(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2013
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` Syllabus
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`LEXMARK INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. STATIC
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`CONTROL COMPONENTS, INC.
`
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
` No. 12–873. Argued December 3, 2013—Decided March 25, 2014
`
`Petitioner Lexmark sells the only style of toner cartridges that work
`with the company’s laser printers, but “remanufacturers” acquire and
`refurbish used Lexmark cartridges to sell in competition with
`Lexmark’s own new and refurbished ones. Lexmark’s “Prebate” pro-
`gram gives customers a discount on new cartridges if they agree to
`
` return empty cartridges to the company. Each Prebate cartridge has
`a microchip that disables the empty cartridge unless Lexmark re-
`places the chip. Respondent Static Control, a maker and seller of
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`components for the remanufacture of Lexmark cartridges, developed
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` a microchip that mimicked Lexmark’s. Lexmark sued for copyright
`infringement, but Static Control counterclaimed, alleging that
`Lexmark engaged in false or misleading advertising in violation of
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` §43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U. S. C. §1125(a), and that its misrep-
`resentations had caused Static Control lost sales and damage to its
`
`business reputation. The District Court held that Static Control
`lacked “prudential standing” to bring the Lanham Act claim, apply-
`
` ing a multifactor balancing test the court attributed to Associated
`Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U. S. 519. In revers-
`ing, the Sixth Circuit relied on the Second Circuit’s “reasonable in-
`
`terest” test.
`
`Held: Static Control has adequately pleaded the elements of a Lanham
`
`Act cause of action for false advertising. Pp. 6–22.
`
`
`(a) The question here is whether Static Control falls within the
`class of plaintiffs that Congress authorized to sue under §1125(a). To
`decide that question, this Court must determine the provision’s
`meaning, using traditional principles of statutory interpretation. It
`
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`is misleading to label this a “prudential standing” question. Lexmark
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`LEXMARK INT’L, INC. v. STATIC CONTROL
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`COMPONENTS, INC.
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`Syllabus
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`bases its “prudential standing” arguments on Associated General
`Contractors, but that case rested on statutory considerations: The
`Court sought to “ascertain,” as a statutory-interpretation matter, the
`“scope of the private remedy created by” Congress in §4 of the Clay-
`
`ton Act, and the “class of persons who [could] maintain a private
`damages action under” that legislatively conferred cause of action,
`459 U. S., at 529, 532. And while this Court may have placed the
`“zone of interests” test that Static Control relies on under the “pru-
`
`dential” rubric in the past, see, e.g., Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v.
`
`Newdow, 542 U. S. 1, 12, it does not belong there any more than As-
`sociated General Contractors does. Rather, whether a plaintiff comes
`within the zone of interests requires the Court to determine, using
`traditional statutory-interpretation tools, whether a legislatively con-
`
`ferred cause of action encompasses a particular plaintiff ’s claim.
`
`
`
`See, e. g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83,
`
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`97, and n. 2. Pp. 6–9.
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`(b) The §1125(a) cause of action extends to plaintiffs who fall with-
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`in the zone of interests protected by that statute and whose injury
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`was proximately caused by a violation of that statute. Pp. 10–18.
`
`
`(1) A statutory cause of action is presumed to extend only to
`plaintiffs whose interests “fall within the zone of interests protected
`by the law invoked.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751. “[T]he
`breadth of [that] zone . . . varies according to the provisions of law at
`
`issue.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154, 163. The Lanham Act in-
`cludes a detailed statement of its purposes, including, as relevant
`here, “protect[ing] persons engaged in [commerce within the control
`of Congress] against unfair competition,” 15 U. S. C. §1127; and “un-
`fair competition” was understood at common law to be concerned
`with injuries to business reputation and present and future sales.
`Thus, to come within the zone of interests in a §1125(a) false-
`advertising suit, a plaintiff must allege an injury to a commercial in-
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`terest in reputation or sales. Pp. 10–13.
