(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2015
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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`
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`
`
` Syllabus
`
` WELCH v. UNITED STATES
`
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
` No. 15–6418. Argued March 30, 2016—Decided April 18, 2016
`
`Federal law makes the possession of a firearm by a felon a crime pun-
`ishable by a prison term of up to 10 years, 18 U. S. C. §§922(g),
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`924(a)(2), but the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 increases that
`sentence to a mandatory 15 years to life if the offender has three or
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`
`more prior convictions for a “serious drug offense” or a “violent felo-
`ny,” §924(e)(1). The definition of “violent felony” includes the so-
`
`called residual clause, covering any felony that “otherwise involves
`conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
`
`
`another.” §924(e)(2)(B)(ii). In Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S.
`___, this Court held that clause unconstitutional under the void-for-
`
`vagueness doctrine.
`
`
`Petitioner Welch was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal
`Act before Johnson was decided. On direct review, the Eleventh Cir-
`cuit affirmed his sentence, holding that Welch’s prior Florida convic-
`
`tion for robbery qualified as a “violent felony” under the residual
`
`
`clause. After his conviction became final, Welch sought collateral re-
`lief under 28 U. S. C. §2255, which the District Court denied. The
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`Eleventh Circuit then denied Welch a certificate of appealability.
`Three weeks later, this Court decided Johnson. Welch now seeks the
`
`
`retroactive application of Johnson to his case.
`Held: Johnson announced a new substantive rule that has retroactive
`
`effect in cases on collateral review. Pp. 6–15.
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`
`
`(a) An applicant seeking a certificate of appealability in a §2255
`proceeding must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a con-
`stitutional right.” §2253(c)(2). That standard is met when “reasona-
`
`ble jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been re-
`
`solved in a different manner.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U. S. 473, 484.
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`The question whether Welch met that standard implicates a broader
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`WELCH v. UNITED STATES
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`
`Syllabus
`legal issue: whether Johnson is a substantive decision with retroac-
`tive effect in cases on collateral review. If so, then on the present
`
`record reasonable jurists could at least debate whether Welch should
`obtain relief in his collateral challenge to his sentence. Pp. 6–7.
`
`
`
`(b) New constitutional rules of criminal procedure generally do
`not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review, but new sub-
`
`
`stantive rules do apply retroactively. Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288,
`
`310; Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U. S. 348, 351. Substantive rules al-
`
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`ter “the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punish-
`
`es,” id., at 353. Procedural rules, by contrast, “regulate only the
`manner of determining the defendant’s culpability.” Ibid. Under this
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`framework, Johnson is substantive. Before Johnson, the residual
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`clause could cause an offender to face a prison sentence of at least 15
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`years instead of at most 10. Since Johnson made the clause invalid,
`it can no longer mandate or authorize any sentence. By the same log-
`ic, Johnson is not procedural, since it had nothing to do with the
`range of permissible methods a court might use to determine whether
`a defendant should be sentenced under the Act, see Schriro, supra, at
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`353. Pp. 7–9.
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`
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`(c) The counterarguments made by Court-appointed amicus are
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`unpersuasive. She contends that Johnson is a procedural decision
`because the void-for-vagueness doctrine is based on procedural due
`process. But the Teague framework turns on whether the function of
`the rule is substantive or procedural, not on the rule’s underlying
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`constitutional source. Amicus’ approach would lead to results that
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`cannot be squared with prior precedent. Precedent also does not
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`support amicus’ claim that a rule must limit Congress’ power to be
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`substantive, see, e.g., Bousley v. United States, 523 U. S. 614, or her
`claim that statutory construction cases are an ad hoc exception to
`that principle and are substantive only because they implement the
`intent of Congress. The separation-of-powers argument raised by
`amicus is also misplaced, for regardless of whether a decision in-
`volves statutory interpretation or statutory invalidation, a court
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`lacks the power to exact a penalty that has not been authorized by
`any valid criminal statute. Pp. 10–15.
