 (CA7 1992); In re Sonnax Industries,
`
`Inc., 907 F. 2d 1280, 1284–1285 (CA2 1990); In re Lieb, 915 F. 2d 180,
`
`
`
`
`185, n. 3 (CA5 1990); Grundy Nat. Bank v. Tandem Mining Corp., 754
`
`
`F. 2d 1436, 1439 (CA4 1985), overruled in part on other grounds by
`
`
`United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.,
`
`
`484 U. S. 365 (1988); In re American Mariner Industries, Inc., 734 F. 2d
`
`426, 429 (CA9 1984), overruled in part on other grounds by Timbers of
`
`
`
`Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365; In re Leimer, 724 F. 2d 744,
`745 (CA8 1984); 16 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice
`
`
`and Procedure §3926.2, p. 352, nn. 39–40 (3d ed. 2012 and Supp. 2019)
`
`(“Automatic-stay rulings by a bankruptcy judge or appellate panel
`should be appealable as final decisions.”). See also 1 Collier on Bank-
`
`
`ruptcy ¶5.09, pp. 5–55 to 5–57 (16th ed. 2019).
`
`
`
`
`
`8
`
`
`RITZEN GROUP, INC. v. JACKSON MASONRY, LLC
`
`Opinion of the Court
`claim-resolution proceedings. Adjudication of a stay-relief
`motion, as just observed, occurs before and apart from pro-
`ceedings on the merits of creditors’ claims: The motion ini-
`tiates a discrete procedural sequence, including notice and
`a hearing, and the creditor’s qualification for relief turns on
`the statutory standard, i.e., “cause” or the presence of spec-
`ified conditions. §362(d), (e); Fed. Rules Bkrtcy. Proc.
`4001(a)(1) and (2), 9014 (describing procedure for adjudicat-
`
`ing motions for relief from automatic stay). Resolution of
`
`stay-relief motions does not occur as part of the adversary
`
`claims-adjudication process, proceedings typically governed
`
`by state substantive law. See Butner v. United States, 440
`U. S. 48, 54–55 (1979). Under Bullard, a discrete dispute
`
`
`of this kind constitutes an independent “proceeding” within
`the meaning of 28 U. S. C. §158(a). 575 U. S., at 502–505.
`
`Our conclusion that the relevant “proceeding” is the stay-
`relief adjudication is consistent with statutory text. See id.,
`at 503. A provision neighboring §158(a), §157(b)(2)(G),
`types motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic
`
`stay as “core proceedings” arising in a bankruptcy case.
`Section 157(b)(2) lists those motions separately from the
`
`“allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate.”
`§157(b)(2)(B), (G). Although the discrete “core proceedings”
`listings “hardly clinc[h] the matter,” as the “provision’s pur-
`pose is not to explain appealability,” they are a “textual
`clue” that Congress viewed adjudication of stay-relief mo-
`
`tions as “proceedings” distinct from claim adjudication.
`Bullard, 575 U. S., at 503.
`
`C
`
`
`In Ritzen’s view, the position Jackson advances and we
`
`adopt “slic[es] the case too thin.” Id., at 502. Ritzen asserts
`that an order denying stay relief simply decides the forum
`
`for adjudication of adversary claims—bankruptcy court or
`
`state court—and therefore should be treated as merely a
`preliminary step in the claims-adjudication process. Brief
`
`
`
`
`
`9
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`for Petitioner 19–21, 26–28.
`
`Courts, we agree, should not define “proceeding” to in-
`clude disputes over minor details about how a bankruptcy
`case will unfold. As we put it in Bullard, “[t]he concept of
`finality cannot stretch to cover, for example, an order re-
`solving a disputed request for an extension of time.” 575
`U. S., at 505.
`
`But Ritzen incorrectly characterizes denial of stay relief
`as determining nothing more than the forum for claim ad-
`judication. Resolution of a motion for stay relief can have
`large practical consequences. See 3 Collier ¶362.03, pp.
`362–23 to 362–24. Disposition of the motion determines
`whether a creditor can isolate its claim from those of other
`creditors and go it alone outside bankruptcy. It can also
`affect the manner in which adversary claims will be adjudi-
`cated. See 11 U. S. C. §502 (permitting summary adjudica-
`tion or estimation of amounts due in bankruptcy claims ad-
`judication). These are not matters of minor detail; they can
`
`significantly increase creditors’ costs. Leaving the stay in
`place may, inter alia, delay collection of a debt or cause col-
`
`lateral to decline in value. See Brief for United States as
`Amicus Curiae 14.
