(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2015
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` Syllabus
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`BIRCHFIELD v. NORTH DAKOTA
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH DAKOTA
`No. 14–1468. Argued April 20, 2016—Decided June 23, 2016*
`To fight the serious harms inflicted by drunk drivers, all States have
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`laws that prohibit motorists from driving with a blood alcohol concen-
`tration (BAC) exceeding a specified level. BAC is typically deter-
`mined through a direct analysis of a blood sample or by using a ma-
`chine to measure the amount of alcohol in a person’s breath. To help
`secure drivers’ cooperation with such testing, the States have also
`enacted “implied consent” laws that require drivers to submit to BAC
`tests. Originally, the penalty for refusing a test was suspension of
`the motorist’s license. Over time, however, States have toughened
`their drunk-driving laws, imposing harsher penalties on recidivists
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`and drivers with particularly high BAC levels. Because motorists
`who fear these increased punishments have strong incentives to re-
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`ject testing, some States, including North Dakota and Minnesota,
`now make it a crime to refuse to undergo testing.
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`In these cases, all three petitioners were arrested on drunk-driving
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`charges. The state trooper who arrested petitioner Danny Birchfield
`advised him of his obligation under North Dakota law to undergo
`BAC testing and told him, as state law requires, that refusing to
`submit to a blood test could lead to criminal punishment. Birchfield
`refused to let his blood be drawn and was charged with a misde-
`meanor violation of the refusal statute. He entered a conditional
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`guilty plea but argued that the Fourth Amendment prohibited crimi-
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`nalizing his refusal to submit to the test. The State District Court re-
`——————
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`*Together with No. 14–1470, Bernard v. Minnesota, on certiorari to
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`the Supreme Court of Minnesota, and No. 14–1507, Beylund v. Levi,
`Director, North Dakota Department of Transportation, also on certiorari
`to the Supreme Court of North Dakota.
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`BIRCHFIELD v. NORTH DAKOTA
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`Syllabus
`jected his argument, and the State Supreme Court affirmed.
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`After arresting petitioner William Robert Bernard, Jr., Minnesota
`police transported him to the station. There, officers read him Min-
`nesota’s implied consent advisory, which like North Dakota’s informs
`motorists that it is a crime to refuse to submit to a BAC test. Ber-
`nard refused to take a breath test and was charged with test refusal
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`in the first degree. The Minnesota District Court dismissed the
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`charges, concluding that the warrantless breath test was not permit-
`ted under the Fourth Amendment. The State Court of Appeals re-
`versed, and the State Supreme Court affirmed.
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`The officer who arrested petitioner Steve Michael Beylund took
`him to a nearby hospital. The officer read him North Dakota’s im-
`plied consent advisory, informing him that test refusal in these cir-
`cumstances is itself a crime. Beylund agreed to have his blood
`drawn. The test revealed a BAC level more than three times the le-
`gal limit. Beylund’s license was suspended for two years after an
`administrative hearing, and on appeal, the State District Court re-
`jected his argument that his consent to the blood test was coerced by
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`the officer’s warning. The State Supreme Court affirmed.
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`Held:
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`1. The Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests inci-
`dent to arrests for drunk driving but not warrantless blood tests.
`Pp. 13–36.
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`
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`(a) Taking a blood sample or administering a breath test is a
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`search governed by the Fourth Amendment. See Skinner v. Railway
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`Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U. S. 602, 616–617; Schmerber v. Cali-
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`fornia, 384 U. S. 757, 767–768. These searches may nevertheless be
`exempt from the warrant requirement if they fall within, as relevant
`here, the exception for searches conducted incident to a lawful arrest.
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`This exception applies categorically, rather than on a case-by-case
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`
`basis. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U. S. ___, ___, n. 3. Pp. 14–16.
`
`
`(b) The search-incident-to-arrest doctrine has an ancient pedi-
`gree that predates the Nation’s founding, and no historical evidence
`suggests that the Fourth Amendment altered the permissible bounds
`of arrestee searches. The mere “fact of the lawful arrest” justifies “a
`full search of the person.” United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218,
`235. The doctrine may also apply in situations that could not have
`been envisioned when the Fourth Amendment was adopted. In Riley
`v. California, 573 U. S. ___, the Court considered how to apply the
`doctrine to searches of an arrestee’s cell phone. Because founding era
`guidance was lacking, the Court determined “whether to exempt [the]
`search from the warrant requirement ‘by assessing, on the one hand,
`the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on
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`the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legit-
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`Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`Syllabus
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`imate governmental interests.’ ” Id., at ___. The same mode of anal-
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`ysis is proper here because the founding era provides no definitive
`guidance on whether blood and breath tests should be allowed inci-
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`dent to arrest. Pp. 16–20.
