`
`
`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2013
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
`
` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
`
`
`
`
` PRADO NAVARETTE ET AL. v. CALIFORNIA
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA,
`
`
`
`FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
`
`No. 12–9490. Argued January 21, 2014—Decided April 22, 2014
`
`A California Highway Patrol officer stopped the pickup truck occupied
`
`by petitioners because it matched the description of a vehicle that a
`911 caller had recently reported as having run her off the road. As he
`
`
`and a second officer approached the truck, they smelled marijuana.
`
`They searched the truck’s bed, found 30 pounds of marijuana, and ar-
`rested petitioners. Petitioners moved to suppress the evidence, argu-
`ing that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment. Their mo-
`tion was denied, and they pleaded guilty to transporting marijuana.
`The California Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the officer
`had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop.
`Held: The traffic stop complied with the Fourth Amendment because,
`under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable
`suspicion that the truck’s driver was intoxicated. Pp. 3–11.
`
`(a) The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative stops when
`
`
`an officer has “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the
`particular person stopped of . . . criminal activity.” United States v.
`
`
`Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417–418. Reasonable suspicion takes into ac-
`count “the totality of the circumstances,” id., at 417, and depends
`“upon both the content of information possessed by police and its de-
`gree of reliability,” Alabama v. White, 496 U. S. 325, 330. An anony-
`mous tip alone seldom demonstrates sufficient reliability, White, 496
`U. S., at 329, but may do so under appropriate circumstances, id., at
`327. Pp. 3–5.
`
`(b) The 911 call in this case bore adequate indicia of reliability for
`
`
`
`the officer to credit the caller’s account. By reporting that she had
`
`
`been run off the road by a specific vehicle, the caller necessarily
`
`claimed an eyewitness basis of knowledge. The apparently short
`time between the reported incident and the 911 call suggests that the
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`PRADO NAVARETTE v. CALIFORNIA
`
`
`Syllabus
`caller had little time to fabricate the report. And a reasonable officer
`could conclude that a false tipster would think twice before using the
`911 system, which has several technological and regulatory features
`that safeguard against making false reports with immunity. Pp. 5–8.
`
`(c) Not only was the tip here reliable, but it also created reasonable
`suspicion of drunk driving. Running another car off the road sug-
`
` gests the sort of impairment that characterizes drunk driving. While
` that conduct might be explained by another cause such as driver dis-
`
`traction, reasonable suspicion “need not rule out the possibility of in-
`nocent conduct.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U. S. 266, 277. Finally,
`the officer’s failure to observe additional suspicious conduct during
`the short period that he followed the truck did not dispel the reason-
`able suspicion of drunk driving, and the officer was not required to
`surveil the truck for a longer period. Pp. 8–10.
`
`Affirmed.
`THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
`
`
`C. J., and KENNEDY, BREYER, and ALITO, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a
`
`
`
`dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ.,
`
`
`
`joined.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`
` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`
`
`
` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
`
` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
`
` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
`
`
` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
`
`
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 12–9490
`_________________
` LORENZO PRADO NAVARETTE AND JOSE PRADO
`
`
`NAVARETTE, PETITIONERS v. CALIFORNIA
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF
`
`CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
`
`
`[April 22, 2014]
`JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
`After a 911 caller reported that a vehicle had run her off
`
`the road, a police officer located the vehicle she identified
`during the call and executed a traffic stop. We hold that
`the stop complied with the Fourth Amendment because,
`under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had
`reasonable suspicion that the driver was intoxicated.
`
`I
`On August 23, 2008, a Mendocino County 911 dispatch
`
`team for the California Highway Patrol (CHP) received a
`call from another CHP dispatcher in neighboring Hum
`boldt County. The Humboldt County dispatcher relayed a
`tip from a 911 caller, which the Mendocino County team
`recorded as follows: “‘Showing southbound Highway 1 at
`mile marker 88, Silver Ford 150 pickup. Plate of 8-David
`94925. Ran the reporting party off the roadway and was
`
`last seen approximately five [minutes] ago.’ ” App. 36a.
`The Mendocino County team then broadcast that infor
`mation to CHP officers at 3:47 p.m.