`
`Ruling on a motion for stay relief, it is true, will deter-
`mine where the adjudication of an adversary claim will take
`
`place—in the bankruptcy forum or state court. But that ef-
`fect does not render a ruling nonfinal. Orders denying a
`plaintiff the opportunity to seek relief in its preferred forum
`
`often qualify as final and immediately appealable, though
`they leave the plaintiff free to sue elsewhere. Notably, dis-
`missal for want of personal jurisdiction ranks as a final de-
`cision. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. 117, 124–125
`
`(2014). So too, dismissal for improper venue, or under the
`doctrine of forum non conveniens. See United States v. Wal-
`
`lace & Tiernan Co., 336 U. S. 793, 794–795, n. 1 (1949); 15A
`C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Pro-
`
`
`
`
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`
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`10
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`RITZEN GROUP, INC. v. JACKSON MASONRY, LLC
`
`Opinion of the Court
`cedure §§3914.6, 3914.12 (2d ed. 1992 and Supp. 2019) (col-
`lecting cases on appealability of dismissal without prejudice
`
`to filing in another forum).3
`Ritzen’s position encounters a further shoal: Many mo-
`
`tions to lift the automatic stay do not involve adversary
`claims against the debtor that would be pursued in another
`forum but for bankruptcy. Bankruptcy’s embracive auto-
`matic stay stops even nonjudicial efforts to obtain or control
`
`
`the debtor’s assets. See §362(a). Motions for stay relief
`may, for example, seek permission to repossess or liquidate
`
`collateral, to terminate a lease, or to set off debts. Ibid.
`These matters do not concern the forum for, and cannot be
`considered part of, any subsequent claim adjudication. See
`Brief for National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy At-
`
`torneys as Amicus Curiae 23–24. We see no good reason to
`treat stay adjudication as the relevant “proceeding” in only
`
`a subset of cases. As we have held in another context, “the
`
`issue of appealability” should “be determined for the entire
`category to which a claim belongs.” Digital Equipment
`
`Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S. 863, 868 (1994) (ad-
`
`dressing collateral order doctrine).
`
`Ritzen alternatively argues that, even if an order denying
`stay relief is not part of the claims-adjudication process, the
`order should nonetheless rank as nonfinal where, as here,
`the bankruptcy court’s decision turns on a substantive issue
`that may be raised later in the litigation. Brief for Peti-
`tioner 45. Specifically, Ritzen stresses that it based its
`
`stay-relief motion largely on an argument that Jackson
`filed for bankruptcy in bad faith, an issue that could have
`
`been urged again later in the bankruptcy case. Ibid.
`
`
`That argument is misaddressed. Section 158(a) asks
`
`——————
`3We note, however, that within the federal court system, when venue
`is laid in the wrong district, or when the plaintiff chooses an inconvenient
`forum, transfer rather than dismissal is ordinarily ordered if “in the in-
`
`terest of justice.” 28 U. S. C. §§1404(a), 1406.
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` 11
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` Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`whether the order in question terminates a procedural unit
`separate from the remaining case, not whether the bank-
`
`ruptcy court has preclusively resolved a substantive issue.
`
`It does not matter whether the court rested its decision on
`a determination potentially pertinent to other disputes in
`the bankruptcy case, so long as the order conclusively re-
`solved the movant’s entitlement to the requested relief.
`
`
`Finally, Ritzen protests that the rule we adopt will en-
`courage piecemeal appeals and unduly disrupt the effi-
`
`ciency of the bankruptcy process. Id., at 48–52. As we see
`it, classifying as final all orders conclusively resolving stay-
`relief motions will avoid, rather than cause, “delays and in-
`
`efficiencies.” Bullard, 575 U. S., at 504. Immediate appeal,
`
`if successful, will permit creditors to establish their rights
`expeditiously outside the bankruptcy process, affecting the
`
`relief sought and awarded later in the bankruptcy case.
`The rule Ritzen urges “would force creditors who lose stay-
`
`relief motions to fully litigate their claims in bankruptcy
`
`court and then, after the bankruptcy case is over, appeal
`and seek to redo the litigation all over again in the original
`court.” 906 F. 3d, at 503.
`
`This case is illustrative. After the Bankruptcy Court de-
`nied Ritzen’s motion for relief from the automatic stay,
`
`Ritzen filed a claim against Jackson in the Bankruptcy
`Court. The parties and court expended substantial re-
`sources definitively
`litigating the dueling breach-of-
`contract allegations, and Ritzen lost. The Bankruptcy Court
`thereafter considered and confirmed Jackson’s reorganiza-
`tion plan. By endeavoring now to appeal the stay-relief or-
`
`der, after forgoing an appeal directly after the denial,
`Ritzen seeks to return to square one. Its aim, to relitigate
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`the opposing contract claims in state court. Nevermind
`that the Bankruptcy Court has fully adjudicated the con-
`tract claims and has, without objection from Ritzen, ap-
`proved Jackson’s reorganization plan. The second bite
`Ritzen seeks scarcely advances the finality principle.
`
`
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`12
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`RITZEN GROUP, INC. v. JACKSON MASONRY, LLC
`
`Opinion of the Court
`IV
` Because the appropriate “proceeding” in this case is the
`adjudication of the motion for relief from the automatic
`stay, the Bankruptcy Court’s order conclusively denying
`that motion is “final.” The court’s order ended the stay-
`relief adjudication and left nothing more for the Bankruptcy
`Court to do in that proceeding.4 The Court of Appeals there-
`fore correctly ranked the order as final and immediately ap-
`pealable, and correctly affirmed the District Court’s dismis-
`sal of Ritzen’s appeal as untimely.
`*
` *
` *
` For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Ap-
`peals is
`
`Affirmed.
`
`——————
`4 We do not decide whether finality would attach to an order denying
`stay relief if the bankruptcy court enters it “without prejudice” because
`further developments might change the stay calculus. Nothing in the
`record before us suggests that this is such an order.
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`