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`(c) The analysis begins by considering the impact of breath and
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`blood tests on individual privacy interests. Pp. 20–23.
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`
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`(1) Breath tests do not “implicat[e] significant privacy con-
`
`cerns.” Skinner, 489 U. S., at 626. The physical intrusion is almost
`negligible. The tests “do not require piercing the skin” and entail “a
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`minimum of inconvenience.” Id., at 625. Requiring an arrestee to in-
`sert the machine’s mouthpiece into his or her mouth and to exhale
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`“deep lung” air is no more intrusive than collecting a DNA sample by
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`rubbing a swab on the inside of a person’s cheek, Maryland v. King,
`569 U. S. ___, ___, or scraping underneath a suspect’s fingernails,
`Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291. Breath tests, unlike DNA samples,
`also yield only a BAC reading and leave no biological sample in the
`government’s possession. Finally, participation in a breath test is not
`likely to enhance the embarrassment inherent in any arrest. Pp. 20–
`
`22.
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`
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`(2) The same cannot be said about blood tests. They “require
`piercing the skin” and extract a part of the subject’s body, Skinner,
`supra, at 625, and thus are significantly more intrusive than blowing
`into a tube. A blood test also gives law enforcement a sample that
`can be preserved and from which it is possible to extract information
`beyond a simple BAC reading. That prospect could cause anxiety for
`the person tested. Pp. 22–23.
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`(d) The analysis next turns to the States’ asserted need to obtain
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`BAC readings. Pp. 23–33.
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`(1) The States and the Federal Government have a “paramount
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`interest . . . in preserving [public highway] safety,” Mackey v.
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`Montrym, 443 U. S. 1, 17; and States have a compelling interest in
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`creating “deterrent[s] to drunken driving,” a leading cause of traffic
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`fatalities and injuries, id., at 18. Sanctions for refusing to take a
`BAC test were increased because consequences like license suspen-
`sion were no longer adequate to persuade the most dangerous offend-
`ers to agree to a test that could lead to severe criminal sanctions. By
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`making it a crime to refuse to submit to a BAC test, the laws at issue
`provide an incentive to cooperate and thus serve a very important
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`function. Pp. 23–25.
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`(2) As for other ways to combat drunk driving, this Court’s de-
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`cisions establish that an arresting officer is not obligated to obtain a
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`warrant before conducting a search incident to arrest simply because
`there might be adequate time in the particular circumstances to ob-
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`tain a warrant. The legality of a search incident to arrest must be
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`BIRCHFIELD v. NORTH DAKOTA
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`Syllabus
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`judged on the basis of categorical rules. See e.g., Robinson, supra, at
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`235. McNeely, supra, at ___, distinguished. Imposition of a warrant
`requirement for every BAC test would likely swamp courts, given the
`enormous number of drunk-driving arrests, with little corresponding
`benefit. And other alternatives—e.g., sobriety checkpoints and igni-
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`tion interlock systems—are poor substitutes. Pp. 25–30.
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`(3) Bernard argues that warrantless BAC testing cannot be
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`justified as a search incident to arrest because that doctrine aims to
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`prevent the arrestee from destroying evidence, while the loss of blood
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`alcohol evidence results from the body’s metabolism of alcohol, a nat-
`ural process not controlled by the arrestee. In both instances, howev-
`er, the State is justifiably concerned that evidence may be lost. The
`State’s general interest in “evidence preservation” or avoiding “the
`loss of evidence,” Riley, supra, at ___, readily encompasses the me-
`tabolization of alcohol in the blood. Bernard’s view finds no support
`in Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, 763, Schmerber, 384 U. S., at
`
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`769, or McNeely, supra, at ___. Pp. 30–33.
