No. 17-571
`
`Supreme Court of the United States
`
`IN THE
`
`d
`
`FOURTH ESTATE PUBLIC BENEFIT CORPORATION,
`
`—v.—
`
`Petitioners,
`
`WALL-STREET.COM, LLC, et al.,
`
`Respondents.
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
`COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
`
`BRIEF OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
`
`AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING
`
`PETITIONER
`
`Of Counsel:
`DALE M. CENDALI
`JOSHUA L. SIMMONS
`KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
`601 Lexington Avenue
`New York, New York 10019
`(212) 446-4800
`
`ROBERT M. CARLSON
`Counsel of Record
`AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
`321 North Clark Street
`Chicago, Illinois 60654
`(312) 988-5000
`abapresident@americanbar.org
`
`Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
`American Bar Association
`
`September 4, 2018
`
`
`
`Supreme Court of the United States
`
`IN THE
`
`d
`
`FOURTH ESTATE PUBLIC BENEFIT CORPORATION,
`
`—v.—
`
`Petitioners,
`
`WALL-STREET.COM, LLC, et al.,
`
`Respondents.
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
`COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
`
`BRIEF OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
`
`AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING
`
`PETITIONER
`
`Of Counsel:
`DALE M. CENDALI
`JOSHUA L. SIMMONS
`KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
`601 Lexington Avenue
`New York, New York 10019
`(212) 446-4800
`
`ROBERT M. CARLSON
`Counsel of Record
`AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
`321 North Clark Street
`Chicago, Illinois 60654
`(312) 988-5000
`abapresident@americanbar.org
`
`Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
`American Bar Association
`
`September 4, 2018
`
`
`
`i
`
`QUESTION PRESENTED
`
`
`
`Whether “registration of [a] copyright claim has
`been made” within the meaning of § 411(a) when the
`copyright holder delivers the required application,
`deposit, and fee to the Copyright Office, as the Fifth
`and Ninth Circuits have held, or only once the
`Copyright Office acts on that application, as the Tenth
`and, in the decision below, the Eleventh Circuit have
`held.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`PAGE
`
`QUESTION PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`
`INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE . . . . . . . . .
`
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`
`ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`
`I. THE APPLICATION APPROACH IS
`CONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT OF
`THE COPYRIGHT ACT . . . . . . . . . . . .
`
`II. THE APPLICATION APPROACH
`BETTER REFLECTS THE UNIQUE
`NATURE AND PURPOSE OF
`COPYRIGHT LAW AS OPPOSED
`TO PATENT LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`
`A. Copyright is Created through
`Fixation in a Tangible Medium,
`Not Copyright Office Grant . . . . . .
`
`B. The Procedural Barriers to Patent
`Protection are Higher than
`Copyright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`
`C. The Copyright Office’s Opinion on
`Registrability is Not Binding on
`Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`
`i
`
`1
`
`3
`
`7
`
`7
`
`12
`
`13
`
`16
`
`21
`
`
`
`iii
`
`III. THE APPLICATION APPROACH
`SAFEGUARDS AUTHORS’
`ABILITIES TO EFFECTIVELY
`RESOLVE INFRINGEMENT
`CLAIMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`
`A. The Application Approach Ensures
`that Authors May Seek the
`Injunctive Relief that is Critical to
`Copyright Litigation . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`
`B. The Application Approach Better
`Accounts for Copyright
`Infringement’s Short Statute of
`Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`
`C. The Application Approach
`Eliminates the Wasteful Re-Filing
`of Infringement Claims that
`Occurs Under the Certificate
`Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`
`IV. THE APPLICATION APPROACH
`MINIMIZES PREJUDICE TO
`AUTHORS OF UNITED STATES
`WORKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`
`23
`
`23
`
`29
`
`31
`
`33
`
`CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`
`35
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iv
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`PAGE(S)
`
`Cases
`
`A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
`239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
`
`Abramski v. United States,
`134 S. Ct. 2259 (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
`
`Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp.,
`714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
`
`Aqua Creations USA Inc. v. Hilton Hotels
`Corp.,No. 10 Civ. 246, 2011 WL 1239793
`(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2011), aff’d sub nom.
