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` Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019)
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`Per Curiam
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` CITY OF ESCONDIDO, CALIFORNIA, ET AL. v. MARTY
`EMMONS
`ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
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`STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`No. 17–1660. Decided January 7, 2019
`PER CURIAM.
`The question in this qualified immunity case is whether
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`two police officers violated clearly established law when
`they forcibly apprehended a man at the scene of a reported
`domestic violence incident.
`The record, viewed in the light most favorable to the
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`plaintiff, shows the following. In April 2013, Escondido
`police received a 911 call from Maggie Emmons about a
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`domestic violence incident at her apartment. Emmons
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`lived at the apartment with her husband, her two chil-
`dren, and a roommate, Ametria Douglas. Officer Jake
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`Houchin responded to the scene and eventually helped
`take a domestic violence report from Emmons about inju-
`ries caused by her husband. The officers arrested her
`husband. He was later released.
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`A few weeks later, on May 27, 2013, at about 2:30 p.m.,
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`Escondido police received a 911 call about another possible
`domestic disturbance at Emmons’ apartment. That 911
`call came from Ametria Douglas’ mother, Trina Douglas.
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`Trina Douglas was not at the apartment, but she was on
`the phone with her daughter Ametria, who was at the
`apartment. Trina heard her daughter Ametria and Mag-
`gie Emmons yelling at each other and heard her daughter
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`screaming for help. The call then disconnected, and Trina
`Douglas called 911.
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`Officer Houchin again responded, along with Officer
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`Robert Craig. The dispatcher informed the officers that
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`two children could be in the residence and that calls to the
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`2
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`ESCONDIDO v. EMMONS
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` Per Curiam
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`apartment had gone unanswered.
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`Police body-camera video of the officers’ actions at the
`apartment is in the record.
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`The officers knocked on the door of the apartment. No
`one answered. But a side window was open, and the
`officers spoke with Emmons through that window, at-
`tempting to convince her to open the door to the apart-
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`ment so that they could conduct a welfare check. A man
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`in the apartment also told Emmons to back away from the
`window, but the officers said they could not identify the
`man. At some point during this exchange, Sergeant Kevin
`Toth, Officer Joseph Leffingwell, and Officer Huy Quach
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`arrived as backup.
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`A few minutes later, a man opened the apartment door
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`and came outside. At that point, Officer Craig was stand-
`ing alone just outside the door. Officer Craig told the man
`not to close the door, but the man closed the door and tried
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`to brush past Officer Craig. Officer Craig stopped the
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`man, took him quickly to the ground, and handcuffed him.
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`Officer Craig did not hit the man or display any weapon.
`The video shows that the man was not in any visible or
`audible pain as a result of the takedown or while on the
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`ground. Within a few minutes, officers helped the man up
`and arrested him for a misdemeanor offense of resisting
`and delaying a police officer.
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`The man turned out to be Maggie Emmons’ father,
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`Marty Emmons. Marty Emmons later sued Officer Craig
`and Sergeant Toth, among others, under Rev. Stat. §1979,
`42 U. S. C. §1983. He raised several claims, including, as
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`relevant here, a claim of excessive force in violation of the
`Fourth Amendment. The suit sought money damages for
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`which Officer Craig and Sergeant Toth would be personally
`liable. The District Court held that the officers had prob-
`able cause to arrest Marty Emmons for the misdemeanor
`offense. The Ninth Circuit did not disturb that finding,
`and there is no claim presently before us that the officers
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`3
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` Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019)
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`Per Curiam
`lacked probable cause to arrest Marty Emmons. The only
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`claim before us is that the officers used excessive force in
`effectuating the arrest.
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`The District Court rejected the claim of excessive force.
`168 F. Supp. 3d 1265, 1274 (SD Cal. 2016). The District
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`Court stated that the “video shows that the officers acted
`professionally and respectfully in their encounter” at the
`apartment. Id., at 1275. Because only Officer Craig used
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`any force at all, the District Court granted summary
`judgment to Sergeant Toth on the excessive force claim.
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`Applying this Court’s precedents on qualified immunity,
`the District Court also granted summary judgment to
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`Officer Craig. According to the District Court, the law did
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`not clearly establish that Officer Craig could not take
`down an arrestee in these circumstances. The court ex-
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`plained that the officers were responding to a domestic
`dispute, and that the encounter had escalated when the
`officers could not enter the apartment to conduct a welfare
`check. The District Court also noted that when Marty
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`Emmons exited the apartment, none of the officers knew
`whether he was armed or dangerous, or whether he had
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`injured any individuals inside the apartment.
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`The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for trial
`on the excessive force claims against both Officer Craig
`and Sergeant Toth. 716 Fed. Appx. 724 (CA9 2018). The
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`Ninth Circuit’s entire relevant analysis of the qual-
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`ified immunity question consisted of the following: “The
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`right to be free of excessive force was clearly established at
`the time of the events in question. Gravelet-Blondin v.