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`(e) Because the impact of breath tests on privacy is slight, and
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`the need for BAC testing is great, the Fourth Amendment permits
`warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving. Blood
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`tests, however, are significantly more intrusive, and their reasona-
`bleness must be judged in light of the availability of the less invasive
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`alternative of a breath test. Respondents have offered no satisfactory
`justification for demanding the more intrusive alternative without a
`warrant. In instances where blood tests might be preferable—e.g.,
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`where substances other than alcohol impair the driver’s ability to op-
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`erate a car safely, or where the subject is unconscious—nothing pre-
`vents the police from seeking a warrant or from relying on the exi-
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`gent circumstances exception if it applies. Because breath tests are
`significantly less intrusive than blood tests and in most cases amply
`serve law enforcement interests, a breath test, but not a blood test,
`may be administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk
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`driving. No warrant is needed in this situation. Pp. 33–35.
`
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`2. Motorists may not be criminally punished for refusing to submit
`to a blood test based on legally implied consent to submit to them. It
`is one thing to approve implied-consent laws that impose civil penal-
`ties and evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse to comply,
`but quite another for a State to insist upon an intrusive blood test
`and then to impose criminal penalties on refusal to submit. There
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`must be a limit to the consequences to which motorists may be
`deemed to have consented by virtue of a decision to drive on public
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`roads. Pp. 36–37.
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`3. These legal conclusions resolve the three present cases. Birch-
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`field was criminally prosecuted for refusing a warrantless blood
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`5
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`Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`Syllabus
`draw, and therefore the search that he refused cannot be justified as
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`a search incident to his arrest or on the basis of implied consent. Be-
`cause there appears to be no other basis for a warrantless test of
`Birchfield’s blood, he was threatened with an unlawful search and
`unlawfully convicted for refusing that search. Bernard was criminal-
`ly prosecuted for refusing a warrantless breath test. Because that
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`test was a permissible search incident to his arrest for drunk driving,
`the Fourth Amendment did not require officers to obtain a warrant
`prior to demanding the test, and Bernard had no right to refuse it.
`Beylund submitted to a blood test after police told him that the law
`required his submission. The North Dakota Supreme Court, which
`based its conclusion that Beylund’s consent was voluntary on the er-
`roneous assumption that the State could compel blood tests, should
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`reevaluate Beylund’s consent in light of the partial inaccuracy of the
`officer’s advisory. Pp. 37–38.
`No. 14–1468, 2015 ND 6, 858 N. W. 2d 302, reversed and remanded;
`No. 14–1470, 859 N. W. 2d 762, affirmed; No. 14–1507, 2015 ND 18,
`859 N. W. 2d 403, vacated and remanded.
`ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J,
`and KENNEDY, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an
`opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which GINSBURG,
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`J., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in
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`part and dissenting in part.
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` Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`14–1468
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`WILLIAM ROBERT BERNARD, JR., PETITIONER
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`14–1470
`v.
`MINNESOTA; AND
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
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`MINNESOTA
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`STEVE MICHAEL BEYLUND, PETITIONER
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`14–1507
`v.
`GRANT LEVI, DIRECTOR, NORTH DAKOTA
`
`DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
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`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
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`
`NORTH DAKOTA
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`
`[June 23, 2016]
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` JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
`Drunk drivers take a grisly toll on the Nation’s roads,
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`claiming thousands of lives, injuring many more victims,
`and inflicting billions of dollars in property damage every
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`_________________
` Nos. 14–1468, 14–1470, and 14–1507
`_________________
` DANNY BIRCHFIELD, PETITIONER
`
` v.
`NORTH DAKOTA;
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
`
`
`NORTH DAKOTA
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`BIRCHFIELD v. NORTH DAKOTA
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`Opinion of the Court
`year. To fight this problem, all States have laws that
`prohibit motorists from driving with a blood alcohol con­
`centration (BAC) that exceeds a specified level. But de­
`termining whether a driver’s BAC is over the legal limit
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`requires a test, and many drivers stopped on suspicion of
`drunk driving would not submit to testing if given the
`option. So every State also has long had what are termed
`“implied consent laws.” These laws impose penalties on
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`motorists who refuse to undergo testing when there is
`sufficient reason to believe they are violating the State’s
`drunk-driving laws.
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`In the past, the typical penalty for noncompliance was
`suspension or revocation of the motorist’s license. The
`cases now before us involve laws that go beyond that and
`make it a crime for a motorist to refuse to be tested after
`being lawfully arrested for driving while impaired. The
`question presented is whether such laws violate the
`Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable
`searches.