`Aqua Creations USA Inc. v. Hilton
`Worldwide, Inc., 487 Fed. App’x 627
`(2d Cir. 2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
`
`Asche & Spencer Music, Inc. v. Principato -
`Young Entm’t, Inc.,
`147 F. Supp. 3d 833 (D. Minn. 2015). . . . . . . 31
`
`Asche & Spencer Music, Inc. v. Principato -
`Young Entm’t, Inc.,
`No. 17 Civ. 150 (D. Minn. filed
`Jan. 18, 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
`
`ATCS Int’l LLC v. Jefferson Contr. Corp.,
`807 F. Supp. 2d 516 (E.D. Va. 2011) . . . . . . . 22
`
`Bartok v. Boosey & Hawkes, Inc.,
`523 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
`
`In re Brandt,
`886 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
`
`
`
`v
`
`Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp.,
`773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
`
`Carter v. United States,
`530 U.S. 255 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
`
`Chere Amie, Inc. v. Windstar Apparel, Corp.,
`191 F. Supp. 2d 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) . . . . . . . 14
`
`Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/
`Interactivecorp,
`606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010) . . . . . . . . . 9, 27, 31
`
`Dable Grain-Shovel Co. v. Flint,
`137 U.S. 41 (1890) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
`
`Darden v. Peters,
`402 F. Supp. 2d 638 (E.D.N.C. 2005),
`aff’d, 488 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2007) . . . . . . . . . 21
`
`EMI Christian Music Grp., Inc. v.
`MP3tunes, LLC,
`844 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
`
`Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
`499 U.S. 340 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
`
`Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-
`Street.com, LLC,
`856 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2017) . . . . . . . . . . 3, 11
`
`Fox Television Stations, Inc. v.
`Aereokiller, LLC,
`851 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
`
`
`
`vi
`
`Greene v. Columbia Records/ Sony Music
`Entm’t,
`No. 3 Civ. 4333, 2004 WL 3211771
`(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
`
`Greene v. Columbia Records, Inc.,
`No. 1:13 Civ. 6965 (S.D.N.Y. filed
`Sept. 30, 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
`
`Int’l Kitchen Exhaust Cleaning Ass’n v. Power
`Washers of N. Am.,
`81 F. Supp. 2d 70 (D.D.C. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . 15
`
`Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement,
`543 U.S. 335 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
`
`K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
`486 U.S. 281 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
`
`Kregos v. Associated Press
`795 F. Supp. 1325 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) . . . . . . . . . 30
`
`La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors
`Angel Fire,
`416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
`
`Lakedreams v. Taylor,
`932 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
`
`Lumetrics, Inc. v. Blalock,
`23 F. Supp. 3d 138 (W.D.N.Y. 2014) . . . . . . . 32
`
`Lumetrics, Inc. v. Blalock,
`No. 6:14 Civ. 6322 (W.D.N.Y. filed
`June 11, 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
`
`Morrow v. Microsoft Corp.,
`499 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
`
`
`
`vii
`
`New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music
`Grp., Inc.,
`693 F. Supp. 1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) . . . . . . . . . 24
`
`Omega Imp. Corp. v. Petri-Kine Camera Co.,
`451 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
`
`Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v.
