Case 3:23-cv-04597-EMC Document 54 Filed 04/10/24 Page 1 of 29
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`Ashley M. Gjovik, JD
`Pro Se Plaintiff
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`2108 N St. Ste. 4553
`Sacramento, CA, 95816
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`(408) 883-4428
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`legal@ashleygjovik.com
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`Case No. 3:23-CV-04597-EMC
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`PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF
`POINTS & AUTHORITIES,
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`IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S:
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`MOTION TO DISMISS
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`ASHLEY GJOVIK, an individual,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`APPLE INC, a corporation,
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`Defendant.
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`Dept: Courtroom 5, 17th Floor (Virtual)
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`Date: May 16, 2024
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`Time: 1:30 p.m.
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`OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS | 3:23-CV-04597-EMC
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`APRIL 9 2024
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`Case 3:23-cv-04597-EMC Document 54 Filed 04/10/24 Page 2 of 29
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
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`PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
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`CLAIMS ........................................................................................................................................................................ 1
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`II. STATEMENTS OF FACTS .............................................................................................................................. 1
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`III. ISSUES TO BE DECIDED ................................................................................................................................ 2
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`IV. THIS MOTION FAILS TO CONFORM WITH THE FED. R. CIV. P., LOCAL RULES, AND COURT
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`ORDER ......................................................................................................................................................................... 3
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`A. MOTION SHOULD BE DENIED WHERE THERE IS NONCOMPLIANCE WITH FED. R. CIV. P. 12(B)(6) ............. 3
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`B. MOTION SHOULD BE DENIED WHERE DEFENDANT QUOTES AND REFERENCES SUBSTANTIVE FACTS
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`WITHIN MOOTED COMPLAINTS SUPERSEDED BY THE TAC AND MOOTED MOTIONS ............................................. 4
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`V. MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF STATES PLAUSIBLE
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`CLAIMS FOR ALL COUNTS ................................................................................................................................... 6
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`A. PLAINTIFF STATES A PLAUSIBLE CLAIM FOR VIOLATIONS OF CAL. LABOR CODE § 98.6 + 96(K) .............. 6
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`B. PLAINTIFF STATES A PLAUSIBLE CLAIM FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT (“GOOD CAUSE”) AND
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`DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING ............................................................................................................... 8
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`C. PLAINTIFF STATES A PLAUSIBLE CLAIM FOR NUISANCE, NUISANCE PER SE, AND ULTRAHAZARDOUS
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`ACTIVITIES................................................................................................................................................................ 9
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`D. PLAINTIFF STATES A PLAUSIBLE CLAIM FOR SOX AND DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER RETALIATION
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`E. PLAINTIFF STATES A PLAUSIBLE CLAIM FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE BANE AND RALPH CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS
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`13
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`F.
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`PLAINTIFF STATES A PLAUSIBLE CLAIM FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE RICO ACT ......................................... 15
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`1)
`Defendant directly injured Plaintiff by its racketeering Predicate Acts, and Defendant’s investment of
`racketeering profits, in violation of RICO Act 1962(a), 1962(c), and 1962(d). .............................................................. 17
`2)
`Apple is Culpable and Liable for the Racketeering. .............................................................................................. 20
`G. PLAINTIFF STATES A PLAUSIBLE CLAIM FOR IIED AND NIED UNDER CA, NY, & MA ............................ 21
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`H. PLAINTIFF STATES A PLAUSIBLE CLAIM FOR CALIFORNIA UCL ............................................................... 22
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`I.
