throbber
(Slip Opinion)
`
`
`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2013
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
`LOZANO v. MONTOYA ALVAREZ
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE SECOND CIRCUIT
` No. 12–820. Argued December 11, 2013—Decided March 5, 2014
`
`When one parent abducts a child and flees to another country, the other
`
`parent may file a petition in that country for the return of the child
`pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Interna-
`tional Child Abduction (Hague Convention or Convention). If the
`parent files a petition within one year of the child’s removal, a court
`“shall order the return of the child forthwith.” But when the petition
`is filed after the 1-year period expires, the court “shall . . . order the
`return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now
`settled in its new environment.”
`
`Respondent Montoya Alvarez and petitioner Lozano resided with
`
`their daughter in London until November 2008, when Montoya Alva-
`rez left with the child for a women’s shelter. In July 2009, Montoya
`
`Alvarez and the child left the United Kingdom and ultimately settled
`in New York. Lozano did not locate Montoya Alvarez and the child
`until November 2010, more than 16 months after Montoya Alvarez
`and the child had left the United Kingdom. At that point, Lozano
`filed a Petition for Return of Child pursuant to the Hague Convention
`in the Southern District of New York. Finding that the petition was
`filed more than one year after removal, the court denied the petition
`on the basis that the child was now settled in New York. It also held
`
`that the 1-year period could not be extended by equitable tolling. The
`Second Circuit affirmed.
`
`Held: Article 12’s 1-year period is not subject to equitable tolling.
`
`Pp. 7–16.
`
`(a) The doctrine of equitable tolling, as applied to federal statutes
`of limitations, extends an otherwise discrete limitations period set by
`Congress. Thus, whether tolling is available is fundamentally a
`question of statutory intent. Because Congress “legislate[s] against a
`
`
`
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`
`
`
`

`
`
`LOZANO v. MONTOYA ALVAREZ
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`background of common-law adjudicatory principles,” Astoria Fed.
`
`Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U. S. 104, 108, including equita-
`
`ble tolling, see Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 397, equitable
`tolling is presumed to apply if the period in question is a statute of
`limitations and if tolling is consistent with the statute, Young v.
`
`United States, 535 U. S. 43, 49–50. Pp. 7–8.
`
`(b) In assessing whether equitable tolling applies to treaties, which
`are “ ‘compact[s] between independent nations,’ ” Medellín v. Texas,
`
`552 U. S. 491, 505, this Court’s “duty [i]s to ascertain the intent of
`the parties” by looking to the document’s text and context, United
`
`
`States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U. S. 494, 535. The parties to the
`Hague Convention did not intend equitable tolling to apply to Article
`12’s 1-year period. Pp. 8–16.
`
`
`
`(1) There is no general presumption that equitable tolling applies
`to treaties. Though part of the established backdrop of American
`law, equitable tolling has no proper role in the interpretation of trea-
`ties unless that principle is shared by the parties to the “agreement
`
`among sovereign powers,” Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516
`U. S. 217, 226. Lozano has identified no such shared principle among
`the Convention signatories, and the courts of several signatories have
`explicitly rejected equitable tolling of the Convention. Thus, the
`
`American presumption does not apply to this multilateral treaty.
`
`The International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U. S. C.
`§§11601–11610, which Congress enacted to implement the Conven-
`
`tion, neither addresses the availability of equitable tolling nor pur-
`ports to alter the Convention, and therefore does not affect this con-
`
`clusion. Pp. 9–11.
`
`
`(2) Even if the Convention were subject to a presumption that
`statutes of limitations may be tolled, Article 12’s 1-year period is not
`a statute of limitations. Statutes of limitations embody a “policy of
`repose, designed to protect defendants,” Burnett v. New York Central
`
`R. Co., 380 U. S. 424, 428, and foster the “elimination of stale claims,
`
`
`and certainty about a plaintiff’s opportunity for recovery and a de-
`
`
`fendant’s potential liabilities,” Rotella v. Wood, 528 U. S. 549, 555.
