`(Slip Opinion)
`
`
`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2017
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
`
` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
`LUCIA ET AL. v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
`
`
`
`
`COMMISSION
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
` No. 17–130. Argued April 23, 2018—Decided June 21, 2018
`
`The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) has
`
`statutory authority to enforce the nation’s securities laws. One way
`
`it can do so is by instituting an administrative proceeding against an
`
`alleged wrongdoer. Typically, the Commission delegates the task of
`
`presiding over such a proceeding to an administrative law judge
`(ALJ). The SEC currently has five ALJs. Other staff members, ra-
`ther than the Commission proper, selected them all. An ALJ as-
`signed to hear an SEC enforcement action has the “authority to do all
`
`things necessary and appropriate” to ensure a “fair and orderly” ad-
`
`versarial proceeding. 17 CFR §§201.111, 200.14(a). After a hearing
`ends, the ALJ issues an initial decision. The Commission can review
`that decision, but if it opts against review, it issues an order that the
`initial decision has become final. See §201.360(d). The initial deci-
`sion is then “deemed the action of the Commission.” 15 U. S. C.
`§78d–1(c).
`
`
`The SEC charged petitioner Raymond Lucia with violating certain
`
`securities laws and assigned ALJ Cameron Elliot to adjudicate the
`case. Following a hearing, Judge Elliot issued an initial decision con-
`
`cluding that Lucia had violated the law and imposing sanctions. On
`
`appeal to the SEC, Lucia argued that the administrative proceeding
`was invalid because Judge Elliot had not been constitutionally ap-
`pointed. According to Lucia, SEC ALJs are “Officers of the United
`States” and thus subject to the Appointments Clause. Under that
`Clause, only the President, “Courts of Law,” or “Heads of Depart-
`ments” can appoint such “Officers.” But none of those actors had
`
`made Judge Elliot an ALJ. The SEC and the Court of Appeals for the
`
`D. C. Circuit rejected Lucia’s argument, holding that SEC ALJs are
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`2
`
`
`
`LUCIA v. SEC
`
`
`Syllabus
`not “Officers of the United States,” but are instead mere employees—
`
`officials with lesser responsibilities who are not subject to the Ap-
`
`pointments Clause.
`Held: The Commission’s ALJs are “Officers of the United States,” sub-
`ject to the Appointments Clause. Pp. 5–13.
`
`
`
`(a) This Court’s decisions in United States v. Germaine, 99 U. S.
`
`508, and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, set out the basic framework
`
`
`for distinguishing between officers and employees. To qualify as an
`officer, rather than an employee, an individual must occupy a “con-
`
`tinuing” position established by law, Germaine, 99 U. S., at 511, and
`must “exercis[e] significant authority pursuant to the laws of the
`
`United States,” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 126.
`
`In Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868, the Court applied this
`framework to “special trial judges” (STJs) of the United States Tax
`Court. STJs could issue the final decision of the Tax Court in “com-
`paratively narrow and minor matters.” Id., at 873. In more major
`matters, they could preside over the hearing but could not issue a fi-
`
`nal decision. Instead, they were to “prepare proposed findings and an
`opinion” for a regular Tax Court judge to consider. Ibid. The pro-
`ceeding challenged in Freytag was a major one. The losing parties
`argued on appeal that the STJ who presided over their hearing was
`not constitutionally appointed.
`
`
`
`This Court held that STJs are officers. Citing Germaine, the Frey-
`
`
`tag Court first found that STJs hold a continuing office established
`
`by law. See 501 U. S., at 881. The Court then considered, as Buckley
`
`demands, the “significance” of the “authority” STJs wield. 501 U. S.,
`
`at 881. The Government had argued that STJs are employees in all
`cases in which they could not enter a final decision. But the Court
`thought that the Government’s focus on finality “ignore[d] the signifi-
`cance of the duties and discretion that [STJs] possess.” Ibid. De-
`
`scribing the responsibilities involved in presiding over adversarial
`hearings, the Court said: STJs “take testimony, conduct trials, rule
`
`on the admissibility of evidence, and have the power to enforce com-
`pliance with discovery orders.” Id., at 881–882. And the Court ob-
`served that “[i]n the course of carrying out these important func-
`
`tions,” STJs “exercise significant discretion.” Id., at 882.
`
`
`Freytag’s analysis decides this case. The Commission’s ALJs, like
`
`the Tax Court’s STJs, hold a continuing office established by law.