`Toy Loft, Inc.,
`684 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
`
`Past Pluto Prods. Corp. v. Dana,
`627 F. Supp. 1435 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) . . . . . . . . . 23
`
`Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.,
`134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) . . 17
`
`Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. Polypap, S.A.R.L.,
`412 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
`
`Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick,
`559 U.S. 154 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 8, 20
`
`Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,
`519 U.S. 337 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
`
`Salinger v. Colting,
`607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
`
`Sapon v. D.C. Comics,
`No. 00 Civ. 8992, 2002 WL 485730
`(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
`
`Sari v. America’s Home Place, Inc.,
`129 F. Supp. 3d 317 (E.D. Va. 2015) . . . . . . . 22
`
`
`
`viii
`
`Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
`323 U.S. 134 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
`
`I.C. ex rel. Solovsky v. Delta Galil USA,
`135 F. Supp. 3d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) . . . . . . . 22
`
`Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
`Inc.,
`464 U.S. 417 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
`
`United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood
`Forest Assocs., Ltd.,
`484 U.S. 365 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
`
`Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC,
`799 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2015), aff’d sub nom.
`Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands,
`Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
`
`Statutes
`
`17 U.S.C. (the Copyright Act). . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
`
`17 U.S.C. § 101 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8, 17, 33
`
`17 U.S.C. § 102(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 14
`
`17 U.S.C. § 401 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
`
`17 U.S.C. § 408 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 10
`
`17 U.S.C. § 408(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 11, 18
`
`17 U.S.C. § 408(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
`
`17 U.S.C. § 408(f) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
`
`17 U.S.C. § 408(f)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
`
`17 U.S.C. § 408(f)(3)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
`
`
`
`ix
`
`17 U.S.C. § 409 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
`
`17 U.S.C. § 410 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
`
`17 U.S.C. § 410(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 20
`
`17 U.S.C. § 410(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
`
`17 U.S.C. § 410(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
`
`17 U.S.C. § 410(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 20
`
`17 U.S.C. § 411(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
`
`17 U.S.C. § 412 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 28
`
`17 U.S.C. § 501 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
`
`17 U.S.C. § 502 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 23
`
`17 U.S.C. § 503 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
`
`17 U.S.C. § 504 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 28
`
`17 U.S.C. § 505 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
`
`17 U.S.C. § 507(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
`
`35 U.S.C. § 101 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
`
`35 U.S.C. § 111 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
`
`Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988,
`Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 . . . . . . . 18
`
`
`
`x
`
`Regulations
`
`37 C.F.R. § 1.104(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
`
`Other Authorities
`
`ABA, Amicus Curiae Briefs,
`http://www.americanbar.org/amicus/1998-
`present.html . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
`
`Ben Depoorter & Robert Kirk Walker, Copyright
`False Positives, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 319
`(2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
`
`Berne Convention for the Protection of
`Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886
`(Paris Text 1971), S. Treaty Doc.
`No. 99–27 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33, 34
`
`H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976
`U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 15, 19
`
`Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with
`Mandatory Copyright Formalities: A
`Love/Hate Relationship, 33 COLUM. J.L. &
`ART 311 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 19
`
`Arthur J. Levine & Jeffrey L. Squires, Notice,
`Deposit and Registration: The
`Importance of Being Formal, 24 UCLA L.
`REV. 1232 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
`
`2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
`NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT (2013) . . 12, 22, 31, 32
`
`
`
`xi
`
`Shira Perlmutter, Freeing Copyright from
`Formalities, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
`565 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
`
`Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland,
`Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A
`Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY
`L. REV. 439 (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
`
`U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
`COMPENDIUM (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 26, 27
`
`U.S. Copyright Office, Fees,
`https://copyright.gov/about/ fees.html . . . . . 28
`
`U.S. Copyright Office, Registration
`Processing Times, https://copyright.gov/
`registration/docs/processing-
`times-faqs.pdf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25, 26
`
`
`
`1
`
`INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
`
`The American Bar Association (“ABA”) respectfully
`submits this brief as amicus curiae in support of
`Petitioner Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation
`(“Fourth Estate”).
`
`The ABA is the leading national organization of
`the legal profession, with more than 400,000 members
`from all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the
`U.S. territories. Membership is voluntary and
`includes attorneys in private practice, government
`service, corporate law departments, and public
`interest organizations. ABA members include judges,
`legislators, law professors, law students, and non-
`lawyer “associates” in related fields, and represent the
`full spectrum of public and private litigants.2
`
`
`1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amicus curiae
`certifies that no counsel for a party authored this brief in
`whole or in part and that no person or entity, other than
`amicus curiae or its counsel, has made a monetary
`contribution to its preparation or submission. The parties
`have granted blanket consent for the filing of amicus curiae
`briefs.