`Here, the remedy the Convention affords the left-behind parent—
`return of the child—continues to be available after one year, thus
`preserving the possibility of relief for that parent and preventing re-
`pose for the abducting parent. The period’s expiration also does not
`establish certainty about the parties’ respective rights. Instead, it
`opens the door to consideration of a third party’s interests, i.e., the
`child’s interest in settlement. Because that is not the sort of interest
`
`
`addressed by a statute of limitations, the 1-year period should not be
`
`treated as a statute of limitations. Young, supra, at 47, distin-
`guished. Pp. 11–13.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`
`
`2
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`
`
`
`

`
`3
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`
`
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`
` Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
`
`
`Syllabus
`(3) Without a presumption of equitable tolling, the Convention
`
`
`does not support extending the 1-year period during concealment.
`
`Article 12 explicitly provides for the period to commence on “the date
` of the wrongful removal or retention” and makes no provision for an
`
`extension. Because the drafters did not choose to delay the period’s
`commencement until discovery of the child’s location—the obvious al-
`ternative to the date of wrongful removal—the natural implication is
`that they did not intend to commence the period on that later date.
`
`Lozano contends that equitable tolling is nonetheless consistent with
`
`the Convention’s goal of deterring child abductions, but the Conven-
`tion does not pursue that goal at any cost, having recognized that the
`return remedy may be overcome by, e.g., the child’s interest in set-
`
`tlement. And the abducting parent does not necessarily profit by
`
`running out the clock, since both American courts and other Conven-
`tion signatories have considered concealment as a factor in determin-
`ing whether a child is settled. Equitable tolling is therefore neither
`required by the Convention nor the only available means to advance
`
`its objectives. Pp. 13–15.
`(4) Lozano contends that there is room for United States courts
`
`
`to apply equitable tolling because the Convention recognizes that
`other sources of law may permit signatory states to return abducted
`children even when return is not available or required by the Con-
`
`vention. But this contention mistakes the nature of equitable tolling,
`which may be applied to the Hague Convention only if the treaty
`
`drafters so intended. For the foregoing reason, they did not. Pp. 15–
`
`16.
`
`697 F. 3d 41, affirmed.
`THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. ALITO, J.,
`
`
`filed a concurring opinion, in which BREYER and SOTOMAYOR, JJ.,
`
`joined.
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`
` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`
`
`
` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
`
` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­
`
` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
`
`
` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
`
`
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 12–820
`_________________
`MANUEL JOSE LOZANO, PETITIONER v. DIANA
`
`
`LUCIA MONTOYA ALVAREZ
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
`
`[March 5, 2014]
`
`JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
`
`When a parent abducts a child and flees to another
`country, the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
`International Child Abduction generally requires that
`country to return the child immediately if the other parent
`
`requests return within one year. The question in this case
`is whether that 1-year period is subject to equitable tolling
`when the abducting parent conceals the child’s location
`from the other parent. We hold that equitable tolling is
`not available.
`
`
`
`
`
`I
`
`To address “the problem of international child abduc­
`
`
`tions during domestic disputes,” Abbott v. Abbott, 560
`U. S. 1, 8 (2010), in 1980 the Hague Conference on Private
`International Law adopted the Convention on the Civil
`Aspects of International Child Abduction (Hague Conven­
`tion or Convention), T. I. A. S. No. 11670, S. Treaty Doc.
`No. 99–11 (Treaty Doc.). The Convention states two pri­
`mary objectives: “to secure the prompt return of children
`wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting
`
`
`State,” and “to ensure that rights of custody and of access
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
` LOZANO v. MONTOYA ALVAREZ
`
`Opinion of the Court
`under the law of one Contracting State are effectively
`
`respected in the other Contracting States.” Art. 1, id.,
`at 7.
`
`To those ends, the Convention’s “central operating
`
`
`feature” is the return of the child. Abbott, 560 U. S., at 9.
`
`That remedy, in effect, lays venue for the ultimate custody
`determination in the child’s country of habitual residence
`rather than the country to which the child is abducted.
`
`See id., at 20 (“The Convention is based on the principle
`that the best interests of the child are well served when de­
`cisions regarding custody rights are made in the country
`of habitual residence”).
`
`The return remedy is not absolute. Article 13 excuses
`return where, for example, the left-behind parent was not
`“actually exercising” custody rights when the abducting
`parent removed the child, or where there is a “grave risk”
`that return would “place the child in an intolerable situa­
`tion.” Hague Convention, Arts. 13(a)–(b), Treaty Doc., at
`10. A state may also refuse to return the child if doing
`
`so would contravene “fundamental principles . . . relating
`to the protection of human rights and fundamental free­
`doms.” Art. 20, id., at 11.