`
`SEC ALJs “receive[ ] a career appointment,” 5 CFR §930.204(a), to a
`
`position created by statute, see 5 U. S. C. §§556–557, 5372, 3105.
`
`
`And they exercise the same “significant discretion” when carrying out
`
`
`the same “important functions” as STJs do. Freytag, 501 U. S., at
`
`882. Both sets of officials have all the authority needed to ensure fair
`and orderly adversarial hearings—indeed, nearly all the tools of fed-
`
`
`
`

`

`3
`
`
`Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`
`Syllabus
`eral trial judges. The Commission’s ALJs, like the Tax Court’s STJs,
`“take testimony,” “conduct trials,” “rule on the admissibility of evi-
`dence,” and “have the power to enforce compliance with discovery or-
`
`ders.” Id., at 881–882. So point for point from Freytag’s list, SEC
`
`
`ALJs have equivalent duties and powers as STJs in conducting ad-
`versarial inquiries.
`
`Moreover, at the close of those proceedings, SEC ALJs issue deci-
`
`sions much like that in Freytag. STJs prepare proposed findings and
`an opinion adjudicating charges and assessing tax liabilities. Simi-
`larly, the Commission’s ALJs issue initial decisions containing factu-
`
`al findings, legal conclusions, and appropriate remedies. And what
`happens next reveals that the ALJ can play the more autonomous
`
`role. In a major Tax Court case, a regular Tax Court judge must al-
`ways review an STJ’s opinion, and that opinion comes to nothing un-
`
`less the regular judge adopts it. By contrast, the SEC can decide
`
`against reviewing an ALJ’s decision, and when it does so the ALJ’s
`decision itself “becomes final” and is “deemed the action of the Com-
`
`mission.” 17 CFR §201.360(d)(2); 15 U. S. C. §78d–1(c). Pp. 5–11.
`
`(b) Judge Elliot heard and decided Lucia’s case without a constitu-
`tional appointment. “[O]ne who makes a timely challenge to the con-
`stitutional validity of the appointment of an officer who adjudicates
`
`his case” is entitled to relief. Ryder v. United States, 515 U. S. 177,
`
`
`182. Lucia made just such a timely challenge. And the “appropriate”
`
`remedy for an adjudication tainted with an appointments violation is
`
`a new “hearing before a properly appointed” official. Id., at 183, 188.
`In this case, that official cannot be Judge Elliot, even if he has by
`now received a constitutional appointment. Having already both
`
`heard Lucia’s case and issued an initial decision on the merits, he
`
`cannot be expected to consider the matter as though he had not adju-
`dicated it before. To cure the constitutional error, another ALJ (or
`the Commission itself) must hold the new hearing. Pp. 12–13.
` 868 F. 3d 1021, reversed and remanded.
`KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
`
`C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined. THOM-
`AS, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined. BREYER,
`J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
`
`part, in which GINSBURG and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined as to Part III.
`
`SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J.,
`joined.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`
` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`
`
`
` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
`
` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
`
` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
`
`
` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
`
`
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 17–130
`_________________
` RAYMOND J. LUCIA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
`
`
` SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`
` APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
`
`
`
`[June 21, 2018]
`
`JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
`The Appointments Clause of the Constitution lays out
`
`
`the permissible methods of appointing “Officers of the
`
`United States,” a class of government officials distinct
`from mere employees. Art. II, §2, cl. 2. This case requires
`
`us to decide whether administrative law judges (ALJs) of
`the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Com-
`mission) qualify as such “Officers.” In keeping with Frey-
`tag v. Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868 (1991), we hold that
`they do.
`
`I
`
`The SEC has statutory authority to enforce the nation’s
`
`securities laws. One way it can do so is by instituting an
`
`administrative proceeding against an alleged wrongdoer.
`By law, the Commission may itself preside over such a
`proceeding. See 17 CFR §201.110 (2017). But the Com-
`
`mission also may, and typically does, delegate that task to
`an ALJ. See ibid.; 15 U. S. C. §78d–1(a). The SEC cur-
`
`rently has five ALJs. Other staff members, rather than
`the Commission proper, selected them all. See App. to
`Pet. for Cert. 295a–297a.
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`2
`
`
`
` LUCIA v. SEC
`
`Opinion of the Court
`An ALJ assigned to hear an SEC enforcement action has
`
`extensive powers—the “authority to do all things neces-
`sary and appropriate to discharge his or her duties” and
`ensure a “fair and orderly” adversarial proceeding.