`
`
`A CHP officer heading northbound toward the reported
`
`vehicle responded to the broadcast. At 4:00 p.m., the
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`PRADO NAVARETTE v. CALIFORNIA
`
`Opinion of the Court
`officer passed the truck near mile marker 69. At about
`
`4:05 p.m., after making a U-turn, he pulled the truck over.
`A second officer, who had separately responded to the
`broadcast, also arrived on the scene. As the two officers
`approached the truck, they smelled marijuana. A search
`of the truck bed revealed 30 pounds of marijuana. The
`officers arrested the driver, petitioner Lorenzo Prado
`Navarette, and the passenger, petitioner José Prado
`
`Navarette.
`
`Petitioners moved to suppress the evidence, arguing
`that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment
`because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal
`
`activity. Both the magistrate who presided over the sup
`
`pression hearing and the Superior Court disagreed.1
`Petitioners pleaded guilty to transporting marijuana and
`were sentenced to 90 days in jail plus three years of
`probation.
`The California Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding
`
`that the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct an
`investigative stop. 2012 WL 4842651 (Oct. 12, 2012). The
`court reasoned that the content of the tip indicated that it
`came from an eyewitness victim of reckless driving, and
`that the officer’s corroboration of the truck’s description,
`location, and direction established that the tip was reliable
`enough to justify a traffic stop. Id., at *7. Finally, the
`
`court concluded that the caller reported driving that was
`
`sufficiently dangerous to merit an investigative stop with
`out waiting for the officer to observe additional reckless
`driving himself. Id., at *9. The California Supreme Court
`
`——————
`1At the suppression hearing, counsel for petitioners did not dispute
`
`that the reporting party identified herself by name in the 911 call
`recording. Because neither the caller nor the Humboldt County dis
`
` patcher who received the call was present at the hearing, however, the
`prosecution did not introduce the recording into evidence. The prosecu
`tion proceeded to treat the tip as anonymous, and the lower courts
`followed suit. See 2012 WL 4842651, *6 (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 12, 2012).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`denied review. We granted certiorari, 570 U. S. ___
`(2013), and now affirm.
`
`3
`
`
`II
`
`The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative
`stops—such as the traffic stop in this case—when a law
`enforcement officer has “a particularized and objective
`basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of crim
`
`inal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417–
`
`
`
`418 (1981); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21–22
`(1968). The “reasonable suspicion” necessary to justify
`such a stop “is dependent upon both the content of infor
`
`mation possessed by police and its degree of reliability.”
`
`Alabama v. White, 496 U. S. 325, 330 (1990). The stand
`ard takes into account “the totality of the circumstances—
`
`the whole picture.” Cortez, supra, at 417. Although a
`
`mere “‘hunch’” does not create reasonable suspicion,
`Terry, supra, at 27, the level of suspicion the standard
`
`
`requires is “considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by
`a preponderance of the evidence,” and “obviously less”
`
`than is necessary for probable cause, United States v.
`Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 7 (1989).
`A
`
`These principles apply with full force to investigative
`
`stops based on information from anonymous tips. We
`have firmly rejected the argument “that reasonable cause
`for a[n investigative stop] can only be based on the officer’s
`personal observation, rather than on information supplied
`by another person.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143,
`147 (1972). Of course, “an anonymous tip alone seldom
`demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge or verac
`ity.” White, 496 U. S., at 329 (emphasis added). That is
`because “ordinary citizens generally do not provide exten
`sive recitations of the basis of their everyday observa
`tions,” and an anonymous tipster’s veracity is “‘by hypoth
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`
`PRADO NAVARETTE v. CALIFORNIA
`
`Opinion of the Court
` esis largely unknown, and unknowable.’” Ibid. But under
`
`appropriate circumstances, an anonymous tip can demon
`strate “sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasona
`ble suspicion to make [an] investigatory stop.” Id., at 327.