`Vacated and remanded.
`KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
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`
`
`C. J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ.,
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`joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
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` Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 15–6418
`_________________
` GREGORY WELCH, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
`[April 18, 2016]
`JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
`Last Term, this Court decided Johnson v. United States,
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`576 U. S. ___ (2015). Johnson considered the residual
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`clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18
`U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court held that provision
`void for vagueness. The present case asks whether John-
`son is a substantive decision that is retroactive in cases on
`collateral review.
`
`
`
`I
`
`
`Federal law prohibits any felon—meaning a person who
`has been convicted of a crime punishable by more than a
`year in prison—from possessing a firearm. 18 U. S. C.
`§922(g). A person who violates that restriction can be
`sentenced to prison for up to 10 years. §924(a)(2). For
`some felons, however, the Armed Career Criminal Act
`
`imposes a much more severe penalty. Under the Act, a
`person who possesses a firearm after three or more convic-
`tions for a “serious drug offense” or a “violent felony” is
`subject to a minimum sentence of 15 years and a maxi-
`mum sentence of life in prison. §924(e)(1). Because the
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`ordinary maximum sentence for a felon in possession of a
`firearm is 10 years, while the minimum sentence under
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` WELCH v. UNITED STATES
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`Opinion of the Court
`the Armed Career Criminal Act is 15 years, a person
`sentenced under the Act will receive a prison term at least
`five years longer than the law otherwise would allow.
`The Act defines “violent felony” as
`
`“any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term ex-
`ceeding one year . . . that—
`“(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
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`threatened use of physical force against the person of
`another; or
`“(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of
`explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that pre-
`sents a serious potential risk of physical injury to an-
`other.” §924(e)(2)(B).
`
`Subsection (i) of this definition is known as the elements
`clause. The end of subsection (ii)—“or otherwise involves
`conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
`injury to another”—is known as the residual clause. See
`Johnson, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 2). It is the residual
`clause that Johnson held to be vague and invalid.
`
`The text of the residual clause provides little guidance
`on how to determine whether a given offense “involves
`conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
`injury.” This Court sought for a number of years to de-
`velop the boundaries of the residual clause in a more pre-
`cise fashion by applying the statute to particular cases. See
`
`
`James v. United States, 550 U. S. 192 (2007) (residual
`clause covers Florida offense of attempted burglary);
`
`Begay v. United States, 553 U. S. 137 (2008) (residual
`
`clause does not cover New Mexico offense of driving under
`the influence of alcohol); Chambers v. United States, 555
`U. S. 122 (2009) (residual clause does not cover Illinois
`offense of failure to report to a penal institution); Sykes v.
`
`United States, 564 U. S. 1 (2011) (residual clause covers
`Indiana offense of vehicular flight from a law-enforcement
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`Opinion of the Court
`officer). In Johnson, a majority of this Court concluded
`that those decisions did not bring sufficient clarity to the
`scope of the residual clause, noting that the federal courts
`remained mired in “pervasive disagreement” over how the
`clause should be interpreted. Johnson, 576 U. S., at ___
`(slip op., at 9).
`The Johnson Court held the residual clause unconstitu-
`tional under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a doctrine
`that is mandated by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
`Amendment (with respect to the Federal Government) and
`the Fourteenth Amendment (with respect to the States).
`The void-for-vagueness doctrine prohibits the government
`from imposing sanctions “under a criminal law so vague
`that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the con-
`duct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbi-
`trary enforcement.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 3). Johnson
`determined that the residual clause could not be recon-
`ciled with that prohibition.