`
`§§201.111, 200.14(a). Those powers “include, but are not
`limited to,” supervising discovery; issuing, revoking, or
`modifying subpoenas; deciding motions; ruling on the
`
`admissibility of evidence; administering oaths; hearing
`and examining witnesses; generally “[r]egulating the
`
`course of ” the proceeding and the “conduct of the parties
`
`for
`and
`their
`counsel”; and
`imposing
`sanctions
`“[c]ontemptuous conduct” or violations of procedural re-
`quirements. §§201.111, 201.180; see §§200.14(a), 201.230.
`
`As that list suggests, an SEC ALJ exercises authority
`“comparable to” that of a federal district judge conducting
`a bench trial. Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 513
`
`(1978).
`After a hearing ends, the ALJ issues an “initial deci-
`
`sion.” §201.360(a)(1). That decision must set out “findings
`
`and conclusions” about all “material issues of fact [and]
`law”; it also must include the “appropriate order, sanction,
`
`relief, or denial thereof.” §201.360(b). The Commission
`
`can then review the ALJ’s decision, either upon request or
`sua sponte. See §201.360(d)(1). But if it opts against
`
`review, the Commission “issue[s] an order that the [ALJ’s]
`decision has become final.” §201.360(d)(2). At that point,
`the initial decision is “deemed the action of the Commis-
`sion.” §78d–1(c).
`
`This case began when the SEC instituted an adminis-
`trative proceeding against petitioner Raymond Lucia and
`his investment company. Lucia marketed a retirement
`
`savings strategy called “Buckets of Money.” In the SEC’s
`
`view, Lucia used misleading slideshow presentations to
`deceive prospective clients. The SEC charged Lucia under
`
`the Investment Advisers Act, §80b–1 et seq., and assigned
`ALJ Cameron Elliot to adjudicate the case. After nine
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
` Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`days of testimony and argument, Judge Elliot issued an
`initial decision concluding that Lucia had violated the Act
`and imposing sanctions, including civil penalties of
`$300,000 and a lifetime bar from the investment industry.
`
`In his decision, Judge Elliot made factual findings about
`only one of the four ways the SEC thought Lucia’s
`slideshow misled investors. The Commission thus re-
`manded for factfinding on the other three claims, explain-
`ing that an ALJ’s “personal experience with the witnesses”
`
`places him “in the best position to make findings of fact”
`
`and “resolve any conflicts in the evidence.” App. to Pet. for
`Cert. 241a. Judge Elliot then made additional findings of
`deception and issued a revised initial decision, with the
`
`same sanctions. See id., at 118a.
`On appeal to the SEC, Lucia argued that the adminis-
`
`trative proceeding was invalid because Judge Elliot had
`not been constitutionally appointed. According to Lucia,
`the Commission’s ALJs are “Officers of the United States”
`and thus subject to the Appointments Clause. Under that
`
`Clause, Lucia noted, only the President, “Courts of Law,”
`or “Heads of Departments” can appoint “Officers.” See
`Art. II, §2, cl. 2. And none of those actors had made Judge
`
`Elliot an ALJ. To be sure, the Commission itself counts as
`a “Head[] of Department[].” Ibid.; see Free Enterprise
`Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561
`U. S. 477, 511–513 (2010). But the Commission had left
`the task of appointing ALJs, including Judge Elliot, to
`
`SEC staff members. See supra, at 1. As a result, Lucia
`contended, Judge Elliot lacked constitutional authority to
`
`do his job.
`
`The Commission rejected Lucia’s argument. It held that
`the SEC’s ALJs are not “Officers of the United States.”
`Instead, they are “mere employees”—officials with lesser
`responsibilities who
`fall outside
`the Appointments
`Clause’s ambit. App. to Pet. for Cert. 87a. The Commis-
`sion reasoned that its ALJs do not “exercise significant
`
`3
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`4
`
`
`
`LUCIA v. SEC
`
`Opinion of the Court
`authority independent of [its own] supervision.” Id., at
`
`88a. Because that is so (said the SEC), they need no
`special, high-level appointment. See id., at 86a.