`
`
`(2) A statutory cause of action is also presumed to be limited to
`plaintiffs whose injuries are proximately caused by violations of the
`
`
`statute. See, e.g., Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corpora-
`tion, 503 U. S. 258, 268–270. This requirement generally bars suits
`for alleged harm that is “too remote” from the defendant’s unlawful
`
`conduct, such as when the harm is purely derivative of “misfortunes
`
`visited upon a third person by the defendant’s acts.” Id., at 268–269.
`In a sense, all commercial injuries from false advertising are deriva-
`
`tive of those suffered by consumers deceived by the advertising. But
`since the Lanham Act authorizes suit only for commercial injuries,
`the intervening consumer-deception step is not fatal to the proxi-
`mate-cause showing the statute requires. Cf. Bridge v. Phoenix Bond
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`Syllabus
` & Indemnity Co., 553 U. S. 639, 656. Thus, a plaintiff suing under
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`§1125(a) ordinarily must show that its economic or reputational inju-
`ry flows directly from the deception wrought by the defendant’s ad-
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` vertising; and that occurs when deception of consumers causes them
`to withhold trade from the plaintiff. Pp. 13–15.
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`(3) Direct application of the zone-of-interests test and the proxi-
`mate-cause requirement supplies the relevant limits on who may sue
`under §1125(a). These principles provide better guidance than the
`multifactor balancing test urged by Lexmark, the direct-competitor
`test, or the reasonable-interest test applied by the Sixth Circuit.
`Pp. 15–18.
`(c) Under these principles, Static Control comes within the class of
`
`plaintiffs authorized to sue under §1125(a). Its alleged injuries—lost
`sales and damage to its business reputation—fall within the zone of
`interests protected by the Act, and Static Control sufficiently alleged
`that its injuries were proximately caused by Lexmark’s misrepresen-
`tations. Pp. 18–22.
`697 F. 3d 387, affirmed.
` SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`_________________
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` No. 12–873
`_________________
`LEXMARK INTERNATIONAL, INC., PETITIONER v.
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` STATIC CONTROL COMPONENTS, INC.
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`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
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`
`APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`[March 25, 2014]
`
` JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
`
`This case requires us to decide whether respondent,
`Static Control Components, Inc., may sue petitioner, Lex-
`mark International, Inc., for false advertising under the
`Lanham Act, 15 U. S. C. §1125(a).
`
`I. Background
`
`Lexmark manufactures and sells laser printers. It also
`sells toner cartridges for those printers (toner being the
`powdery ink that laser printers use to create images on
`paper). Lexmark designs its printers to work only with its
`own style of cartridges, and it therefore dominates the
`
`market for cartridges compatible with its printers. That
`market, however, is not devoid of competitors. Other
`businesses, called “remanufacturers,” acquire used Lex-
`mark toner cartridges, refurbish them, and sell them in
`competition with new and refurbished cartridges sold by
`
`Lexmark.
`
`
`Lexmark would prefer that its customers return their
`empty cartridges to it for refurbishment and resale, rather
`than sell those cartridges to a remanufacturer.
`So
`Lexmark introduced what it called a “Prebate” program,
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`LEXMARK INT’L, INC. v. STATIC CONTROL
`COMPONENTS, INC.
`Opinion of the Court
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`which enabled customers to purchase new toner cartridges
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`at a 20-percent discount if they would agree to return the
`cartridge to Lexmark once it was empty. Those terms
`were communicated to consumers through notices printed
`on the toner-cartridge boxes, which advised the consumer
`that opening the box would indicate assent to the terms—
`a practice commonly known as “shrinkwrap licensing,”
`see, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F. 3d 1447, 1449
`
`
`(CA7 1996). To enforce the Prebate terms, Lexmark in­
`cluded a microchip in each Prebate cartridge that would
`disable the cartridge after it ran out of toner; for the car­
`tridge to be used again, the microchip would have to be
`replaced by Lexmark.