`
`The vagueness of the residual clause rests in large part
`
`on its operation under the categorical approach. The
`categorical approach is the framework the Court has
`applied in deciding whether an offense qualifies as a vio-
`lent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act. See id.,
`at ___ (slip op., at 4). Under the categorical approach, “a
`
`court assesses whether a crime qualifies as a violent fel-
`ony ‘in terms of how the law defines the offense and not in
`terms of how an individual offender might have committed
`it on a particular occasion.’” Ibid. (quoting Begay, supra,
`at 141). For purposes of the residual clause, then, courts
`were to determine whether a crime involved a “serious
`potential risk of physical injury” by considering not the
`defendant’s actual conduct but an “idealized ordinary case
`of the crime.” 576 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12).
`
`
`The Court’s analysis in Johnson thus cast no doubt on
`the many laws that “require gauging the riskiness of
`conduct in which an individual defendant engages on a
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` WELCH v. UNITED STATES
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`Opinion of the Court
`particular occasion.” Ibid. The residual clause failed not
`because it adopted a “serious potential risk” standard but
`because applying that standard under the categorical
`approach required courts to assess the hypothetical risk
`posed by an abstract generic version of the offense. In the
`Johnson Court’s view, the “indeterminacy of the wide-
`ranging inquiry” made the residual clause more unpre-
`dictable and arbitrary in its application than the Consti-
`tution allows. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 5). “Invoking so
`shapeless a provision to condemn someone to prison for 15
`years to life,” the Court held, “does not comport with the
`
`Constitution’s guarantee of due process.” Id., at ___ (slip
`op., at 10).
`
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`
`4
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`
`II
`
`Petitioner Gregory Welch is one of the many offenders
`
`sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act before
`Johnson was decided. Welch pleaded guilty in 2010 to one
`count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The
`Probation Office prepared a presentence report finding
`
`that Welch had three prior violent felony convictions,
`including a Florida conviction for a February 1996 “strong-
`arm robbery.” The relevant Florida statute prohibits
`taking property from the person or custody of another with
`“the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear.” Fla.
`Stat. §812.13(1) (1994). The charging document from the
`1996 Florida case tracked that statutory language. App.
`187a. The 2010 federal presentence report provides more
`detail. It states that, according to the robbery victim,
`Welch punched the victim in the mouth and grabbed a
`gold bracelet from his wrist while another attacker
`
`grabbed a gold chain from his neck.
`Welch objected to the presentence report, arguing (as
`
`relevant here) that this conviction was not a violent felony
`conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The
`District Court overruled the objection. It concluded that
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`Opinion of the Court
`the Florida offense of strong-arm robbery qualified as a
`violent felony both under the elements clause, 18 U. S. C.
`
`§924(e)(2)(B)(i), and the residual clause, §924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
`The District Court proceeded to sentence Welch to the
`Act’s mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in prison.
`
`The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
`
`That court did not decide whether the conviction at issue
`could qualify as a violent felony under the elements
`clause. Instead, it held only that the conviction qualified
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`under the residual clause. This Court denied certiorari,
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`see Welch v. United States, 568 U. S. ___ (2013), and
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`Welch’s conviction became final.
`
`In December 2013, Welch appeared pro se before the
`District Court and filed a collateral challenge to his con-
`viction and sentence through a motion under 28 U. S. C.
`§2255. He argued, among other points, that his strong-
`arm robbery conviction itself was “vague” and that his
`counsel was ineffective for allowing him to be sentenced as
`
`an armed career criminal. The District Court denied the
`motion and denied a certificate of appealability.
`
`
` Still proceeding pro se, Welch applied to the Court of
`Appeals for a certificate of appealability. His application
`noted that Johnson was pending before this Court. Welch
`
`
`argued, in part, that his “armed career offender status is
`
`unconstitutional and violate[s] [his] Fifth Amendment
`right to notice of the state priors.” App. 20a. Two months
`later, Welch filed a motion asking the Court of Appeals to
`hold his case in abeyance until Johnson could be decided,
`“based on the fact he was sentenced under the [residual
`clause].” App. 15a.