`
`This case concerns another exception to the return
`remedy. Article 12 of the Convention states the general
`rule that when a court receives a petition for return within
`one year after the child’s wrongful removal, the court
`“shall order the return of the child forthwith.” Id., at 9.
`Article 12 further provides that the court,
`“where the proceedings have been commenced after
`the expiration of the period of one year [from the date
`of the wrongful removal], shall also order the return of
`the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is
`
`now settled in its new environment.” Ibid.
`Thus, at least in some cases, failure to file a petition
`
`for return within one year renders the return remedy
`
`2
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`

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`
`
`Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`3
`
`unavailable.
`
`The United States ratified the Hague Convention in
`1988, and Congress implemented the Convention that
`same year through the International Child Abduc-
`tion Remedies Act (ICARA). 102 Stat. 437, 42 U. S. C.
`§§11601–11610. That statute instructs courts to “decide
`the case in accordance with the Convention.” §11603(d).
`Echoing the Convention, ICARA further provides that
`“[c]hildren who are wrongfully removed . . . are to be
`promptly returned unless one of the narrow exceptions set
`forth in the Convention applies.” §11601(a)(4). Finally,
`ICARA requires the abducting parent to establish by a
`preponderance of the evidence that Article 12’s exception
`to return applies. §11603(e)(2)(B).
`
`II
`
`Diana Lucia Montoya Alvarez and Manuel Jose Lozano
`
`are the parents of the girl at the center of this dispute.1
`Montoya Alvarez and Lozano met and began dating in
`
`London in early 2004. Montoya Alvarez gave birth to a
`daughter in October 2005.
`
`
`Montoya Alvarez and Lozano describe their relationship
`in starkly different terms. Lozano stated that they were
`“‘very happy together,’” albeit with “normal couple prob­
`lems.” In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d 197, 204 (SDNY
`
`2011). Montoya Alvarez described a pattern of physical
`and emotional abuse that included multiple incidents of
`rape and battery. The District Court found insufficient
`
`evidence to make specific findings about domestic violence
`but determined that Lozano’s claim that he never mis­
`treated Montoya Alvarez was “not credible.” Id., at 206.
`The parties also differ as to the child’s well-being during
`
`
`the first three years of her life. Lozano stated that he and
`——————
`1Except where otherwise noted, the facts are taken from the District
`
` Court’s findings. Like the courts below, we refer to Montoya Alvarez
`and Lozano’s daughter as “the child” to protect her identity.
`
`
`
`
`
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`
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`
`
`
`

`
`
`
` LOZANO v. MONTOYA ALVAREZ
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
` the child had a very good relationship, and that the child
`was generally happy. Montoya Alvarez believed other­
`wise. In October 2008, Montoya Alvarez reported to the
`child’s doctor that she refused to speak at the nursery she
`attended, cried often, and wet the bed. Montoya Alvarez
`
`also stated that the child refused to speak when Lozano
`was present. The child’s nursery manager wrote that the
`
`girl was “‘very withdrawn,’” and noted that the home
`
`“‘environment obviously had a negative effect’” on her.
`
`Id., at 207. The District Court found insufficient evidence
`that Lozano had physically abused the child, but did con­
`
`clude that the child had seen and heard her parents argu­
`ing at home.
`
`In November 2008, when the child was just over three
`
`
`
`years old, Montoya Alvarez went to New York to visit her
`sister Maria. During that time, the child remained in
`London with Lozano and his visiting mother. When Mon­
`
`
`toya Alvarez returned on November 18, she became acutely
`concerned about the child’s fearful behavior around Lo­
`zano. The next day, Montoya Alvarez left with the child
`and never returned.
`
`
`Montoya Alvarez and the child lived at a women’s shel­
`ter for the next seven months. After Montoya Alvarez was
`unable to find suitable long-term accommodations in the
`United Kingdom, she and the child left for France on July
`
`3, 2009, and then for the United States, arriving five days
`later. Since their arrival, Montoya Alvarez and the child
`have lived with Montoya Alvarez’ sister Maria and her
`family in New York.