`
`2 Neither this brief nor the decision to file it should be
`interpreted to reflect the views of any judicial member of the
`American Bar Association. No inference should be drawn
`that any member of the Judicial Division Council has
`participated in the adoption or endorsement of the positions
`in this brief. This brief was not circulated to any member of
`the Judicial Division Council prior to filing.
`
`
`
`2
`
`The ABA Section of Intellectual Property Law
`(“IPL Section”), which was established in 1894 (three
`years before the Copyright Office was created), is the
`world’s oldest and largest organization of intellectual
`property professionals.
` The IPL Section has
`approximately 20,000 members, including attorneys
`who represent authors, copyright owners, accused
`infringers, a wide range of companies across the
`entertainment and technology industries, and public
`interest organizations and
`institutions such as
`libraries, archives, and museums.
`
`The IPL Section promotes the development and
`improvement of intellectual property law and takes
`an active role in addressing proposed legislation,
`administrative rule changes, and
`international
`initiatives regarding intellectual property. It also
`develops and presents resolutions to the ABA House
`of Delegates for adoption as ABA policy to foster
`necessary changes to the law. These policies provide
`a basis for the preparation of ABA amicus curiae
`briefs, which are filed primarily in this Court and the
`United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
`Circuit.3 The IPL Section includes and represents
`attorneys on all sides of issues of intellectual property
`law, and its reliance on the expertise of its members
`to develop consensus positions within the ABA
`
`
`
`3 See ABA, Amicus Curiae Briefs, http://www.americanbar.org
`/amicus/1998-present.html (last visited August 29, 2018).
`
`
`
`3
`
`ensures its positions reflect those of the broader
`intellectual property community.
`
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
`
`The ABA is concerned about the adverse impact on
`attorneys, their clients, and the judicial system of
`requiring copyright holders to wait to seek relief for
`copyright
`infringement until a
`certificate of
`registration is issued by the Copyright Office or the
`Copyright Office refuses to
`issue one.
` This
`“certificate approach” to the term “registration” in
`the Registration and Civil Infringement Actions
`provision of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)
`denies access to the courts in a manner inconsistent
`with the overall structure and nature of the Copyright
`Act.4 By contrast, the “application approach”—
`which merely requires a copyright holder to submit a
`complete set of registration materials (i.e., an
`application, deposit copy, and registration fee) to the
`Copyright Office—is more consistent with the text of
`Subsection 411(a), the text of neighboring Copyright
`Act provisions, the purposes of the Copyright Act, and
`the overall copyright system.
`
`The ABA closely has monitored—long before the
`Fourth Estate case itself—the circuit split between the
`
`4 While Respondents and certain lower court opinions refer to
`this as the “registration” approach, that name is misleading
`because, as discussed below, the term “registration” in the
`Copyright Act properly means the act of delivering a
`copyright application, deposit copy, and fee to the Copyright
`Office.
`
`
`
`4
`
`“certificate approach” and the “application approach.”
`After careful analysis and input from its members,
`many of whom are expert intellectual property
`practitioners, the ABA IPL Section adopted a
`resolution favoring the application approach in
`October 2017. The ABA House of Delegates adopted
`a similar resolution on behalf of the ABA as a whole
`in February 2018. The ABA favors the application
`approach interpretation of Subsection 411(a) for
`several reasons.
