throbber
(Slip Opinion)
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`
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2014
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`
`Syllabus
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`1
`
` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`
`
` Syllabus
`
` UNITED STATES v. KWAI FUN WONG
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE NINTH CIRCUIT
` No. 13–1074. Argued December 10, 2014—Decided April 22, 2015*
`
`The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) provides that a tort claim against
`the United States “shall be forever barred” unless the claimant meets
`two deadlines. First, a claim must be presented to the appropriate
`federal agency for administrative review “within two years after [the]
`
` claim accrues.” 28 U. S. C. §2401(b). Second, if the agency denies the
`claim, the claimant may file suit in federal court “within six months”
`
` of the agency’s denial. Ibid.
`Kwai Fun Wong and Marlene June, respondents in Nos. 13–1074
`
`and 13–1075, respectively, each missed one of those deadlines. Wong
`failed to file her FTCA claim in federal court within 6 months, but
`argued that that was only because the District Court had not permit-
`ted her to file that claim until after the period expired. June failed to
`
` present her FTCA claim to a federal agency within 2 years, but ar-
`gued that her untimely filing should be excused because the Govern-
`ment had, in her view, concealed facts vital to her claim. In each
`case, the District Court dismissed the FTCA claim for failure to satis-
`fy §2401(b)’s time bars, holding that, despite any justification for de-
`
`
`lay, those time bars are jurisdictional and not subject to equitable
`
`tolling. The Ninth Circuit reversed in both cases, concluding that
`§2401(b)’s time bars may be equitably tolled.
`
`
`Held: Section 2401(b)’s time limits are subject to equitable tolling.
`
`Pp. 4–18.
`(a) Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, provides
`the framework for deciding the applicability of equitable tolling to
`statutes of limitations on suits against the Government. There, the
`——————
`* Together with No. 13–1075, United States v. June, Conservator, al-
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`so on certiorari to the same court.
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`

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`UNITED STATES v. KWAI FUN WONG
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`Court adopted a “rebuttable presumption” that such time bars may
`
`
`be equitably tolled. Id., at 95. Irwin’s presumption may, of course,
`
`be rebutted. One way to do so—pursued by the Government here—is
`to demonstrate that the statute of limitations at issue is jurisdiction-
`
`al; if so, the statute cannot be equitably tolled. But this Court will
`not conclude that a time bar is jurisdictional unless Congress pro-
`
`vides a “clear statement” to that effect. Sebelius v. Auburn Regional
`
`Medical Center, 568 U. S. ___, ___. And in applying that clear state-
`ment rule, this Court has said that most time bars, even if mandato-
`ry and emphatic, are nonjurisdictional. See id., at ___. Congress
`thus must do something special to tag a statute of limitations as ju-
`
`risdictional and so prohibit a court from tolling it. Pp. 4–7.
`
`(b) Congress did no such thing in enacting §2401(b). The text of
`that provision speaks only to a claim’s timeliness; it does not refer to
`the jurisdiction of the district courts or address those courts’ authori-
`ty to hear untimely suits. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S.
`
`
`500, 515. Instead, it “reads like an ordinary, run-of-the-mill statute
`
`of limitations.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631, 647. Statutory
`context confirms that reading. Congress’s separation of a filing dead-
`line from a jurisdictional grant often indicates that the deadline is
`not jurisdictional, and here the FTCA’s jurisdictional grant appears
`
`not in §2401(b) but in another section of Title 28, §1346(b)(1). That
`jurisdictional grant is not expressly conditioned on compliance with
`§2401(b)’s limitations periods. Finally, assuming it could provide the
`clear statement that this Court’s cases require, §2401(b)’s legislative
`history does not clearly demonstrate that Congress intended the pro-
`
`vision to impose a jurisdictional bar. Pp. 7–9.
`
`(c) The Government’s two principal arguments for treating
`§2401(b) as jurisdictional are unpersuasive and foreclosed by this
`Court’s precedents. Pp. 9–17.
`
`
`(1) The Government first points out that §2401(b) includes the
`
`same “shall be forever barred” language as the statute of limitations
`
`
`governing Tucker Act claims, which this Court has held to be juris-
`
`dictional. See, e.g., Kendall v. United States, 107 U. S. 123, 125–126.