`
`
`
`When they arrived in New York, Montoya Alvarez and
`the child began seeing a therapist at a family medical
`clinic. The therapist testified that, at first, the child was
`withdrawn and would wet herself. The therapist diag­
`nosed her with posttraumatic stress disorder. Within six
`months, however, the therapist described her as “‘a com­
`pletely different child,’” who had stopped wetting herself,
`
`4
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`
`
`
`

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`
`
`Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`was excited to play with friends, and was able to speak
`freely about her emotions. Id., at 212. When Montoya
`Alvarez and the child returned to the therapist after Lo­
`zano filed a petition for the child’s return, the therapist
`noted that the child was doing well but did not wish to see
`her father.
`
`In the meantime, Lozano attempted to find Montoya
`Alvarez and the child. Shortly after Montoya Alvarez left
`in November 2008, he called her sister Gloria in London,
`but eventually received legal advice not to speak with
`Montoya Alvarez’ family. A mediation service also sent
`several letters to Montoya Alvarez on Lozano’s behalf
`without receiving a response. In July 2009, Lozano filed
`an application for a court order in the United Kingdom “‘to
`
`ensure that he obtains regular contact with his [child] and
`
`plays an active role in [her] life.’” Id., at 210. He also
`sought court orders to compel Montoya Alvarez’ sisters
`and legal counsel, the child’s doctor and nursery, and
`various government offices in London to disclose the
`
`child’s whereabouts.
`
`On March 15, 2010, after determining that the child was
`not in the United Kingdom (and suspecting that the child
`was in New York), Lozano filed a form with the Hague
`Convention Central Authority for England and Wales
`seeking to have the child returned.2 The United States
`Central Authority—the Office of Children’s Issues in the
`Department of State, see 22 CFR §94.2 (2013)—received
`the application on March 23, 2010. After the Office of
`Children’s Issues confirmed that Montoya Alvarez had
`entered the United States, Lozano located Montoya Alva­
`
`rez’ address in New York. On November 10, 2010, more
`than 16 months after Montoya Alvarez and the child left
`——————
`2Article 6 of the Hague Convention requires each Contracting State
`
`to “designate a Central Authority to discharge the duties which are
`
` imposed by the Convention upon such authorities.” Treaty Doc., at 8.
`
`
`
`5
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`
`
`
`
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`LOZANO v. MONTOYA ALVAREZ
`
`Opinion of the Court
`the United Kingdom, Lozano filed a Petition for Return of
`
`Child pursuant to the Hague Convention and ICARA, 42
`
`U. S. C. §11603, in the United States District Court for the
`Southern District of New York.
`
`After a 2-day evidentiary hearing, the District Court
`
`denied Lozano’s petition. 809 F. Supp. 2d 197. The Dis­
`trict Court concluded that Lozano had stated a prima facie
`case of wrongful removal under the Hague Convention.
`Id., at 219–220. Prior to her removal, the child was a
`
`habitual resident of the United Kingdom, see Hague Con­
`vention, Art. 4, and Lozano had custody rights that he
`was actually exercising at the time of removal, see Arts.
`3(a)–(b).
`Because the petition was filed more than one year after
`
`the child’s wrongful removal, however, the District Court
`
`denied the petition on the basis that the child was now
`settled in New York. Id., at 230, 234. “Viewing the total­
`ity of the circumstances,” the court found sufficient indicia
`of “stability in her family, educational, social, and most
`importantly, home life,” id., at 233, to conclude that the
`child was settled in her current environment and that
`
` repatriation would be “extremely disruptive,” id., at 234.
`Lozano argued that the child should be returned forthwith
`because the 1-year period in Article 12 should be equitably
`tolled during the period that Montoya Alvarez concealed
`the child. The court rejected that argument, holding that
`
`the 1-year period could not be extended by equitable toll­
`ing.3 Id., at 228–229.
`
`——————
`3The District Court held in the alternative that even if equitable
`tolling could apply, it would not be warranted in this case because
`Lozano had contact information for Montoya Alvarez’ sister Maria in
`New York. Lozano’s solicitors did not attempt to contact Maria to
`determine if Montoya Alvarez and the child were there. 809 F. Supp.
`2d, at 229–230.
