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` OCTOBER TERM, 2012
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`
` Syllabus
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` MARYLAND v. KING
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`CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
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` No. 12–207. Argued February 26, 2013—Decided June 3, 2013
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`After his 2009 arrest on first- and second-degree assault charges, re-
`spondent King was processed through a Wicomico County, Maryland,
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`facility, where booking personnel used a cheek swab to take a DNA
`sample pursuant to the Maryland DNA Collection Act (Act). The
`swab was matched to an unsolved 2003 rape, and King was charged
`with that crime. He moved to suppress the DNA match, arguing that
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`the Act violated the Fourth Amendment, but the Circuit Court Judge
`found the law constitutional. King was convicted of rape. The Mary-
`land Court of Appeals set aside the conviction, finding unconstitu-
`tional the portions of the Act authorizing DNA collection from felony
`arrestees.
`Held: When officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold
`for a serious offense and bring the suspect to the station to be de-
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`tained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the ar-
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`restee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate
`police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth
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`Amendment. Pp. 3–28.
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`(a) DNA testing may “significantly improve both the criminal jus-
`tice system and police investigative practices,” District Attorney’s Of-
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`fice for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U. S. 52, 55, by making it
`“possible to determine whether a biological tissue matches a suspect
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`with near certainty,” id., at 62. Maryland’s Act authorizes law en-
`forcement authorities to collect DNA samples from, as relevant here,
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`persons charged with violent crimes, including first-degree assault.
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`A sample may not be added to a database before an individual is ar-
`raigned, and it must be destroyed if, e.g., he is not convicted. Only
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`identity information may be added to the database. Here, the officer
`collected a DNA sample using the common “buccal swab” procedure,
`which is quick and painless, requires no “surgical intrusio[n] beneath
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`MARYLAND v. KING
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`Syllabus
`the skin,” Winston v. Lee, 470 U. S. 753, 760, and poses no threat to
`the arrestee’s “health or safety,” id., at 763. Respondent’s identifica-
`tion as the rapist resulted in part through the operation of the Com-
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`bined DNA Index System (CODIS), which connects DNA laboratories
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`at the local, state, and national level, and which standardizes the
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`points of comparison, i.e., loci, used in DNA analysis. Pp. 3–7.
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`(b) The framework for deciding the issue presented is well estab-
`lished. Using a buccal swab inside a person’s cheek to obtain a DNA
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`sample is a search under the Fourth Amendment. And the fact that
`the intrusion is negligible is of central relevance to determining
`whether the search is reasonable, “the ultimate measure of the con-
`stitutionality of a governmental search,” Vernonia School Dist. 47J v.
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`Acton, 515 U. S. 646, 652. Because the need for a warrant is greatly
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`diminished here, where the arrestee was already in valid police cus-
`tody for a serious offense supported by probable cause, the search is
`analyzed by reference to “reasonableness, not individualized suspi-
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`cion,” Samson v. California, 547 U. S. 843, 855, n. 4, and reasonable-
`ness is determined by weighing “the promotion of legitimate govern-
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`mental interests” against “the degree to which [the search] intrudes
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`upon an individual’s privacy,” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U. S. 295,
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`300. Pp. 7–10.
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`(c) In this balance of reasonableness, great weight is given to both
`the significant government interest at stake in the identification of
`arrestees and DNA identification’s unmatched potential to serve that
`interest. Pp. 10–23.
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`(1) The Act serves a well-established, legitimate government in-
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`terest: the need of law enforcement officers in a safe and accurate
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`way to process and identify persons and possessions taken into cus-
`tody. “[P]robable cause provides legal justification for arresting a
`[suspect], and for a brief period of detention to take the administra-
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`tive steps incident to arrest,” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 113–
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`114; and the “validity of the search of a person incident to a lawful
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`arrest” is settled, United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 224. In-
`dividual suspicion is not necessary. The “routine administrative pro-
`cedure[s] at a police station house incident to booking and jailing the
`suspect” have different origins and different constitutional justifica-
`tions than, say, the search of a place not incident to arrest, Illinois v.