`
`
`Our decisions in Alabama v. White, 496 U. S. 325 (1990),
`
`
`and Florida v. J. L., 529 U. S. 266 (2000), are useful
`guides. In White, an anonymous tipster told the police
`that a woman would drive from a particular apartment
`building to a particular motel in a brown Plymouth station
`
`wagon with a broken right tail light. The tipster further
`asserted that the woman would be transporting cocaine.
`496 U. S., at 327. After confirming the innocent details,
`officers stopped the station wagon as it neared the motel
`and found cocaine in the vehicle. Id., at 331. We held that
`the officers’ corroboration of certain details made the
`anonymous tip sufficiently reliable to create reasonable
`suspicion of criminal activity. By accurately predicting
`future behavior, the tipster demonstrated “a special famil
`iarity with respondent’s affairs,” which in turn implied
`that the tipster had “access to reliable information about
`that individual’s illegal activities.” Id., at 332. We also
`recognized that an informant who is proved to tell the
`truth about some things is more likely to tell the truth
`about other things, “including the claim that the object of
`the tip is engaged in criminal activity.” Id., at 331 (citing
`Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 244 (1983)).
`In J. L., by contrast, we determined that no reasonable
`suspicion arose from a bare-bones tip that a young black
`male in a plaid shirt standing at a bus stop was carrying a
`gun. 529 U. S., at 268. The tipster did not explain how he
`knew about the gun, nor did he suggest that he had any
`special familiarity with the young man’s affairs. Id., at
`271. As a result, police had no basis for believing “that the
`
`tipster ha[d] knowledge of concealed criminal activity.”
`
`Id., at 272. Furthermore, the tip included no predictions
`
`of future behavior that could be corroborated to assess the
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`tipster’s credibility. Id., at 271. We accordingly concluded
`that the tip was insufficiently reliable to justify a stop and
`
`frisk.
`
`5
`
`B
`
`The initial question in this case is whether the 911 call
`was sufficiently reliable to credit the allegation that peti
`
`
`tioners’ truck “ran the [caller] off the roadway.” Even
`assuming for present purposes that the 911 call was anon
`ymous, see n. 1, supra, we conclude that the call bore
`
`
`adequate indicia of reliability for the officer to credit the
`caller’s account. The officer was therefore justified in
`proceeding from the premise that the truck had, in fact,
`caused the caller’s car to be dangerously diverted from the
`
`highway.
`
`
`By reporting that she had been run off the road by a
`specific vehicle—a silver Ford F-150 pickup, license plate
`8D94925—the caller necessarily claimed eyewitness
`knowledge of the alleged dangerous driving. That basis of
`
`knowledge lends significant support to the tip’s reliability.
`See Gates, supra, at 234 (“[An informant’s] explicit and
`detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a
`statement that the event was observed firsthand, entitles
`
`his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the
`case”); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410, 416 (1969)
`(a tip of illegal gambling is less reliable when “it is not
`alleged that the informant personally observed [the de
`fendant] at work or that he had ever placed a bet with
`him”). This is in contrast to J. L., where the tip provided
`
`no basis for concluding that the tipster had actually seen
`
`the gun. 529 U. S., at 271. Even in White, where we
`upheld the stop, there was scant evidence that the tipster
`had actually observed cocaine in the station wagon. We
`
`called White a “‘close case’” because “[k]nowledge about a
`person’s future movements indicates some familiarity with
`that person’s affairs, but having such knowledge does not
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`
`
`PRADO NAVARETTE v. CALIFORNIA
`
`Opinion of the Court
`necessarily imply that the informant knows, in particular,
`whether that person is carrying hidden contraband.” 529
`U. S., at 271. A driver’s claim that another vehicle ran her
`off the road, however, necessarily implies that the inform
`ant knows the other car was driven dangerously.
`There is also reason to think that the 911 caller in this
`
`case was telling the truth. Police confirmed the truck’s
`location near mile marker 69 (roughly 19 highway miles
`south of the location reported in the 911 call) at 4:00 p.m.