`
`
`
`I
`
`The problem of drunk driving arose almost as soon as
`motor vehicles came into use. See J. Jacobs, Drunk Driv­
`ing: An American Dilemma 57 (1989) (Jacobs). New Jer­
`sey enacted what was perhaps the Nation’s first drunk-
`driving law in 1906, 1906 N. J. Laws pp. 186, 196, and
`other States soon followed. These early laws made it
`illegal to drive while intoxicated but did not provide a
`statistical definition of intoxication. As a result, prosecu­
`tors normally had to present testimony that the defendant
`was showing outward signs of intoxication, like imbalance
`or slurred speech. R. Donigan, Chemical Tests and the
`Law 2 (1966) (Donigan). As one early case put it, “[t]he
`effects resulting from the drinking of intoxicating liquors
`are manifested in various ways, and before any one can be
`shown to be under the influence of intoxicating liquor it is
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`
`Opinion of the Court
`necessary for some witness to prove that some one or more
`of these effects were perceptible to him.” State v. Noble,
`119 Ore. 674, 677, 250 P. 833, 834 (1926).
`The 1930’s saw a continued rise in the number of motor
`
`vehicles on the roads, an end to Prohibition, and not coin­
`cidentally an increased interest in combating the growing
`problem of drunk driving. Jones, Measuring Alcohol in
`Blood and Breath for Forensic Purposes—A Historical
`
`Review, 8 For. Sci. Rev. 13, 20, 33 (1996) (Jones). The
`
`
`American Medical Association and the National Safety
`Council set up committees to study the problem and ulti­
`mately concluded that a driver with a BAC of 0.15% or
`higher could be presumed to be inebriated. Donigan 21–
`22. In 1939, Indiana enacted the first law that defined
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`presumptive intoxication based on BAC levels, using the
`recommended 0.15% standard. 1939 Ind. Acts p. 309;
`Jones 21. Other States soon followed and then, in re­
`sponse to updated guidance from national organizations,
`lowered the presumption to a BAC level of 0.10%. Don­
`igan 22–23. Later, States moved away from mere pre­
`sumptions that defendants might rebut, and adopted laws
`providing that driving with a 0.10% BAC or higher was
`per se illegal. Jacobs 69–70.
`Enforcement of laws of this type obviously requires the
`
`
`measurement of BAC. One way of doing this is to analyze
`a sample of a driver’s blood directly. A technician with
`medical training uses a syringe to draw a blood sample
`from the veins of the subject, who must remain still during
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`the procedure, and then the sample is shipped to a sepa­
`rate laboratory for measurement of its alcohol concentra­
`tion. See 2 R. Erwin, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases
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`§§17.03–17.04 (3d ed. 2015) (Erwin). Although it is possi­
`ble for a subject to be forcibly immobilized so that a sam­
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`ple may be drawn, many States prohibit drawing blood
`from a driver who resists since this practice helps “to
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`avoid violent confrontations.” South Dakota v. Neville,
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`3
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`4
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`BIRCHFIELD v. NORTH DAKOTA
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`
`Opinion of the Court
`459 U. S. 553, 559 (1983).
`
`The most common and economical method of calculating
`BAC is by means of a machine that measures the amount
`of alcohol in a person’s breath. National Highway Traffic
`Safety Admin. (NHTSA), E. Haire, W. Leaf, D. Preusser, &
`M. Solomon, Use of Warrants to Reduce Breath Test Re­
`fusals: Experiences from North Carolina 1 (No. 811461,
`Apr. 2011). One such device, called the “Drunkometer,”
`was invented and first sold in the 1930’s. Note, 30 N. C.
`L. Rev. 302, 303, and n. 10 (1952). The test subject would
`inflate a small balloon, and then the test analyst would
`release this captured breath into the machine, which
`forced it through a chemical solution that reacted to the
`presence of alcohol by changing color. Id., at 303. The test
`
`analyst could observe the amount of breath required to
`produce the color change and calculate the subject’s breath
`alcohol concentration and by extension, BAC, from this
`figure. Id., at 303–304. A more practical machine, called
`the “Breathalyzer,” came into common use beginning in
`the 1950’s, relying on the same basic scientific principles.