`
`First, the application approach better reflects the
`text of the Copyright Act. As an initial matter, this
`Court already has considered the text of Subsection
`411(a) in Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick and tacitly
`recognized that the term “registration” in that
`Subsection refers to an act performed by copyright
`holders
`(when they submit their applications,
`deposits, and fees to the Copyright Office) not the
`Copyright Office (when it issues or refuses to issue a
`certificate of registration). See 559 U.S. 154, 158 n.1
`(2010) (considering “the registration process” and the
`“incentives to encourage copyright holders to register
`their works” (emphasis added)). Similarly, other
`provisions of the Copyright Act describe “registration”
`as something that the copyright holder “may obtain”
`when she delivers the registration materials to the
`Copyright Office without reference to the Office’s
`issuance or refusal of a certificate memorializing that
`registration. See infra 9. Moreover, the “effective date
`of registration” is the date on which the copyright
`holder delivers her registration materials to the
`
`
`
`5
`
`Copyright Office, not when the Copyright Office issues
`its decision. See infra 9.
`
`Second, the application approach is particularly
`important to copyright practitioners who submit
`copyright registrations and counsel clients on the
`meaning of the Copyright Office’s review. In sharp
`contrast to patent law—where no rights exist until
`and unless a patent is formally issued—under
`copyright law, a copyright exists at the moment an
`original work is “fixed” in a “tangible medium of
`expression,” regardless of any action by the Copyright
`Office. See infra 13. In addition, unlike in patent law,
`the Copyright Office’s refusal to issue a certificate of
`registration for a work has no preclusive effect on the
`district court, which reviews copyrightability de novo.5
`See infra 21. As copyrights exist regardless of
`whether works are registered, and the Copyright
`Office’s position on copyrightability is not binding on
`the courts, it does not make sense and would be an
`abrupt departure for copyright practitioners from the
`normal operation of copyright law to interpret
`Subsection 411(a) as requiring receipt of a final
`
`
`5 To be clear, the ABA has great respect for the Copyright
`Office and the role that it plays in the copyright system. But
`the submission of registration materials to the Copyright
`Office should suffice for a copyright holder to gain access to
`the courts. Under this approach, a court still benefits from
`the Copyright Office’s views at some point early in the case,
`and the benefits of collecting deposit copies and filing fee
`revenues are still realized, but in a manner that better
`enables litigants to obtain adequate redress.
`
`
`
`6
`
`decision from the Copyright Office before a lawsuit
`can be commenced.
`
`Third, the application approach avoids the
`draconian impact that the certificate approach has on
`litigants as it permits the prompt filing of lawsuits to
`obtain urgent injunctive relief, while still ensuring
`that copyright holders register their works with the
`Copyright Office. See infra 23. It also eliminates the
`adverse consequences for meeting the Copyright Act’s
`short three-year statute of limitations that can flow
`from the certificate approach’s preclusion of suit until
`the Copyright Office decides whether to issue a
`certificate of registration. See infra 29.
`
`Finally, the application approach reduces the
`inequity authors of United States works face as
`Subsection 411(a)’s prerequisite applies only to them,
`not authors of foreign works, who are entirely exempt
`from Subsection 411(a)’s registration requirement to
`gain access to United States courts. By permitting
`copyright holders to bring suit as soon as their
`registration materials are filed, rather than when the
`Copyright Office eventually decides whether to issue
`a certificate of registration, the application approach
`minimizes the additional burden on authors of United
`States works in gaining access to the court system.
`See infra 33.
`
`For these reasons, and as further detailed below,
`the application approach to Subsection 411(a) better
`comports with the Copyright Act as a whole, and
`
`
`
`7
`
`better serves authors of United States works, their
`lawyers, and the judicial system at large.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`I.
`
`IS
`THE APPLICATION APPROACH
`CONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT OF THE
`COPYRIGHT ACT
`
`Subsection 411(a) of the United States Copyright
`Act states that, subject to certain exceptions, “no civil
`action for infringement of the copyright in any United
`States work shall be instituted until preregistration
`or registration of the copyright claim has been made
`in accordance with this title.” 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). The
`issue before this Court is the meaning of the term
`“registration” in this Subsection.
`
`When confronted with a question of statutory
`interpretation such as this, this Court “begin[s] by
`examining the text,” Carter v. United States, 530 U.S.