`(roughly 18 minutes after the 911 call). That timeline of
`
`events suggests that the caller reported the incident soon
`after she was run off the road. That sort of contemporane
`ous report has long been treated as especially reliable. In
`
`evidence law, we generally credit the proposition that
`statements about an event and made soon after perceiving
`that event are especially trustworthy because “substantial
`contemporaneity of event and statement negate the likeli
`hood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.” Advi
`sory Committee’s Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 803(1), 28
`U. S. C. App., p. 371 (describing the rationale for the
`hearsay exception for “present sense impression[s]”). A
`similar rationale applies to a “statement relating to a
`startling event”—such as getting run off the road—“made
`while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
`that it caused.” Fed. Rule Evid. 803(2) (hearsay exception
`for “excited utterances”). Unsurprisingly, 911 calls that
`would otherwise be inadmissible hearsay have often been
`
` admitted on those grounds. See D. Binder, Hearsay
`Handbook §8.1, pp. 257–259 (4th ed. 2013–2014) (citing
`cases admitting 911 calls as present sense impressions);
`id., §9.1, at 274–275 (911 calls admitted as excited utter
`ances). There was no indication that the tip in J. L. (or
`even in White) was contemporaneous with the observation
`of criminal activity or made under the stress of excitement
`caused by a startling event, but those considerations
`weigh in favor of the caller’s veracity here.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Another indicator of veracity is the caller’s use of the
`
`
` 911 emergency system. See Brief for Respondent 40–41,
`
` 44; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16–18. A 911
`
`call has some features that allow for identifying and trac
`ing callers, and thus provide some safeguards against
`making false reports with immunity. See J. L., supra, at
`276 (KENNEDY, J., concurring). As this case illustrates,
`
`see n. 1, supra, 911 calls can be recorded, which provides
`
`victims with an opportunity to identify the false tipster’s
`voice and subject him to prosecution, see, e.g., Cal. Penal
`Code Ann. §653x (West 2010) (makes “telephon[ing] the
`911 emergency line with the intent to annoy or harass”
`punishable by imprisonment and fine); see also §148.3
`
`(2014 West Cum. Supp.) (prohibits falsely reporting “that
`an ‘emergency’ exists”); §148.5 (prohibits falsely reporting
`“that a felony or misdemeanor has been committed”). The
`911 system also permits law enforcement to verify im
`portant information about the caller. In 1998, the Federal
`Communications Commission (FCC) began to require
`cellular carriers to relay the caller’s phone number to 911
`dispatchers. 47 CFR §20.18(d)(1) (2013) (FCC’s “Phase I
`
`enhanced 911 services” requirements). Beginning in 2001,
`carriers have been required to identify the caller’s geo
`graphic location with increasing specificity. §§20.18(e)–(h)
`(“Phase II enhanced 911 service” requirements). And
`although callers may ordinarily block call recipients from
`obtaining their identifying information, FCC regulations
`exempt 911 calls from that privilege.
`§§64.1601(b),
`(d)(4)(ii) (“911 emergency services” exemption from rule
`that, when a caller so requests, “a carrier may not reveal
`that caller’s number or name”). None of this is to suggest
`that tips in 911 calls are per se reliable. Given the forego
`
`ing technological and regulatory developments, however, a
`reasonable officer could conclude that a false tipster would
`think twice before using such a system. The caller’s use of
`
`the 911 system is therefore one of the relevant circum
`
`
`
`
`
`7
`
`
`
`
`
`8
`
`
`PRADO NAVARETTE v. CALIFORNIA
`
`Opinion of the Court
`stances that, taken together, justified the officer’s reliance
`on the information reported in the 911 call.
`C
`
`Even a reliable tip will justify an investigative stop only
`if it creates reasonable suspicion that “criminal activity
`may be afoot.” Terry, 392 U. S., at 30. We must therefore
`determine whether the 911 caller’s report of being run off
`the roadway created reasonable suspicion of an ongoing
`crime such as drunk driving as opposed to an isolated
`
`episode of past recklessness. See Cortez, 449 U. S., at 417
`(“An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective
`manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be,
`engaged in criminal activity”). We conclude that the
`behavior alleged by the 911 caller, “viewed from the
`standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer,
`
`amount[s] to reasonable suspicion” of drunk driving.
`Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 696 (1996). The
`
`stop was therefore proper.2
`Reasonable suspicion depends on “‘“the factual and
`
`practical considerations of everyday life on which reason-
`able and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”’” Id., at
`
`695. Under that commonsense approach, we can appro
`priately recognize certain driving behaviors as sound
`indicia of drunk driving. See, e.g., People v. Wells,
`
`38 Cal. 4th 1078, 1081, 136 P. 3d 810, 811 (2006) (“‘weav
`ing all over the roadway’”); State v. Prendergast, 103 Haw.
`451, 452–453, 83 P. 3d 714, 715–716 (2004) (“cross[ing]
`over the center line” on a highway and “almost caus[ing]
`several head-on collisions”); State v. Golotta, 178 N. J.
`205, 209, 837 A. 2d 359, 361 (2003) (driving “‘all over
`
`the road’” and “‘weaving back and forth’”); State v.
`
`——————
`2Because we conclude that the 911 call created reasonable suspicion
`of an ongoing crime, we need not address under what circumstances a
`stop is justified by the need to investigate completed criminal activity.
`Cf. United States v. Hensley, 469 U. S. 221, 229 (1985).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Walshire, 634 N. W. 2d 625, 626 (Iowa 2001) (“driving in
`the median”).
`Indeed, the accumulated experience of
`thousands of officers suggests that these sorts of erratic
`
`behaviors are strongly correlated with drunk driving.
`
`See Nat. Highway Traffic Safety Admin., The Visual
`Detection of DWI Motorists 4–5 (Mar. 2010), online at
`http://nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/pdf/808677.pdf
`(as visited
`Apr. 18, 2014, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file).
`
`Of course, not all traffic infractions imply intoxication.
`
`Unconfirmed reports of driving without a seatbelt or
`slightly over the speed limit, for example, are so tenuously
`connected to drunk driving that a stop on those grounds
`alone would be constitutionally suspect. But a reliable tip
`alleging the dangerous behaviors discussed above gener-
`ally would justify a traffic stop on suspicion of drunk
`driving.
`
`The 911 caller in this case reported more than a minor
`traffic infraction and more than a conclusory allegation of
`drunk or reckless driving. Instead, she alleged a specific
`and dangerous result of the driver’s conduct: running
`another car off the highway. That conduct bears too great
`a resemblance to paradigmatic manifestations of drunk
`driving to be dismissed as an isolated example of reckless
`ness. Running another vehicle off the road suggests lane
`positioning problems, decreased vigilance, impaired judg
`ment, or some combination of those recognized drunk
`
`driving cues. See Visual Detection of DWI Motorists 4–5.
`
`And the experience of many officers suggests that a driver
`who almost strikes a vehicle or another object—the exact
`scenario that ordinarily causes “running [another vehicle]
`
`off the roadway”—is likely intoxicated. See id., at 5, 8.
`As a result, we cannot say that the officer acted unreason
`
`ably under these circumstances in stopping a driver
`whose alleged conduct was a significant indicator of drunk
`driving.
`
`Petitioners’ attempts to second-guess the officer’s rea
`
`
`
`
`
`9
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`10
`
`
`
`
`
`
`PRADO NAVARETTE v. CALIFORNIA
`
`Opinion of the Court
` sonable suspicion of drunk driving are unavailing. It is
`
`true that the reported behavior might also be explained
`by, for example, a driver responding to “an unruly child or
`other distraction.” Brief for Petitioners 21. But we have
`consistently recognized that reasonable suspicion “need
`not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” United
`
`States v. Arvizu, 534 U. S. 266, 277 (2002).
`Nor did the absence of additional suspicious conduct,
`
`
`after the vehicle was first spotted by an officer, dispel the
`
`reasonable suspicion of drunk driving. Brief for Petition
`ers 23–24. It is hardly surprising that the appearance of a
`marked police car would inspire more careful driving for a
`
`
`time. Cf. Arvizu, supra, at 275 (“‘[s]lowing down after
`
`spotting a law enforcement vehicle’” does not dispel rea
`sonable suspicion of criminal activity). Extended observa
`tion of an allegedly drunk driver might eventually dispel a
`reasonable suspicion of intoxication, but the 5-minute
`period in this case hardly sufficed in that regard. Of
`course, an officer who already has such a reasonable sus
`picion need not surveil a vehicle at length in order to
`personally observe suspicious driving. See Adams v.