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`PLAINTIFF STATES A PLAUSIBLE CLAIM FOR VIOLATIONS OF CAL. LABOR CODE § 1102.5
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`(WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION ACT) ................................................................................................................. 22
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`VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................................. 24
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`OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS | 3:23-CV-04597-EMC
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`Case 3:23-cv-04597-EMC Document 54 Filed 04/10/24 Page 3 of 29
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`CASES
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`Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal.3d 493, 498-99 (Cal. 1970). ---------------------------------------------- 21
`Alonso v. Hills (1950) 95 C.A.2d 778, 214 P.2d 50 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 11
`Auster Oil Gas, Inc. v. Stream, 764 F.2d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 1985); --------------------------------------------------- 6
`AVCO Corp. v. Precision Air Parts, Inc. (11th Cir. 1982) 676 F2d 494, 495 ---------------------------------------- 9
`Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 759 (N.D. Cal. 2013) analyzing Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47
`Cal.3d 654, 681-82 (Cal. 1988). ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8
`Banko v. Apple, Inc., No. 13-02977 RS, 12 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2013) ----------------------------------------------- 8
`Banko v. Apple, Inc., No. 13-02977 RS, 12 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2013). ---------------------------------------------- 9
`Banko v. Apple, Inc., No. 13-02977 RS, 9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2013). ------------------------------------------------ 8
`Beery v. Hitachi Home Electronics America, Inc., 157 FRD 477, 480; U.S. (CD CA 1993) ---------------------- 3
`Bell v. Clair, Case No. 1:13-cv-01594-SKO (PC), 4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2015) -------------------------------------- 4
`Boxall v. Sequoia Union High Sch. Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 1979), ---------------------------- 15
`Brady v. Dairy Fresh Products Co., 974 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 1992) ------------------------------------------ 19
`Brady v. Dairy Fresh Products Co., 974 F.2d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 1992). ----------------------------------------- 20
`Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 276 (Utah 1982). ------------------------------------------------- 9
`Calamco v. J.R. Simplot Co., 2:21-cv-01201-KJM-KJN, 12 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 27, 2023). --------------------------- 5
`Caribbean Broadcasting System, Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1998). ----- 13
`Craftmatic Securities Litigation v. Kraftsow, 890 F.2d 628, 645 (3d Cir. 1989).------------------------------------ 3
`Dias v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 919 F.2d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir. 1990). -------------------------------------------------------- 22
`Di-Az v. Tesla, Inc., Case No. 3:17-cv-06748-WHO, 24-25 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2019). -------------------------- 14
`Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 778 (2018).----------------------------------------------------- 12
`Doe v. Apple Inc., 3:22-CV-2575-NJR, 10 (S.D. Ill. May. 8, 2023). ------------------------------------------------- 22
`dotStrategy Co. v. Facebook Inc., No. C 20-00170 WHA, 8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2020). -------------------------- 5
`E.E.O.C. v. Alia Corp., 842 F.Supp.2d 1243, 1250 (ED CA 2012). --------------------------------------------------- 3
`Erhart v. BofI Holding, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1108 (S.D. Cal. 2020). ---------------------------------------- 22
`esai v. Deutche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 936 n.5 (9th Cir. 2009). ---------------------------------------------- 4
`Espinosa v. Roswell Tower, Inc., 121 N.M. 306, 310 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995)----------------------------------------- 9
`Garvey v. Admin. Review Bd., 56 F.4th 110, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2022) --------------------------------------------------- 12
`Gilligan v. Jamco Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997), quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
`U.S. 232, 236, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). -------------------------------------------------------- 6
`Grimmett v. Brown, 75 F.3d 506, 510 (9th Cir. 1996). ----------------------------------------------------------------- 17
`Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 1986) -------------------------------------------------- 6
`Industries v. Safety Light Corp., 123 N.J. 371, 394 (N.J. 1991) ------------------------------------------------------ 11
`Jane Doe I v. Reddy, No. C 02-05570 WHA, 2003 WL 23893010, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2003) ---------- 19
`Knapps v. City of Oakland, 647 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1168 (N.D. Cal. 2009), amended in part (Sept. 8, 2009). - 14
`Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 442 (2014). ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 12
`Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc., 12 Cal.5th 703, 718 (Cal. 2022). ------------------------------------ 23
`Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). ------------------------------------------------------------------ 25
`M.F. v. Pac. Pearl Hotel Mgmt. LLC, 16 Cal.App.5th 693, 700 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). ---------------------------- 22
`McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F3d 1259, 1270 (9th Cir. 2004) ---------------------------------------------------- 15
`McGowan v. Weinstein, 505 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1012 (C.D. Cal. 2020). --------------------------------------------- 16
`McGowan v. Weinstein, 505 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1016 (C.D. Cal. 2020) quoting Clark Equip. Co. v. Wheat , 92
`Cal. App. 3d 503, 521, 154 Cal.Rptr. 874 (1979). ------------------------------------------------------------------- 16
`McKenna v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co. (1930) 104 C.A. 538, 540, 286 P. 445. (TAC starting at ¶ 22). -------------- 11
`Nodine v. Textron, Inc., 819 F.2d 347, 349 n.3 (1st Cir. 1987). ------------------------------------------------------- 18
`Northeastern Women’s Ctr. Inc v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1357 (3d Cir. 1989) ----------------------------- 17
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`OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS | 3:23-CV-04597-EMC
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`APRIL 9 2024
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`Case 3:23-cv-04597-EMC Document 54 Filed 04/10/24 Page 4 of 29
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`Parada v City of Colton, 24 CA4th 356 (1994), ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 24
`Petro-Tech v. Western Co. of North America, 824 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1987). -------------------------------------- 20
`Potter v. Firestone Tire &, 6 Cal.4th 965, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993).---------------------- 10
`Procter Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 565 (5th Cir. 2001) ------------------------------------------- 19
`Ramirez v. County of Los Angeles (C.D. Cal. 2005) 397 F. Supp. 2d 1208. ---------------------------------------- 14
`Sedima SPRL v Imrex Co, 473 U.S. 479, 496-96 (1985). -------------------------------------------------------------- 17
`Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 947, 959 [137 Cal.Rptr.3d 839] --------------------- 14
`Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States (9th Cir. 1995) 68 F3d 1204, 1206 ------------------------------------------ 9
`Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167 (1980). ------------------------------------------------------------- 24
`United States v eBay, District of Mass., 24-CR-____, pg2, Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Jan. 11 2024). 21
`United States v. Gambino, 838 F. Supp. 744, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) -------------------------------------------------- 16
`United States v. Raniere, 384 F. Supp. 3d 282, 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) ----------------------------------------------- 20
`United States v. Raniere, 384 F. Supp. 3d 282, 325-26 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). ------------------------------------------- 16
`United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1011 (2d Cir. 1990) ---------------------------------------------------------- 16
`Updike v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 538, 543 (W.D. La. 1992). ----------------------------------------- 10
`Wadler v Bio-Rad Labratories, 916 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2019). ------------------------------------------------------ 13
`Wadler v. Bio-Rad Labs, 141 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2015) citing Banko v Apple, 20 F.Supp.3d
`749, 759–60. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 24
`Wadler v. Bio-Rad Labs., Inc., 141 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1008-9 (N.D. Cal. 2015). ---------------------------------- 12
`Williams v. County of Alameda, 26 F. Supp. 3d 925, 947 (N.D. Cal. 2014). ----------------------------------------- 5
`Xanthopoulos v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 991 F.3d 823, 830 (7th Cir. 2021). -------------------------------------------- 2
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`STATUTES
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`18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1). --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12
`Cal. Labor Code § 96(k). ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6
`Cal. Labor Code § 98.6 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 6
`Cal. Labor Code §§ 98.6 and 96(k),---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7
`Cal. Labor Code 1102.5(a) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 23
`Cal. Labor Code Section 1102.5 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 22
`Cal. Labor Codes §§ 1102.5 and § 232.5 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7
`CERCLA --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 23
`OSHA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 23
`Sedima, 473 U.S. at 493, 105 S.Ct. at 3283 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 20
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`RULES
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1, 2, 3
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
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`California Constitution------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7
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`CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
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`OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS | 3:23-CV-04597-EMC
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`APRIL 9 2024
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`Case 3:23-cv-04597-EMC Document 54 Filed 04/10/24 Page 5 of 29
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`I.
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`PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S
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`MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIMS
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`1.
