`(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2016
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`
`
` Syllabus
`
` BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA ET AL. v.
`
`
`HELMERICH & PAYNE INTERNATIONAL DRILLING
`
`
`CO. ET AL.
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
` No. 15–423. Argued November 2, 2016—Decided May 1, 2017
`
`The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) shields foreign states
`
`from suits in United States Courts, 28 U. S. C. §1604, with specified
`exceptions. The expropriation exception applies to “any case . . . in
`which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in
`issue and that property . . . is owned or operated by an agency or in-
`strumentality of the foreign state . . . engaged in a commercial activi-
`
`ty in the United States.” §1605(a)(3).
`
`A wholly owned Venezuelan subsidiary (Subsidiary) of an Ameri-
`can company (Parent) has long supplied oil rigs to oil development
`entities that were part of the Venezuelan Government. The Ameri-
`
`
`can Parent and its Venezuelan Subsidiary (plaintiffs) filed suit in
`federal court against those entities (Venezuela), claiming that Vene-
`zuela had unlawfully expropriated the Subsidiary’s rigs by national-
`izing them. Venezuela moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
`
`its sovereign immunity deprived the District Court of jurisdiction.
`Plaintiffs argued that the case falls within the expropriation excep-
`tion, but Venezuela claimed that international law did not cover the
`expropriation of property belonging to a country’s nationals like the
`Subsidiary and that the American Parent did not have property
`rights in the Subsidiary’s assets. The District Court agreed as to the
`Subsidiary, dismissing its claim on jurisdictional grounds. But it re-
`jected the claim that the Parent had no rights in the Subsidiary’s
`
`property. The District of Columbia Circuit reversed in part and af-
`
`firmed in part, finding that both claims fell within the exception.
`With respect to the Subsidiary’s claim, it concluded that a sovereign’s
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`taking of its own nationals’ property would violate international law
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`2 BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA v. HELMERICH &
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`PAYNE INT’L DRILLING CO.
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`if the expropriation unreasonably discriminated based on a compa-
`ny’s shareholders’ nationality. With respect to the Parent’s claim, it
`held that the exception applied because the Parent had raised its
`rights in a nonfrivolous way. The court decided only whether the
`plaintiffs might have a nonfrivolous expropriation claim, making
`clear that, under its standard, a nonfrivolous argument would be suf-
`ficient to bring a case within the scope of the exception. Given the
`factual stipulations, the court concluded, the Subsidiary had satisfied
`
`that standard for purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss.
`
`Held: The nonfrivolous-argument standard is not consistent with the
`FSIA. A case falls within the scope of the expropriation exception on-
`ly if the property in which the party claims to hold rights was indeed
`“property taken in violation of international law.” A court should de-
`cide the foreign sovereign’s immunity defense “[a]t the threshold” of
`the action, Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480,
`
`493, resolving any factual disputes as near to the outset of the case as
`
`is reasonably possible. Pp. 6–16.
`
`(a) The expropriation exception grants jurisdiction only where
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`there is a legally valid claim that a certain kind of right is at issue
`(property rights) and that the relevant property was taken in a cer-
`tain way (in violation of international law). Simply making a non-
`frivolous argument to that effect is not sufficient. This reading is
`
`supported by the provision’s language, which applies in a “case. . . in
`which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in
`issue.” Such language would normally foresee a judicial decision
`about the jurisdictional matter. This interpretation is supported by
`precedent. See, e.g., Permanent Mission of India to United Nations v.
`City of New York, 551 U. S. 193, 201–202. It is also supported by a
`basic objective of the FSIA, which is to follow international law prin-
`ciples, namely, that granting foreign sovereigns immunity from suit
`both recognizes the “absolute independence of every sovereign au-
`thority” and helps to “induc[e]” each nation state, as a matter of “in-
`ternational comity,” to “respect the independence and dignity of every
`other,” Berizzi Brothers Co. v. S. S. Pesaro, 271 U. S. 562, 575. Noth-
`ing in the FSIA’s history suggests that Congress intended a radical
`departure from these principles in codifying the mid-20th-century
`doctrine of “restrictive” sovereign immunity, which denies immunity
`
`
`in cases “arising out of a foreign state’s strictly commercial acts,” but
`
`applies immunity in “suits involving the foreign sovereign’s public
`acts,” Verlinden, supra, at 487. It is thus not surprising that the ex-
`propriation exception on its face emphasizes conformity with interna-
`tional law, requiring both a commercial connection with the United
`States and a taking of property “in violation of international law.”