`
`3 Erwin §22.01, at 22–3; Jones 34.
`
`Over time, improved breath test machines were devel­
`oped. Today, such devices can detect the presence of
`alcohol more quickly and accurately than before, typically
`
`using infrared technology rather than a chemical reaction.
`2 Erwin §18A.01; Jones 36. And in practice all breath
`testing machines used for evidentiary purposes must be
`approved by the National Highway Traffic Safety Admin­
`istration. See 1 H. Cohen & J. Green, Apprehending and
`
`Prosecuting the Drunk Driver §7.04[7] (LexisNexis 2015).
`
`These machines are generally regarded as very reliable
`because the federal standards require that the devices
`produce accurate and reproducible test results at a variety
`of BAC levels, from the very low to the very high. 77 Fed.
`
`Reg. 35747 (2012); 2 Erwin §18.07; Jones 38; see also
`California v. Trombetta, 467 U. S. 479, 489 (1984).
`
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`Opinion of the Court
`Measurement of BAC based on a breath test requires
`
`the cooperation of the person being tested. The subject
`must take a deep breath and exhale through a mouthpiece
`that connects to the machine. Berger, How Does it Work?
`Alcohol Breath Testing, 325 British Medical J. 1403 (2002)
`(Berger). Typically the test subject must blow air into the
`
`device “‘for a period of several seconds’” to produce an
`adequate breath sample, and the process is sometimes
`repeated so that analysts can compare multiple samples to
`ensure the device’s accuracy. Trombetta, supra, at 481;
`
`
`see also 2 Erwin §21.04[2][b](L), at 21–14 (describing the
`Intoxilyzer 4011 device as requiring a 12-second exhala­
`tion, although the subject may take a new breath about
`halfway through).
`
`Modern breath test machines are designed to capture
`so-called “deep lung” or alveolar air. Trombetta, supra, at
`481. Air from the alveolar region of the lungs provides the
`best basis for determining the test subject’s BAC, for it is
`in that part of the lungs that alcohol vapor and other
`gases are exchanged between blood and breath. 2 Erwin
`§18.01[2][a], at 18–7.
`
`
`When a standard infrared device is used, the whole
`process takes only a few minutes from start to finish.
`Berger 1403; 2 Erwin §18A.03[2], at 18A–14. Most evi­
`dentiary breath tests do not occur next to the vehicle, at
`the side of the road, but in a police station, where the
`controlled environment is especially conducive to reliable
`testing, or in some cases in the officer’s patrol vehicle or in
`special mobile testing facilities. NHTSA, A. Berning et al.,
`Refusal of Intoxication Testing: A Report to Congress 4,
`and n. 5 (No. 811098, Sept. 2008).
`
`
`Because the cooperation of the test subject is necessary
`when a breath test is administered and highly preferable
`when a blood sample is taken, the enactment of laws
`defining intoxication based on BAC made it necessary for
`
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`

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`BIRCHFIELD v. NORTH DAKOTA
`
`
`Opinion of the Court
`States to find a way of securing such cooperation.1 So-
`called “implied consent” laws were enacted to achieve this
`
`result. They provided that cooperation with BAC testing
`was a condition of the privilege of driving on state roads
`and that the privilege would be rescinded if a suspected
`drunk driver refused to honor that condition. Donigan
`177. The first such law was enacted by New York in 1953,
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`and many other States followed suit not long thereafter.
`
`Id., at 177–179. In 1962, the Uniform Vehicle Code also
`included such a provision. Id., at 179. Today, “all 50
`States have adopted implied consent laws that require
`
`
`motorists, as a condition of operating a motor vehicle
`within the State, to consent to BAC testing if they are
`arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-
`driving offense.” Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U. S. ___, ___
`(2013) (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 18). Suspension or
`revocation of the motorist’s driver’s license remains the
`standard legal consequence of refusal. In addition, evi­
`dence of the motorist’s refusal is admitted as evidence of
`likely intoxication in a drunk-driving prosecution. See
`ibid.