`Consistent with Second Circuit precedent, see Blondin v. Dubois, 238
`F. 3d 153, 164 (2001), the District Court also considered “whether to
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`
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`
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`
`
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`

`
`
`
`
`Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
`
`Opinion of the Court
` On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed. 697 F. 3d 41
`
`
`(2012). The Court of Appeals agreed that the 1-year per­
`iod in Article 12 is not subject to equitable tolling. Accord­
`ing to the court, unlike a statute of limitations that would
`prohibit the filing of a return petition after one year, the
`
`1-year period in Article 12 merely permits courts, after that
`
`
`period has run, to consider the interests of the child in
`settlement. Id., at 52. The Second Circuit concluded that
`
`
`allowing equitable tolling to delay consideration of the
`child’s interests would undermine the purpose of the
`
`Hague Convention. Id., at 54.
`We granted certiorari to decide whether Article 12’s
`
`1-year period is subject to equitable tolling. 570 U. S. ___
`(2013). Compare 697 F. 3d, at 50–55 (equitable tolling not
`available); and Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F. 3d 1, 12–16 (CA1
`2013) (same), with Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F. 3d 563, 568–
`570 (CA9 2008) (equitable tolling available); and Furnes v.
`Reeves, 362 F. 3d 702, 723–724 (CA11 2004) (same). We
`
`hold that equitable tolling is not available, and therefore
`affirm.
`
`7
`
`
`
`III
`
`Although this case concerns the application of equitable
`
`tolling to a treaty, we begin with a more familiar context:
`equitable tolling of federal statutes of limitations. As a
`general matter, equitable tolling pauses the running of, or
`“tolls,” a statute of limitations when a litigant has pursued
`his rights diligently but some extraordinary circumstance
`
`
`prevents him from bringing a timely action. See, e.g., Pace
`v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U. S. 408, 418 (2005). Because the
`doctrine effectively extends an otherwise discrete limita­
`——————
`exercise its discretion and repatriate the child even though she is now
`settled in New York.” 809 F. Supp. 2d, at 234. The court declined to
`
`exercise that discretion because the “strong evidence that the child is
`quite settled in New York” outweighed Lozano’s “fairly diligent” search
`
`efforts and Montoya Alvarez’ conduct. Ibid.
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
` LOZANO v. MONTOYA ALVAREZ
`
`Opinion of the Court
`tions period set by Congress, whether equitable tolling is
`available is fundamentally a question of statutory intent.
`
` See, e.g., Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498
`
`
` U. S. 89, 95 (1990); Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U. S.
`467, 479–480 (1986); Honda v. Clark, 386 U. S. 484, 501
`(1967).
`As applied to federal statutes of limitations, the inquiry
`
`begins with the understanding that Congress “legislate[s]
`against a background of common-law adjudicatory princi­
`ples.” Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501
`
`U. S. 104, 108 (1991). Equitable tolling, a long-established
`
`feature of American jurisprudence derived from “the old
`chancery rule,” Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 397
`(1946), is just such a principle. See Young v. United
`
`States, 535 U. S. 43, 49–50 (2002) (“Congress must be
`presumed to draft limitations periods in light of this back­
`ground principle”); Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342, 349–350
`(1875). We therefore presume that equitable tolling ap­
`
` plies if the period in question is a statute of limitations
`and if tolling is consistent with the statute. Young, supra,
`at 49–50 (“It is hornbook law that limitations periods are
`‘customarily subject to “equitable tolling,”’ unless tolling
`would be ‘inconsistent with the text of the relevant stat­
`ute’” (citation omitted)).
`
`
`
`
`
`IV
`
`The Hague Convention, of course, is a treaty, not a
`federal statute. For treaties, which are primarily “‘com­
`pact[s] between independent nations,’” Medellín v. Texas,
`
`552 U. S. 491, 505 (2008), our “duty [i]s to ascertain the
`intent of the parties” by looking to the document’s text and
`context, United States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U. S. 494,
`
`535 (1900); see also BG Group plc v. Republic of Argen­
`tina, post, at 10.