`But that phrase was a commonplace in statutes of limitations enact-
`ed around the time of the FTCA, and it does not carry talismanic ju-
`
`risdictional significance. Indeed, this Court has construed the same
`language to be subject to tolling in the Clayton Act’s statute of limita-
`tions. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538, 559.
`And in two decisions addressing the Tucker Act’s statute of limita-
`
`tions, the Court has dismissed the idea that that language is jurisdic-
`tionally significant. See Irwin, 498 U. S., at 95; John R. Sand &
`
`
`Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. 130, 137, 139. The “shall be
`forever barred” phrase is thus nothing more than an ordinary way to
`
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`2
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`3
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`Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Syllabus
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`set a statutory deadline. Pp. 9–14.
`
`
`
`(2) The Government next argues that §2401(b) is jurisdictional
`because it is a condition on the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity.
`
`But that argument is foreclosed by Irwin, which considered an identi-
`cal objection but concluded that even time limits that condition a
`
`waiver of immunity may be equitably tolled. See 498 U. S., at 95–96.
`The Government’s invocation of sovereign immunity principles is also
`peculiarly inapt here. Unlike other waivers of sovereign immunity,
`
`the FTCA treats the Government much like a private party, and the
`Court has accordingly declined to construe the Act narrowly merely
`because it waives the Government’s immunity from suit. There is no
`
`reason to do differently here. Pp. 14–17.
`No. 13–1074, 732 F. 3d 1030, and No. 13–1075, 550 Fed. Appx. 505,
`affirmed and remanded.
`KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY,
`GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a dis-
`senting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ.,
`joined.
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`

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` Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
`
`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`
`
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
`
` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
`
`
` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
`_________________
` Nos. 13–1074 and 13–1075
`_________________
`UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
`
`v.
`KWAI FUN WONG
`
`
`13–1074
`
`
`
`13–1075
`
`UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
`
`v.
`MARLENE JUNE, CONSERVATOR
`ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`[April 22, 2015]
`JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
`The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA or Act) provides
`
`that a tort claim against the United States “shall be for-
`ever barred” unless it is presented to the “appropriate Fed-
`eral agency within two years after such claim accrues” and
`then brought to federal court “within six months” after the
`agency acts on the claim. 28 U. S. C. §2401(b). In each of
`
`the two cases we resolve here, the claimant missed one of
`those deadlines, but requested equitable tolling on the
`ground that she had a good reason for filing late. The
`Government responded that §2401(b)’s time limits are not
`subject to tolling because they are jurisdictional re-
`strictions. Today, we reject the Government’s argument
`
`and conclude that courts may toll both of the FTCA’s
`limitations periods.
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`2
`
`
`UNITED STATES v. KWAI FUN WONG
`
`Opinion of the Court
`I
`
`In the first case, respondent Kwai Fun Wong asserts
`that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
`
`falsely imprisoned her for five days in 1999. As the FTCA
`
`
`
`
`requires, Wong first presented that claim to the INS within
`two years of the alleged unlawful action. See §2401(b);
`§2675(a). The INS denied the administrative complaint on
`December 3, 2001. Under the Act, that gave Wong six
`months, until June 3, 2002, to bring her tort claim in
`federal court. See §2401(b).
`
`Several months prior to the INS’s decision, Wong had
`filed suit in federal district court asserting various non-
`FTCA claims against the Government arising out of the
`same alleged misconduct. Anticipating the INS’s ruling,
`Wong moved in mid-November 2001 to amend the com-
`plaint in that suit by adding her tort claim. On April 5,
`2002, a Magistrate Judge recommended granting Wong
`
`leave to amend. But the District Court did not finally
`
`
`adopt that proposal until June 25—three weeks after the
`FTCA’s 6-month deadline.