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`Shelton, 728 F. 3d 1086, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013).” Id., at 726.
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`We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals as to
`Sergeant Toth, and vacate and remand as to Officer Craig.
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`With respect to Sergeant Toth, the Ninth Circuit offered
`no explanation for its decision. The court’s unexplained
`reinstatement of the excessive force claim against Ser-
`geant Toth was erroneous—and quite puzzling in light of
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`4
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`ESCONDIDO v. EMMONS
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` Per Curiam
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`the District Court’s conclusion that “only Defendant Craig
`was involved in the excessive force claim” and that Em-
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`mons “fail[ed] to identify contrary evidence.” 168 F. Supp.
`3d, at 1274, n. 4.
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`As to Officer Craig, the Ninth Circuit also erred. As we
`have explained many times: “Qualified immunity attaches
`when an official’s conduct does not violate clearly estab-
`lished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reason-
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`able person would have known.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584
`U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (per curiam) (slip op., at 4) (internal
`quotation marks omitted); see District of Columbia v.
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`Wesby, 583 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018); White v. Pauly, 580
`U. S. ___, ___–___ (2017) (per curiam); Mullenix v. Luna,
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`577 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2015) (per curiam).
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`Under our cases, the clearly established right must be
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`defined with specificity. “This Court has repeatedly told
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`courts . . . not to define clearly established law at a high
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`level of generality.” Kisela, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4)
`(internal quotation marks omitted). That is particularly
`important in excessive force cases, as we have explained:
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`“Specificity is especially important in the Fourth
`Amendment context, where the Court has recognized
`that it is sometimes difficult for an officer to deter-
`mine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive
`force, will apply to the factual situation the officer
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`confronts. Use of excessive force is an area of the law
`in which the result depends very much on the facts of
`each case, and thus police officers are entitled to qual-
`ified immunity unless existing precedent squarely
`governs the specific facts at issue. . . .
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`“[I]t does not suffice for a court simply to state that
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`an officer may not use unreasonable and excessive
`force, deny qualified immunity, and then remit the
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`case for a trial on the question of reasonableness. An
`officer cannot be said to have violated a clearly estab-
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`5
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` Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019)
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`Per Curiam
`lished right unless the right’s contours were suffi-
`ciently definite that any reasonable official in the de-
`fendant’s shoes would have understood that he was
`violating it.”
`Id., at ___ (slip op., at 5) (quotation
`altered).
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`In this case, the Court of Appeals contravened those
`settled principles. The Court of Appeals should have
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`asked whether clearly established law prohibited the
`officers from stopping and taking down a man in these
`circumstances. Instead, the Court of Appeals defined the
`clearly established right at a high level of generality by
`saying only that the “right to be free of excessive force”
`was clearly established. With the right defined at that
`high level of generality, the Court of Appeals then denied
`qualified immunity to the officers and remanded the case
`for trial. 716 Fed. Appx., at 726.
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`Under our precedents, the Court of Appeals’ formulation
`of the clearly established right was far too general. To be
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`sure, the Court of Appeals cited the Gravelet-Blondin case
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`from that Circuit, which described a right to be “free from
`the application of non-trivial force for engaging in mere
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`passive resistance. . . .” 728 F. 3d, at 1093. Assuming
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`without deciding that a court of appeals decision may
`constitute clearly established law for purposes of qualified
`immunity, see City and County of San Francisco v.
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`Sheehan, 575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015), the Ninth Circuit’s
`Gravelet-Blondin case law involved police force against
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`individuals engaged in passive resistance. The Court of
`Appeals made no effort to explain how that case law pro-
`hibited Officer Craig’s actions in this case. That is a prob-
`lem under our precedents:
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`“[W]e have stressed the need to identify a case where
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`an officer acting under similar circumstances was
`held to have violated the Fourth Amendment. . . .
`While there does not have to be a case directly on
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`6
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`ESCONDIDO v. EMMONS
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` Per Curiam
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` point, existing precedent must place the lawfulness of
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` the particular [action] beyond debate. . . . Of course,
`there can be the rare obvious case, where the unlaw-
`fulness of the officer’s conduct is sufficiently clear
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`even though existing precedent does not address simi-
`lar circumstances. . . . But a body of relevant case law
`is usually necessary to clearly establish the an-
`swer . . . .” Wesby, 583 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 15)
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`(internal quotation marks omitted).
`The Court of Appeals failed to properly analyze whether
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`clearly established law barred Officer Craig from stopping
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`and taking down Marty Emmons in this manner as Em-
`mons exited the apartment. Therefore, we remand the
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`case for the Court of Appeals to conduct the analysis re-
`quired by our precedents with respect to whether Officer
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`Craig is entitled to qualified immunity.
`The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of
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`the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and vacated in
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`part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
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`consistent with this opinion.
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`It is so ordered.
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