`
`A “nonfrivolous-argument” reading of the exception would under-
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`Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
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`
`Syllabus
`mine the objectives embedded in the statute’s language, history, and
`structure. It could also embroil a foreign sovereign in an American
`lawsuit for some time by adopting a standard limited only by the
`bounds of a lawyer’s (nonfrivolous) imagination. And it could cause
`
`
`friction with other nations, leading to reciprocal actions against this
`
`country. Pp. 6–12.
`
`(b) Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. They
`suggest that the expropriation exception should be treated similarly
`to 28 U. S. C. §1331’s “arising under” jurisdiction, which applies if a
`plaintiff can make a nonfrivolous argument that a federal law pro-
`vides the relief sought—even if, in fact, it does not, Bell v. Hood, 327
`U. S. 678 685. But §1331 differs from the exception in language and
`concerns. Section 1331 often simply determines which court doors—
`federal or state—are open, and neither it nor related jurisdictional
`sections seek to provide a sovereign foreign nation with immunity—
`the FSIA’s basic objective. Nor does the text of §1331 suggest that
`consistency with international law is of particular importance.
`
`Plaintiffs also claim that the nonfrivolous-argument approach will
`work little harm since the matter could be resolved by motion prac-
`tice before the sovereign bears the expense of a full trial. But resolv-
`ing a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or
`summary judgment under Rule 56 may impose increased burdens of
`time and expense upon the foreign nation. And a district court’s de-
`cision that there is a “violation of international law” as a matter of
`jurisdiction may be immediately appealable as a collateral order,
`while the same decision made pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56
`motion would be a decision on the “merits” not subject to immediate
`appeal. Moreover, the Circuit would part with its nonfrivolous-
`argument standard where a “violation of international law” is not an
`element of the claim to be decided on the merits. This bifurcated ap-
`proach is difficult to reconcile with the statute’s language, history, or
`purpose; and it creates needless complexity for judges and lawyers,
`
`domestic and foreign. Pp. 12–16.
`784 F. 3d 804, vacated and remanded.
`BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other
`Members joined, except GORSUCH, J., who took no part in the considera-
`tion or decision of the case.
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`3
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`

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` Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 15–423
`_________________
` BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA, ET AL.,
`
`
`
`PETITIONERS v. HELMERICH & PAYNE IN­
`TERNATIONAL DRILLING CO., ET AL.
`
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
`
`
`[May 1, 2017]
`
` JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
`The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA or
`
`Act), provides, with specified exceptions, that a “foreign
`state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of
`the United States and of the States . . . .” 28 U. S. C.
`§1604. One of the jurisdictional exceptions—the expropri­
`ation exception—says that
`“[a] foreign state shall not be immune from the juris­
`diction of courts of the United States or of the States
`in any case . . . (3) in which rights in property taken in
`violation of international law are in issue and that
`property . . . is owned or operated by an agency or
`instrumentality of the foreign state . . . engaged in
`the United States.”
`a commercial activity
`in
`
`§1605(a)(3).
`
`
`The question here concerns the phrase “case . . . in which
`rights in property taken in violation of international law
`are in issue.”
`
`
`Does this phrase mean that, to defeat sovereign immu­
`nity, a party need only make a “nonfrivolous” argument
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`

`

` 2 BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA v. HELMERICH &
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`PAYNE INT’L DRILLING CO.