`Lafayette, 462 U. S. 640, 643, which depends on the “fair probability
`that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
`place,” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 238. And when probable cause
`exists to remove an individual from the normal channels of society
`and hold him in legal custody, DNA identification plays a critical role
`in serving those interests. First, the government has an interest in
`properly identifying “who has been arrested and who is being tried.”
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`Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
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`Syllabus
`Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty., 542 U. S.
`177, 191. Criminal history is critical to officers who are processing a
`suspect for detention. They already seek identity information
`through routine and accepted means: comparing booking photo-
`graphs to sketch artists’ depictions, showing mugshots to potential
`witnesses, and comparing fingerprints against electronic databases of
`known criminals and unsolved crimes. The only difference between
`DNA analysis and fingerprint databases is the unparalleled accuracy
`DNA provides. DNA is another metric of identification used to con-
`nect the arrestee with his or her public persona, as reflected in rec-
`ords of his or her actions that are available to the police. Second, of-
`ficers must ensure that the custody of an arrestee does not create
`inordinate “risks for facility staff, for the existing detainee popula-
`tion, and for a new detainee.” Florence v. Board of Chosen Freehold-
`ers of County of Burlington, 566 U. S. ___, ___. DNA allows officers to
`know the type of person being detained. Third, “the Government has
`a substantial interest in ensuring that persons accused of crimes are
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`available for trials.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 534. An arrestee
`may be more inclined to flee if he thinks that continued contact with
`the criminal justice system may expose another serious offense.
`Fourth, an arrestee’s past conduct is essential to assessing the dan-
`ger he poses to the public, which will inform a court’s bail determina-
`tion. Knowing that the defendant is wanted for a previous violent
`crime based on DNA identification may be especially probative in this
`regard. Finally, in the interests of justice, identifying an arrestee as
`the perpetrator of some heinous crime may have the salutary effect of
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`freeing a person wrongfully imprisoned. Pp. 10–18.
`(2) DNA identification is an important advance in the techniques
`long used by law enforcement to serve legitimate police concerns. Po-
`lice routinely have used scientific advancements as standard proce-
`dures for identifying arrestees. Fingerprinting, perhaps the most di-
`rect historical analogue to DNA technology, has, from its advent,
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`been viewed as a natural part of “the administrative steps incident to
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`arrest.” County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U. S. 44, 58. How-
`ever, DNA identification is far superior. The additional intrusion up-
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`on the arrestee’s privacy beyond that associated with fingerprinting
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`is not significant, and DNA identification is markedly more accurate.
`It may not be as fast as fingerprinting, but rapid fingerprint analysis
`is itself of recent vintage, and the question of how long it takes to
`process identifying information goes to the efficacy of the search for
`its purpose of prompt identification, not the constitutionality of the
`search. Rapid technical advances are also reducing DNA processing
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`times. Pp. 18–23.
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`(d) The government interest is not outweighed by respondent’s pri-
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`MARYLAND v. KING
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`Syllabus
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`vacy interests. Pp. 23–28.
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`(1) By comparison to the substantial government interest and the
`unique effectiveness of DNA identification, the intrusion of a cheek
`swab to obtain a DNA sample is minimal. Reasonableness must be
`considered in the context of an individual’s legitimate privacy expec-
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`tations, which necessarily diminish when he is taken into police cus-
`tody. Bell, supra, at 557. Such searches thus differ from the so-
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`called special needs searches of, e.g., otherwise law-abiding motorists
`at checkpoints. See Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32. The rea-
`sonableness inquiry considers two other circumstances in which par-
`ticularized suspicion is not categorically required: “diminished expec-
`tations of privacy [and a] minimal intrusion.” Illinois v. McArthur,
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`531 U. S. 326, 330. An invasive surgery may raise privacy concerns
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`weighty enough for the search to require a warrant, notwithstanding
`the arrestee’s diminished privacy expectations, but a buccal swab,
`which involves a brief and minimal intrusion with “virtually no risk,
`trauma, or pain,” Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 771, does
`not increase the indignity already attendant to normal incidents of
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`arrest. Pp. 23–26.