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`Plaintiff Ashley Gjovik respectfully submits the following Memorandum of
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`Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss some of the clams in her
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`Third Amended Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Defendant’s Motion to Strike should
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`be denied for a variety of reasons including due to Defendant’s failure to provide rational
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`justifications for its positions, unsound legal ground for many of its arguments, Defendant’s
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`attempt to “strike” and remove facts integral to this matter in both the Motion to Dismiss and
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`Motion to Strike, and Defendant’s substantive references to prior mooted pleadings in violation
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`of Local Rules 10-1 and this Court’s Order. [Docket No 50].
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`2.
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`Plaintiff responds to most of Defendant’s substantive arguments in this
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`Opposition brief, however, Plaintiff will not engage with Defendant’s proffered substantive
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`arguments based on mooted prior pleadings, as to not violate this Court’s rules. Plaintiff will
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`also not be responding to Defendant’s various attacks on her character and competence. Plaintiff
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`generally denies Defendant’s factual allegations in their Motion as it is compromised with
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`inappropriate commentary and editorialization.
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`II.
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`STATEMENTS OF FACTS
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`3.
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`This is a complex regulatory-compliance-avoidance scheme conducted by Apple
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`Inc through a criminal enterprise, which prior-Apple-employee Ashley Gjovik became caught up
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`in after she complained about toxic waste exposure at her Apple office, and then she reported
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`Apple to federal agencies and law enforcement, and Apple decided to physically remove her from
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`the scene of their apparent environmental crimes in order to prevent Gjovik from gathering of
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`evidence, and then Gjovik was terminated the day before a federal affidavit about Apple’s
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`unlawful acts, shortly after complaining about “witness intimidation” from a “Workplace
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`Violence” interrogator. Gjovik realized it was all an effort to cover up intentional regulatory
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`OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS | 3:23-CV-04597-EMC
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`APRIL 9 2024
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`Case 3:23-cv-04597-EMC Document 54 Filed 04/10/24 Page 6 of 29
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`violations under at least three federal environmental statutes, which also implicated racketeering
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`and securities fraud concerns, and to cover up over five years of Apple’s poisoning of a large
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`community by lawlessly releasing metric tons of solvent vapors and lethal gases into thousands of
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`home windows and making some of the residents severely ill, including Gjovik. Gjovik’s
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`termination was then followed with over two years of deranged intimidation and threats to coerce
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`Gjovik to drop her charges. Gjovik has not dropped her charges.
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`4.
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`A Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act case is
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`appropriate and required here because Apple’s threats and retaliation against Gjovik, and
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`conspiracy to conceal its corrupt and unlawful acts, violated federal criminal statutes for which
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`there is no other appropriate private civil action. Apple’s retaliation against Gjovik was partially
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`due to Gjovik reporting Apple to the FBI, U.S. Department of Justice, and Santa Clara County
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`District Attorney’s office for multiple apparent criminal acts, and Gjovik’s public accusations
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`that Apple is actively violating the RICO Act – all of which Apple knew prior to Apple’s abrupt
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`termination of Gjovik by an Apple Global Security team/Worldwide Loyalty enterprise
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`“Workplace Violence” investigator and without explanation. This is quite literally a “RICO Act
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`Whistleblower” case.
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`5.
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`Gjovik generally denies Apple’s allegations and statements/restatements of fact in
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`their Motion to Dismiss, including Apple’s description of events, but also Apple’s summary and
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`description of Gjovik’s allegations against Apple. A summary of the procedural history of this
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`civil case can be found in the concurrently filed Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Strike.
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`III.
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`ISSUES TO BE DECIDED
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`6.
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`Apple filed three motions and asks to dismiss claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),
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`to strike claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), and to reinterpret the complaint with a request for
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`judicial notice. Plaintiff will respond to all of these motions concurrent with Oppositions.
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`OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS | 3:23-CV-04597-EMC
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`APRIL 9 2024
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`Case 3:23-cv-04597-EMC Document 54 Filed 04/10/24 Page 7 of 29
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`7.