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`that the case falls within the scope of the exception? Once
`made, does the existence of that nonfrivolous argument
`mean that the court retains jurisdiction over the case until
`the court decides, say, the merits of the case? Or does a
`more rigorous jurisdictional standard apply? To put the
`question more generally: What happens in a case where
`the party seeking to rely on the expropriation exception
`makes a nonfrivolous, but ultimately incorrect, claim that
`his property was taken in violation of international law?
`In our view, a party’s nonfrivolous, but ultimately incor­
`
`rect, argument that property was taken in violation of
`international law is insufficient to confer jurisdiction.
`
`
`Rather, state and federal courts can maintain jurisdiction
`to hear the merits of a case only if they find that the prop­
`erty in which the party claims to hold rights was indeed
`
`“property taken in violation of international law.” Put
`differently, the relevant factual allegations must make out
`a legally valid claim that a certain kind of right is at issue
`(property rights) and that the relevant property was taken
`in a certain way (in violation of international law). A good
`argument to that effect is not sufficient. But a court nor­
`mally need not resolve, as a jurisdictional matter, disputes
`about whether a party actually held rights in that prop-
`erty; those questions remain for the merits phase of the
`litigation.
`
`Moreover, where jurisdictional questions turn upon
`further factual development, the trial judge may take
`evidence and resolve relevant factual disputes. But, con­
`sistent with foreign sovereign immunity’s basic objective,
`namely, to free a foreign sovereign from suit, the court
`should normally resolve those factual disputes and reach a
`decision about immunity as near to the outset of the case
`
`as is reasonably possible. See Verlinden B. V. v. Central
`
`Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 493–494 (1983).
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` Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
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`Opinion of the Court
`
`I
`
`
`Since the mid-1970’s a wholly owned Venezuela-
`incorporated subsidiary (Subsidiary) of an American com­
`pany (Parent) supplied oil rigs to oil development entities
`that were part of the Venezuelan Government. In 2011
`the American Parent company and its Venezuelan Subsid­
`iary (the respondents here) brought this lawsuit in federal
`court against those foreign government entities. (The
`entities go by their initials, PDVSA, but we shall normally
`refer to them as “Venezuela” or the “Venezuelan Govern­
`ment.”) The American Parent and the Venezuelan Subsid­
`iary claimed that the Venezuelan Government had unlaw­
`
`fully expropriated the Subsidiary’s oil rigs. And they
`
`sought compensation.
`
`
`According to stipulated facts, by early 2010 the Vene­
`zuelan Government had failed to pay more than $10 mil­
`lion that it owed the Subsidiary. At that point the gov­
`ernment sent troops to the equipment yard where the rigs
`were stored, prevented the Subsidiary from removing the
`rigs, and issued a “‘Decree of Expropriation’” nationaliz­
`ing the rigs. App. 72–74. Subsequently, the president of
`the oil development entities led a rally at the Subsidiary’s
`offices, where he referred to the Venezuelan Subsidiary as
`an “‘American company’” with “‘foreign gentlemen inves­
`tors.’” Id., at 54.
`
`Venezuela asked the court to dismiss the case on the
`ground that Venezuela possessed sovereign immunity and
`that the court consequently lacked “jurisdiction” to hear
`the case. See 28 U. S. C. §1604; Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.
`12(b)(1) and (b)(2); Verlinden, supra, at 485, n. 5 (explain­
`ing that a court lacks “subject-matter” and “personal”
`jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign unless an FSIA excep­
`tion applies). The companies replied that the case falls
`within the expropriation exception. Venezuela in turn
`argued that the Subsidiary’s expropriation claim did not
`satisfy the exception because “‘international law does not
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` 4 BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA v. HELMERICH &
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`PAYNE INT’L DRILLING CO.
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`cover expropriations of property belonging to a country’s
`own nationals’”; the taking was not “‘in violation of inter­
`national law,’” and the exception thus does not apply.
`Record in No. 11–cv–01735 (D DC), Doc. 22, p. 13. Vene­
`zuela further argued that the American Parent’s national­
`
`ity makes no difference because, “as a corporate parent,
`[it] does not own [the Subsidiary’s] assets.” Id., Doc. 24,
`at 12.
