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` OCTOBER TERM, 2015
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`Syllabus
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` Syllabus
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` SHAPIRO ET AL. v. McMANUS, CHAIRMAN,
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` MARYLAND STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, ET AL.
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`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
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`THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
` No. 14–990. Argued November 4, 2015—Decided December 8, 2015
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`Since 1976, federal law has mandated that a “district court of three
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` judges shall be convened . . . when an action is filed challenging the
`constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts . . . ,”
`28 U. S. C. §2284(a), and has provided that “the judge [presented
`with a request for a three-judge court] shall, unless he determines
`that three judges are not required, immediately notify the chief judge
`of the circuit, who shall designate two other judges” to serve,
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`§2284(b)(1).
` Petitioners requested that a three-judge court be convened to con-
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` sider their claim that Maryland’s 2011 congressional redistricting
`plan burdens their First Amendment right of political association.
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` Concluding that no relief could be granted for this claim, the District
`Judge dismissed the action instead of notifying the Chief Judge of the
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` Circuit to convene a three-judge court. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.
` Held: Section 2284 entitles petitioners to make their case before a
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`three-judge court. Pp. 3–8.
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`(a) Section 2284(a)’s prescription could not be clearer. Because the
` present suit is indisputably “an action . . . challenging the constitu-
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`tionality of the apportionment of congressional districts,” the District
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`Judge was required to refer the case to a three-judge court. Section
`2284(a) admits of no exception, and “the mandatory ‘shall’ . . . nor-
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`mally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion.” Lex-
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`econ Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U. S. 26, 35.
`The subsequent provision of §2284(b)(1), that the district judge shall
`commence the process for appointment of a three-judge panel “unless
`he determines that three judges are not required,” should be read not
`as a grant of discretion to the district judge to ignore §2284(a), but as
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`SHAPIRO v. MCMANUS
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`Syllabus
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`a compatible administrative detail requiring district judges to “de-
`termin[e]” only whether the “request for three judges” is made in a
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`case covered by §2284(a).
`This conclusion
`is bolstered by
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`§2284(b)(3)’s explicit command that “[a] single judge shall not . . . en-
`ter judgment on the merits.” Pp. 3–5.
`(b) Respondents’ alternative argument, that the District Judge
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`should have dismissed petitioners’ claim as “constitutionally insub-
`stantial” under Goosby v. Osser, 409 U. S. 512, is unpersuasive. This
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`Court has long distinguished between failing to raise a substantial
`federal question for
`jurisdictional purposes—what Goosby ad-
`dressed—and failing to state a claim for relief on the merits—what
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`the District Judge found here; only “wholly insubstantial and frivo-
`lous” claims implicate the former, Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 682–
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`683. Absent such obvious frivolity, “the failure to state a proper
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`cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dis-
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`missal for want of jurisdiction.” Id., at 682. Petitioners’ plea for re-
`lief, which was based on a legal theory put forward in JUSTICE KEN-
`NEDY’s concurrence in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U. S. 267, 315, and
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`in subsequent majority opinions, easily clears
`uncontradicted
`Goosby’s low bar. Pp. 5–7.
`584 Fed. Appx. 140, reversed and remanded.
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` SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
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` Cite as: 577 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`_________________
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` No. 14–990
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` STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
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`DAVID J. MCMANUS, JR., CHAIRMAN, MARYLAND
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`STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, ET AL.
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`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
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`APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
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`[December 8, 2015]
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` JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
`We consider under what circumstances, if any, a district
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`judge is free to “determin[e] that three judges are not
`required” for an action “challenging the constitutionality
`of the apportionment of congressional districts.”
`28
`U. S. C. §§2284(a), (b)(1).