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`(2) The processing of respondent’s DNA sample’s CODIS loci also
`did not intrude on his privacy in a way that would make his DNA
`identification unconstitutional. Those loci came from noncoding DNA
`parts that do not reveal an arrestee’s genetic traits and are unlikely
`to reveal any private medical information. Even if they could provide
`such information, they are not in fact tested for that end. Finally, the
`Act provides statutory protections to guard against such invasions of
`privacy. Pp. 26–28.
`425 Md. 550, 42 A. 3d 549, reversed.
`KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
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`C. J., and THOMAS, BREYER, and ALITO, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a
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`dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ.,
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`joined.
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` Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`_________________
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` No. 12–207
`_________________
`MARYLAND, PETITIONER v. ALONZO JAY KING, JR.
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
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`MARYLAND
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`[June 3, 2013]
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` JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
`In 2003 a man concealing his face and armed with a gun
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`broke into a woman’s home in Salisbury, Maryland. He
`raped her. The police were unable to identify or appre
`hend the assailant based on any detailed description or
`other evidence they then had, but they did obtain from the
`victim a sample of the perpetrator’s DNA.
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`In 2009 Alonzo King was arrested in Wicomico County,
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`Maryland, and charged with first- and second-degree
`assault for menacing a group of people with a shotgun. As
`part of a routine booking procedure for serious offenses,
`his DNA sample was taken by applying a cotton swab or
`filter paper—known as a buccal swab—to the inside of his
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`cheeks. The DNA was found to match the DNA taken
`from the Salisbury rape victim. King was tried and con
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`victed for the rape. Additional DNA samples were taken
`from him and used in the rape trial, but there seems to be
`no doubt that it was the DNA from the cheek sample
`taken at the time he was booked in 2009 that led to his
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`first having been linked to the rape and charged with its
`commission.
`The Court of Appeals of Maryland, on review of King’s
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` MARYLAND v. KING
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`Opinion of the Court
`rape conviction, ruled that the DNA taken when King was
`booked for the 2009 charge was an unlawful seizure be
`cause obtaining and using the cheek swab was an unrea
`sonable search of the person. It set the rape conviction
`aside. This Court granted certiorari and now reverses the
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`judgment of the Maryland court.
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`I
`When King was arrested on April 10, 2009, for menac
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`ing a group of people with a shotgun and charged in state
`court with both first- and second-degree assault, he was
`processed for detention in custody at the Wicomico County
`Central Booking facility. Booking personnel used a cheek
`swab to take the DNA sample from him pursuant to provi
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`sions of the Maryland DNA Collection Act (or Act).
`On July 13, 2009, King’s DNA record was uploaded to
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`the Maryland DNA database, and three weeks later, on
`August 4, 2009, his DNA profile was matched to the DNA
`sample collected in the unsolved 2003 rape case. Once the
`DNA was matched to King, detectives presented the foren
`sic evidence to a grand jury, which indicted him for the
`rape. Detectives obtained a search warrant and took a
`second sample of DNA from King, which again matched
`the evidence from the rape. He moved to suppress the
`DNA match on the grounds that Maryland’s DNA collec
`tion law violated the Fourth Amendment. The Circuit
`Court Judge upheld the statute as constitutional. King
`pleaded not guilty to the rape charges but was convicted
`and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of
`parole.
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`In a divided opinion, the Maryland Court of Appeals
`struck down the portions of the Act authorizing collection
`of DNA from felony arrestees as unconstitutional. The
`majority concluded that a DNA swab was an unreasonable
`search in violation of the Fourth Amendment because
`King’s “expectation of privacy is greater than the State’s
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`Opinion of the Court
`purported interest in using King’s DNA to identify him.”