`
`In June 2015, the Court of Appeals entered a brief
`
`single-judge order denying the motion for a certificate of
`appealability. Less than three weeks later, this Court
`issued its decision in Johnson holding, as already noted,
`that the residual clause is void for vagueness. Welch filed
`a motion asking the Court of Appeals for additional time
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` WELCH v. UNITED STATES
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`Opinion of the Court
`to seek reconsideration of its decision in light of Johnson,
`but the court returned that motion unfiled because
`Welch’s time to seek reconsideration already had expired.
`
`Welch then filed a pro se petition for certiorari. His
`
`petition presented two questions: whether the District
`Court erred in denying his §2255 motion because his
`Florida robbery conviction does not qualify as a violent
`felony conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act;
`and whether Johnson announced a substantive rule that
`has retroactive effect in cases on collateral review. Pet. for
`Cert. i. This Court granted the petition. 577 U. S. ___
`(2016). Because the United States, as respondent, agrees
`with Welch that Johnson is retroactive, the Court ap-
`pointed Helgi C. Walker as amicus curiae in support of the
`judgment of the Court of Appeals. She has ably dis-
`
`charged her responsibilities.
`
`III
`
`A
`
`
`This case comes to the Court in a somewhat unusual
`procedural posture. Under the Antiterrorism and Effec-
`
`tive Death Penalty Act of 1996, there can be no appeal
`from a final order in a §2255 proceeding unless a circuit
`justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28
`U. S. C. §2253(c)(1). A certificate of appealability may
`issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial show-
`ing of the denial of a constitutional right.” §2253(c)(2).
`That standard is met when “reasonable jurists could de-
`bate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition
`should have been resolved in a different manner.” Slack v.
`McDaniel, 529 U. S. 473, 484 (2000). Obtaining a certifi-
`cate of appealability “does not require a showing that the
`appeal will succeed,” and “a court of appeals should not
`
`decline the application . . . merely because it believes the
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`applicant will not demonstrate an entitlement to relief.”
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`Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U. S. 322, 337 (2003).
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`Opinion of the Court
`The decision under review here is the single-judge order
`
`in which the Court of Appeals denied Welch a certificate of
`appealability. Under the standard described above, that
`order determined not only that Welch had failed to show
`any entitlement to relief but also that reasonable jurists
`would consider that conclusion to be beyond all debate.
`
`See Slack, supra, at 484. The narrow question here is
`
`
`whether the Court of Appeals erred in making that deter-
`
`mination. That narrow question, however, implicates a
`broader legal issue: whether Johnson is a substantive
`decision with retroactive effect in cases (like Welch’s) on
`
`collateral review. If so, then on the present record reason-
`able jurists could at least debate whether Welch should
`obtain relief in his collateral challenge to his sentence. On
`these premises, the Court now proceeds to decide whether
`
` Johnson is retroactive.
`
`
`
`B
`The normal framework for determining whether a new
`
`rule applies to cases on collateral review stems from the
`plurality opinion in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989).
`That opinion in turn drew on the approach outlined by the
`second Justice Harlan in his separate opinions in Mackey
`
` v. United States, 401 U. S. 667 (1971), and Desist v. United
`States, 394 U. S. 244 (1969). The parties here assume that
`the Teague framework applies in a federal collateral chal-
`
`lenge to a federal conviction as it does in a federal collat-
`eral challenge to a state conviction, and we proceed on
`that assumption. See Chaidez v. United States, 568 U. S.
`
`
`___, ___, n. 16 (2013); Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U. S.
`264, 269, n. 4 (2008).
`
`Under Teague, as a general matter, “new constitutional
`
`
`rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those
`cases which have become final before the new rules are
`announced.” 489 U. S., at 310. Teague and its progeny
`recognize two categories of decisions that fall outside this
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` WELCH v. UNITED STATES
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`Opinion of the Court
`general bar on retroactivity for procedural rules. First,
`
`
`“[n]ew substantive rules generally apply retroactively.”