`
`The parties agreed that the District Court should then
`decide whether the exception applies, and it should do so
`on the basis of governing law, taking all of the plaintiffs’
`well-pleaded allegations as true and construing the com­
`plaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. App.
`119. The court decided, in relevant part, that the excep­
`tion did not apply to the Venezuelan Subsidiary’s claim
`because the Subsidiary was a national of Venezuela. See
`971 F. Supp. 2d 49, 57–61 (2013). The court concluded
`that Venezuela consequently possessed sovereign immu-
`nity, and it dismissed the Subsidiary’s claim on jurisdic­
`tional grounds. It rejected, however, Venezuela’s argument
`that the Parent had no rights in property in the Subsidi­
`ary. It concluded that Venezuela’s “actions have deprived
`[the Parent], individually, of its essential and unique
`rights as sole shareholder . . . by dismantling its voting
`power, destroying its ownership, and frustrating its con­
`
`
`trol over the company.” Id., at 73.
`
`The Venezuelan Subsidiary appealed the dismissal of its
`expropriation claim, and Venezuela appealed the court’s
`refusal to dismiss the Parent’s claim. The Court of Ap­
`peals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed in part
`and affirmed in part the District Court’s conclusions. It
`decided that both the Subsidiary’s and the Parent’s claims
`fell within the exception.
`
`With respect to the Subsidiary’s claim, the court agreed
`that a sovereign’s taking of its own nationals’ property
`normally does not violate international law. But, the
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` Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`court said, there is an “exception” to this rule. And that
`exception applies when a sovereign’s expropriation unrea­
`sonably discriminates on the basis of a company’s share­
`holders’ nationality, 784 F. 3d 804, 812 (CADC 2015)
`(citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F. 2d
`845 (CA2 1962)). That exception, it added, might apply
`here, in which case the expropriation would violate inter­
`national law, the FSIA’s expropriation exception would
`apply, and the federal courts would possess jurisdiction
`
`over the case. 784 F. 3d, at 813. With respect to the
`
`Parent’s expropriation claim, the court agreed with the
`District Court that the expropriation exception applied
`because the Parent had “‘put its rights in property in issue
`in a non-frivolous way.’” Id., at 816.
`
`For present purposes, it is important to keep in mind
`that the Court of Appeals did not decide (on the basis of
`the stipulated facts) that the plaintiffs’ allegations are
`sufficient to show their property was taken in violation of
`international law. It decided instead that the plaintiffs
`might have such a claim. And it made clear the legal
`standard that it would apply. It said that, in deciding
`whether the expropriation exception applies, it would set
`an “exceptionally low bar.” Id., at 812. Any possible, i.e.,
`“‘non-frivolous,’” ibid., claim of expropriation is sufficient,
`in the Court of Appeals’ view, to bring a case within the
`scope of the FSIA’s exception. In particular: If a plaintiff
`alleges facts and claims that permit the plaintiff to make
`an expropriation claim that is not “‘wholly insubstantial or
`
`frivolous,’” then the exception permits the suit and the
`
`sovereign loses its immunity. Ibid. (emphasis added).
`Given the factual stipulations, the Court of Appeals did
`not suggest further factfinding on this jurisdictional issue
`but, rather, decided that the Subsidiary had “satisfied this
`Circuit’s forgiving standard for surviving a motion to
`dismiss in an FSIA case.” Id., at 813.
`
`
`Venezuela filed a petition for certiorari asking us to
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` 6 BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA v. HELMERICH &
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`PAYNE INT’L DRILLING CO.
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`decide whether the Court of Appeals had applied the
`
`correct standard in deciding that the companies had met
`
`the expropriation exception’s requirements. We agreed to
`do so.
`
`
`II
`
`
`Foreign sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in this case
`because explicit statutory language makes it so. See
`§1604 (“[A] foreign state shall be immune from the juris­
`diction of the courts of the United States and of the States
`except as provided” by the FSIA’s exceptions); §1605(a) (“A
`foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction” of
`
`federal and state courts if the exception at issue here is
`satisfied). Given the parties’ stipulations as to all rele­
`
`vant facts, our inquiry poses a “‘pure question of statutory
`
`construction,’” Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U. S.