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` 425 Md. 550, 561, 42 A. 3d 549, 556 (2012). In reach-
`ing that conclusion the Maryland Court relied on the deci
`sions of various other courts that have concluded that
`DNA identification of arrestees is impermissible. See, e.g.,
`People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (App. 2011) (offi
`cially depublished); Mario W. v. Kaipio, 228 Ariz. 207,
`265 P. 3d 389 (App. 2011).
`Both federal and state courts have reached differing
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`conclusions as to whether the Fourth Amendment prohib
`its the collection and analysis of a DNA sample from
`persons arrested, but not yet convicted, on felony charges.
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`This Court granted certiorari, 568 U. S. ___ (2012), to
`address the question. King is the respondent here.
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`II
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`The advent of DNA technology is one of the most signifi
`cant scientific advancements of our era. The full potential
`for use of genetic markers in medicine and science is still
`being explored, but the utility of DNA identification in the
`criminal justice system is already undisputed. Since the
`first use of forensic DNA analysis to catch a rapist and
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`murderer in England in 1986, see J. Butler, Fundamentals
`of Forensic DNA Typing 5 (2009) (hereinafter Butler), law
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`enforcement, the defense bar, and the courts have
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`acknowledged DNA testing’s “unparalleled ability both to
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`exonerate the wrongly convicted and to identify the guilty.
`It has the potential to significantly improve both the
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`criminal justice system and police investigative practices.”
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`District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Os-
`borne, 557 U. S. 52, 55 (2009).
`A
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`The current standard for forensic DNA testing relies on
`an analysis of the chromosomes located within the nucleus
`of all human cells. “The DNA material in chromosomes is
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` MARYLAND v. KING
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`Opinion of the Court
` composed of ‘coding’ and ‘noncoding’ regions. The coding
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`regions are known as genes and contain the information
`necessary for a cell to make proteins. . . . Non-protein
`coding regions . . . are not related directly to making pro
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`teins, [and] have been referred to as ‘junk’ DNA.” Butler
`25. The adjective “junk” may mislead the layperson, for
`in fact this is the DNA region used with near certainty to
`identify a person. The term apparently is intended to
`indicate that this particular noncoding region, while use
`ful and even dispositive for purposes like identity, does not
`show more far-reaching and complex characteristics like
`genetic traits.
`Many of the patterns found in DNA are shared among
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`all people, so forensic analysis focuses on “repeated DNA
`sequences scattered throughout the human genome,”
`known as “short tandem repeats” (STRs). Id., at 147–148.
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`The alternative possibilities for the size and frequency of
`these STRs at any given point along a strand of DNA are
`known as “alleles,” id., at 25; and multiple alleles are
`analyzed in order to ensure that a DNA profile matches
`only one individual. Future refinements may improve pres-
`ent technology, but even now STR analysis makes it
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`“possible to determine whether a biological tissue match
` es a suspect with near certainty.” Osborne, supra, at 62.
`
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`The Act authorizes Maryland law enforcement author
`ities to collect DNA samples from “an individual who is
`charged with . . . a crime of violence or an attempt to
`commit a crime of violence; or . . . burglary or an attempt
`to commit burglary.” Md. Pub. Saf. Code Ann. §2–
`504(a)(3)(i) (Lexis 2011). Maryland law defines a crime of
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`violence to include murder, rape, first-degree assault,
`kidnaping, arson, sexual assault, and a variety of other
`serious crimes. Md. Crim. Law Code Ann. §14–101 (Lexis
`2012). Once taken, a DNA sample may not be processed
`or placed in a database before the individual is arraigned
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`(unless the individual consents). Md. Pub. Saf. Code Ann.