`Williams, 407 U. S., at 147 (repudiating the argument
`that “reasonable cause for a[n investigative stop] can only
`be based on the officer’s personal observation”). Once
`reasonable suspicion of drunk driving arises, “[t]he rea
`sonableness of the officer’s decision to stop a suspect does
`not turn on the availability of less intrusive investigatory
`techniques.” Sokolow, 490 U. S., at 11. This would be a
`particularly inappropriate context to depart from that
`settled rule, because allowing a drunk driver a second
`chance for dangerous conduct could have disastrous
`
`consequences.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`III
` Like White, this is a “close case.” 496 U. S., at 332. As
`in that case, the indicia of the 911 caller’s reliability here
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`It is so ordered.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` 11
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`are stronger than those in J. L., where we held that a
`bare-bones tip was unreliable. 529 U. S., at 271. Alt
`hough the indicia present here are different from those we
`found sufficient in White, there is more than one way to
`demonstrate “a particularized and objective basis for
`suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activ
`ity.” Cortez, 449 U. S., at 417–418. Under the totality of
`the circumstances, we find the indicia of reliability in this
`case sufficient to provide the officer with reasonable suspi
`
`cion that the driver of the reported vehicle had run another
`vehicle off the road. That made it reasonable under the
`circumstances for the officer to execute a traffic stop. We
`accordingly affirm.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
`
`SCALIA, J., dissenting
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`1
`
`_________________
`
` No. 12–9490
`_________________
` LORENZO PRADO NAVARETTE AND JOSE PRADO
`
`
`NAVARETTE, PETITIONERS v. CALIFORNIA
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF
`
`CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
`
`
`[April 22, 2014]
`JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG,
`
`
`JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting.
`
`The California Court of Appeal in this case relied on
`
`jurisprudence from the California Supreme Court (adopted
`as well by other courts) to the effect that “an anonymous
`and uncorroborated tip regarding a possibly intoxicated
`highway driver” provides without more the reasonable
`suspicion necessary to justify a stop. People v. Wells, 38
`Cal. 4th l078, 1082, 136 P. 3d 810, 812, (2006). See also,
`e.g., United States v. Wheat, 278 F. 3d 722, 729–730 (CA8
`2001); State v. Walshire, 634 N. W. 2d 625, 626–627, 630
`(Iowa 2001). Today’s opinion does not explicitly adopt
`such a departure from our normal Fourth Amendment
`requirement that anonymous tips must be corroborated; it
`purports to adhere to our prior cases, such as Florida v.
`J. L., 529 U. S. 266 (2000), and Alabama v. White, 496
`U. S. 325 (1990). Be not deceived.
`
`Law enforcement agencies follow closely our judgments
`
`on matters such as this, and they will identify at once our
`new rule: So long as the caller identifies where the car is,
`anonymous claims of a single instance of possibly careless
`or reckless driving, called in to 911, will support a traffic
`stop. This is not my concept, and I am sure would not be
`the Framers’, of a people secure from unreasonable
`searches and seizures. I would reverse the judgment of
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`PRADO NAVARETTE v. CALIFORNIA
`
`SCALIA, J., dissenting
`
`the Court of Appeal of California.
`I
`The California Highway Patrol in this case knew noth
`
`ing about the tipster on whose word—and that alone—
`they seized Lorenzo and José Prado Navarette. They did
`not know her name.1 They did not know her phone num
`ber or address. They did not even know where she called
`from (she may have dialed in from a neighboring county,
`App. 33a–34a).
`
`The tipster said the truck had “[run her] off the road
`
`way,” id., at 36a, but the police had no reason to credit
`
`that charge and many reasons to doubt it, beginning with
`the peculiar fact that the accusation was anonymous.
`“[E]liminating accountability . . . is ordinarily the very
`purpose of anonymity.” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
`Comm’n, 514 U. S. 334, 385 (1995) (SCALIA, J., dissenting).