`255, 271 (2000), including both “the particular
`statutory language at issue, as well as the language
`and design of the statute as a whole,” K Mart Corp. v.
`Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988). The Copyright
`Act defines the term “registration” to mean “a
`registration of a claim in the original or the renewed
`and extended term of copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.
`This self-referential definition sheds little light on the
`meaning of Subsection 411(a) because it does not
`indicate what steps must be taken, and by whom, for
`registration to occur.
`
`
`
`8
`
`In contrast to its unhelpful definition of the term
`“registration,” the Copyright Act makes clear through
`other provisions
`that submitting a copyright
`application, deposit copy, and fee is sufficient to
`satisfy the requirements of Subsection 411(a). This
`Court already implicitly has read the text of
`Subsection 411(a) as providing that registration
`occurs when the copyright holder acts by delivering
`her application, deposit copy, and fee to the Copyright
`Office. In Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, this Court
`found
`that Subsection
`411(a)’s
`registration
`requirement was a precondition to filing rather than
`a limitation on a court’s subject-matter jurisdictional
`prerequisite. 559 U.S. 154. In so holding, this Court
`highlighted the “incentives to encourage copyright
`holders to register their works.” Id. at 158 n.1
`(emphasis added). 6
`
`Neighboring provisions to Subsection 411(a) also
`confirm that registration is dependent upon the
`
`6 Relatedly, reading Subsection 411(a) to give the Copyright
`Office control over which authors can enforce their
`copyrights and when is inconsistent with the fundamental
`rule expressed
`in the Copyright Act that copyright
`“subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in a
`tangible medium of expression,” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), and that
`fixation occurs when the work
`is made sufficiently
`permanent “by or under the authority of the author,” id.
`§ 101. This language makes clear that copyright protection
`is contingent upon the author’s acts, not Copyright Office
`action. Reading Subsection 411(a) to increase arbitrarily the
`burden on authors to enforce their copyrights is inconsistent
`with this “broader context of the [Copyright Act] as a whole.”
`Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997).
`
`
`
`9
`
`copyright holder’s conduct, not that of the Copyright
`Office. Possibly most critically, Subsection 410(d)
`expressly states that the effective date of a
`registration is the “day on which an application,
`deposit, and fee” are submitted to the Copyright
`Office. Id. § 410(d); see also Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v.
`IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 617 (9th Cir.
`2010). Thus, registration is deemed to have occurred
`when the copyright holder submitted the registration
`materials, not when the Copyright Office issued a
`certificate memorializing that registration. It would
`be inconsistent with the statute’s text to interpret
`Subsection 411(a) as saying that registration does not
`occur until the Copyright Office acts, because that
`would suggest that the date of the Copyright Office’s
`action is the date of registration, which the plain
`language of Subsection 410(d) refutes.
` The
`application approach accords with this language by
`focusing on the timing of the submission of
`registration materials.
`
`In addition, Subsection 408(a) expressly states
`that “[t]he owner of copyright or of any exclusive right
`in the work may obtain registration . . . by delivering
`to the Copyright Office the deposit specified by this
`section, together with the application and fee
`specified.” 17 U.S.C. § 408 (emphasis added). This
`confirms that the copyright holder alone effectuates
`registration by “delivering” registration materials.
`The certificate approach would have the Court read
`into the statute the additional words “and receiving a
`certificate of registration or refusal
`from the
`
`
`
`10
`
`Copyright Office,” but that is not what the plain text
`says.7
`
`Similarly, the latter part of Subsection 411(a)
`shows that registration does not require Copyright
`
`
`7 Respondents argue that Section 408’s preregistration
`provision supports the certificate approach, see Respondents’
`Brief in Opposition to Petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari
`(“Resp. Cert. Br.”) 15, but Section 408 is a red herring. As an
`initial matter, preregistration is a completely distinct
`process from the registration process that is at issue in this
`appeal, applying in a unique set of circumstances involving
`delineated types of works. Moreover, the text of Section 408
`does not support Respondents’ assertion that submitting an
`application, deposit copy, and fee under Subsection 408(f)(3)
`constitutes an “application for registration,” rather than a
`registration. The statute makes clear that the phrase
`“application for registration” refers to solely the application
`form, not the combined registration materials. See 17 U.S.C.