`
`Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U. S. 348, 351 (2004); see
`Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip
`op., at 6); Teague, supra, at 307, 311. Second, new “‘wa-
`tershed rules of criminal procedure,’” which are proce-
`dural rules “implicating the fundamental fairness and accu-
`racy of the criminal proceeding,” will also have retroactive
`effect. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 495 (1990); see
`Teague, supra, at 311–313.
`
`
`It is undisputed that Johnson announced a new rule.
`See Teague, supra, at 301 (“[A] case announces a new rule
`if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the
`time the defendant’s conviction became final”). The ques-
`tion here is whether that new rule falls within one of the
`two categories that have retroactive effect under Teague.
`The parties agree that Johnson does not fall into the
`
`
`limited second category for watershed procedural rules.
`Welch and the United States contend instead that John-
`son falls into the first category because it announced a
`substantive rule.
`
`
`“A rule is substantive rather than procedural if it alters
`the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law
`punishes.” Schriro, 542 U. S., at 353. “This includes
`decisions that narrow the scope of a criminal statute by
`interpreting its terms, as well as constitutional determina-
`tions that place particular conduct or persons covered by
`the statute beyond the State’s power to punish.” Id., at
`
`351–352 (citation omitted); see Montgomery, supra, at ___
`(slip op., at 6). Procedural rules, by contrast, “regulate
`
`only the manner of determining the defendant’s culpabil-
`ity.” Schriro, 542 U. S., at 353. Such rules alter “the
`
`range of permissible methods for determining whether a
`defendant’s conduct is punishable.” Ibid. “They do not
`produce a class of persons convicted of conduct the law
`does not make criminal, but merely raise the possibility
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`Opinion of the Court
`that someone convicted with use of the invalidated proce-
`dure might have been acquitted otherwise.” Id., at 352.
`
`Under this framework, the rule announced in Johnson
`is substantive. By striking down the residual clause as
`void for vagueness, Johnson changed the substantive
`reach of the Armed Career Criminal Act, altering “the
`range of conduct or the class of persons that the [Act]
`punishes.” Schriro, supra, at 353. Before Johnson, the
`Act applied to any person who possessed a firearm after
`three violent felony convictions, even if one or more of
`those convictions fell under only the residual clause. An
`
`offender in that situation faced 15 years to life in prison.
`After Johnson, the same person engaging in the same
`conduct is no longer subject to the Act and faces at most
`10 years in prison. The residual clause is invalid under
`Johnson, so it can no longer mandate or authorize any
`sentence. Johnson establishes, in other words, that “even
`the use of impeccable factfinding procedures could not
`legitimate” a sentence based on that clause. United States
`v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U. S. 715, 724
`
`(1971). It follows that Johnson is a substantive decision.
`
`
`By the same logic, Johnson is not a procedural decision.
`Johnson had nothing to do with the range of permissible
`methods a court might use to determine whether a de-
`
`fendant should be sentenced under the Armed Career
`Criminal Act. See Schriro, 542 U. S., at 353. It did not,
`for example, “allocate decisionmaking authority” between
`judge and jury, ibid., or regulate the evidence that the
`court could consider in making its decision, see Whorton v.
`Bockting, 549 U. S. 406, 413–414, 417 (2007); Mackey,
`supra, at 700–701 (opinion of Harlan, J.). Unlike those
`cases, Johnson affected the reach of the underlying statute
`rather than the judicial procedures by which the statute is
`applied. Johnson is thus a substantive decision and so has
`retroactive effect under Teague in cases on collateral
`review.
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` WELCH v. UNITED STATES
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`Opinion of the Court
`
`C
`
`
`Amicus urges the Court to adopt a different understand-
`
`ing of the Teague framework. She contends courts should
`
`apply that framework by asking whether the constitu-
`tional right underlying the new rule is substantive or
`procedural. Under that approach, amicus concludes that
`Johnson is a procedural decision because the void-for-
`vagueness doctrine that Johnson applied is based, she
`asserts, on procedural due process.
