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United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

October 16, 2023

Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court

RUSSELL G. GREER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

No. 21-4128

JOSHUA MOON, an individual;
KIWI FARMS, a website,

Defendants-Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Utah
Case No. 2:20-CV-00647-TC

Andrew Grimm of The Digital Justice Foundation, Omaha, Nebraska, for Appellant.

Gregory Skordas of Skordas & Caston, LLC, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Appellees.

Before **BACHARACH, MORITZ, and ROSSMAN**, Circuit Judges.

ROSSMAN, Circuit Judge.

When he discovered his copyrighted book and song online, Plaintiff Russell Greer sent a “takedown notice” to Defendants Joshua Moon and his

website Kiwi Farms, requesting the material be removed from the Kiwi Farms site. *See* 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (codifying notice-and-takedown process). When Mr. Moon refused to remove the infringing material from Kiwi Farms, Mr. Greer sued the Defendants for copyright infringement. The district court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding Mr. Greer failed to state a claim. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we disagree, and reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I

A

To “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” the Constitution empowers Congress to “secur[e] for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Since 1790, Congress has effected this goal by legislating to grant copyright holders a bundle of rights, including the use and distribution of their copyrighted materials. *See, e.g.*, Copyright Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-15, 1 Stat. 124.

Nearly fifty years ago, to address “significant changes in technology affect[ing] the operation of the copyright law,” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 47, Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 *et seq.*). The Copyright Act of 1976 provides “[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner”

shall be “an infringer” 17 U.S.C. § 501(a); *see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.*, 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984) (“Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner, that is, anyone who trespasses into his exclusive domain by using or authorizing the use of the copyrighted work . . . is an infringer of the copyright.”) (internal quotation marks, citations omitted). Under the same Act, those “exclusive rights” include the rights “to reproduce the copyrighted work,” “to distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the public,” “to display the copyrighted work publicly,” and “to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3)–(6).

While the Copyright Act itself does not “expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by another,” *Sony Corp.*, 464 U.S. at 434,¹ federal courts have long recognized and applied theories of secondary liability, *see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.*, 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005) (explaining “doctrines of secondary liability emerged from common law principles and are well established in the law”). In applying secondary liability to copyright infringement, the Supreme Court explained the imposition of liability on those who have not themselves directly

¹ *But see* H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976) (“Use of the phrase ‘to authorize’ is intended to avoid any questions as to the liability of contributory infringers.”).

infringed “is grounded on the recognition that adequate protection of a [copyright] monopoly may require the courts to look beyond actual duplication . . . to the products or activities that make such duplication possible.” *Sony Corp.*, 464 U.S. at 442.²

There are several flavors of secondary liability for copyright infringement.³

Vicarious liability attaches when the secondary infringer has “an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials” and “the right and ability to supervise” the direct infringer. *Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co.*, 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963); *see also Diversey v. Schmidly*, 738 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2013) (drawing this test from the Second Circuit’s opinion in *Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc.*, 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)). Vicarious liability has no knowledge requirement, based as it is on the

² In *Sony Corp.* itself, however, the Court rejected a claim of secondary liability directed towards Sony’s distribution of videocassette recorders. Sony had neither advertised nor intended the VCR for infringement purposes. And since the VCR was capable of “commercially significant noninfringing uses,” the Court declined to attach liability based on the product’s capacity to be misused for infringement. 464 U.S. at 439, 442.

³ Mr. Greer proceeded under a *contributory infringement* theory of liability, *see* RI.85 (“[Mr. Greer] isn’t claiming vicarious infringement, which is a completely separate issue from contributory infringement.”), but we discuss all three forms of secondary copyright infringement to emphasize certain elemental distinctions.

common law doctrine of *respondeat superior*. *Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.*, 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996).

Under the *inducement rule*, the Supreme Court has held “one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.” *Grokster*, 545 U.S. at 936–37. Inducement requires a showing of “affirmative intent,” such as “active steps . . . taken to encourage direct infringement” or “advertising an infringing use.” *Id.* at 936 (quoting *Oak Indus., Inc. v. Zenith Elec. Corp.*, 697 F. Supp. 988, 992 (N.D. Ill. 1988)); see also *id.* at 937 (“The inducement rule . . . premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct . . .”).

Mr. Greer proceeds under a third theory, *contributory liability* (or *contributory infringement*). Applying this theory in *Diversey*, we explained “contributory liability attaches when the defendant causes or materially contributes to another’s infringing activities and knows of the infringement.” 738 F.3d at 1204 (citation omitted); see also *Grokster*, 545 U.S. at 930 (“One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing^[4] or

⁴ “Although the traditional test for contributory infringement refers to *inducement*, inducement liability under the test articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in *MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster* should be considered as

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