`
`Static Control is not itself a manufacturer or remanu­
`
`facturer of toner cartridges. It is, rather, “the market
`
`leader [in] making and selling the components necessary
`to remanufacture Lexmark cartridges.” 697 F. 3d 387, 396
`(CA6 2012) (case below). In addition to supplying remanu­
`facturers with toner and various replacement parts, Static
`Control developed a microchip that could mimic the micro­
`chip in Lexmark’s Prebate cartridges. By purchasing
`Static Control’s microchips and using them to replace the
`Lexmark microchip, remanufacturers were able to refur­
`bish and resell used Prebate cartridges.
`
`
`
` Lexmark did not take kindly to that development. In
`2002, it sued Static Control, alleging that Static Control’s
`microchips violated both the Copyright Act of 1976, 17
`U. S. C. §101 et seq., and the Digital Millennium Copy­
`right Act, 17 U. S. C. §1201 et seq. Static Control counter­
`claimed, alleging, among other things, violations of §43(a)
`
`of the Lanham Act, 60 Stat. 441, codified at 15 U. S. C.
`§1125(a). Section 1125(a) provides:
`
`“(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any
`goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in
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`commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or
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`Opinion of the Court
` any combination thereof, or any false designation of
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`origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false
`or misleading representation of fact, which—
`
`“(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake,
`or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or asso­
`ciation of such person with another person, or as to
`the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
`goods, services, or commercial activities by another
`person, or
`
`“(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, mis­
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`represents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geo­
`graphic origin of his or her or another person’s goods,
`services, or commercial activities,
`“shall be liable in a civil action by any person who be­
`lieves that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by
`
`such act.”
`Section 1125(a) thus creates two distinct bases of liability:
`false association, §1125(a)(1)(A), and false advertising,
`§1125(a)(1)(B). See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F. 2d
`1093, 1108 (CA9 1992). Static Control alleged only false
`
`advertising.
`
`
`As relevant to its Lanham Act claim, Static Control
`alleged two types of false or misleading conduct by
`Lexmark. First, it alleged that through its Prebate pro­
`gram Lexmark “purposefully misleads end-users” to be­
`lieve that they are legally bound by the Prebate terms and
`are thus required to return the Prebate-labeled cartridge
`
`to Lexmark after a single use. App. 31, ¶39. Second, it
`alleged that upon introducing the Prebate program,
`Lexmark “sent letters to most of the companies in the
`toner cartridge remanufacturing business” falsely advising
`
`those companies that it was illegal to sell refurbished
`Prebate cartridges and, in particular, that it was illegal to
`use Static Control’s products to refurbish those cartridges.
`Id., at 29, ¶35. Static Control asserted that by those
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`LEXMARK INT’L, INC. v. STATIC CONTROL
`COMPONENTS, INC.
`Opinion of the Court
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`statements, Lexmark had materially misrepresented “the
`nature, characteristics, and qualities” of both its own
`
`products and Static Control’s products. Id., at 43–44, ¶85.
`It further maintained that Lexmark’s misrepresentations
`
`had “proximately caused and [we]re likely to cause injury
`to [Static Control] by diverting sales from [Static Control]
`to Lexmark,” and had “substantially injured [its] business
`reputation” by “leading consumers and others in the trade
`to believe that [Static Control] is engaged in illegal con­
`
`duct.” Id., at 44, ¶88. Static Control sought treble dam­
`
`ages, attorney’s fees and costs, and injunctive relief.1
`The District Court granted Lexmark’s motion to dismiss
`
`Static Control’s Lanham Act claim. It held that Static
`Control lacked “prudential standing” to bring that claim,
`App. to Pet. for Cert. 83, relying on a multifactor balanc­
`ing test it attributed to Associated Gen. Contractors of
`Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U. S. 519 (1983). The court
`
`emphasized that there were “more direct plaintiffs in the
`form of remanufacturers of Lexmark’s cartridges”; that
`Static Control’s injury was “remot[e]” because it was a
`mere “byproduct of the supposed manipulation of consum­
`ers’ relationships with remanufacturers”; and
`that
`Lexmark’s “alleged intent [was] to dry up spent cartridge
`supplies at the remanufacturing level, rather than at
`[Static Control]’s supply level, making remanufacturers
`Lexmark’s alleged intended target.” App. to Pet. for Cert.
`83.