`677, 701 (2004). In our view, the expropriation exception
`grants jurisdiction only where there is a valid claim that
`“property” has been “taken in violation of international
`law.” §1605(a)(3). A nonfrivolous argument to that effect
`is insufficient.
`For one thing, the provision’s language, while ambigu­
`
`ous, supports such a reading. It says that there is juris­
`diction in a “case . . . in which rights in property taken in
`
`violation of international law are in issue.” Ibid. Such
`
`language would normally foresee a judicial decision about
`the jurisdictional matter. And that matter is whether a
`certain kind of “right” is “at issue,” namely, a property
`right taken in violation of international law. To take a
`purely hypothetical example, a party might assert a claim
`to a house in a foreign country. If the foreign country
`nationalized the house and, when sued, asserted sovereign
`immunity, then the claiming party would as a jurisdic­
`tional matter prove that he claimed “property” (which a
`house obviously is) and also that the property was “taken
`in violation of international law.” He need not show as a
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`

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` Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`Opinion of the Court
` jurisdictional matter that he, rather than someone else,
`
`owned the house. That question is part of the merits of
`the case and remains “at issue.”
`
`We recognize that merits and jurisdiction will some­
`
`times come intertwined. Suppose that the party asserted
`a claim to architectural plans for the house. It might be
`necessary to decide whether the law recognizes the kind of
`right that he asserts, or whether it is a right in “property”
`that was “taken in violation of international law.” Per­
`haps that is the only serious issue in the case. If so, the
`court must still answer the jurisdictional question. If to
`do so, it must inevitably decide some, or all, of the merits
`issues, so be it.
`Our reading of the statute is consistent with its lan­
`
`guage. The case is one which the existence of “rights”
`remains “at issue” until the court decides the merits of the
`case. But whether the rights asserted are rights of a
`
`certain kind, namely, rights in “property taken in violation
`of international law,” is a jurisdictional matter that the
`court must typically decide at the outset of the case, or as
`
` close to the outset as is reasonably possible.
`Precedent offers a degree of support for our interpreta­
`
`tion. In Permanent Mission of India to United Nations v.
`City of New York, 551 U. S. 193 (2007), we interpreted a
`different FSIA exception for cases “in which . . . rights in
`immovable property situated in the United States are in
`issue.” §1605(a)(4). We held that there was jurisdiction
`over the case because the plaintiff ’s lawsuit to enforce a
`tax lien “directly implicate[d]” the property rights de­
`scribed by the FSIA exception. See id., at 200–201. We did
`not simply rely upon a finding that the plaintiff had made
`a nonfrivolous argument that the exception applied.
`
`For another thing, one of the FSIA’s basic objectives, as
`
`shown by its history, supports this reading. The Act for
`the most part embodies basic principles of international
`law long followed both in the United States and elsewhere.
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` 8 BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA v. HELMERICH &
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`PAYNE INT’L DRILLING CO.
`Opinion of the Court
`
` See Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, 136–
`137 (1812); see also Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 493 (explain­
`ing that the Act “comprehensively regulat[es] the amen­
`
`ability of foreign nations to suit in the United States”). Our
`
`
`courts have understood, as international law itself under­
`stands, foreign nation states to be “independent sovereign”
`entities. To grant those sovereign entities an immunity
`
`from suit in our courts both recognizes the “absolute inde­
`pendence of every sovereign authority” and helps to “‘in­
`duc[e]’” each nation state, as a matter of “‘international
`comity,’” to “‘respect the independence and dignity of
`
`every other,’” including our own. Berizzi Brothers Co. v.
`
`S. S. Pesaro, 271 U. S. 562, 575 (1926) (quoting The Par-
`lement Belge, [1880] 5 P. D. 197, 214–215 (appeal taken
`
`from Admiralty Div.)).