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`Opinion of the Court
`§2–504(d)(1) (Lexis 2011). It is at this point that a judicial
`officer ensures that there is probable cause to detain the
`arrestee on a qualifying serious offense. If “all qualifying
`criminal charges are determined to be unsupported by
`probable cause . . . the DNA sample shall be immediately
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`destroyed.” §2–504(d)(2)(i). DNA samples are also de
`stroyed if “a criminal action begun against the individual
`. . . does not result in a conviction,” “the conviction is
`finally reversed or vacated and no new trial is permitted,”
`or “the individual is granted an unconditional pardon.”
`§2–511(a)(1).
`The Act also limits the information added to a DNA
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`database and how it may be used. Specifically, “[o]nly
`DNA records that directly relate to the identification of
`individuals shall be collected and stored.” §2–505(b)(1).
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`No purpose other than identification is permissible: “A
`person may not willfully test a DNA sample for infor
`mation that does not relate to the identification of indi
`viduals as specified in this subtitle.” §2–512(c). Tests for
`familial matches are also prohibited. See §2–506(d) (“A
`person may not perform a search of the statewide DNA
`data base for the purpose of identification of an offender
`in connection with a crime for which the offender may be
`a biological relative of the individual from whom the DNA
`sample was acquired”). The officers involved in taking
`and analyzing respondent’s DNA sample complied with
`the Act in all respects.
`
`Respondent’s DNA was collected in this case using a
`common procedure known as a “buccal swab.” “Buccal cell
`collection involves wiping a small piece of filter paper or a
`cotton swab similar to a Q-tip against the inside cheek of
`an individual’s mouth to collect some skin cells.” Butler
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`86. The procedure is quick and painless. The swab touches
`inside an arrestee’s mouth, but it requires no “surgical
`intrusio[n] beneath the skin,” Winston v. Lee, 470 U. S.
`753, 760 (1985), and it poses no “threa[t] to the health or
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`Opinion of the Court
`safety” of arrestees, id., at 763.
`B
`Respondent’s identification as the rapist resulted in part
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`through the operation of a national project to standardize
`collection and storage of DNA profiles. Authorized by
`Congress and supervised by the Federal Bureau of Inves
`tigation, the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) con
`nects DNA laboratories at the local, state, and national
`level. Since its authorization in 1994, the CODIS system
`has grown to include all 50 States and a number of federal
`agencies. CODIS collects DNA profiles provided by local
`laboratories taken from arrestees, convicted offenders, and
`forensic evidence found at crime scenes. To participate
`in CODIS, a local laboratory must sign a memorandum of
`understanding agreeing to adhere to quality standards
`and submit to audits to evaluate compliance with the
`federal standards for scientifically rigorous DNA testing.
`Butler 270.
`One of the most significant aspects of CODIS is the
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`standardization of the points of comparison in DNA analy
`sis. The CODIS database is based on 13 loci at which
`the STR alleles are noted and compared. These loci make
`possible extreme accuracy in matching individual samples,
`with a “random match probability of approximately 1 in
`100 trillion (assuming unrelated individuals).” Ibid. The
`CODIS loci are from the non-protein coding junk regions
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`of DNA, and “are not known to have any association
`with a genetic disease or any other genetic predisposition.
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`Thus, the information in the database is only useful for
`human identity testing.” Id., at 279. STR information
`is recorded only as a “string of numbers”; and the DNA
`identification is accompanied only by information denoting
`the laboratory and the analyst responsible for the submis
`sion. Id., at 270. In short, CODIS sets uniform national
`standards for DNA matching and then facilitates connec
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`Opinion of the Court
`tions between local law enforcement agencies who can
`share more specific information about matched STR
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`profiles.