`The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Static Con­
`
`trol’s Lanham Act claim. 697 F. 3d, at 423. Taking the
`lay of the land, it identified three competing approaches to
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`——————
`1Lexmark contends that Static Control’s allegations failed to describe
`“commercial advertising or promotion” within the meaning of 15
`U. S. C. §1125(a)(1)(B). That question is not before us, and we express
`no view on it. We assume without deciding that the communica­
`tions alleged by Static Control qualify as commercial advertising or
`promotion.
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`Opinion of the Court
`determining whether a plaintiff has standing to sue under
`the Lanham Act. It observed that the Third, Fifth,
`Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits all refer to “antitrust stand­
`ing or the [Associated General Contractors] factors in
`
`deciding Lanham Act standing,” as the District Court had
`done. Id., at 410 (citing Conte Bros. Automotive, Inc. v.
`
`Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F. 3d 221, 233–234 (CA3
`1998); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F. 3d
`539, 562–563 (CA5 2001); Gilbert/Robinson, Inc. v. Carrie
`Beverage-Missouri, Inc., 989 F. 2d 985, 990–991 (CA8
`1993); Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 489
`F. 3d 1156, 1162–1164 (CA11 2007)). By contrast, “[t]he
`Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth [Circuits] use a categorical
`test, permitting Lanham Act suits only by an actual com­
`petitor.” 697 F. 3d, at 410 (citing L. S. Heath & Son, Inc.
`v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc., 9 F. 3d 561, 575 (CA7
`1993); Waits, supra, at 1108–1109; Stanfield v. Osborne
`Industries, Inc., 52 F. 3d 867, 873 (CA10 1995)). And the
`Second Circuit applies a “‘reasonable interest’ approach,”
`under which a Lanham Act plaintiff “has standing if the
`claimant can demonstrate ‘(1) a reasonable interest to be
`protected against the alleged false advertising and (2) a
`reasonable basis for believing that the interest is likely to
`
`be damaged by the alleged false advertising.’” 697 F. 3d,
`
`at 410 (quoting Famous Horse, Inc. v. 5th Avenue Photo
`
`Inc., 624 F. 3d 106, 113 (CA2 2010)). The Sixth Circuit
`applied the Second Circuit’s reasonable-interest test and
`concluded that Static Control had standing because it
`“alleged a cognizable interest in its business reputation
`and sales to remanufacturers and sufficiently alleged that
`th[o]se interests were harmed by Lexmark’s statements to
`the remanufacturers that Static Control was engaging in
`illegal conduct.” 697 F. 3d, at 411.
`
`
`We granted certiorari to decide “the appropriate ana-
`
`lytical framework for determining a party’s standing to
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`maintain an action for false advertising under the Lanham
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`LEXMARK INT’L, INC. v. STATIC CONTROL
`COMPONENTS, INC.
`Opinion of the Court
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` Act.” Pet. for Cert. i; 569 U. S. ____ (2013).2
`
`II. “Prudential Standing”
`
`
`The parties’ briefs treat the question on which we
`granted certiorari as one of “prudential standing.” Be­
`cause we think that label misleading, we begin by clarify­
`ing the nature of the question at issue in this case.
`
`From Article III’s limitation of the judicial power to
`resolving “Cases” and “Controversies,” and the separation­
`of-powers principles underlying that limitation, we have
`deduced a set of requirements that together make up the
`“irreducible constitutional minimum of standing.” Lujan
`v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992). The
`plaintiff must have suffered or be imminently threatened
`with a concrete and particularized “injury in fact” that is
`fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant
`and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.
`Ibid. Lexmark does not deny that Static Control’s alle-
`gations of lost sales and damage to its business reputa-
`tion give it standing under Article III to press its false­
`advertising claim, and we are satisfied that they do.
`
`Although Static Control’s claim thus presents a case or
`controversy that is properly within federal courts’ Article
`III jurisdiction, Lexmark urges that we should decline to
`adjudicate Static Control’s claim on grounds that are
`“prudential,” rather than constitutional. That request is
`in some tension with our recent reaffirmation of the prin­
`ciple that “a federal court’s ‘obligation’ to hear and decide”
`cases within its jurisdiction “is ‘virtually unflagging.’”
`Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U. S. ___, ___
`(2013) (slip op., at 6) (quoting Colorado River Water Con-
`——————
`including
`litigation,
` 2Other aspects of the parties’ sprawling
`
`Lexmark’s claims under federal copyright and patent law and Static
`Control’s claims under federal antitrust and North Carolina unfair­
`competition law, are not before us. Our review pertains only to Static
`Control’s Lanham Act claim.
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`Opinion of the Court
`servation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 817 (1976)).
`In recent decades, however, we have adverted to a “pru­
`dential” branch of standing, a doctrine not derived from
`Article III and “not exhaustively defined” but encompass­
`ing (we have said) at least three broad principles: “‘the
`general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s
`legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized
`grievances more appropriately addressed in the repre­
`sentative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff ’s
`complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the
`
`law invoked.’” Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow,
`
`542 U. S. 1, 12 (2004) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S.
`737, 751 (1984)).
`
`Lexmark bases its “prudential standing” arguments
`chiefly on Associated General Contractors, but we did not
`describe our analysis in that case in those terms. Rather,
`we sought to “ascertain,” as a matter of statutory interpre­
`tation, the “scope of the private remedy created by” Con­
`gress in §4 of the Clayton Act, and the “class of persons
`who [could] maintain a private damages action under”
`that legislatively conferred cause of action. 459 U. S., at
`529, 532. We held that the statute limited the class to
`plaintiffs whose injuries were proximately caused by a
`
`defendant’s antitrust violations. Id., at 532–533. Later
`
`decisions confirm that Associated General Contractors
`rested on statutory, not “prudential,” considerations. See,
`
`e.g., Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation,
`503 U. S. 258, 265–268 (1992) (relying on Associated Gen-
`
`eral Contractors in finding a proximate-cause requirement
`
`in the cause of action created by the Racketeer Influenced
`and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C.
`§1964(c)); Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U. S. 451,
`456 (2006) (affirming that Holmes “relied on a careful
`interpretation of §1964(c)”). Lexmark’s arguments thus do
`not deserve the “prudential” label.
`
`Static Control, on the other hand, argues that we should
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`LEXMARK INT’L, INC. v. STATIC CONTROL
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`COMPONENTS, INC.
`Opinion of the Court
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`measure its “prudential standing” by using the zone-of­
`
`interests test. Although we admittedly have placed that
`
`
`test under the “prudential” rubric in the past, see, e.g., Elk
`Grove, supra, at 12, it does not belong there any more than
`Associated General Contractors does. Whether a plain-
`tiff comes within “the ‘zone of interests’” is an issue
`that requires us to determine, using traditional tools of
`statutory interpretation, whether a legislatively conferred
`
`cause of action encompasses a particular plaintiff ’s claim.
`
`See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S.
`
`83, 97, and n. 2 (1998); Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn.,
`
`479 U. S. 388, 394–395 (1987); Holmes, supra, at 288
`
`(SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). As Judge Silberman
`
`of the D. C. Circuit recently observed, “‘prudential stand­
`ing’ is a misnomer” as applied to the zone-of-interests
`analysis, which asks whether “this particular class of
`persons ha[s] a right to sue under this substantive stat­
`ute.” Association of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, 716
`
`
`F. 3d 667, 675–676 (2013) (concurring opinion).3
`——————
`3The zone-of-interests test is not the only concept that we have previ­
`ously classified as an aspect of “prudential standing” but for which,
`
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`upon closer inspection, we have found that label inapt. Take, for
`
`example, our reluctance to entertain generalized grievances—i.e., suits
`“claiming only harm to [the plaintiff ’s] and every citizen’s interest in
`proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that
`no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at
`large.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 573–574 (1992).
`While we have at times grounded our reluctance to entertain such suits
`in the “counsels of prudence” (albeit counsels “close[ly] relat[ed] to the
`policies reflected in” Article III), Valley Forge Christian College v.
`Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S.