`
`In recent decades, the States and the Federal Govern­
`ment have toughened drunk-driving laws, and those ef­
`forts have corresponded to a dramatic decrease in alcohol-
`related fatalities. As of the early 1980’s, the number of
`annual fatalities averaged 25,000; by 2014, the most re­
`cent year for which statistics are available, the number
`had fallen to below 10,000. Presidential Commission on
`Drunk Driving 1 (Nov. 1983); NHTSA, Traffic Safety
`Facts, 2014 Data, Alcohol-Impaired Driving 2 (No. 812231,
`Dec. 2015) (NHTSA, 2014 Alcohol-Impaired Driving). One
`
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`6
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`——————
`1In addition, BAC may be determined by testing a subject’s urine,
`which also requires the test subject’s cooperation. But urine tests
`appear to be less common in drunk-driving cases than breath and blood
`tests, and none of the cases before us involves one.
`
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`Opinion of the Court
`legal change has been further lowering the BAC standard
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`from 0.10% to 0.08%. See 1 Erwin, §2.01[1], at 2–3 to 2–4.
`In addition, many States now impose increased penalties
`for recidivists and for drivers with a BAC level that ex­
`ceeds a higher threshold. In North Dakota, for example,
`the standard penalty for first-time drunk-driving offenders
`is license suspension and a fine. N. D. Cent. Code Ann.
`§39–08–01(5)(a)(1) (Supp. 2015); §39–20–04.1(1). But an
`offender with a BAC of 0.16% or higher must spend at
`least two days in jail. §39–08–01(5)(a)(2). In addition, the
`State imposes increased mandatory minimum sentences
`for drunk-driving recidivists. §§39–08–01(5)(b)–(d).
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`Many other States have taken a similar approach, but
`this new structure threatened to undermine the effective­
`ness of implied consent laws. If the penalty for driving
`with a greatly elevated BAC or for repeat violations ex­
`ceeds the penalty for refusing to submit to testing, motor­
`ists who fear conviction for the more severely punished
`offenses have an incentive to reject testing. And in some
`States, the refusal rate is high. On average, over one-fifth
`of all drivers asked to submit to BAC testing in 2011
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`refused to do so. NHTSA, E. Namuswe, H. Coleman, & A.
`Berning, Breath Test Refusal Rates in the United States—
`2011 Update 1 (No. 811881, Mar. 2014). In North Dakota,
`the refusal rate for 2011 was a representative 21%. Id.,
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`at 2. Minnesota’s was below average, at 12%. Ibid.
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`To combat the problem of test refusal, some States have
`begun to enact laws making it a crime to refuse to undergo
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`testing. Minnesota has taken this approach for decades.
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`See 1989 Minn. Laws p. 1658; 1992 Minn. Laws p. 1947.
`And that may partly explain why its refusal rate now is
`below the national average. Minnesota’s rate is also half
`the 24% rate reported for 1988, the year before its first
`criminal refusal law took effect. See Ross, Simon, Cleary,
`Lewis, & Storkamp, Causes and Consequences of Implied
`Consent Refusal, 11 Alcohol, Drugs and Driving 57, 69
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`BIRCHFIELD v. NORTH DAKOTA
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`Opinion of the Court
`(1995). North Dakota adopted a similar law, in 2013, after
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`a pair of drunk-driving accidents claimed the lives of an
`entire young family and another family’s 5- and 9-year-old
`boys.2 2013 N. D. Laws pp. 1087–1088 (codified at §§39–
`08–01(1)–(3)). The Federal Government also encourages
`this approach as a means for overcoming the incentive
`that drunk drivers have to refuse a test. NHTSA, Refusal
`of Intoxication Testing, at 20.
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`II
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`A
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` Petitioner Danny Birchfield accidentally drove his car
`off a North Dakota highway on October 10, 2013. A state
`trooper arrived and watched as Birchfield unsuccessfully
`tried to drive back out of the ditch in which his car was
`stuck. The trooper approached, caught a strong whiff of
`alcohol, and saw that Birchfield’s eyes were bloodshot and
`watery. Birchfield spoke in slurred speech and struggled
`to stay steady on his feet. At the trooper’s request, Birch-
`field agreed to take several field sobriety tests and per­
`formed poorly on each. He had trouble reciting sections of
`the alphabet and counting backwards in compliance with
`the trooper’s directions.
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`Believing that Birchfield was intoxicated, the trooper
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`informed him of his obligation under state law to agree to
`a BAC test. Birchfield consented to a roadside breath test.