`
`
`We conclude that the parties to the Hague Convention
`did not intend equitable tolling to apply to the 1-year
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`8
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`

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` Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`period in Article 12. Unlike federal statutes of limitations,
`the Convention was not adopted against a shared back­
`ground of equitable tolling. Even if the Convention were
`subject to a presumption that statutes of limitations may
`be tolled, the 1-year period in Article 12 is not a statute of
`limitations. And absent a presumption in favor of equita­
`ble tolling, nothing in the Convention warrants tolling the
`1-year period.
`
`9
`
`
`
`A
`
`First, there is no general presumption that equitable
`tolling applies to treaties. Congress is presumed to incor­
`porate equitable tolling into federal statutes of limitations
`because equitable tolling is part of the established back­
`
`drop of American law. Rotella v. Wood, 528 U. S. 549, 560
`(2000) (“[F]ederal statutes of limitations are generally
`subject to equitable principles of tolling”).
`It does not
`
`follow, however, that we can export such background
`principles of United States law to contexts outside their
`jurisprudential home.
`
`It is particularly inappropriate to deploy this back­
`ground principle of American law automatically when
`interpreting a treaty. “A treaty is in its nature a contract
`between . . . nations, not a legislative act.” Foster v.
`Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314 (1829) (Marshall, C. J., for the
`Court); see also 2 Debates on the Federal Constitution 506
`(J. Elliot 2d ed. 1863) (James Wilson) (“[I]n their nature
`treaties originate differently from laws. They are made by
`equal parties, and each side has half of the bargain to
`make . . . ”). That distinction has been reflected in the way
`we interpret treaties. It is our “responsibility to read the
`treaty in a manner ‘consistent with the shared expecta­
`tions of the contracting parties.’” Olympic Airways v.
`Husain, 540 U. S. 644, 650 (2004) (quoting Air France v.
`Saks, 470 U. S. 392, 399 (1985); emphasis added). Even if
`a background principle is relevant to the interpretation of
`
`
`
`
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`

`
`10
`
`
`
`LOZANO v. MONTOYA ALVAREZ
`
`Opinion of the Court
`federal statutes, it has no proper role in the interpretation
`of treaties unless that principle is shared by the parties to
`“an agreement among sovereign powers,” Zicherman v.
`Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U. S. 217, 226 (1996).
`
`
`Lozano has not identified a background principle of
`equitable tolling that is shared by the signatories to the
`Hague Convention. To the contrary, Lozano concedes that
`in the context of the Convention, “foreign courts have
`failed to adopt equitable tolling . . . because they lac[k] the
`presumption that we [have].” Tr. of Oral Arg. 19–20.
`While no signatory state’s court of last resort has resolved
`the question, intermediate courts of appeals in several
`states have rejected equitable tolling. See Cannon v.
`Cannon, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1330, [2005] 1 W. L. R. 32,
`¶51 (Eng.), (rejecting the “tolling rule” as “too crude an
`approach” for the Convention); Kubera v. Kubera, 3 B. C.
`L. R. (5th) 121, ¶64, 317 D. L. R. (4th) 307, ¶64 (2010)
`(Can.) (equitable tolling “has not been adopted in other
`jurisdictions, including Canada”); see also HJ v. Secretary
`for Justice, [2006] NZFLR 1005, ¶53 (CA), appeal dism’d
`
`
`
`on other grounds, [2007] 2 NZLR 289; A. C. v. P. C., [2005]
`HKEC 839, 2005 WL 836263, ¶55, (Hong Kong Ct. 1st
`Instance).4 The American presumption that federal stat­
`
`utes of limitations can be equitably tolled therefore does
`
`not apply to this multilateral treaty. Cf. Eastern Airlines,
`
`Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U. S. 530, 544–545, and n. 10 (1991)
`(declining to adopt liability for psychic injury under the
`Warsaw Convention because “the unavailability of com­
`pensation for purely psychic injury in many common and
`civil law countries at the time of the Warsaw Conference
`persuades us that the signatories had no specific intent
`——————
`4Lozano contends that a single-judge decision by an English family
`court adopted equitable tolling without referring to it by name. See
`
`
` In re H, [2000] 2 F. L. R. 51, [2000] 3 F. C. R. 404 (Eng.). It is unclear
`whether the logic of that decision survived the decision of the Court of
`Appeals for England and Wales in Cannon.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
` Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`to include such a remedy in the Convention” (footnote
`omitted)).