`
`The Government moved to dismiss the tort claim on the
`ground that it was filed late. The District Court at first
`rejected the motion. It recognized that Wong had man-
`aged to add her FTCA claim only after §2401(b)’s 6-month
`time period had expired. But the court equitably tolled
`that period for all the time between the Magistrate
`Judge’s recommendation and its own order allowing
`amendment, thus bringing Wong’s FTCA claim within the
`statutory deadline. Several years later, the Government
`moved for reconsideration of that ruling based on an in-
`tervening Ninth Circuit decision. This time, the District
`Court dismissed Wong’s claim, reasoning that §2401(b)’s
`6-month time bar was jurisdictional and therefore not
`subject to equitable tolling. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
`agreed to hear the case en banc to address an intra-circuit
`conflict on the issue. The en banc court held that the 6-
`
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`

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`3
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` Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Opinion of the Court
`month limit is not jurisdictional and that equitable tolling
`
`is available. Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe, 732 F. 3d 1030
`(2013). It then confirmed the District Court’s prior ruling
`that the circumstances here justify tolling because Wong
`“exercis[ed] due diligence” in attempting to amend her
`complaint before the statutory deadline. Id., at 1052.
`
`The second case before us arises from a deadly highway
`accident. Andrew Booth was killed in 2005 when a car in
`which he was riding crossed through a cable median bar-
`
`rier and crashed into oncoming traffic. The following year,
`respondent Marlene June, acting on behalf of Booth’s
`young son, filed a wrongful death action alleging that the
`State of Arizona and its contractor had negligently con-
`structed and maintained the median barrier. Years into
`that state-court litigation, June contends, she discovered
`
`that the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) had
`approved installation of the barrier knowing it had not
`been properly crash tested.
`
`Relying on that new information, June presented a tort
`claim to the FHWA in 2010, more than five years after the
`accident. The FHWA denied the claim, and June promptly
`filed this action in federal district court. The court dis-
`missed the suit because June had failed to submit her
`claim to the FHWA within two years of the collision. The
`
`FTCA’s 2-year bar, the court ruled, is jurisdictional and
`
`therefore not subject to equitable tolling; accordingly, the
`court did not consider June’s contention that tolling was
`proper because the Government had concealed its failure
`to require crash testing. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
`reversed in light of its recent decision in Wong, thus hold-
`ing that §2401(b)’s 2-year deadline, like its 6-month coun-
`
`
`terpart, is not jurisdictional and may be tolled. 550 Fed.
`Appx. 505 (2013).
`
`We granted certiorari in both cases, 573 U. S. ___
`(2014), to resolve a circuit split about whether courts may
`equitably toll §2401(b)’s two time limits. Compare, e.g., In
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`UNITED STATES v. KWAI FUN WONG
`
`Opinion of the Court
`re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liability Litiga-
`tion, 646 F. 3d 185, 190–191 (CA5 2011) (per curiam)
`(tolling not available), with Arteaga v. United States, 711
`
`F. 3d 828, 832–833 (CA7 2013) (tolling allowed).1 We now
`affirm the Court of Appeals’ rulings.
`II
`
`
`
`Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95
`(1990), sets out the framework for deciding “the applicabil-
`
`ity of equitable tolling in suits against the Government.”
`In Irwin, we recognized that time bars in suits between
`private parties are presumptively subject to equitable
`tolling. See id., at 95–96. That means a court usually
`may pause the running of a limitations statute in private
`litigation when a party “has pursued his rights diligently
`but some extraordinary circumstance” prevents him from
`meeting a deadline. Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U. S.
`1, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 7). We held in Irwin that “the
`same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling” should
`also apply to suits brought against the United States
`under a statute waiving sovereign immunity. 498 U. S., at
`95–96. Our old “ad hoc,” law-by-law approach to deter-
`mining the availability of tolling in those suits, we rea-
`soned, had produced inconsistency and “unpredictability”
`
`without the offsetting virtue of enhanced “fidelity to the
`intent of Congress.” Id., at 95. Adopting the “general
`rule” used
`in private
`litigation, we stated, would
`“amount[ ] to little, if any, broadening” of a statutory
`
`waiver of immunity. Ibid. Accordingly, we thought such a
`——————
`
` 1Although we did not consolidate these cases, we address them to-
`gether because everyone agrees that the core arguments for and
`
`against equitable tolling apply equally to both of §2401(b)’s deadlines.
`See, e.g., Brief for United States in June 15 (“Nothing in the text or
`
`relevant legislative history . . . suggests that the respective time bars
`should be interpreted differently with respect to whether they are
`jurisdictional or subject to equitable tolling”).