`
`
`Lucia’s claim fared no better in the Court of Appeals for
`the D. C. Circuit. A panel of that court seconded the
`Commission’s view that SEC ALJs are employees rather
`
`than officers, and so are not subject to the Appointments
`
`Clause. See 832 F. 3d 277, 283–289 (2016). Lucia then
`petitioned for rehearing en banc. The Court of Appeals
`granted that request and heard argument in the case. But
`
`the ten members of the en banc court divided evenly,
`
`resulting in a per curiam order denying Lucia’s claim. See
`868 F. 3d 1021 (2017). That decision conflicted with one
`from the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. See
`Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F. 3d 1168, 1179 (2016).
`
`
`Lucia asked us to resolve the split by deciding whether
`the Commission’s ALJs are “Officers of the United States
`
`within the meaning of the Appointments Clause.” Pet. for
`Cert. i. Up to that point, the Federal Government (as
`
`represented by the Department of Justice) had defended
`the Commission’s position that SEC ALJs are employees,
`not officers. But in responding to Lucia’s petition, the
`Government switched sides.1 So when we granted the
`
`
`petition, 583 U. S. ___ (2018), we also appointed an amicus
`
`curiae to defend the judgment below.2 We now reverse.
`
`
`
`
`——————
`1In the same certiorari-stage brief, the Government asked us to add a
`
`second question presented: whether the statutory restrictions on
`
`
` removing the Commission’s ALJs are constitutional. See Brief in
`
` Response 21. When we granted certiorari, we chose not to take that
`
`
`
` step. See 583 U. S. ___ (2018). The Government’s merits brief now
`
`
` asks us again to address the removal issue. See Brief for United States
`
`
` 39–55. We once more decline. No court has addressed that question,
` and we ordinarily await “thorough lower court opinions to guide our
`
`
` analysis of the merits.” Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U. S. 189, 201 (2012).
`
`2We appointed Anton Metlitsky to brief and argue the case, 583 U. S.
`
`___ (2018), and he has ably discharged his responsibilities.
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`
`
` II
`
`
`
`The sole question here is whether the Commission’s
`
`ALJs are “Officers of the United States” or simply employ-
`ees of the Federal Government. The Appointments Clause
`prescribes the exclusive means of appointing “Officers.”
`Only the President, a court of law, or a head of depart-
`ment can do so. See Art. II, §2, cl. 2.3 And as all parties
`
`agree, none of those actors appointed Judge Elliot before
`
`he heard Lucia’s case; instead, SEC staff members gave
`him an ALJ slot. See Brief for Petitioners 15; Brief for
`United States 38; Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Cu-
`
`riae 21. So if the Commission’s ALJs are constitutional
`officers, Lucia raises a valid Appointments Clause claim.
`
`The only way to defeat his position is to show that those
`
`ALJs are not officers at all, but instead non-officer em-
`ployees—part of the broad swath of “lesser functionaries”
`in the Government’s workforce. Buckley v. Valeo, 424
`
`
`U. S. 1, 126, n. 162 (1976) (per curiam). For if that is true,
`
`the Appointments Clause cares not a whit about who
`
`named them. See United States v. Germaine, 99 U. S. 508,
`
`510 (1879).
`Two decisions set out this Court’s basic framework for
`
`
`distinguishing between officers and employees. Germaine
`
`held that “civil surgeons” (doctors hired to perform various
`
`physical exams) were mere employees because their duties
`were “occasional or temporary” rather than “continuing
`——————
`3That statement elides a distinction, not at issue here, between
`
`“principal” and “inferior” officers. See Edmond v. United States, 520
`U. S. 651, 659–660 (1997). Only the President, with the advice and
`
`consent of the Senate, can appoint a principal officer; but Congress
`
`(instead of relying on that method) may authorize the President alone,
`
`a court, or a department head to appoint an inferior officer. See ibid.
`Both the Government and Lucia view the SEC’s ALJs as inferior
`officers and acknowledge that the Commission, as a head of depart-
`
`ment, can constitutionally appoint them. See Brief for United States
`
`38; Brief for Petitioners 50–51.
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`6
`
`
`
` LUCIA v. SEC
`
`Opinion of the Court
`and permanent.” Id., at 511–512. Stressing “ideas of
`
`tenure [and] duration,” the Court there made clear that an
`
`individual must occupy a “continuing” position established
`by law to qualify as an officer. Id., at 511. Buckley then
`
`set out another requirement, central to this case. It de-
`termined that members of a federal commission were
`
`officers only after finding that they “exercis[ed] significant
`
`authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.” 424
`
`U. S., at 126. The inquiry thus focused on the extent of
`power an individual wields in carrying out his assigned
`functions.