`
`The unnamed tipster “can lie with impunity,” J. L., supra,
`at 275 (KENNEDY, J., concurring). Anonymity is especially
`suspicious with respect to the call that is the subject of the
`present case. When does a victim complain to the police
`about an arguably criminal act (running the victim off the
`road) without giving his identity, so that he can accuse
`and testify when the culprit is caught?
`
`The question before us, the Court agrees, ante, at 8, is
`
`whether the “content of information possessed by police
`and its degree of reliability,” White, 496 U. S., at 330, gave
`the officers reasonable suspicion that the driver of the
`truck (Lorenzo) was committing an ongoing crime. When
`the only source of the government’s information is an
`informant’s tip, we ask whether the tip bears sufficient
`“‘indicia of reliability,’” id., at 328, to establish “a particu
`larized and objective basis for suspecting the particular
`——————
`1There was some indication below that the tipster was a woman. See
`App. 18a. Beyond that detail, we must, as the Court notes, ante, at 2,
`n. 1, assume that the identity of the tipster was unknown.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
`
`SCALIA, J., dissenting
`
`person stopped of criminal activity,” United States v.
`Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417–418 (1981).
`
`The most extreme case, before this one, in which an
`anonymous tip was found to meet this standard was
`White, supra. There the reliability of the tip was estab
`lished by the fact that it predicted the target’s behavior in
`the finest detail—a detail that could be known only by
`someone familiar with the target’s business: She would,
`the tipster said, leave a particular apartment building, get
`into a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right
`
`tail light, and drive immediately to a particular motel.
`Id., at 327. Very few persons would have such intimate
`knowledge, and hence knowledge of the unobservable fact
`that the woman was carrying unlawful drugs was plausi
`
`ble. Id., at 332. Here the Court makes a big deal of the
`fact that the tipster was dead right about the fact that a
`silver Ford F-150 truck (license plate 8D94925) was trav
`eling south on Highway 1 somewhere near mile marker
`
`88. But everyone in the world who saw the car would have
`that knowledge, and anyone who wanted the car stopped
`would have to provide that information. Unlike the situa
`tion in White, that generally available knowledge in no
`way makes it plausible that the tipster saw the car run
`someone off the road.
`
`The Court says, ante, at 5, that “[b]y reporting that she
`had been run off the road by a specific vehicle . . . the
`caller necessarily claimed eyewitness knowledge.” So
`what? The issue is not how she claimed to know, but
`
`whether what she claimed to know was true. The claim to
`“eyewitness knowledge” of being run off the road supports
`not at all its veracity; nor does the amazing, mystifying
`prediction (so far short of what existed in White) that the
`
`petitioners’ truck would be heading south on Highway 1.
`
`The Court finds “reason to think” that the informant
`“was telling the truth” in the fact that police observation
`confirmed that the truck had been driving near the spot at
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`PRADO NAVARETTE v. CALIFORNIA
`
`SCALIA, J., dissenting
`
`which, and at the approximate time at which, the tipster
`
`alleged she had been run off the road. Ante, at 6. Accord
`ing to the Court, the statement therefore qualifies as a
`“‘present sense impression’” or “‘excited utterance,’” kinds
`of hearsay that the law deems categorically admissible
`
`given their low likelihood of reflecting “‘deliberate or
`conscious misrepresentation.’”
`Ibid. (quoting Advisory
`
`Committee’s Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 803(1), 28 U. S. C.
`App., p. 371). So, the Court says, we can fairly suppose
`that the accusation was true.
`
`No, we cannot. To begin with, it is questionable whether
`either the “present sense impression” or the “excited ut
`terance” exception to the hearsay rule applies here. The
`classic “present sense impression” is the recounting of an
`event that is occurring before the declarant’s eyes, as the
`declarant is speaking (“I am watching the Hindenburg
`
`explode!”). See 2 K. Broun, McCormick on Evidence 362
`(7th ed. 2013) (hereinafter McCormick). And the classic
`“excited utterance” is a statement elicited, almost involun
`tarily, by the shock of what the declarant is immediately
`
`witnessing (“My God, those people will be killed!”). See
`id.,