`
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`4
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` Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`presumption “likely to be a realistic assessment of legisla-
`tive intent as well as a practically useful” rule of interpre-
`tation. Ibid.
`A rebuttable presumption, of course, may be rebutted, so
`
`Irwin does not end the matter. When enacting a time bar
`for a suit against the Government (as for one against a
`private party), Congress may reverse the usual rule if it
`chooses. See id., at 96. The Government may therefore
`attempt to establish, through evidence relating to a par-
`ticular statute of limitations, that Congress opted to forbid
`equitable tolling.
`One way to meet that burden—and the way the Gov-
`
`ernment pursues here—is to show that Congress made the
`time bar at issue jurisdictional.2 When that is so, a liti-
`
`gant’s failure to comply with the bar deprives a court of all
`authority to hear a case. Hence, a court must enforce the
`limitation even if the other party has waived any timeli-
`ness objection. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U. S. ___, ___–
`
`___ (2012) (slip op., at 5–6). And, more crucially here, a
`court must do so even if equitable considerations would
`support extending the prescribed time period. See John R.
`Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. 130, 133–
`
`134 (2008).3
`——————
`2The Government notes, and we agree, that Congress may preclude
`
` equitable tolling of even a nonjurisdictional statute of limitations. See
`
` Brief for United States in Wong 20; Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medi-
`cal Center, 568 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2013) (slip op., at 6–8, 10–11) (find-
`ing a nonjurisdictional time limit not amenable to tolling). And the
`Government contends in passing that even if §2401(b) is nonjurisdic-
`
`
`tional, it prohibits equitable tolling. See Brief for United States in
`
`
`Wong 20. But the Government makes no independent arguments in
`support of that position; instead, it relies (and even then implicitly) on
`
`the same indicia of congressional intent that, in its view, show that
`§2401(b)’s time limits are jurisdictional. See infra, at 9–10, 14–15. In
`addressing the Government’s predominant, jurisdictional claim, we
`therefore also deal with its subsidiary one.
`3The dissent takes issue with the sequence in which we decide the
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`UNITED STATES v. KWAI FUN WONG
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Given those harsh consequences, the Government must
`
`clear a high bar to establish that a statute of limitations is
`jurisdictional. In recent years, we have repeatedly held
`that procedural rules, including time bars, cabin a court’s
`power only if Congress has “clearly state[d]” as much.
`Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, 568 U. S. ___,
`___ (2013) (slip op., at 6) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,
`546 U. S. 500, 515 (2006)); see Gonzalez, 565 U. S., at ___–
`___ (slip op., at 6–7). “[A]bsent such a clear statement, . . .
`‘courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional.’”
`Auburn Regional, 568 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 6–7)
`(quoting Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 516). That does not mean
`“Congress must incant magic words.” Auburn Regional,
`568 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7). But traditional tools of
`
`statutory construction must plainly show that Congress
`
`imbued a procedural bar with jurisdictional consequences.
`
`
`And in applying that clear statement rule, we have
`made plain that most time bars are nonjurisdictional.
`See, e.g., id., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (noting the rarity of
`jurisdictional time limits). Time and again, we have de-
`scribed filing deadlines as “quintessential claim-processing
`rules,” which “seek to promote the orderly progress of
`
`
`
`
`
`——————
`jurisdictional question, contending that we must do so prior to mention-
`ing Irwin’s presumption. See post, at 11–12 (opinion of ALITO, J.). We
`
` do not understand the point—or more precisely, why the dissent thinks
` the ordering matters. When Congress makes a time bar in a suit
`
`against the Government jurisdictional, one could say (as the dissent
`does) that Irwin does not apply, or one could say (as we do) that Irwin’s
`presumption is conclusively rebutted. The bottom line is the same:
`Tolling is not available. We frame the inquiry as we do in part because
`that is how the Government presented the issue. See Brief for United
`States in Wong 19 (“One way to show that [Irwin’s presumption is
`rebutted] is to establish that the statutory time limit is a ‘jurisdictional’
`restriction”). And we think that choice makes especially good sense in
`these cases because various aspects of Irwin’s reasoning are central to
`considering the parties’ positions on whether §2401(b) is jurisdictional.
`See infra, at 12–17.