`
`464, 475 (1982), we have since held that such suits do not present
`
`
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`constitutional “cases” or “controversies.” See, e.g., Lance v. Coffman,
`549 U. S. 437, 439 (2007) (per curiam); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,
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`547 U. S. 332, 344–346 (2006); Defenders of Wildlife, supra, at 573–574.
`
`They are barred for constitutional reasons, not “prudential” ones. The
`limitations on third-party standing are harder to classify; we have
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`observed that third-party standing is “ ‘closely related to the question
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`Opinion of the Court
` In sum, the question this case presents is whether Static
`Control falls within the class of plaintiffs whom Congress
`has authorized to sue under §1125(a). In other words, we
`ask whether Static Control has a cause of action under the
`statute.4 That question requires us to determine the
`meaning of the congressionally enacted provision creating
`a cause of action. In doing so, we apply traditional princi-
`ples of statutory interpretation. We do not ask whether in
`our judgment Congress should have authorized Static
`Control’s suit, but whether Congress in fact did so. Just
`as a court cannot apply its independent policy judgment to
`recognize a cause of action that Congress has denied, see
`Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 286–287 (2001), it
`cannot limit a cause of action that Congress has created
`merely because “prudence” dictates.
`
`——————
`whether a person in the litigant’s position will have a right of action on
`the claim,’ ” Department of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U. S. 715, 721, n. **
`(1990) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 500, n. 12 (1975)), but
`most of our cases have not framed the inquiry in that way. See, e.g.,
`Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U. S. 125, 128–129 (2004) (suggesting it is an
`element of “prudential standing”). This case does not present any issue
`of third-party standing, and consideration of that doctrine’s proper
`place in the standing firmament can await another day.
`4 We have on occasion referred to this inquiry as “statutory standing”
`and treated it as effectively jurisdictional. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens
`for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 97, and n. 2 (1998); cases cited
`id., at 114–117 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). That label is an
`improvement over the language of “prudential standing,” since it
`correctly places the focus on the statute. But it, too, is misleading,
`since “the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action
`does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the court’s statutory
`or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.’ ” Verizon Md. Inc. v.
`Public Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U. S. 635, 642–643 (2002) (quoting
`Steel Co., supra, at 89); see also Grocery Mfrs. Assn. v. EPA, 693 F. 3d
`169, 183–185 (CADC 2012) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), and cases cited
`therein; Pathak, Statutory Standing and the Tyranny of Labels, 62
`Okla. L. Rev. 89, 106 (2009).
`
`
`
`

`
`10
`
`
`LEXMARK INT’L, INC. v. STATIC CONTROL
`
`COMPONENTS, INC.
`Opinion of the Court
`
`III. Static Control’s Right To Sue Under §1125(a)
`
`Thus, this case presents a straightforward question of
`statutory interpretation: Does the cause of action in
`§1125(a) extend to plaintiffs like Static Control? The
`statute authorizes suit by “any person who believes that
`he or she is likely to be damaged” by a defendant’s false
`advertising. §1125(a)(1). Read literally, that broad lan­
`guage might suggest that an action is available to anyone
`who can satisfy the minimum requirements of Article III.
`No party makes that argument, however, and the “unlike­
`lihood that Congress meant to allow all factually injured
`plaintiffs to recover persuades us that [§1125(a)] should
`not get such an expansive reading.” Holmes, 503 U. S., at
`
`266 (footnote omitted). We reach that conclusion in light
`of two relevant background principles already mentioned:
`zone of interests and proximate causality.
`A. Zone of Interests
`
`First, we presume that a statutory cause of action ex­
`tends only to plaintiffs whose interests “fall within the
`zone of interests protected by the law invoked.” Allen, 468
`U. S., at 751. The modern “zone of interests” formulation
`
`originated in Association of Data Processing Service Or-
`ganizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 (1970), as a limi­
`tation on the cause of action for judicial review conferred
`by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). We have
`since made clear, however, that it applies to all statutorily
`created causes of action; that it is a “requirement of gen­
`eral application”; and that Congress is presumed to “legis­
`
`lat[e] against the background of ” the zone-of-interests
`
`limitation, “which applies unless it is expressly negated.”