`It does not matter to this conclusion that Congress
`
`
`enacted a statute to implement the Hague Convention.
`See ICARA, 42 U. S. C. §§11601–11610. ICARA does not
`address the availability of equitable tolling. Nor does it
`purport to alter the Convention. See §11601(b)(2) (“The
`provisions of [ICARA] are in addition to and not in lieu of
`the provisions of the Convention”).
`In fact, Congress
`explicitly recognized “the need for uniform international
`interpretation of the Convention.” §11601(b)(3)(B). Con­
`gress’ mere enactment of implementing legislation did not
`somehow import background principles of American law
`
`into the treaty interpretation process, thereby altering our
`
`understanding of the treaty itself.
`B
`Even if the presumption in favor of equitable tolling had
`
`force outside of domestic law, we have only applied that
`presumption to statutes of limitations. See Hallstrom v.
`Tillamook County, 493 U. S. 20, 27 (1989) (no equitable
`tolling of a 60-day presuit notice requirement that does
`not operate as a statute of limitations). The 1-year period
`in Article 12 is not a statute of limitations.
`As a general matter, “[s]tatutes of limitations establish
`
`the period of time within which a claimant must bring an
`action.” Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co.,
`571 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 4). They characteris­
`tically embody a “policy of repose, designed to protect
` defendants.” Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380
`
`
`U. S. 424, 428 (1965). And they foster the “elimination of
`stale claims, and certainty about a plaintiff ’s opportunity
`for recovery and a defendant’s potential liabilities.” Rotella,
`supra, at 555.
`In Young, 535 U. S. 43, we evaluated whether those
`characteristics of statutes of limitations were present in
`
`
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` 11
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`
`
`

`
`12
`
`
`
`LOZANO v. MONTOYA ALVAREZ
`
`Opinion of the Court
`the “three-year lookback period” for tax liabilities in bank­
`ruptcy proceedings. The Bankruptcy Code favors tax
`claims less than three years old in two respects: Such
`claims cannot be discharged, and they have priority over
`certain others in bankruptcy proceedings. See 11 U. S. C.
`§§507(a)(8)(A)(i), 523(a)(1)(A). If the Internal Revenue
`Service “sleeps on its rights” by failing to prosecute those
`claims within three years, however, then those mecha­
`nisms for enforcing claims against bankrupt taxpayers are
`
`eliminated. Young, 535 U. S., at 47. We concluded that
`
`the lookback period “serves the same ‘basic policies [fur­
`thered by] all limitations provisions,’” ibid. (quoting Ro­
`tella, 528 U. S., at 555), i.e., certainty and repose. We
`accordingly held that
`it was a
`limitations period
`
`presumptively subject to equitable tolling. 535 U. S.,
`at 47.
`
`
`
`Unlike the 3-year lookback period in Young, expiration
`
`of the 1-year period in Article 12 does not eliminate the
`remedy the Convention affords the left-behind parent—
`namely, the return of the child. Before one year has
`elapsed, Article 12 provides that the court “shall order the
`return of the child forthwith.” Treaty Doc., at 9. But even
`after that period has expired, the court “shall also order
`the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the
`
`child is now settled.” Ibid. The continued availability of
`
`the return remedy after one year preserves the possibility
`of relief for the left-behind parent and prevents repose
`for the abducting parent.5 Rather than establishing any
`——————
`5In the State Department’s view, the Hague Convention confers equi­
`
`table discretion on courts to order the return of a child even if the court
`determines that the child is “settled” within the meaning of Article 12.
`See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19–25. If accurate, that
`interpretation would reinforce that Article 12 is not meant to provide
`repose to the abducting parent, and it would underscore that the 1-year
`period is not a statute of limitations. But we do not decide whether,
`and under what circumstances, a court may exercise discretion to order
`
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`

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`
`
`Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`certainty about the respective rights of the parties, the
`expiration of the 1-year period opens the door to consider­
`ation of a third party’s interests, i.e., the child’s interest in
`settlement. Because that is not the sort of interest ad­
`dressed by a statute of limitations, we decline to treat the
`1-year period as a statute of limitations.6
`
`C
`Without a presumption of equitable tolling, the Conven­
`
`tion does not support extending the 1-year period during
`concealment. Article 12 explicitly provides that the 1

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