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`7
`
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` Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`litigation,” but do not deprive a court of authority to hear a
`case. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 435 (2011);
`see Auburn Regional, 568 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8);
`Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U. S. 401, 413 (2004). That
`is so, contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, see post, at 4,
`10–11, even when the time limit is important (most are)
`and even when it is framed in mandatory terms (again,
`most are); indeed, that is so “however emphatic[ally]”
`expressed those terms may be. Henderson, 562 U. S., at
`439 (quoting Union Pacific R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers,
`
`558 U. S. 67, 81 (2009)). Congress must do something
`special, beyond setting an exception-free deadline, to tag a
`statute of limitations as jurisdictional and so prohibit a
`court from tolling it.
`
`In enacting the FTCA, Congress did nothing of that
`
`
`kind.
`It provided no clear statement indicating that
`§2401(b) is the rare statute of limitations that can deprive
`a court of jurisdiction. Neither the text nor the context
`nor the legislative history indicates (much less does so
`plainly) that Congress meant to enact something other
`than a standard time bar.
`Most important, §2401(b)’s text speaks only to a claim’s
`
`timeliness, not to a court’s power. It states that “[a] tort
`claim against the United States shall be forever barred
`unless it is presented [to the agency] within two years . . .
`
`or unless action is begun within six months” of the agen-
`cy’s denial of the claim. That is mundane statute-of-
`limitations language, saying only what every time bar,
`by definition, must: that after a certain time a claim
`is barred. See infra, at 11, n. 7 (citing many similarly
`worded limitations statutes). The language is mandatory—
`“shall” be barred—but (as just noted) that is true of most
`such statutes, and we have consistently found it of no
`consequence. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 565 U. S., at ___–___
`(slip op., at 10–11). Too, the language might be viewed as
`emphatic—“forever” barred—but (again) we have often
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`UNITED STATES v. KWAI FUN WONG
`
`Opinion of the Court
`held that not to matter. See, e.g., Henderson, 562 U. S., at
`439; Union Pacific, 558 U. S., at 81. What matters instead
`is that §2401(b) “does not speak in jurisdictional terms or
`
`refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts.”
`Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 515 (quoting Zipes v. Trans World
`Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 394 (1982)). It does not define
`a federal court’s jurisdiction over tort claims generally,
`address its authority to hear untimely suits, or in any way
`cabin its usual equitable powers. Section 2401(b), in
`short, “reads like an ordinary, run-of-the-mill statute of
`limitations,” spelling out a litigant’s filing obligations
`without restricting a court’s authority. Holland v. Flor-
`
`ida, 560 U. S. 631, 647 (2010).4
`Statutory context confirms that reading. This Court has
`
`often explained that Congress’s separation of a filing
`deadline from a jurisdictional grant indicates that the
`time bar is not jurisdictional. See Henderson, 562 U. S., at
`439–440; Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154,
`164–165 (2010); Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 515; Zipes, 455
`U. S., at 393–394. So too here. Whereas §2401(b) houses
`the FTCA’s time limitations, a different section of Title 28
`confers power on federal district courts to hear FTCA
`
`claims. See §1346(b)(1) (“district courts . . . shall have
`exclusive jurisdiction” over tort claims against the United
`States). Nothing conditions the jurisdictional grant on the
`——————
`4The dissent argues that nonjurisdictional time limits typically men-
`
` tion claimants, whereas §2401(b) does not. See post, at 10. But none of
`
`our precedents have either said or suggested that such a difference
`
`matters—that, for example, a statute barring a “tort claim” is jurisdic-
`tional, but one barring a “person’s tort claim” is not. See, e.g., Zipes,
`
`455 U. S., at 394, and n. 10 (concluding that a time limit did “not speak
`
`in jurisdictional terms” even though it did not refer to a claimant).
`Rather, in case after case, we have emphasized another distinction—
`that jurisdictional statutes speak about jurisdiction, or more generally
`phrased, about a court’s powers. See Auburn Regional, 568 U. S., at
`___ (slip op., at 7); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154, 160–
`
`161 (2010); Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 515.
`
`
`
`
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`8
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` Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`limitations periods, or otherwise links those separate
`provisions. Treating §2401(b)’s time bars as jurisdictional
`would thus disregard the structural divide built into the
`statute.