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`I
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`A
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`Rare today, three-judge district courts were more com-
`mon in the decades before 1976, when they were required
`for various adjudications, including the grant of an “inter-
`locutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforce-
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`ment, operation or execution of any State statute . . . upon
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`the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute.” 28
`U. S. C. §2281 (1970 ed.), repealed, Pub. L. 94–381, §1, 90
`Stat. 1119. See Currie, The Three-Judge District Court
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`in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 3–12
`(1964). Decisions of three-judge courts could, then as now,
`be appealed as of right directly to this Court. 28 U. S. C.
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`§1253.
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`SHAPIRO v. MCMANUS
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`Opinion of the Court
`In 1976, Congress substantially curtailed the circum-
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`stances under which a three-judge court is required. It
`was no longer required for the grant of an injunction
`against state statutes, see Pub. L. 94–381, §1, 90 Stat.
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`1119 (repealing 28 U. S. C. §2281), but was mandated for
`“an action . . . challenging the constitutionality of the
`apportionment of congressional districts or the apportion-
`ment of any statewide legislative body.”
`Id., §3, now
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`codified at 28 U. S. C. §2284(a).
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`Simultaneously, Congress amended the procedures
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`governing three-judge district courts. The prior statute
`had provided: “The district judge to whom the application
`for injunction or other relief is presented shall constitute
`one member of [the three-judge] court. On the filing of the
`application, he shall immediately notify the chief judge of
`the circuit, who shall designate two other judges” to serve.
`28 U. S. C. §2284(1) (1970 ed.). The amended statute
`provides: “Upon the filing of a request for three judges, the
`judge to whom the request is presented shall, unless he
`determines that three judges are not required, immediately
`notify the chief judge of the circuit, who shall designate
`two other judges” to serve. 28 U. S. C. §2284(b)(1) (2012
`ed.) (emphasis added). The dispute here concerns the
`scope of the italicized text.
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`B
`In response to the 2010 Census, Maryland enacted a
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`statute in October 2011 establishing—or, more pejora-
`tively, gerrymandering—the districts for the State’s eight
`congressional seats. Dissatisfied with the crazy-quilt
`results, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a, petitioners, a bipar-
`tisan group of citizens, filed suit pro se in Federal District
`Court. Their amended complaint alleges, inter alia, that
`Maryland’s redistricting plan burdens their First Amend-
`ment right of political association. Petitioners also re-
`quested that a three-judge court be convened to hear the
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` Cite as: 577 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`case.
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`The District Judge, however, thought the claim “not one
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`for which relief can be granted.” Benisek v. Mack, 11
`F. Supp. 3d 516, 526 (Md. 2014). “[N]othing about the
`congressional districts at issue in this case affects in any
`proscribed way [petitioners’] ability to participate in the
`political debate in any of the Maryland congressional
`districts in which they might find themselves. They are
`free to join preexisting political committees, form new
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`ones, or use whatever other means are at their disposal to
`influence the opinions of their congressional representa-
`tives.”
`Ibid. (brackets, ellipsis, and internal quotation
`marks omitted).
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`For that reason, instead of notifying the Chief Judge of
`the Circuit of the need for a three-judge court, the District
`Judge dismissed the action. The Fourth Circuit summar-
`ily affirmed in an unpublished disposition. Benisek v.
`Mack, 584 Fed. Appx. 140 (CA4 2014). Seeking review in
`this Court, petitioners pointed out that at least two other
`Circuits consider it reversible error for a district judge to
`dismiss a case under §2284 for failure to state a claim for
`relief rather than refer it for transfer to a three-judge
`court. See LaRouche v. Fowler, 152 F. 3d 974, 981–983
`(CADC 1998); LULAC v. Texas, 113 F. 3d 53, 55–56 (CA5
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`1997) (per curiam). We granted certiorari. Shapiro v.
`Mack, 576 U. S. ___ (2015).