`
`In the mid-20th century, we, like many other nations,
`began to treat nations acting in a commercial capacity like
`other commercial entities. See Permanent Mission, supra,
`at 199–200. And we consequently began to limit our
`recognition of sovereign immunity, denying that immunity
`in cases “arising out of a foreign state’s strictly commercial
`acts,” but continuing to apply that doctrine in “suits in­
`volving the foreign sovereign’s public acts,” Verlinden, 461
`U. S., at 487 (emphasis added).
`
`At first, our courts, aware of the expertise of the Execu­
`tive Branch in matters of foreign affairs, relied heavily
`upon the advice of that branch when deciding just when
`and how this “restrictive” sovereign immunity doctrine
`applied. Ibid. See also H. R. Rep. No. 94–1487, pp. 8–9
`(1976) (similar). But in 1976, Congress, at the urging of
`the Department of State and Department of Justice, began
`to codify the doctrine. The resulting statute, the FSIA,
`“starts from a premise of immunity and then creates
`exceptions to the general principle.” Id., at 17; Verlinden,
`supra, at 493. Almost all the exceptions involve commerce
`or immovable property located in the United States. E.g.,
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` Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
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`Opinion of the Court
`§§1605(a)(2) and (4); see also §1602 (expressing the finding
`that “[u]nder international law, states are not immune
`from the jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their
`commercial activities are concerned”). The statute thereby
`creates a doctrine that by and large continues to reflect
`basic principles of international law, in particular those
`principles embodied in what jurists refer to as the “restric­
`tive” theory of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Restatement
`(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
`§451, and Comment a (1986) (describing the restrictive
`theory of immunity); United Nations General Assembly,
`Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and
`Their Property, Res. 59/38, Arts. 5, 10–12 (Dec. 2, 2004)
`(adopting a restrictive theory of immunity and withdraw­
`ing immunity for loss of property where, among other
`requirements, “the act or omission occurred in whole or in
`part in the territory of th[e] other State”); United Nations
`General Assembly, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on
`Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property,
`
`Supp. A/59/22 No. 1, pp. 7–11 (Mar. 1–5, 2004) (same).
`
`We have found nothing in the history of the statute that
`suggests Congress intended a radical departure from these
`basic principles. To the contrary, the State Department,
`which helped to draft the FSIA’s language (and to whose
`views on sovereign immunity this Court, like Congress,
`has paid special attention, Altmann, 541 U. S., at 696),
`told Congress that the Act was “drafted keeping in mind
`what we believe to be the general state of the law interna­
`tionally, so that we conform fairly closely . . . to our ac­
`cepted international standards,” Hearing on H. R. 3493
`before the Subcommittee on Claims and Governmental
`
`Relations of the House of Representatives Committee on
`the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 18 (1973). The De­
`
`partment added that, by doing so, we would diminish the
`likelihood that other nations would each go their own way,
`
`thereby “subject[ing]” the United States “abroad” to more
`
`
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`
`
`9
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` 10 BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA v. HELMERICH &
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`PAYNE INT’L DRILLING CO.
`Opinion of the Court
`claims “than we permit in this country . . . .” Ibid. It is
`consequently not surprising to find that the expropriation
`exception on its face emphasizes conformity with interna­
`tional law by requiring not only a commercial connection
`with the United States but also a taking of property “in
`violation of international law.”