`
`Finally, even assuming legislative history alone could
`
`
`provide a clear statement (which we doubt), none does so
`
`here. The report accompanying the FTCA did not discuss
`
`whether §2401(b)’s time limits are jurisdictional. See S.
`Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 33 (1946). And in
`amending §2401(b) four times after its enactment, Con-
`gress declined again (four times over) to say anything
`specific about whether the statute of limitations imposes a
`jurisdictional bar. Congress thus failed to provide any-
`thing like the clear statement this Court has demanded
`before deeming a statute of limitations to curtail a court’s
`power.
`
`And so we wind up back where we started, with Irwin’s
`“general rule” that equitable tolling is available in suits
`against the Government. 498 U. S., at 95. The justifica-
`tion the Government offers for departing from that princi-
`ple fails: Section 2401(b) is not a jurisdictional require-
`ment. The time limits in the FTCA are just time limits,
`
`nothing more. Even though they govern litigation against
`
`the Government, a court can toll them on equitable
`
`grounds.
`
`
`
`
`
`III
`
`
`The Government balks at that straightforward analysis,
`
`claiming that it overlooks two reasons for thinking
`§2401(b) jurisdictional. But neither of those reasons is
`persuasive. Indeed, our precedents in this area foreclose
`them both.
`
`A
`
`
`The Government principally contends that §2401(b) is
`jurisdictional because it includes the same language as the
`
`
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`
`UNITED STATES v. KWAI FUN WONG
`
`Opinion of the Court
`statute of limitations governing contract (and some other
`non-tort) suits brought against the United States under
`the Tucker Act. See §2501.5 That statute long provided
`that such suits “shall be forever barred” if not filed within
`six years. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, §10, 12 Stat. 767; see Act of
`Mar. 3, 1911, §156, 36 Stat. 1139.6 And this Court repeat-
`edly held that 6-year limit to be jurisdictional and thus not
`
`subject to equitable tolling. See Kendall v. United States,
`107 U. S. 123, 125–126 (1883); Finn v. United States, 123
`U. S. 227, 232 (1887); Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S.
`270, 273–274 (1957). When Congress drafted the FTCA’s
`time bar, it used the same “shall be forever barred” lan-
`guage (though selecting a shorter limitations period). “In
`these circumstances,” the Government maintains, “the
`only reasonable conclusion is that Congress intended the
`FTCA’s identically worded time limit to be a jurisdictional
`bar.” Brief for United States in Wong 21–22. According to
`the Government, Congress wanted the FTCA to serve as
`“a tort-law analogue to the Tucker Act” and incorporated
`the words “shall be forever barred” to similarly preclude
`equitable tolling. Reply Brief in Wong 4.
`(The dissent
`relies heavily on the same argument. See post, at 4–8.)
`
`
`But the Government takes too much from Congress’s
`use in §2401(b) of an utterly unremarkable phrase. The
`“shall be forever barred” formulation was a commonplace
`in federal limitations statutes for many decades surround-
`
`
`
`10
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`——————
`5The Tucker Act of 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505, enlarged the Court of
`Claims’ jurisdiction over contract and other non-tort actions against the
`Government. The statute of limitations applying to such suits pre-
`
`dated the Tucker Act by more than two decades.
`6During a recodification occurring in 1948 (two years after passage of
`the FTCA), Congress omitted the word “forever” from the Tucker Act’s
`statute of limitations; since then, it has provided simply that untimely
`claims “shall be barred.” 28 U. S. C. §2501; see §2501, 62 Stat. 976. No
`party contends that change makes any difference to the resolution of
`
` these cases.
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`11
`
`
`Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
`
`
`Opinion of the Court
`ing Congress’s enactment of the FTCA.7 And neither this
`
`Court nor any other has accorded those words talismanic
`power to render time bars jurisdictional. To the contrary,
`we have construed the very same “shall be forever barred”
`language in 15 U. S. C. §15b, the Clayton Act’s statute of
`limitations, to be subject to tolling; nothing in that provi-
`sion, we found, “restrict[s] the power of the federal courts”
`to extend a limitations period when circumstances war-
`rant. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538,
`559 (1974); see Hardin v. City Title & Escrow Co., 797
`
`F. 2d 1037, 1040 (CADC 1986) (calling §15(b) “a good
`example of a non-jurisdictional time limitation” based on
`its text and separation from the Clayton Act’s jurisdic-
`tional provisions).8 As the Government itself has previously
`——————
`7See, e.g., §6 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 87, 29
`U. S. C. §255 (1952 ed.); §3 of the Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court
`Act, 70 Stat. 1125, 15 U. S. C. §1223 (1958 ed.); §111(b) of the National
`Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 725, 15 U. S. C.