`
`Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154, 163 (1997); see also
`Holmes, supra, at 287–288 (SCALIA, J., concurring in
`
`judgment). It is “perhaps more accurat[e],” though not
`very different as a practical matter, to say that the limita­
`tion always applies and is never negated, but that our
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`
`

`
`
`11
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`analysis of certain statutes will show that they protect a
`more-than-usually “expan[sive]” range of interests. Ben-
`nett, supra, at 164. The zone-of-interests test is therefore
`an appropriate tool for determining who may invoke the
`cause of action in §1125(a).5
`
`We have said, in the APA context, that the test is
`
`
`not “‘especially demanding,’” Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish
`
`
`Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U. S. ___,
`___ (2012) (slip op., at 15). In that context we have often
`“conspicuously included the word ‘arguably’ in the test to
`indicate that the benefit of any doubt goes to the plaintiff,”
`and have said that the test “forecloses suit only when a
`plaintiff ’s ‘interests are so marginally related to or incon­
`sistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it
`cannot reasonably be assumed that’” Congress authorized
`that plaintiff to sue. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 15–16). That
`lenient approach is an appropriate means of preserving
`the flexibility of the APA’s omnibus judicial-review provi­
`sion, which permits suit for violations of numerous stat­
`utes of varying character that do not themselves include
`causes of action for judicial review. “We have made clear,
`however, that the breadth of the zone of interests varies
`according to the provisions of law at issue, so that what
`comes within the zone of interests of a statute for purposes
`
`of obtaining judicial review of administrative action under
`——————
`
` 5Although we announced the modern zone-of-interests test in 1971,
`its roots lie in the common-law rule that a plaintiff may not recover
`
`
`
` under the law of negligence for injuries caused by violation of a statute
` unless the statute “is interpreted as designed to protect the class of
`
`
`persons in which the plaintiff is included, against the risk of the type of
`
`
`harm which has in fact occurred as a result of its violation.” W. Keeton,
`D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts
`
`§36, pp. 229–230 (5th ed. 1984); see cases cited id., at 222–227; Gorris
`v. Scott, [1874] 9 L. R. Exch. 125 (Eng.). Statutory causes of action are
`regularly interpreted to incorporate standard common-law limitations
`on civil liability—the zone-of-interests test no less than the require­
`ment of proximate causation, see Part III–B, infra.
`
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`

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`12
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`
`LEXMARK INT’L, INC. v. STATIC CONTROL
`COMPONENTS, INC.
`Opinion of the Court
`
`the ‘“generous review provisions”’ of the APA may not
`do so for other purposes.” Bennett, supra, at 163 (quot-
`ing Clarke, 479 U. S., at 400, n. 16, in turn quoting Data
`
`Processing, supra, at 156).
`
`
`Identifying the interests protected by the Lanham Act,
`however, requires no guesswork, since the Act includes an
`“unusual, and extraordinarily helpful,” detailed statement
`of the statute’s purposes. H. B. Halicki Productions v.
`United Artists Communications, Inc., 812 F. 2d 1213, 1214
`(CA9 1987). Section 45 of the Act, codified at 15 U. S. C.
`
`§1127, provides:
`“The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce
`within the control of Congress by making actionable
`the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such
`commerce; to protect registered marks used in such
`commerce from interference by State, or territorial
`legislation; to protect persons engaged in such com­
`merce against unfair competition; to prevent fraud
`and deception in such commerce by the use of repro­
`ductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations
`of registered marks; and to provide rights and reme­
`dies stipulated by treaties and conventions respect-
`ing trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition
`entered into between the United States and foreign
`nations.”
`Most of the enumerated purposes are relevant to false­
`association cases; a typical false-advertising case will
`implicate only the Act’s goal of “protect[ing] persons en­
`gaged in [commerce within the control of Congress]
`against unfair competition.” Although “unfair competi­
`tion” was a “plastic” concept at common law, Ely-Norris
`Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F. 2d 60