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`The Court will need to decide it if it will grant any of the motions, and if so, which
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`requests. Apple made literally hundreds of requests.
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`IV. THIS MOTION FAILS TO CONFORM WITH THE FED. R. CIV. P., LOCAL
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`RULES, AND COURT ORDER
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`A. MOTION SHOULD BE DENIED WHERE THERE IS NONCOMPLIANCE WITH FED. R.
`CIV. P. 12(B)(6)
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`8.
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`A Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion may argue that there is no legal theory based on
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`settled rules (frivolous); that a complaint uses questionable legal ground to establish claim; it
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`provides no factual allegation for an essential element of legal theory; or it provides conclusory or
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`improbable allegations. The motion is not supposed argue new facts; dispute existing facts; deny
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`well pled statute of limitations tolling theories or vicarious liability theories; or incite evidentiary
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`inquiries prior to discovery.
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`9.
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`A Rule 12(b)(6) motion cannot be used to challenge just certain allegations within
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`a claim while the underlying claim is not itself challenged – and if the detail sought by a motion
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`for more definite statement is obtainable through discovery, the motion should be denied. Beery
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`v. Hitachi Home Electronics America, Inc., 157 FRD 477, 480; U.S. (CD CA 1993); E.E.O.C. v.
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`Alia Corp., 842 F.Supp.2d 1243, 1250 (ED CA 2012).
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`10.
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`This is especially true in cases about civil rights and corporate fraud. In these types
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`of white-collar cases, as “plaintiffs cannot be expected to have personal knowledge of the details
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`of corporate internal affairs” and “rigid enforcement in such circumstances could permit
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`‘sophisticated defrauders’ to avoid liability.” Craftmatic Securities Litigation v. Kraftsow, 890
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`F.2d 628, 645 (3d Cir. 1989).
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`OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS | 3:23-CV-04597-EMC
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`APRIL 9 2024
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`Case 3:23-cv-04597-EMC Document 54 Filed 04/10/24 Page 8 of 29
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`B. MOTION SHOULD BE DENIED WHERE DEFENDANT QUOTES AND REFERENCES
`SUBSTANTIVE FACTS WITHIN MOOTED COMPLAINTS SUPERSEDED BY THE TAC
`AND MOOTED MOTIONS
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`11.
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`In Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Defendant repeatedly cites, references, quotes,
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`and argue matters contained within mooted pleadings. Defendant directly references facts and
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`allegations the mooted Second Amended Complaint at least twenty times. (Def. Mot. to Dismiss
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`at pages 3, 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 14, 16, 18, 19, 24). Defendant also directly refences the First Amended
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`Complaint (Def. Mot. to Dismiss at page 24) and even directly references the original complaint
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`(Def. Mot. to Dismiss at page 8). Defendants also cite Def’s RJN Exhibit A (a previously mooted
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`exhibit) in the pending motion at least four times (Def. Mot. to Dismiss at pages 3, 10, 11, 13).
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`12.
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`In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendant repeatedly quotes Bell v. Clair, in order to
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`justify its excessive citations to mooted pleadings, and Defendant even warns that Plaintiff that
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`she “may not plead around the deficiencies in [her] claims by omitting previously pled facts” in
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`her prior complaints. Defendant improperly cites Bell v. Clair, which refenced an amended
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`complaint following a prior complaint that was decided on the merits and dismissed for failure to
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`state a claim with leave to amend. Bell v. Clair, Case No. 1:13-cv-01594-SKO (PC), 4 (E.D. Cal.
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`Apr. 8, 2015). There has been no decision on the merits in this case and thus Bell v. Clair is an
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`incorrect interpretation of the law.
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`13.
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`“Once a complaint is amended, it supersedes the former complaint, rendering it of
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`"no legal effect." Williams v. County of Alameda, 26 F.Supp.3d 925, 936 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10,
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`2014). After plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original complaint became "non-existent."
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`Desai v. Deutche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 936 n.5 (9th Cir. 2009).1 “It is hornbook law that
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`an amended pleading supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.