`
`Neither Teague nor its progeny support that approach.
`As described above, this Court has determined whether a
`
`new rule is substantive or procedural by considering the
`function of the rule, not its underlying constitutional
`source. See, e.g., Schriro, supra, at 351–353. That is for
`good reason. The Teague framework creates a balance
`between, first, the need for finality in criminal cases, and
`second, the countervailing imperative to ensure that crim-
`inal punishment is imposed only when authorized by law.
`That balance turns on the function of the rule at issue, not
`the constitutional guarantee from which the rule derives.
`If a new rule regulates only the procedures for determin-
`ing culpability, the Teague balance generally tips in favor
`of finality. The chance of a more accurate outcome under
`the new procedure normally does not justify the cost of
`vacating a conviction whose only flaw is that its proce-
`dures “conformed to then-existing constitutional stand-
`ards.” Teague, supra, at 310. On the other hand, if a new
`rule changes the scope of the underlying criminal proscrip-
`tion, the balance is different. A change of that character
`will “necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant
`stands convicted of ‘an act that the law does not make
`
`criminal.’” Bousley v. United States, 523 U. S. 614, 620
`(1998) (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, 346
`(1974)). By extension, where the conviction or sentence in
`fact is not authorized by substantive law, then finality
`interests are at their weakest. As Justice Harlan wrote,
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`Opinion of the Court
`“[t]here is little societal interest in permitting the criminal
`
`process to rest at a point where it ought properly never to
`repose.” Mackey, 401 U. S., at 693 (opinion of Harlan, J.).
`The Teague balance thus does not depend on whether
`the underlying constitutional guarantee is characterized
`as procedural or substantive. It depends instead on
`
`
`whether the new rule itself has a procedural function or a
`substantive function—that is, whether it alters only the
`procedures used to obtain the conviction, or alters instead
`the range of conduct or class of persons that the law pun-
`
`ishes. See Schriro, supra, at 353; Montgomery, 577 U. S.,
`at ___ (slip op., at 14). The emphasis by amicus on the
`constitutional guarantee behind the new rule, then, would
`untether the Teague framework from its basic purpose.
` The approach amicus suggests also would lead to results
`that cannot be squared with prior precedent. Decisions
`from this Court show that a rule that is procedural for
`Teague purposes still can be grounded in a substantive
`constitutional guarantee. For instance, the Court has
`adopted certain rules that regulate capital sentencing
`procedures in order to enforce the substantive guarantees
`of the Eighth Amendment. The consistent position has
`been that those rules are procedural, even though their
`
`ultimate source is substantive. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks,
`542 U. S. 406, 408, 416–417 (2004); Sawyer v. Smith, 497
`U. S. 227, 233, 241–242 (1990). From the converse per-
`spective, there also can be substantive rules based on
`constitutional protections that, on the theory amicus
`advances, likely would be described as procedural. For
`instance, a decision that invalidates as void for vagueness
`a statute prohibiting “conduct annoying to persons passing
`by,” cf. Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 612, 614
`(1971), would doubtless alter the range of conduct that the
`law prohibits. That would make it a substantive decision
`
`
`under our precedent, see Schriro, 542 U. S., at 353, even if
`the reasons for holding that statute invalid could be char-
`
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`Opinion of the Court
`
` acterized as procedural.