`§ 408(f)(3)(A) (“application for registration” is one out of
`three materials that must be submitted); id. § 409
`(describing an “application for copyright registration”
`without mention of deposit copies or fees). Respondents also
`argue that Subsection 408(f) states that a preregistrant
`“must ‘appl[y] for registration of the work’” by submitting an
`application, deposit copy, and fee. Resp. Cert. Br. 15 (quoting
`17 U.S.C. § 408(f)(3)). The text, however, does not provide
`that submitting these materials constitutes “application.”
`Instead, it merely says that one must “submit to the
`Copyright Office” the enumerated materials. 17 U.S.C.
`§ 408(f)(3). Lastly, the Government’s argument that the
`application approach would render the preregistration
`scheme unnecessary, see U.S. Amicus Br. 16–17, does not
`stand as, under either approach, an author wanting to sue
`for infringement of an unfinished, unpublished work would
`be unable to do so without the benefit of preregistration.
`
`
`
`11
`
`Office action. That provision permits the copyright
`holder to file suit even “where the deposit, application,
`and fee required for registration have been delivered
`to the Copyright Office in proper form and registration
`has been refused.” 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (emphasis
`added). The language here is telling because saying
`“registration has been refused” in the past tense
`contemplates a registration upon filing, which only
`later was refused. Indeed, this phrasing suggests that
`the act of registration is something distinct from the
`act of refusal. If these acts were one and the same,
`this provision would not make sense, as the Copyright
`Office cannot refuse to accept a registration that does
`not yet exist.8
`
`Finally, while advocates of the certificate approach
`argue that the Copyright Office must act for
`registration to occur, the provisions on which they rely
`actually support the application approach because
`each of those provisions focuses on issuance of the
`“certificate of registration.” Id. §§ 408(a), 410(a). This
`
`
`8
`In interpreting this portion of Subsection 411(a), some
`certificate-approach courts have found that because the
`provision contemplates that one may submit the “deposit,
`application, and
`fee required
`for registration” yet
`registration may still be refused, the submission of
`registration materials cannot constitute registration, see La
`Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d
`1195, 1200–01 (10th Cir. 2005); Fourth Estate Public Benefit
`Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 856 F.3d 1338, 1341 (11th Cir.
`2017). But again, the plain text undermines this argument,
`as it construes registration and acceptance or refusal of the
`registration as different things.
`
`
`
`12
`
`makes sense under the application approach as the
`act of registration (filing the application, deposit copy,
`and fee with the Copyright Office) is different from the
`issuance of a certificate of registration. By contrast,
`the certificate approach would require treating two
`different terms used by Congress—“registration” and
`“certificate of registration”—as defining the same
`conduct. This is contrary to the standard rules of
`statutory interpretation. See Jama v. Immigration &
`Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 358 (2005)
`(explaining that a statute should be interpreted so
`that “distinct words have distinct meanings”).9
`
`As a result, “only one of the permissible meanings
`produces a substantive effect that is compatible with
`the rest of the law.” United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v.
`Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365,
`371 (1988). Submitting an application, deposit copy,
`and
`fee
`to
`the Copyright Office constitutes
`“registration” under Subsection 411(a).
`
`II.
`
`THE APPLICATION APPROACH BETTER
`REFLECTS THE UNIQUE NATURE AND
`PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT LAW AS
`OPPOSED TO PATENT LAW
`
`As discussed above, the application approach is the
`better reading of the Copyright Act. At best, those
`supporting the certificate approach have raised
`arguments suggesting that the term “registration” is
`
`
`9 See also 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
`ON COPYRIGHT § 7.16[B][3][a][i] (2013) (hereinafter
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