` Both the amicus and the Government urge us to elabo-
`rate on Buckley’s “significant authority” test, but another
`of our precedents makes that project unnecessary. The
`standard is no doubt framed in general terms, tempting
`
`advocates to add whatever glosses best suit their argu-
`ments. See Brief for Amicus Curiae 14 (contending that
`an individual wields “significant authority” when he has
`“(i) the power to bind the government or private parties (ii)
`in her own name rather than in the name of a superior
`
`
` officer”); Reply Brief for United States 2 (countering that
`an individual wields that authority when he has “the
`power to bind the government or third parties on signifi-
`cant matters” or to undertake other “important and dis-
`
`tinctively sovereign functions”). And maybe one day we
`
` will see a need to refine or enhance the test Buckley set
`
`out so concisely. But that day is not this one, because in
`Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868 (1991), we applied
`
`the unadorned “significant authority” test to adjudicative
`
`officials who are near-carbon copies of the Commission’s
`ALJs. As we now explain, our analysis there (sans any
`more detailed legal criteria) necessarily decides this case.
`
`
` The officials at issue in Freytag were the “special trial
`judges” (STJs) of the United States Tax Court. The au-
`thority of those judges depended on the significance of the
`tax dispute before them. In “comparatively narrow and
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`7
`
`
`
` Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`minor matters,” they could both hear and definitively
`
`
`resolve a case for the Tax Court. Id., at 873. In more
`major matters, they could preside over the hearing, but
`could not issue the final decision; instead, they were to
`“prepare proposed findings and an opinion” for a regular
`Tax Court judge to consider. Ibid. The proceeding chal-
`lenged in Freytag was a major one, involving $1.5 billion
`
`in alleged tax deficiencies. See id., at 871, n. 1. After
`
`conducting a 14-week trial, the STJ drafted a proposed
`
`decision in favor of the Government. A regular judge then
`
`adopted the STJ’s work as the opinion of the Tax Court.
`
`See id., at 872. The losing parties argued on appeal that
`the STJ was not constitutionally appointed.
`
`This Court held that the Tax Court’s STJs are officers,
`
`not mere employees. Citing Germaine, the Court first
`found that STJs hold a continuing office established by
`law. See 501 U. S., at 881. They serve on an ongoing,
`
`rather than a “temporary [or] episodic[,] basis”; and their
`“duties, salary, and means of appointment” are all speci-
`fied in the Tax Code. Ibid. The Court then considered, as
`Buckley demands, the “significance” of the “authority”
`
`STJs wield. 501 U. S., at 881. In addressing that issue,
`the Government had argued that STJs are employees,
`rather than officers, in all cases (like the one at issue) in
`
`which they could not “enter a final decision.” Ibid. But
`
`the Court thought the Government’s focus on finality
`“ignore[d] the significance of the duties and discretion that
`
`Ibid. Describing the responsibilities
`[STJs] possess.”
`involved in presiding over adversarial hearings, the Court
`said: STJs “take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the
`
`admissibility of evidence, and have the power to enforce
`compliance with discovery orders.” Id., at 881–882. And
`
`
`the Court observed that “[i]n the course of carrying out
`these important functions, the [STJs] exercise significant
`discretion.” Id., at 882. That fact meant they were offi-
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`8
`
`
`
`LUCIA v. SEC
`
`Opinion of the Court
` cers, even when their decisions were not final.4
`
`Freytag says everything necessary to decide this case.
`
`
`To begin, the Commission’s ALJs, like the Tax Court’s
`STJs, hold a continuing office established by law. See id.,
`at 881. Indeed, everyone here—Lucia, the Government,
`
`and the amicus—agrees on that point. See Brief for Peti-
`tioners 21; Brief for United States 17–18, n. 3; Brief for
`Amicus Curiae 22, n. 7. Far from serving temporarily or
`
`episodically, SEC ALJs “receive[] a career appointment.”
`
`5 CFR §930.204(a) (2018). And that appointment is to a
`position created by statute, down to its “duties, salary, and
`
`means of appointment.” Freytag, 501 U. S., at 881; see 5
`U. S. C. §§556–557, 5372, 3105.
`
`Still more, the Commission’s ALJs exercise the same
`“significant discretion” when carrying out the same “im-
`
`portant functions” as STJs do. Freytag, 501 U. S., at 882.