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`1 See, Civil L.R. 10-1 “Amended Pleadings” – (“Any party filing or moving to file an amended
`pleading must reproduce the entire proposed pleading and may not incorporate any part of a
`prior pleading by reference.)
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`OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS | 3:23-CV-04597-EMC
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`Case 3:23-cv-04597-EMC Document 54 Filed 04/10/24 Page 9 of 29
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`Once amended, the original no longer performs any function as a pleading." Bullen v. De
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`Bretteville, 239 F.2d 824, 833 (9th Cir. 1956).2 “It is well-established that an amended pleading
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`supersedes the original pleading and renders it of no legal effect.” Williams v. County of Alameda,
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`26 F. Supp. 3d 925, 936 (N.D. Cal. 2014).”
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`14.
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`Defendant’s actions put Plaintiff in a difficult situation, as to get her “day in court,”
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`she is expected to object and correct statements made by the opposing party if she does not think
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`they are accurate – yet if she were to do so where Defendant references and quotes its allegations
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`on mooted pleadings, then Plaintiff joins Defendant in conduct this District has described as
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`“wholly improper.” Williams v. County of Alameda, 26 F. Supp. 3d 925, 947 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
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`Instruction the Court “refuses” to allow parties to “engage in such conduct.” Id. In Williams v.
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`County of Alameda, the court refused to “consider the arguments that [the party] improperly seeks
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`to incorporate by reference.” Id. Plaintiff asks this court for similar discretion in response to
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`Defendant’s conduct, as Plaintiff does not plan to respond to those arguments.
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`15.
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`Defendant engages in other odd conduct in Def. Mot. to Dismiss, including making
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`substantive arguments in footnotes (e.g., fn 5 arguing vicarious liability theories and fn 8 arguing
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`statute of limitations tolling theories) and suggesting piecemeal dismissals of partial claims, which
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`is disfavored. “Federal courts have often declined invitations to consider claims or allegations
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`piecemeal, ” Calamco v. J.R. Simplot Co., 2:21-cv-01201-KJM-KJN, 12 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 27, 2023).
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`If an opposing litigant may divide up or reorganize the pleader's claims and conquer the divided
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`claims one by one, it could eviscerate the pleader's right to organize its pleading. Id. at 13.
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`16.
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`There’s the old saying, “If you have the facts on your side, pound the facts; if you
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`2 See also, e.g., Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546
`(9th Cir. 1989) (same), see also, Doe v. Unocal Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1180 (C.D. Cal.
`1998) (same); dotStrategy Co. v. Facebook Inc., No. C 20-00170 WHA, 8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 11,
`2020); Indep. Towers of Wash.,350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir.2003).
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`OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS | 3:23-CV-04597-EMC
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`Case 3:23-cv-04597-EMC Document 54 Filed 04/10/24 Page 10 of 29
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`have the law on your side, pound the law; if you have neither the facts nor the law, pound the
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`table." Apple’s response with these three motions seems to be Apple pounding on the table.
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`V. MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF STATES
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`PLAUSIBLE CLAIMS FOR ALL COUNTS
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`17.
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`The Rule 8 standard contains "a powerful presumption against rejecting pleadings
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`for failure to state a claim." Auster Oil Gas, Inc. v. Stream, 764 F.2d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 1985);
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`see also Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 1986) ("It is axiomatic that
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`'[t]he motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is viewed with disfavor and is rarely
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`granted.'")
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`18.
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`“The Supreme Court has explained that "it may appear on the face of the
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`pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.” Gilligan v. Jamco
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`Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997), quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
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`232, 236, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974).
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`A.
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`PLAINTIFF STATES A PLAUSIBLE CLAIM FOR VIOLATIONS OF CAL. LABOR CODE
`§ 98.6 + 96(K)
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`19.