`
`All 50 States require the collection of DNA from felony
`convicts, and respondent does not dispute the validity of
`that practice. See Brief for Respondent 48. Twenty-eight
`States and the Federal Government have adopted laws
`similar to the Maryland Act authorizing the collection of
`DNA from some or all arrestees. See Brief for State of
`California et al. as Amici Curiae 4, n. 1 (States Brief)
`(collecting state statutes). Although those statutes vary
`in their particulars, such as what charges require a DNA
`sample, their similarity means that this case implicates
`more than the specific Maryland law. At issue is a stand
`ard, expanding technology already in widespread use
`throughout the Nation.
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`III
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`A
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`Although the DNA swab procedure used here presents a
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`question the Court has not yet addressed, the framework
`for deciding the issue is well established. The Fourth
`Amendment, binding on the States by the Fourteenth
`Amendment, provides that “[t]he right of the people to
`be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
`against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
`violated.” It can be agreed that using a buccal swab on the
`inner tissues of a person’s cheek in order to obtain DNA
`samples is a search. Virtually any “intrusio[n] into the
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`human body,” Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 770
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`(1966), will work an invasion of “‘cherished personal secu
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`rity’ that is subject to constitutional scrutiny,” Cupp v.
`Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 295 (1973) (quoting Terry v. Ohio,
`392 U. S. 1, 24–25 (1968)). The Court has applied the
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`Fourth Amendment to police efforts to draw blood, see
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`Schmerber, supra; Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U. S. ___
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`Opinion of the Court
`(2013), scraping an arrestee’s fingernails to obtain trace
`evidence, see Cupp, supra, and even to “a breathalyzer
`test, which generally requires the production of alveolar
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` or ‘deep lung’ breath for chemical analysis,” Skinner v.
` Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U. S. 602, 616
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`(1989).
`A buccal swab is a far more gentle process than a veni
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`puncture to draw blood. It involves but a light touch on
`the inside of the cheek; and although it can be deemed
`a search within the body of the arrestee, it requires no
`“surgical intrusions beneath the skin.” Winston, 470 U. S.,
`at 760. The fact than an intrusion is negligible is of cen
`tral relevance to determining reasonableness, although it
`is still a search as the law defines that term.
`B
`
`To say that the Fourth Amendment applies here is the
`beginning point, not the end of the analysis. “[T]he Fourth
`Amendment’s proper function is to constrain, not against
`all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are
`not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an
`improper manner.” Schmerber, supra, at 768. “As the text
`of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure
`of the constitutionality of a governmental search is ‘rea
`sonableness.’” Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515
`U. S. 646, 652 (1995). In giving content to the inquiry
`whether an intrusion is reasonable, the Court has pre
`ferred “some quantum of individualized suspicion . . . [as]
`a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure. But
`the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible require
`ment of such suspicion.” United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
`428 U. S. 543, 560–561 (1976) (citation and footnote
`omitted).
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`In some circumstances, such as “[w]hen faced with
`special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of
`privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, the Court has
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`Opinion of the Court
`found that certain general, or individual, circumstances
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`may render a warrantless search or seizure reasonable.”
`Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U. S. 326, 330 (2001). Those
`circumstances diminish the need for a warrant, either
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`because “the public interest is such that neither a warrant
`nor probable cause is required,” Maryland v. Buie, 494
`U. S. 325, 331 (1990), or because an individual is already
`on notice, for instance because of his employment, see
`Skinner, supra, or the conditions of his release from gov
`ernment custody, see Samson v. California, 547 U. S. 843
`(2006), that some reasonable police intrusion on his pri
`vacy is to be expected. The need for a warrant is perhaps
`least when the search involves no discretion that could
`properly be limited by the “interpo[lation of] a neutral
`magistrate between the citizen and the law enforcement
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`officer.” Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U. S. 656,
`667 (1989).
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`The instant case can be addressed with this background.
`The Maryland DNA Collection Act provides that, in order
`to obtain a DNA sample, all arrestees charged with seri
`ous crimes must furnish the sample on a buccal swab
`applied, as noted, to the inside of the cheeks. The arrestee
`is already in valid police custody for a serious offense
`supported by probable cause. The DNA collection is not
`subject to the judgment of officers whose perspective
`might be “colored by their primary involvement in ‘the
`often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’” Terry,
`supra, at 12 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S.