`The device used for this sort of test often differs from the
`machines used for breath tests administered in a police
`station and is intended to provide a preliminary assess­
`ment of the driver’s BAC. See, e.g., Berger 1403. Because
`the reliability of these preliminary or screening breath
`——————
`2See Smith, Moving From Grief to Action: Two Families Push for
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`Stronger DUI Laws in N. D., Bismarck Tribune, Feb. 2, 2013, p. 1A;
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`Haga, Some Kind of Peace: Parents of Two Young Boys Killed in
`Campground Accident Urge for Tougher DUI Penalties in N. D., Grand
`Forks Herald, Jan. 15, 2013, pp. A1–A2.
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`Opinion of the Court
`tests varies, many jurisdictions do not permit their numer­
`ical results to be admitted in a drunk-driving trial as
`evidence of a driver’s BAC. See generally 3 Erwin
`§24.03[1]. In North Dakota, results from this type of test
`are “used only for determining whether or not a further
`test shall be given.” N. D. Cent. Code Ann. §39–20–14(3).
`
`In Birchfield’s case, the screening test estimated that his
`BAC was 0.254%, more than three times the legal limit of
`0.08%. See §39–08–01(1)(a).
`
`The state trooper arrested Birchfield for driving while
`impaired, gave the usual Miranda warnings, again ad­
`vised him of his obligation under North Dakota law to
`undergo BAC testing, and informed him, as state law
`requires, see §39–20–01(3)(a), that refusing to take the
`test would expose him to criminal penalties. In addition to
`mandatory addiction treatment, sentences range from a
`mandatory fine of $500 (for first-time offenders) to fines of
`at least $2,000 and imprisonment of at least one year and
`one day (for serial offenders). §39–08–01(5). These crimi­
`nal penalties apply to blood, breath, and urine test refus­
`als alike. See §§39–08–01(2), 39–20–01, 39–20–14.
`
`Although faced with the prospect of prosecution under
`this law, Birchfield refused to let his blood be drawn. Just
`three months before, Birchfield had received a citation for
`driving under the influence, and he ultimately pleaded
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`guilty to that offense. State v. Birchfield, Crim. No. 30–
`2013–CR–00720 (Dist. Ct. Morton Cty., N. D., Jan. 27,
`2014). This time he also pleaded guilty—to a misde-
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`meanor violation of the refusal statute—but his plea was
`a conditional one: while Birchfield admitted refusing the
`blood test, he argued that the Fourth Amendment prohib­
`ited criminalizing his refusal to submit to the test. The
`State District Court rejected this argument and imposed a
`sentence that accounted for his prior conviction. Cf. §39–
`08–01(5)(b). The sentence included 30 days in jail (20 of
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`which were suspended and 10 of which had already been
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`Opinion of the Court
`served), 1 year of unsupervised probation, $1,750 in fine
`and fees, and mandatory participation in a sobriety pro­
`gram and in a substance abuse evaluation. App. to Pet.
`for Cert. in No. 14–1468, p. 20a.
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`On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.
`2015 ND 6, 858 N. W. 2d 302. The court found support for
`the test refusal statute in this Court’s McNeely plurality
`opinion, which had spoken favorably about “acceptable
`‘legal tools’ with ‘significant consequences’ for refusing to
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`submit to testing.” 858 N. W. 2d, at 307 (quoting McNeely,
`569 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 18)).
`B
`On August 5, 2012, Minnesota police received a report of
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`a problem at a South St. Paul boat launch. Three appar­
`ently intoxicated men had gotten their truck stuck in the
`river while attempting to pull their boat out of the water.
`When police arrived, witnesses informed them that a man
`in underwear had been driving the truck. That man
`proved to be William Robert Bernard, Jr., petitioner in the
`second of these cases. Bernard admitted that he had been
`drinking but denied driving the truck (though he was
`holding its keys) and refused to perform any field sobriety
`tests. After noting that Bernard’s breath smelled of alco­
`hol and that his eyes were bloodshot and watery, officers
`arrested Bernard for driving while impaired.
`Back at the police station, officers read Bernard Minne­
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`sota’s implied consent advisory, which like North Dakota’s
`informs motorists that it is a crime under state law to
`refuse to submit to a legally required BAC test. See Minn.
`Stat. §169A.51, subd. 2 (2014). Aside from noncriminal
`penalties like license revocation, §169A.52, subd. 3, test
`refusal