`
`We emphasize this point, embedded in the statute’s
`language, history, and structure, because doing so reveals
`a basic objective of our sovereign immunity doctrine,
`which a “nonfrivolous-argument” reading of the expropria­
`tion exception would undermine. A sovereign’s taking or
`regulating of its own nationals’ property within its own
`territory is often just the kind of foreign sovereign’s public
`act (a “jure imperii”) that the restrictive theory of sover­
`eign immunity ordinarily leaves immune from suit. See
`Permanent Mission, 551 U. S., at 199 (describing the
`FSIA’s distinction between public acts, or jure imperii, and
`purely commercial ones); Restatement (Third) of Foreign
`Relations Law of the United States §712, at 196 (noting
`that, under international law, a state is responsible for a
`“taking of the property of a national of another state”
`(emphasis added)). See also Restatement (Fourth) of
`Foreign Relations Law of the United States §455, Report­
`er’s Note 12, p. 9 (Tent. Draft No. 2, Mar. 22, 2016) (noting
`that “[n]o provision comparable” to the exception “has yet
`been adopted in the domestic immunity statutes of other
`countries” and that expropriations are considered acts jure
`imperii); United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324, 332
`(1937); B. Cheng & G. Schwarzberger, General Principles
`of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals
`37–38 (1953) (collecting cases describing “the power of the
`sovereign State to expropriate” (internal quotation marks
`omitted)); Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany
`v. Italy), 2012 I. C. J. 99, 123–125, ¶¶56–60 (Judgt. of Feb.
`3) (noting consistent state practice in respect to the dis­
`tinction between public and commercial acts and describ­
`
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` Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
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`Opinion of the Court
`ing an international law of immunity recognizing such a
`difference); Altmann, supra, at 708 (BREYER, J., concur­
`ring) (describing the French Court of Appeals’ decision
`about whether a King who has abdicated the throne is
`“‘entitled to claim . . . immunity’” as “‘Hea[d] of State’”
`when his sovereign status at the time of suit was in doubt
`(quoting Ex-King Farouk of Egypt v. Christian Dior, 84
`Clunet 717, 24 I. L. R. 228, 229 (CA Paris 1957))).
`To be sure, there are fair arguments to be made that a
`
`sovereign’s taking of its own nationals’ property some­
`times amounts to an expropriation that violates interna­
`tional law, and the expropriation exception provides that
`the general principle of immunity for these otherwise
`public acts should give way. But such arguments are
`about whether such an expropriation does violate interna­
`tional law. To find jurisdiction only where a taking does
`violate international law is thus consistent with basic
`international law and the related statutory objectives and
`principles that we have mentioned. But to find jurisdic­
`tion where a taking does not violate international law (e.g.,
`where there is a nonfrivolous but ultimately incorrect
`argument that the taking violates international law) is
`inconsistent with those objectives. And it is difficult to
`understand why Congress would have wanted that result.
`Moreover, the “nonfrivolous-argument” interpretation
`
`would, in many cases, embroil the foreign sovereign in an
`American lawsuit for an increased period of time. It would
`substitute for a more workable standard (“violation of
`international law”) a standard limited only by the bounds
`of a lawyer’s (nonfrivolous) imagination. It would create
`increased complexity in respect to a jurisdictional matter
`where clarity is particularly important. Hertz Corp. v.
`Friend, 559 U. S. 77, 94–95 (2010). And clarity is doubly
`important here where foreign nations and foreign lawyers
`must understand our law.
`
`Finally, the Solicitor General and the Department of
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` 12 BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA v. HELMERICH &
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`PAYNE INT’L DRILLING CO.
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`Opinion of the Court
`
`State also warn us that the nonfrivolous-argument inter­
`pretation would “affron[t]” other nations, producing fric­
`tion in our relations with those nations and leading some
`to reciprocate by granting their courts permission to em­
`broil the United States in “expensive and difficult litiga­
`tion, based on legally insufficient assertions that sovereign
`immunity should be vitiated.” Brief for United States as
`Amicus Curiae 21–22. (At any given time the Department
`of Justice’s Office of Foreign Litigation represents the
`United States in about 1,000 cases in 100 courts around
`the world. Ibid.) See also National City Bank of N. Y. v.
`Republic of China, 348 U. S. 356, 362 (1955) (noting that
`our grant of immunity to foreign sovereigns dovetails with
`our own interest in receiving similar treatment).
`
`III
`
`The plaintiffs make two important arguments to the
`contrary. First, they point to the federal statute that gives
`federal courts jurisdiction over cases “arising under the
`Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” 28
`U. S. C. §1331. They note that in Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S.
`678 (1946), this Court held that the “arising under” stat­
`ut