`10, 14 (1948)). As noted by this Court in a different
`but still instructive context involving blood testing, “[b]oth
`the circumstances justifying toxicological testing and the
`permissible limits of such intrusions are defined nar-
`rowly and specifically in the regulations that authorize
`them . . . . Indeed, in light of the standardized nature of
`the tests and the minimal discretion vested in those
`charged with administering the program, there are virtu
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` MARYLAND v. KING
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`Opinion of the Court
`ally no facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate.” Skin-
`ner, supra, at 622. Here, the search effected by the buccal
`swab of respondent falls within the category of cases
`this Court has analyzed by reference to the proposition
`that the “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reason
`ableness, not individualized suspicion.” Samson, supra, at
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`855, n. 4.
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`Even if a warrant is not required, a search is not beyond
`Fourth Amendment scrutiny; for it must be reasonable in
`its scope and manner of execution. Urgent government
`interests are not a license for indiscriminate police behav
`ior. To say that no warrant is required is merely to
`acknowledge that “rather than employing a per se rule of
`unreasonableness, we balance the privacy-related and law
`enforcement-related concerns to determine if the intrusion
`was reasonable.” McArthur, supra, at 331. This applica
`tion of “traditional standards of reasonableness” requires a
`court to weigh “the promotion of legitimate governmen
`tal interests” against “the degree to which [the search]
`intrudes upon an individual’s privacy.” Wyoming v. Hough-
`ton, 526 U. S. 295, 300 (1999). An assessment of reasona
`bleness to determine the lawfulness of requiring this class
`of arrestees to provide a DNA sample is central to the
`instant case.
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`IV
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`A
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`The legitimate government interest served by the Mary
`land DNA Collection Act is one that is well established:
`the need for law enforcement officers in a safe and accu
`rate way to process and identify the persons and posses
`sions they must take into custody. It is beyond dispute
`that “probable cause provides legal justification for arrest
`ing a person suspected of crime, and for a brief period of
`detention to take the administrative steps incident to
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`arrest.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 113–114 (1975).
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`Opinion of the Court
`Also uncontested is the “right on the part of the Govern
`ment, always recognized under English and American law,
`to search the person of the accused when legally arrested.”
`Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 392 (1914), over
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`ruled on other grounds, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643
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`(1961). “The validity of the search of a person incident to
`a lawful arrest has been regarded as settled from its
`first enunciation, and has remained virtually unchallenged.”
`United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 224 (1973).
`Even in that context, the Court has been clear that indi
`vidual suspicion is not necessary, because “[t]he constitu
`tionality of a search incident to an arrest does not depend
`on whether there is any indication that the person ar
`rested possesses weapons or evidence. The fact of a lawful
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`arrest, standing alone, authorizes a search.” Michigan v.
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`DeFillippo, 443 U. S. 31, 35 (1979).
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`The “routine administrative procedure[s] at a police sta
`tion house incident to booking and jailing the suspect”
`derive from different origins and have different constitu
`tional justifications than, say, the search of a place, Illi-
`nois v. Lafayette, 462 U. S. 640, 643 (1983); for the search
`of a place not incident to an arrest depends on the “fair
`probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
`found in a particular place,” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S.
`213, 238 (1983). The interests are further different when
`an individual is formally processed into police custody.
`Then “the law is in the act of subjecting the body of the
`accused to its physical dominion.” People v. Chiagles, 237
`N. Y. 193, 197, 142 N. E. 583, 584 (1923) (Cardozo, J.).
`When probable cause exists to remove an individual from
`the normal channels of society and hold him in legal cus
`tody, DNA identification plays a critical role in serving
`those interests.
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`First, “[i]n every criminal case, it is known and must be
`known who has been arrested and who is being tried.”
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`Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dis