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`II
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`Petitioners’ sole contention is that the District Judge
`had no authority to dismiss the case rather than initiate
`the procedures to convene a three-judge court. Not so,
`argue respondents; the 1976 addition to §2284(b)(1) of the
`clause “unless he determines that three judges are not
`required” is precisely such a grant of authority. Moreover,
`say respondents, Congress declined to specify a standard
`to constrain the exercise of this authority. Choosing, as
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`SHAPIRO v. MCMANUS
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`Opinion of the Court
`the District Judge did, the familiar standard for dismissal
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`under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) best serves
`the purposes of a three-judge court, which (in respondents’
`view) is to protect States from “hasty, imprudent invalida-
`tion” of their statutes by rogue district judges acting alone.
`Brief for Respondents 27.
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`Whatever the purposes of a three-judge court may be,
`respondents’ argument needlessly produces a contradic-
`tion in the statutory text. That text’s initial prescription
`could not be clearer: “A district court of three judges shall
`be convened . . . when an action is filed challenging the
`constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional
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`districts . . . .” 28 U. S. C. §2284(a) (emphasis added).
`Nobody disputes that the present suit is “an action . . .
`challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of
`congressional districts.” It follows that the district judge
`was required to refer the case to a three-judge court, for
`§2284(a) admits of no exception, and “the mandatory
`‘shall’ . . . normally creates an obligation impervious to
`judicial discretion.” Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad
`Hynes & Lerach, 523 U. S. 26, 35 (1998); see also National
`Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U. S.
`644, 661–662 (2007) (same).
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`The subsequent provision of §2284(b)(1), that the dis-
`trict judge shall commence the process for appointment of
`a three-judge panel “unless he determines that three
`judges are not required,” need not and therefore should
`not be read as a grant of discretion to the district judge to
`ignore §2284(a). It is not even framed as a proviso, or an
`exception from that provision, but rather as an adminis-
`trative detail that is entirely compatible with §2284(a).
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`The old §2284(1) triggered the district judge’s duty to refer
`the matter for the convening of a three-judge court “[o]n
`the filing of the application” to enjoin an unconstitutional
`state law. By contrast, the current §2284(b)(1) triggers
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`the district judge’s duty “[u]pon the filing of a request for
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` Cite as: 577 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Opinion of the Court
`three judges” (emphasis added). But of course a party
`may—whether in good faith or bad, through ignorance or
`hope or malice—file a request for a three-judge court even
`if the case does not merit one under §2284(a). Section
`2284(b)(1) merely clarifies that a district judge need not
`unthinkingly initiate the procedures to convene a three-
`judge court without first examining the allegations in the
`complaint. In short, all the district judge must “deter-
`min[e]” is whether the “request for three judges” is made
`in a case covered by §2284(a)—no more, no less.
`That conclusion is bolstered by §2284(b)(3)’s explicit
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`command that “[a] single judge shall not . . . enter judg-
`ment on the merits.” It would be an odd interpretation
`that allowed a district judge to do under §2284(b)(1) what
`he is forbidden to do under §2284(b)(3). More likely that
`Congress intended a three-judge court, and not a single
`district judge, to enter all final judgments in cases satisfy-
`ing the criteria of §2284(a).
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`III
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`Respondents argue in the alternative that a district
`judge is not required to refer a case for the convening of a
`three-judge court if the constitutional claim is (as they
`assert petitioners’ claim to be) “insubstantial.” In Goosby
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`v. Osser, 409 U. S. 512 (1973), we stated that the filing of a
`“constitutionally insubstantial” claim did not trigger the
`three-judge-court requirement under the pre-1976 statu-
`tory regime. Id., at 518. Goosby rested not on an interpre-
`tation of statutory text, but on the familiar proposition
`that “[i]n the absence of diversity of citizenship, it is es-
`sential to jurisdiction that a substantial federal question
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`should be presented.” Ex parte Poresky, 290 U. S. 30, 31
`(1933) (per curiam) (emphasis added). Absent a substan-
`tial federal question, even a single-judge district court
`lacks jurisdiction, and “[a] three-judge court is not re-
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`quired where the district court itself lacks jurisdiction of
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`SHAPIRO v. MCMANUS
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`Opinion of the Court
`the complaint or the complaint is not justiciable in the
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` federal courts.” Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit
`Union, 419 U. S. 90, 100 (1974).