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`Apple said it only want to dismiss a subpart of Plaintiff’s Cal. Labor Code § 98.6
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`claim: retaliation under Cal. Labor Code § 96(k). Apple appears to proffer a legal theory for its
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`request to dismiss that this statute only applies to private employees related to “conduct” but not
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`“speech,” because, Apple says, there are no U.S. Constitution First Amendment rights for private
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`workers. [Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 22]. Defendant then cites cases about the federal First
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`Amendment not applying to private companies. Id. But Plaintiff never invoked the First
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`Amendment in her claim.
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`20.
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`Plaintiff claimed that under 96(k), conduct occurring during nonworking hours
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`away from the employer's premises is protected and cannot be the basis of a termination, when
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`that conduct involved the exercise of a right protected by the Labor Code or Constitution. Apple
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`OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS | 3:23-CV-04597-EMC
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`APRIL 9 2024
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`Case 3:23-cv-04597-EMC Document 54 Filed 04/10/24 Page 11 of 29
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`argues the federal Constitution, but as this is state labor code, the California Constitution is surely
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`just as applicable, if not more.
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`21.
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`The conduct Plaintiff argues she engaged in, and was protected under 96(k), and
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`she faced retaliation for engaging in was speaking about “work conditions and the terms and
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`conditions of her employment (including pay, complaints of discrimination and harassment,
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`complaints about workplace safety, complaints about retaliation, complaints about employer
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`surveillance and unlawful invasions of employee privacy, complaints about criminal conduct by
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`Apple executives, encouraging employees or organize and report illegal conduct to the
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`government, and about her reports to the government about Apple).” (TAC at ¶ 215-216.)
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`22.
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`The California Constitution provides self-executing protections for certain rights
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`that do apply to private employers – such as California’s constitutional right to privacy (Article 1,
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`Section 1) and California’s “free speech” clause (Article 1, Section 2). Further, the California
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`Labor Code is integrated with the California Constitution under Article XIV Section 1-3, and
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`several statutes protect employees from retaliation for speaking about pay and work conditions..
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`Plaintiff also invoked her right to safety (Article 1, Section 1), right to be free of discrimination
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`(Article 1 Section 8 and 31), to be free from water pollution (Article X Section 2), and protections
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`for victims of crime (Article 1, Section 28 – aka “Marsy’s Rights”).
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`23.
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`Defendant writes in their Motion, “Plaintiff’s offer letter states that her
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`employment with Apple was at will, and that Apple could terminate her employment ‘at any time
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`and for any or no reason.’” (Def’s Mot. to Dismiss at 23). This is not only an unsound legal
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`interpretation of Cal. Labor Code §§ 98.6 and 96(k), but the statement itself is likely a potential
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`violation of Cal. Labor Codes §§ 1102.5 and § 232.5, as well as, of course, the National Labor
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`Relations Act.
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`24.
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` Further, Apple of course cannot terminate its employees “for any reason,” under
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`OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS | 3:23-CV-04597-EMC
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`APRIL 9 2024
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`Case 3:23-cv-04597-EMC Document 54 Filed 04/10/24 Page 12 of 29
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`those laws – and also laws like whistleblower protection and witness intimidation statutes – but
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`that, of course, is why we’re here. In fact, Apple was in this very courthouse a decade ago trying
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`to argue a similar position as they take now, but Judge Seeborg tried to help Apple understand
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`that, actually, there is a “fundamental public interest in a workplace free from crime,” and in fact,
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`Apple cannot lawfully terminate employees in retaliation for reporting crimes. Banko v. Apple,
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`Inc., No. 13-02977 RS, 9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2013). (TAC fn 59).
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`B.
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`PLAINTIFF STATES A PLAUSIBLE CLAIM FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT
`(“GOOD CAUSE”) AND DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
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`25.
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`Plaintiff argued in her pleadings that she was no longer an at-will employees at
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`Apple. (TAC ¶ 234-237). Her TAC analyzes the Foley factors and applied them to her employment
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`at the company. Apple’s response does not say anything about the Foley factors and the tests
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`implied contract employment under California law. (Def’s Mot. to Dismiss at 23.) This is the
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`section where Apple made the comment above about being able to fire employees for any reason
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`they