`
`Both sets of officials have all the authority needed to
`ensure fair and orderly adversarial hearings—indeed,
`
`
`nearly all the tools of federal trial judges. See Butz, 438
`U. S., at 513; supra, at 2. Consider in order the four spe-
`cific (if overlapping) powers Freytag mentioned. First, the
`——————
`4The Court also provided an alternative basis for viewing the STJs as
`officers. “Even if the duties of [STJs in major cases] were not as signifi-
`
`cant as we . . . have found them,” we stated, “our conclusion would be
`unchanged.” Freytag, 501 U. S., at 882. That was because the Gov-
`ernment had conceded that in minor matters, where STJs could enter
`
`final decisions, they had enough “independent authority” to count as
`
`officers. Ibid. And we thought it made no sense to classify the STJs as
`
`officers for some cases and employees for others. See ibid. JUSTICE
`SOTOMAYOR relies on that back-up rationale in trying to reconcile
`
`Freytag with her view that “a prerequisite to officer status is the
`
`
`
`authority” to issue at least some “final decisions.” Post, at 5 (dissenting
`
`
`
`opinion). But Freytag has two parts, and its primary analysis explicitly
`
`rejects JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’s theory that final decisionmaking authority
`is a sine qua non of officer status. See 501 U. S., at 881–882. As she
`
`acknowledges, she must expunge that reasoning to make her reading
`
`
`work. See post, at 5 (“That part of the opinion[] was unnecessary to the
`
`result”).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`9
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Commission’s ALJs (like the Tax Court’s STJs) “take
`testimony.” 501 U. S., at 881. More precisely, they
`“[r]eceiv[e] evidence” and “[e]xamine witnesses” at hear-
`ings, and may also take pre-hearing depositions. 17 CFR
`§§201.111(c), 200.14(a)(4); see 5 U. S. C. §556(c)(4). Sec-
`ond, the ALJs (like STJs) “conduct trials.” 501 U. S., at
`882. As detailed earlier, they administer oaths, rule on
`motions, and generally “regulat[e] the course of ” a hear-
`ing, as well as the conduct of parties and counsel.
`
`§201.111; see §§200.14(a)(1), (a)(7); supra, at 2. Third, the
`
`ALJs (like STJs) “rule on the admissibility of evidence.”
`
`501 U. S., at 882; see §201.111(c). They thus critically
`shape the administrative record (as they also do when
`
`issuing document subpoenas). See §201.111(b). And
`fourth, the ALJs (like STJs) “have the power to enforce
`compliance with discovery orders.” 501 U. S., at 882. In
`
`particular, they may punish all “[c]ontemptuous conduct,”
`including violations of those orders, by means as severe
`
`
`as excluding the offender from the hearing.
`See
` §201.180(a)(1). So point for point—straight from Freytag’s
`
`list—the Commission’s ALJs have equivalent duties and
`
` powers as STJs in conducting adversarial inquiries.
`
`And at the close of those proceedings, ALJs issue deci-
`
` sions much like that in Freytag—except with potentially
`more independent effect. As the Freytag Court recounted,
`STJs “prepare proposed findings and an opinion” adjudi-
`cating charges and assessing tax liabilities. 501 U. S., at
`
`873; see supra, at 7. Similarly, the Commission’s ALJs
`issue decisions containing factual findings, legal conclu-
`
`sions, and appropriate remedies. See §201.360(b); supra,
`
`at 2. And what happens next reveals that the ALJ can
`play the more autonomous role. In a major case like Frey-
`tag, a regular Tax Court judge must always review an
`
`STJ’s opinion. And that opinion counts for nothing unless
`
`the regular judge adopts it as his own. See 501 U. S., at
`873. By contrast, the SEC can decide against reviewing
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`10
`
`
`
` LUCIA v. SEC
`
`Opinion of the Court
`an ALJ decision at all. And when the SEC declines review
`
`(and issues an order saying so), the ALJ’s decision itself
`“becomes final” and is “deemed the action of the Commis-
`sion.” §201.360(d)(2); 15 U. S. C. §78d–1(c); see supra, at
`2. That last-word capacity makes this an a fortiori case: If
`
`the Tax Court’s STJs are officers, as Freytag held, then the
`
`Commission’s ALJs must be too.
`
` The amicus offers up two distinctions to support the
`opposite conclusion. His main argument relates to “the
`power to enforce compliance with discovery orders”—the
`
`
`fourth of Freytag’s listed functions. 501 U. S., at 882. The
`Tax Court’s STJs, he states, had that power “because they
`
`had authority to punish contempt” (including discovery
`violations) through fines or imprisonment. Brief for Ami-
`
`cus Curiae 37; see id., at 37, n. 10 (citing 26 U. S. C.