`In the present case, however, the District Judge dis-
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`missed petitioners’ complaint not because he thought he
`lacked jurisdiction, but because he concluded that the
`allegations failed to state a claim for relief on the merits,
`citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662 (2009), and Bell
`Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544 (2007). See 11
`F. Supp. 3d, at 520. That was in accord with Fourth Cir-
`cuit precedent, which holds that where the “pleadings do
`not state a claim, then by definition they are insubstantial
`and so properly are subject to dismissal by the district
`court without convening a three-judge court.” Duckworth
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`v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 332 F. 3d 769, 772–
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`773 (CA4 2003) (emphasis added).
`We think this standard both too demanding and incon-
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`sistent with our precedents. “[C]onstitutional claims will
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`not lightly be found insubstantial for purposes of ” the
`three-judge-court statute. Washington v. Confederated
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`Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U. S. 134, 147–148
`(1980). We have long distinguished between failing to
`raise a substantial federal question for jurisdictional
`purposes—which is what Goosby addressed—and failing to
`state a claim for relief on the merits; only “wholly insub-
`stantial and frivolous” claims implicate the former. Bell v.
`Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 682–683 (1946); see also Hannis
`Distilling Co. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 216
`U. S. 285, 288 (1910) (“obviously frivolous or plainly in-
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`substantial”); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31, 33 (1962)
`(per curiam) (“wholly insubstantial,” “legally speaking
`non-existent,” “essentially fictitious”); Steel Co. v. Citizens
`for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 89 (1998) (“frivolous
`or immaterial”). Absent such frivolity, “the failure to state
`a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits
`and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.” Bell,
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` Cite as: 577 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Opinion of the Court
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` supra, at 682. Consistent with this principle, Goosby
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`clarified that “‘[c]onstitutional insubstantiality’ for this
`purpose has been equated with such concepts as ‘essen-
`tially fictitious,’ ‘wholly insubstantial,’ ‘obviously frivolous,’
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`and ‘obviously without merit.’” 409 U. S., at 518 (citations
`omitted). And the adverbs were no mere throwaways;
`“[t]he limiting words ‘wholly’ and ‘obviously’ have cogent
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`legal significance.” Ibid.
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`Without expressing any view on the merits of petition-
`ers’ claim, we believe it easily clears Goosby’s low bar;
`after all, the amended complaint specifically challenges
`Maryland’s apportionment “along the lines suggested by
`Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in Vieth [v. Jubelirer,
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`541 U. S. 267 (2004)].” App. to Brief in Opposition 44.
`Although the Vieth plurality thought all political gerry-
`mandering claims nonjusticiable, JUSTICE KENNEDY,
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`concurring in the judgment, surmised that if “a State did
`impose burdens and restrictions on groups or persons by
`reason of their views, there would likely be a First
`Amendment violation, unless the State shows some com-
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`pelling interest. . . . Where it is alleged that a gerryman-
`der had the purpose and effect of imposing burdens on a
`disfavored party and its voters, the First Amendment may
`offer a sounder and more prudential basis for intervention
`than does the Equal Protection Clause.” Vieth v. Ju-
`belirer, 541 U. S. 267, 315 (2004). Whatever “wholly in-
`substantial,” “obviously frivolous,” etc., mean, at a mini-
`mum they cannot include a plea for relief based on a legal
`theory put forward by a Justice of this Court and uncon-
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`tradicted by the majority in any of our cases. Accordingly,
`the District Judge should not have dismissed the claim as
`“constitutionally insubstantial” under Goosby. Perhaps
`petitioners will ultimately fail on the merits of their suit,
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`but §2284 entitles them to make their case before a three-
`judge district court.
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`SHAPIRO v. MCMANUS
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`Opinion of the Court
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`The judgment of the Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the
`case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
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`this opinion.
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`It is so ordered.