`§1400(b) (1970 ed.); §7(e) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
`of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 605, 29 U. S. C. §626(e) (1970 ed.); §6(c) of the
`Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1967, 82 Stat. 95, 7 U. S. C. §2305(c)
`(1970 ed.); §613(b) of the National Manufactured Housing Construction
`
`and Safety Standards Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 707, 42 U. S. C. §5412(b)
`(1976 ed.).
`8Even before this Court’s decision in American Pipe, Courts of Ap-
`peals had unanimously construed the Clayton Act’s statute of limita-
`
`tions to allow equitable tolling. See General Elec. Co. v. San Antonio,
`334 F. 2d 480, 484–485 (CA5 1964) (joining six other Circuits in reach-
`ing that conclusion). Similarly, every Court of Appeals to have consid-
`ered the issue has found that §6 of the Portal-to-Portal Act, which
`contains the same “shall be forever barred” phrase, permits hearing
`late claims. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Humphries, 454 F. 2d 1279, 1283–
`
`
`1284 (CA10 1972); Ott v. Midland-Ross Corp., 523 F. 2d 1367, 1370
`(CA6 1975); Partlow v. Jewish Orphans’ Home of Southern Cal., Inc.,
`
`645 F. 2d 757, 760–761 (CA9 1981), abrogated on other grounds by
`
`
`
`Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U. S. 165 (1989). And so too
`
`Courts of Appeals unanimously found that the ADEA’s longtime
`
`(though not current) time bar containing that language was subject to
`
`
`tolling. See, e.g., Vance v. Whirlpool Corp., 707 F. 2d 483, 489 (CA4
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`12
`
`
`UNITED STATES v. KWAI FUN WONG
`
`Opinion of the Court
`acknowledged, referring to the “shall be forever barred”
`
`
` locution: “[T]hat type of language has more to do with the
` legal rhetoric at the time the statute was passed” than
`
`
`with anything else, and should not “make[ ] a difference”
`to the jurisdictional analysis. Tr. of Oral Arg. in Irwin,
`O. T. 1990, No. 89–5867, p. 30. Or, put just a bit differ-
`ently: Congress’s inclusion of a phrase endemic to limita-
`tions statutes of that era, at least some of which allow
`
`tolling, cannot provide the requisite clear statement that a
`
`time bar curtails a court’s authority.
`
`Indeed, in two decisions directly addressing the Tucker
`
`Act’s statute of limitations, this Court dismissed the idea
`that the language the Government relies on here has
`jurisdictional significance. Twice we described the words
`in that provision as not meaningfully different from those
`in a nonjurisdictional statute of limitations. And twice we
`made clear that the jurisdictional status of the Tucker
`Act’s time bar has precious little to do with its phrasing.
`
`We first did so in Irwin. Using our newly minted pre-
`
`sumption, see supra, at 4–5, we decided there that the
`
`
`limitations period governing Title VII suits against the
`Government, 42 U. S. C. §2000e–16(c) (1988 ed.), allowed
`equitable tolling. In reaching that conclusion, we com-
`pared §2000e–16(c)’s text (then stating that an employee
`
`“may file a civil action” within 30 days of an agency’s
` denial of her claim) with the language of the Tucker Act’s
`
`time bar. We noted that we had formerly held the Tucker
`
`Act’s limitations statute to “jurisdictionally bar[ ]” late
`claims, and we acknowledged the possibility of justifying
`that different treatment by characterizing its “language
`[as] more stringent than” §2000e–16(c)’s. Irwin, 498 U. S.,
`at 94–95. But we rejected that reasoning, instead finding
`that the two formulations were materially alike. “[W]e are
`——————
`1983); Callowhill v. Allen-Sherman-Hoff Co., 832 F. 2d 269, 273–274
`
`(CA3 1987).
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
` Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
`
`Opini

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