`Amicus next relies on language from this Court’s cases
`
`describing substantive decisions as those that “place par-
`ticular conduct or persons . . . beyond the State’s power to
`punish,” id., at 352, or that “prohibi[t] a certain category of
`punishment for a class of defendants because of their
`status or offense,” Saffle, 494 U. S., at 494 (internal quota-
`tion marks omitted). Cases such as these, in which the
`Constitution deprives the Government of the power to
`impose the challenged punishment, “represen[t] the clear-
`est instance” of substantive rules for which retroactive
`application is appropriate. Mackey, supra, at 693 (opinion
`of Harlan, J.). Drawing on those decisions, amicus argues
`that Johnson is not substantive because it does not limit
`Congress’ power: Congress is free to enact a new version of
`the residual clause that imposes the same punishment on
`the same persons for the same conduct, provided the new
`statute is precise enough to satisfy due process.
`
`Although this Court has put great emphasis on substan-
`tive decisions that place certain conduct, classes of per-
`sons, or punishments beyond the legislative power of
`Congress, the Court has also recognized that some sub-
`stantive decisions do not impose such restrictions. The
`
`clearest example comes from Bousley, supra. In Bousley,
`
`
`the Court was asked to determine what retroactive effect
`should be given to its decision in Bailey v. United States,
`516 U. S. 137 (1995). Bailey considered the “use” prong of
`18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1), which imposes increased penalties
`on the use of a firearm in relation to certain crimes. The
`Court held as a matter of statutory interpretation that the
`“use” prong punishes only “active employment of the
`
`firearm” and not mere possession. 516 U. S., at 144. The
`
`Court in Bousley had no difficulty concluding that Bailey
`was substantive, as it was a decision “holding that a sub-
`stantive federal criminal statute does not reach certain
`
`conduct.” Bousley, supra, at 620; see Schriro, supra, at
`
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` Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`Opinion of the Court
` 354 (“A decision that modifies the elements of an offense is
`
`
`normally substantive rather than procedural”). The Court
`reached that conclusion even though Congress could (and
`later did) reverse Bailey by amending the statute to cover
`possession as well as use. See United States v. O’Brien,
`
`560 U. S. 218, 232–233 (2010) (discussing statutory
`amendment known as the “Bailey fix”). Bousley thus
`
`contradicts the contention that the Teague inquiry turns
`only on whether the decision at issue holds that Congress
`lacks some substantive power.
`Amicus recognizes that Bousley does not fit the theory
`
`that, in her view, should control this case. She instead
`proposes an ad hoc exception, contending that Bousley
`“recognized a separate subcategory of substantive rules”
`for decisions that interpret statutes (but not those, like
`Johnson, that invalidate statutes). Brief for Court-
`Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below
`40. For support, amicus looks to the separation-of-powers
`doctrine. Her argument is that statutory construction
`cases are substantive because they define what Congress
`always intended the law to mean—unlike Johnson, which
`struck down the residual clause regardless of Congress’
`intent.
`
`That argument is not persuasive. Neither Bousley nor
`any other case from this Court treats statutory interpreta-
`tion cases as a special class of decisions that are substan-
`tive because they implement the intent of Congress.
`Instead, decisions that interpret a statute are substantive
`if and when they meet the normal criteria for a substan-
`tive rule: when they “alte[r] the range of conduct or the
`class of persons that the law punishes.” Schriro, supra, at
`353.
`
`The separation-of-powers argument that amicus raises
`is also misplaced. Bousley noted that the separation of
`powers prohibits a court from imposing criminal punish-
`ment beyond what Congress meant to enact. 523 U. S., at
`
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`620–621 (“[I]t is only Congress, and not the courts, which
`can make conduct criminal”). But a court likewise is
`prohibited from imposing criminal punishment beyond
`what Congress in fact has enacted by a valid law. In
`
`either case a court lacks the power to exact a penalty that
`has not been authorized by any valid criminal statute.
`
`Treating decisions as substantive if they involve statu-
`tory interpretation, but not if they involve statutory inval-
`idation, would produce unusual outcomes. “It has long
`been our practice . . . before striking a federal statute as
`impermissibly vague, to consider whether the prescription
`is amenable to a limiting construction.” Skilling v. United
`States, 561 U. S. 358, 405–406 (2010). Amicus ackn