`§7456(c)). By contrast, he observes, the Commission’s
`
`ALJs have less capacious power to sanction misconduct.
`
`The amicus’s secondary distinction involves how the Tax
`Court and Commission, respectively, review the factfind-
`
`ing of STJs and ALJs. The Tax Court’s rules state that an
`
`STJ’s findings of fact “shall be presumed” correct. Tax
`Court Rule 183(d). In comparison, the amicus notes, the
`
`SEC’s regulations include no such deferential standard.
`See Brief for Amicus Curiae 10, 38, n. 11.
`
`But those distinctions make no difference for officer
`status. To start with the amicus’s primary point, Freytag
`
`referenced only the general “power to enforce compliance
`
`with discovery orders,” not any particular method of doing
`
`so. 501 U. S., at 882. True enough, the power to toss
`
`
`malefactors in jail is an especially muscular means of
`enforcement—the nuclear option of compliance tools. But
`just as armies can often enforce their will through conven-
`
`tional weapons, so too can administrative judges. As
`
`noted earlier, the Commission’s ALJs can respond to
`discovery violations and other contemptuous conduct by
`
`excluding the wrongdoer (whether party or lawyer) from
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
` 11
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`the proceedings—a powerful disincentive to resist a court
`
`order. See §201.180(a)(1)(i); supra, at 9. Similarly, if the
`offender is an attorney, the ALJ can “[s]ummarily sus-
`pend” him from representing his client—not something
`the typical lawyer wants to invite. §201.180(a)(1)(ii). And
`finally, a judge who will, in the end, issue an opinion
`complete with factual findings, legal conclusions, and
`sanctions has substantial informal power to ensure the
`parties stay in line. Contrary to the amicus’s view, all
`that is enough to satisfy Freytag’s fourth item (even sup-
`posing, which we do not decide, that each of those items is
`
`necessary for someone conducting adversarial hearings to
`
`count as an officer).
` And the amicus’s standard-of-review distinction fares
`
`just as badly. The Freytag Court never suggested that the
`
`
`deference given to STJs’ factual findings mattered to its
`Appointments Clause analysis. Indeed, the relevant part
`of Freytag did not so much as mention the subject (even
`
`though it came up at oral argument, see Tr. of Oral Arg.
`
`33–41). And anyway, the Commission often accords a
`similar deference to its ALJs, even if not by regulation.
`The Commission has repeatedly stated, as it did below,
`that its ALJs are in the “best position to make findings of
`
` fact” and “resolve any conflicts in the evidence.” App. to
`
` Pet. for Cert. 241a (quoting In re Nasdaq Stock Market,
`
`LLC, SEC Release No. 57741 (Apr. 30, 2008)). (That was
`
`why the SEC insisted that Judge Elliot make factual
`findings on all four allegations of Lucia’s deception. See
`
`supra, at 3.) And when factfinding derives from credibility
`judgments, as it frequently does, acceptance is near-
`automatic. Recognizing ALJs’ “personal experience with
`
`the witnesses,” the Commission adopts their “credibility
`finding[s] absent overwhelming evidence to the contrary.”
`
`App. to Pet. for Cert. 241a; In re Clawson, SEC Release
`
`No. 48143 (July 9, 2003). That practice erases the consti-
`tutional line the amicus proposes to draw.
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`12
`
`
`
`LUCIA v. SEC
`
`Opinion of the Court
`The only issue left is remedial. For all the reasons we
`
`
` have given, and all those Freytag gave before, the Com-
`mission’s ALJs are “Officers of the United States,” subject
`to the Appointments Clause. And as noted earlier, Judge
`Elliot heard and decided Lucia’s case without the kind of
`appointment the Clause requires. See supra, at 5. This
`
`Court has held that “one who makes a timely challenge to
`the constitutional validity of the appointment of an officer
`
`who adjudicates his case” is entitled to relief. Ryder v.
`
`United States, 515 U. S. 177, 182–183 (1995). Lucia made
`just such a timely challenge: He contested the validity of
`Judge Elliot’s appointment before the Commission, and
`continued pressing that claim in the Court of Appeals and
`this Court. So what relief follows? This Court has also
`held that the “appropriate” remedy for an adjudication
`
`tainted with an appointments violation